Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western Europe, Volume VII, Part 2

130. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, September 2, 1959, noon.

PRESENT

• The President
• The President of France
• Mr. Labelle
• Lt. Colonel Vernon A. Walters

General de Gaulle opened the conversation by referring to Mr. Khrushchev’s forthcoming visit to the United States and indicated that he felt this was fundamentally a matter for the U.S. to decide.¹ President Eisenhower said that in his mind this was a preliminary move, perhaps a last preliminary move in an attempt to bring Mr. Khrushchev to a state of mind which might lead him to make some sort of a reasonable proposal. The President said that he was not negotiating with Khrushchev and that he was not terribly optimistic as to what results might be obtained from his visit, but that he felt that there was some possibility that it might put Mr. Khrushchev into a more amiable state of mind.

General de Gaulle then said that France and Germany had reconciled their differences and that in fact his policy favored ever closer action between the two countries. President Eisenhower said that he felt that this was one of the most favorable developments in Europe. General de Gaulle said that the French were in favor of German reunification, but added wryly they were not in too much of a hurry. He declared that France intended despite² some British reserve to going ahead with the Common Market and achieve not only European economic unity but also achieve a real political cooperation. President Eisenhower said that he felt that the British had understood the need for the Common Market and that the setting up of the Outer Seven was being carried through in a sense of a sort of bridge towards the Common Market which might lead to a greater degree of unity at a later date.

General de Gaulle said that he was less optimistic in this respect but stated that France had no intention of carrying out economic warfare against England but desired to achieve good economic relationships with the United Kingdom, but the most important thing was to organize the Common Market.

General de Gaulle then went on to discuss the German problem, expressing the belief that the country would remain divided for a long time. General Eisenhower expressed his agreement and said that he realized that this was something that had to be done step by step as any precipitate action might lead to unfavorable results. General de Gaulle then spoke of Berlin and the President said that it was obvious that they were in complete agreement to remain entirely firm on the principle of not abandoning Berlin to the Soviets, but to examine with a certain flexibility such changes as might be possible in the present arrangements.

General de Gaulle when speaking of the responsibilities of the various powers in NATO said that he was very concerned by the events taking place in Africa, not merely North Africa but also Black Africa. He was convinced that the countries of Africa should sooner or later be able to decide their own future. France had started this process within the framework of the Community.³ The states which are members of the Community had decided on their own free will to work in common with France for a period of time on matters of defense, foreign affairs, and economy. All this may evolve in the future, but he would not want to see it evolve against France. Certain precautions should be taken to avoid a repetition of what had happened in Guinea which alone had decided to accept the General’s offer of complete independence. The Soviet Bloc countries had rushed into the breach and Mr. Sekou Debré had worked with them all the more easily as he himself was a Communist. President Eisenhower asked whether this was actually so, and General de Gaulle repeated that he was a Communist. President Eisenhower mentioned that Mr. Sekou Debré was going to visit Washington officially in October.⁴ General de Gaulle shrugged and made no comment.

Taking up Algeria, General de Gaulle recalled that France has been established there for 130 years, and as a result of this, there are certain realities that must be taken into consideration. These include the existence there of one million Frenchmen and nine million Moslems. This presents a complex problem that is not easy to solve. It is the sort of situation that would prevail if there were forty million Indians in California.

Algeria, said General de Gaulle, has never been a separate state or country unlike Morocco and Tunisia which had governments and were recognized as states even during the Protectorate. This was a group of men whose evolution was as difficult for Algeria as for France. General de Gaulle felt that the Algerians should have the right to decide their own future. Since his taking power, he had granted them equal rights, universal suffrage, and a seat in the Assembly which involved an automatic majority for the Moslems in representing Algeria at different levels. The rebellion was not yet over. When it is over, and when the time necessary for reorganization has passed, the Algerians will be able to choose between being 100% French, or enjoying a certain autonomy, or else obtain their complete independence. The General said that [although] he had hinted at this previously, he will state it solemnly in about two weeks.⁵ But this free choice cannot take place before the end of the rebellion. The President asked the General if he would make this announcement before the end of the rebellion, and the General said that he would. As for the organization which claims to be the government of Algeria, which it is not in fact, this group does not represent the Algerians and represents neither a state nor a majority. General de Gaulle said he would not recognize a group which existed only through the terror of its machine guns. If this movement would achieve power, it would rule through totalitarian procedure and would rapidly degenerate into Communism. General de Gaulle said that he would under no conditions negotiate with them as a government. This would be quite different if the FLN wanted to talk to France as a group of men rather than as a government. A government could result only from the freely expressed will of the people through universal suffrage.

