Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

132. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, September 2, 1959, 5:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The President of France
• Lt. Colonel Vernon A. Walters

Following presentation of the Diplomatic Corps, the two Presidents went to General de Gaulle’s office. General de Gaulle asked the President how he had found Chancellor Adenauer.¹ The President said that he had found the Chancellor in good health and good spirits. The Germans were working like a people possessed. Their crops were good, they were building everywhere; and, added the President, “He is a great admirer of yours”. General de Gaulle replied that he also had great admiration for the Chancellor. He had met him first in Germany and the Chancellor had indicated to him that he felt it would be many years before the Germans’ cherished dream of reunification was achieved.² On his second meeting, he had found the Chancellor somewhat saddened and depressed.³ He felt that the Chancellor had devoted himself to creating a rich and prosperous Germany and he had been with General de Gaulle when Khrushchev had issued his ultimatum on Berlin.⁴ This had greatly shaken the Chancellor as he realized that Germany had only the appearance of power and that, in fact, her future would depend on what other people did. He was therefore glad to hear that the Chancellor was in good spirits.

He then asked the President how he had found the British.⁵ The President replied he had found the British hard at work and in good spirits. He said that Mr. Macmillan seemed confident that he would win his election. General de Gaulle interjected that he also felt that Mr. Macmillan would win his election. The President said that the agreement was general between the British and Americans and that the main point of difference related to the possibility of a summit meeting. The British felt that a summit meeting would be useful even if no concrete progress were achieved. He did not share this belief. On the contrary, he felt it might even be harmful. He did feel that the British were not hostile per se to the Common Market and that the Outer Seven which they were setting up might perhaps provide a bridge for coming in at a later date with the Common Market. General de Gaulle said that he did not quite share the President’s optimism on this point. General de Gaulle said he had recently paid a visit to Italy and had been given a great reception in northern Italy.⁶ He had found the country somewhat politically unstable. The Italians had a great many Communists. They had the acute problem of southern Italy where standards of living were very low [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The President then said that he was seeing Mr. Segni and Mr. Pella on the following day and that later Mr. Segni was coming to the United States where the President would see him,⁷ and he would be happy to do whatever he could to smooth any susceptibilities they might have. General de Gaulle then asked bluntly, “Are you determined at all costs to prevent Formosa falling to the hands of the Chinese Communists”? The President replied affirmatively. The President then explained the powers Congress had voted to him regarding Quemoy, Matsu, and Formosa.⁸

General de Gaulle then said that he had recently received the visit of Mr. Kishi, the Prime Minister of Japan, who was a very intelligent man and very interested in aid to underdeveloped countries.⁹ The President then spoke of the interest which many of the underdeveloped countries, India in particular, might feel in Japanese techniques that might be more adaptable to their own requirements than those used by the Western countries where the cost of labor was high. The President then said that sentiment in Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia was evolving favorably towards the West. In reply to a question concerning Sukarno, the President said that at one time he feared he might be drifting towards Communism but recently since he had reorganized his government he seemed to be taking a saner view to things and we have resumed our assistance to him. The President then said that in the light of India’s previous non-commitment, it was evident that Communist action toward India now would arouse even greater resentment. The President said the situation in Laos was bad but that in South Vietnam, President Diem seemed to be making progress in fighting Communism. In reply to a question concerning the Arab world, the President felt that things were improving with relation to the UAR, but that for a time he had feared that Iraq was lost. General de Gaulle replied that he too had shared these fears.

At this time it was indicated to the two Presidents that it was time for them to leave for the Arc de Triomphe and the conversation was concluded.

As the two Presidents were walking to the elevator, the President said to General de Gaulle that it would be very helpful if provocative statements about Algeria could be avoided. General de Gaulle then said that in France the press was free and it was impossible to control it. The President said he was not referring to the press. General de Gaulle smiled, nodded, and said, “I understand, I’ll bear in mind what you have said”.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Meetings. Top Secret. Presumably drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Walters. This conversation was held in de Gaulle’s office at the Elysée Palace.
1. Eisenhower met with Adenauer in Bonn August 26–27.
2. Presumably reference is to Adenauer’s visit with de Gaulle at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises September 14–15, 1958. For two accounts of this meeting, see Adenauer, Erinnerungen, pp. 436–439 and de Gaulle, Mémoires, pp. 184–190.
3. For de Gaulle’s account of his meeting with Adenauer at Bad Kreuznach November 26, 1958, see ibid., pp. 190–191.
4. For text of the Soviet note on Berlin, November 27, 1958, see Department of State Bulletin, January 19, 1959, pp. 81–89.
5. See Documents 365 ff.
6. De Gaulle made a State visit to Italy June 23–28.
7. Segni visited the United States September 30–October 4; see Documents 241 ff.
8. Reference is to the Formosa (Taiwan) Resolution, signed by the President on January 29, 1955, which authorized the President to use military force to protect Taiwan.
9. Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi made a State visit to France while on his world tour during July and August 1959. He returned to Tokyo on August 11.