Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

186. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, June 24, 1960, 7 p.m.

6081. Re Deptel 5366.¹ We are convinced de Gaulle has not changed in any substantial way views set forth in September 1958 memo to President Eisenhower and to Macmillan, specifically his desire that US, UK and France take joint decisions on political questions affecting world security and establish, and if necessary put into effect, strategic plans of action, notably with regard employment nuclear weapons on world-wide basis. de Gaulle, not receiving satisfaction from US and UK on directorate, concentrated on strengthening French position in Western Europe by developing closer ties with Germany and pushing forward on Common Market, and on developing independent French nuclear capacity. He saw these programs as contributing to but not substituting for his desire for tripartitism and for equal treatment with UK on the part of US.

In meantime we believe de Gaulle regards any tripartite activities as step in right direction but this in no way influences him to lower his sights. It probable he felt his insistence on tripartitism largely vindicated at recent Summit meeting Paris. He certainly would have been justified in considering that the high-level conversations referred to last paragraph reftel marked major step in advance for realization his demands. Evidence of this is found in his veiled reference (Embtel 5606)² to tripartitism in his May 31 speech and in Couve’s as well as Debre’s insistence on tripartitism in remarks to National Assembly on June 14 and 15.³

We make these introductory remarks as background to following responses to specific questions in reftel.

1. We are in agreement with USRO (Polto 2496)⁴ that we continue reporting frankly and openly to NAC on tripartite meetings. We also believe we should not be apologetic but should make it clear we consider it normal diplomatic practice for various groups of countries such as US, UK and France to discuss periodically matters of mutual interest, but that we have no intention in such discussions of reaching decisions which would affect other NATO countries without fully consulting them and NAC.

2. Although chairman of tripartite meeting referred to Embtel 5737⁵ and British colleague expressed interest in further meeting, US representatives had impression it was more in response their belief US wished such talks than as reflection their own anxiety for them be continued in near future.

3. We believe de Gaulle and other French leaders have been reasonably pleased by developments of past six months regarding tripartitism, both as to actual tripartite talks which have been held and as to greater US-UK willingness accept such talks. This does not mean, however, that de Gaulle feels he has achieved his objectives. In particular we certain he desires even more explicit signs that he can use regarding France’s role as one of Western Big Three. In addition he probably does not regard talks which have occurred thus far as having been as broad and fundamental in political field as he would like. Undoubtedly he envisages tripartite talks as not mere exchanges of information and opinions, but as occasions for bringing about joint policy formation. Finally, he has received no satisfaction with regard strategic planning, an area which he has stressed as important in regard to tripartitism.

4. Perhaps Couve exaggerated his remarks to Le Monde correspondent for obvious strategic purposes.

5. If it impossible satisfy French in such fields as strategic military planning or in nuclear cooperation, it seems clear we cannot give full satisfaction to de Gaulle on tripartitism. Nevertheless we are convinced it worthwhile continue and further develop tripartite consultation on political matters and, to extent conditions and our policies permit, to be forthcoming on strategic planning and nuclear cooperation. (We question Dept’s parenthetical comment in numbered para 5 that in these fields French desire proceed bilaterally. It our impression de Gaulle still wishes pursue strategic military planning on global basis tripartitely.)

6. See comments in numbered para 1 above. While we believe publicity on tripartite meetings should be kept to minimum, we continue believe we should be frank as possible in NAC.

7. Our conclusion is that we should continue tripartite effort (taking advantage of occasions such as UNGA meeting, etc.). We should make clear our intention continue consult fully in NAC and attempt persuade French make their cooperation in NATO more whole-hearted. We recognize that, as pointed out in London’s 6118 to Dept,⁶ we are up against problem trying carry water on both shoulders; however, we do not have black and white alternatives. There appears be an assumption in some quarters that by avoiding tripartitism we preserve the Alliance. We are not certain of this. We are firmly committed to NATO and must continue loyally to support and develop it; but at same time we convinced that attempting to soft-pedal tripartitism, particularly after basic understandings discussed at highest level in Paris tripartitely May 18, would do serious damage to French-American relations and in long run would be harmful to NATO.

Houghton

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/6–2460. Secret; Niact. Also sent to Ottawa and repeated to London, Bonn, and Rome.
1. Document 183.
2. Telegram 5606 from Paris, May 31, summarized de Gaulle’s May 31 speech in which he outlined the principles of French foreign policy following the failure of the Summit Conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.00/5–3160)
3. Not further identified.
4. Dated June 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/6–1960)
5. See footnote 3, Document 183. Jean Sauvagnargues, French Ambassador to Ethiopia, was the chairman.
6. Dated June 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/6–2060)