Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

131. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/26

Paris, September 2, 1959, 4 p.m.

PRESIDENT’S TRIP TO EUROPE

August-September 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Houghton
  • Mr. Gates
  • Mr. Merchant
  • General Goodpaster
  • Major Eisenhower
  • Colonel Walters (interpreter)
  • Mr. McBride
• France
  • President de Gaulle
  • Prime Minister Debré
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • M. de Carbonnel
  • M. de Courcel
  • M. Lebel (interpreter)
  • M. Boegner

SUBJECT

• Algeria; Tripartite Consultations; NATO and Problems of Nuclear Warfare; Berlin, Khrushchev Visit and Summit Meeting

After welcoming the President, President de Gaulle said he would very much appreciate the President’s views on problems of current interest. After expressing his own gratification at being here, the President said there were three main topics of concern. First, there was Algeria in general and the specific problem of what tactics and procedure to follow in the UN debate. Second, there was the need to make sure that we were together on the Berlin question; while third, there was the general question of NATO affairs and what role we believed it should play in our common defense and security mission. He noted he had talked about these matters with General de Gaulle this morning but would be happy to continue discussing them more in detail this afternoon. De Gaulle said he would like to have the President’s views on all of these subjects.

The President discussed Algeria first, saying that he very much hoped, if the French developed their program as de Gaulle had expounded it during the morning meeting, it would make the United States position easier. We of course wanted to support our French friends and he hoped the French were taking a course which would make this possible. There is some time to mobilize our strength since the debate cannot begin before the end of the month, and President de Gaulle had indicated his intention of announcing the program before then. The President indicated understanding of the French position regarding their participation in the debate; however, he hoped there could be a clear exposé by France concurrently, perhaps in some other context, of the history of Algeria and what the French had done there. He also thought the French would be well-advised to publicize their program for Algeria as soon as possible.

General de Gaulle said that the UN debate would probably be engaged through the introduction of a hostile motion by some of the African or Asian states, and, in this framework, France could not participate; however, outside of the UN, and in other circumstances, France could explain her position. The President said if President de Gaulle could, at the proper moment, present the French case, it would ease the pressure on us.

De Gaulle said that it was very important that there should be no difference between the French and United States positions at the UNGA. He added France would go as far as possible to be conciliatory, and he hoped the United States would do likewise, even if this caused certain difficulties for us. The most important element of the debate was that France and the United States should be in agreement. The President noted that this issue caused a certain problem for us with public opinion, and we hoped the circumstances would be such that we would not feel constrained to abstain again during the UN vote as we had last year.

Prime Minister Debré said there was a public opinion problem in France, too. French public opinion is now dominated by the Algerian question and there is an extreme view predominating on this issue. The importance of US-French agreement at the UNGA cannot be overestimated. If the positions were divergent there would be a serious break. He stressed that this was not a Government-to-Government problem or a Foreign Ministers’ problem but one deeply involving the French people. Unity of purpose on this issue was necessary for allied solidarity. He characterized this issue as stirring a deeply national feeling.

The President said he was sure that the Prime Minister’s exposé was true but that it was the problem of statesmen to bring the divergent public opinions sufficiently close together to prevent a rupture in the co-operative attitude of our two countries. In matters where public opinion differed in the two countries, probably neither one was entirely right. Government attitudes should be such that public opinion can follow them in the direction of conciliation.

De Gaulle said that he understood that the United States should reserve its attitude on Algeria until the details of the French program were known. However, he felt that when we saw it published, we would see it was so in conformity with the UN Charter, and with democratic processes, that we would not have difficulty in giving it support. De Gaulle added that, while our two ideas of tactics and maneuver might vary, he could not imagine, after the French program is clarified, that the United States and France should adopt different positions.

De Gaulle continued that there were two different things involved in the Algerian situation. There was the need for a free expression of the will of the people of Algeria through democratic processes, i.e., through voting, on the one hand. On the other hand, there was an organization in Algeria which wants to establish there a government by force over the people. He made it clear that France has not and never will recognize that organization.

