Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

184. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

June 20, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Tripartitism

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Foy D. Kohler, EUR
• The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Mr. Kohler filled in the British Minister on the de Gaulle letter to the President of June 10 which was primarily a transmittal vehicle for a copy of de Gaulle’s letter to Macmillan on the subject of tripartitism.¹ Mr. Kohler informed Lord Hood that the President had sent an interim response² and also had authorized us to consult with the British before proceeding further in this field. Lord Hood said he would inform the Foreign Office of this discussion. With regard to the passage in de Gaulle’s letter to Macmillan regarding the use of the Standing Group members in military discussions, Lord Hood remarked that, of course, these were the most obvious people to undertake tripartite military talks so far as the British and French Embassies were concerned, since they were the senior military officers stationed here. He realized, however, that this was not true as respects the U.S., since in Washington we obviously had officers more suitable than the U.S. representative on the Standing Group. Mr. Kohler said we had not entirely thought through how tripartitism might evolve on the military side. Lord Hood admitted that it was obscure what the French had in mind.

[3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Kohler added, the French will continue to insist on tripartitism and probably will make public such discussions as take place. He noted that Couve had given a recent interview to the correspondent in Washington of Le Monde in which he indicated that the French were still dissatisfied with the progress of tripartitism. He wondered whether it was possible to satisfy the French without a real explosion in NATO. He said our present tendency was to re-think this whole problem and perhaps soft-pedal tripartitism for the moment. Lord Hood said that we were of course ready to talk with the French at any time but he admitted he did not think we had made much progress so far in satisfying the French.

Mr. Kohler said that frankly we were puzzled as to how to proceed on our French problem. In the meantime the French were not solving the basic problem in NATO which was in fact their own non-cooperation in this body. He said we were also stymied with regard to nuclear cooperation with the French and it was quite clear that they wished precisely the same status as the British with regard to being furnished with information, etc. He said that the Spaak concept of selling Polaris missiles to the French would obviously not satisfy them. He concluded that they seem to have an “all or nothing” attitude. He said that French policy on the sixes and sevens problem was also a factor. Lord Hood said that he thought one of de Gaulle’s basic ideas was to create a Europe from Brest to the Urals without the British. He said he would attempt to get as soon as possible London’s attitude on the problem of tripartitism and what the next steps in this field might be.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WA/6–2060. Secret. Drafted by McBride and initialed by Kohler.
1. Document 182 and its enclosure.
2. See footnote 5, Document 182.