The Secretary of State said that, perhaps when the details of the French program were known, there would be a different frame of mind in the General Assembly. At the present time we did not know exactly what type of resolutions would be introduced. The Secretary thought that we were placed momentarily in a somewhat difficult situation because the French program would not be announced until later in the month, and he thought we should get together on what could be done between now and the opening of the UN session and the French announcement of its Algerian program.

The President suggested that the two Foreign Ministers should prepare a statement, which must be very carefully worded, saying that the two Chiefs of State had met and discussed Algeria. It could add that General de Gaulle was presently consulting numerous elements in Algeria and in France on this subject, and that France was bringing forward a program which it believed was in accordance with the UN Charter.

General de Gaulle said that he could go further in statements after the French declaration had been made than before. At present we could say that the United States and French Presidents had discussed the Algerian problems as friends, but there must be avoided any statement which appeared in principle to internationalize the Algerian situation.¹ This, de Gaulle added, would make the world draw false conclusions, and it must not appear before the French declaration that the conflict had been placed in an international forum. The President agreed with these statements. De Gaulle preferred not to say that the Algerian question has been debated in detail but rather discussions had been held concerning Africa, especially the North African problem. He thought this would be a better line for a possible Foreign Ministers’ statement. Couve de Murville agreed that something extremely general would be better.

The President explained that what he was looking for was something which would permit him to try to influence public opinion in the United States favorably, and also something which would influence favorably as many countries as possible in the UNGA. He said we can make clear that the French consider Algeria an internal affair, and he agreed in fact this was the case. President de Gaulle agreed that it would be obvious to all that the two Presidents had discussed Algeria, but that it should be clear there was no negotiation. The President said the two Foreign Ministers should get ready a statement hinting at the problem and at the prospect of a solution for the study of President de Gaulle and himself.

Prime Minister Debré said that it was not only a question of Algeria but of common attitudes in Morocco and Tunisia, and indeed for all of Africa. In the future there should be a common policy for the whole continent, and this was a necessity to make worthwhile the future of Franco-American relations. The President said he had discussed this with President de Gaulle earlier in the day, and that there should be cooperation in helping new nations and those about to be free. There should be technical and economic aid to assist these nations in keeping the values of freedom and in resisting the blandishments of Communism.

The President then passed to a discussion of NATO. He said he should make it clear that we were firmly dedicated to NATO as a means of ensuring collective security. It is because of this that we have put treasure, soldiers and military support into Western Europe, and expect to continue to do so. The President noted that when he came to Europe in 1951 as SACEUR, six United States divisions had been committed to NATO in Europe as a sort of stop-gap measure; however, we had never asked to reduce these forces, both because of our general desire to contribute to European solidarity and also because French forces had unfortunately been withdrawn from NATO for Algeria. Therefore, the questions of NATO and Algeria were linked. Prime Minister Debré agreed that Algeria and the Mediterranean were part of the European security concept.

The President continued that it is important in this context to feel that we are all united in the maximum support of NATO and European security. If this situation obtained, then he felt sure other problems could be solved fairly easily.

De Gaulle said that, with regard to the Atlantic Alliance generally, we must of course maintain it, make it live and further develop it. NATO as now constituted was, however, not entirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, there was the question of integration. This had been all right in 1949 when there was a question of urgency, and he could understand this had seemed a good idea. Now, however, a country like France felt that it was no longer responsible for the defense of its own territory but that this had been entrusted to a collective organization about which little was known and for which it was not responsible. Second, NATO had been created in 1949 when the menace hardly existed except in Europe, but now there was a menace in both the political and strategic fields in the East, and in Africa, so a purely European and North American organization did not correspond to the nature of the present danger and was insufficient for this new threat. Of course we wanted NATO to continue and France did not wish to separate herself from her allies, but there were certain inconveniences in NATO now. At present an outbreak of nuclear war, which would almost certainly devastate France, could occur in such a manner that France could be crushed without ever having had the opportunity of expressing its views and without having any role. De Gaulle said that he supported the idea of consultations with the British and ourselves on worldwide problems and on nuclear matters. He hoped that, through such tripartite consultations, a way could be found for the expression of the views of France in the case of atomic warfare.

The President said that, with regard to tripartite consultations, we were happy to confer in this framework, informally, as we had always consulted with the British, regarding matters beyond the NATO area. We were quite ready to discuss world problems with the other two countries having worldwide responsibilities, and we could establish ad hoc tripartite staff committees to discuss individual problems, for example. We could consult as seems fit on any matter brought up by one of the three. We should not formalize these arrangements as this would cause trouble with our other allies. Likewise, our arrangements should not affect NATO.

Passing to de Gaulle’s point regarding integrated forces destroying national morale, the President said he did not believe we could conduct a war, or win a war, without an integrated command. Furthermore, if we all put forces in Europe, some effective form of control was required. It would be a mistake to have a series of national forces. Under this concept, where would United States forces fit into the picture? Would they not have to go home? The President thought that integrated forces should obviously only be used after approval by all, through consultation in the North Atlantic Council or some other appropriate channel. He concluded there must be some form of integrated command.

With regard to nuclear warfare, the President continued, President de Gaulle would recall that we had attempted to have the UN accept responsibility for the atomic bomb, but this had not been possible.² The first responsibility of the United States in world security was to keep its deterrent strong. Nuclear weapons, unfortunately, were no longer special but had permeated down to the battalion level, and were being spread even farther. The President said that the United States would never, except in the case of defense against complete surprise, launch a nuclear war without consultation. In view of the possibility of emergency, he suggested to President de Gaulle that he furnish the President of France with certain specialized communications equipment, which had already been given to Mr. Macmillan, to permit instant communication in the case of emergency. The President continued, saying that nuclear weapons now were like the air force used to be. It was unfortunate that they pervaded our entire defense concept but this was true and we could not help it.

The President also said that there must be some way of obtaining national spirit in support of NATO. Consultation on problems of the NATO area should take place in the North Atlantic Council, while he agreed there could be close tripartite consultation of problems outside the NATO area. General de Gaulle agreed that tripartite consultation on world problems was essential. The President said he thought we would easily work out methods for doing this. In response to de Gaulle’s request for his views on other problems, the President first apologized for the length of his presentation on NATO problems, to which de Gaulle said he had found this intensely interesting. The President then said it was hardly necessary to reopen discussion of the Berlin question since there was no difference of view on this subject. He said we were not going to desert over two million Berliners. We were ready to discuss Berlin with anyone, even Khrushchev, but these discussions would have to take place within the framework of the maintenance of our existing rights in Berlin.

De Gaulle asked for the President’s views on a summit meeting, which the British often, and the Soviets sometimes, said they wanted. The President said he thought a summit meeting would not be helpful to world peace and would prove a deception unless there were some results therefrom which would give the world confidence. He said he personally would not attend a summit meeting unless there were some assurances in advance that this would bring some productive results. De Gaulle said he had exactly the same sentiments.

The President said he hoped for some result to the Khrushchev visit but was not expecting anything. De Gaulle said he did not expect any results either, and regretted that the decision to invite Khrushchev had been taken unilaterally. However, he did not see any great harm in the visit. The President said he had assured Adenauer and Macmillan, and now de Gaulle, that he would not make any proposals, or start any negotiations. He noted that Khrushchev might take some helpful step towards peace. De Gaulle said if we could convert him to capitalism, that would be the greatest benefit. The President said he was going to show Khrushchev that in our country workers had the right to strike. Indeed, there was presently a major strike in progress and he intended to ask him what he would do in the Soviet Union in these circumstances.

The meeting then adjourned for President de Gaulle to introduce the President to the Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions stationed in Paris.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Meetings. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McBride and cleared by White. The conversation was held at the Elysée Palace. A summary of the conversation is published in Declassified Documents, 1987, 741.
1. In a September 4 memorandum for Calhoun, Krebs wrote that Herter wished to correct the memorandum of conversation by adding the following at the end of this sentence: “or make it appear that a later statement by de Gaulle on Algeria might be interpreted as resulting from negotiations carried on in his talks with President Eisenhower.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)
2. See footnote 11, Document 130.