This policy which had been undertaken during the preceding year differs from other policies which had gone before. Bearing these facts in mind, General de Gaulle said that France could not consider discussing Algeria which was an internal French affair before the United Nations. The General said his policy would be announced to the world, but it cannot be discussed with this or that young state. General de Gaulle said that this was a very sensitive question for France, and that France hoped the United States would not renew its abstention of the previous year. This would be a very serious matter, especially if it were to occur after the announcement of the new policy.

President Eisenhower said he understood full well that this was an internal French affair, but recalled that France is often attacked on the subject of Algeria by a number of countries. If, therefore, France cannot discuss this problem before the United Nations as though it were a matter involving a foreign country, he felt that at least some one should speak for France and present her program before the Assembly in order to allow friendly delegations to use this presentation in order to win support for the French position.

General de Gaulle replied that his public statement would be perfectly clear on this subject. President Eisenhower mentioned the fact that this was a proud organization and thought that perhaps while⁶ not actually taking part in the debate itself, to [France could] present to the Assembly on some other occasion the French position setting forth everything France had done in the economic, social and educational fields. General de Gaulle said he could not have such a statement made during a debate on a hostile motion, but he would take note of President Eisenhower’s remarks and emphasized once again how important this matter was to Franco-American relations. The President expressed some concern as to whether General de Gaulle’s statement would be made early enough to allow the time necessary to round up support from hesitant delegations, and said that the sooner the General could announce his program, the easier it would be to do this. General de Gaulle then said in great confidence that he would make this speech September 15.

President Eisenhower said that if his speech appeared as an implementation of a policy moving step by step to self determination for the people of Algeria, the United States would study it with the greatest of sympathy. He very much wanted to be able to go along with the French, but in so doing we had two difficulties. One—the long anti-colonial tradition in our country arising from the origin of our own independence, and it was a feeling that was sometimes more instinctive then reasoning; and secondly, the hostility in the United States to the use of force in order to solve problems.

He therefore hoped that General de Gaulle’s statement will have all the clarity and strength which is necessary and he was very happy to have heard this program set forth which is by far the most courageous and realistic on Algeria.

General de Gaulle then spoke of the rest of Africa. He expressed his concern over the progress of Communism in all these areas (Morocco, Black Africa, former British territory such as Ghana, etc.). General Eisenhower said he shared General de Gaulle’s concern and that Communists often attempt to “buy” these countries through economic aid and attractive credits which seem very desirable to the local leaders who are thinking only in terms of the immediate future. General de Gaulle indicated that Emperor Haile Selassie had been in Paris on his return from Russia and had told the French President that he had been offered 50 billion francs in Moscow and he couldn’t do anything else but take it. Likewise, the Soviets had just offered Guinea 15 billion francs which is a very large amount for such a small country.⁷ President Eisenhower said he felt this question could be solved only through close cooperation between all of the Western nations in their efforts to render technical and financial assistance. Only thus can these countries which are not thinking of the future be made to understand the advantages of remaining on the side of the free nations.

General de Gaulle said that France was giving what was for her a great deal of money, most of it without hope of return (except in the case of the oil of the Sahara), to the countries of North Africa and Black Africa. General de Gaulle wondered whether it might not be possible to obtain the support of the Soviet Union on an aid program for specific countries such as Egypt. General Eisenhower said that we had tried to take out the political aspects of assistance through the United Nations but that this had run into a Soviet veto and that this had compelled the West to handle these matters within a Western framework. He referred to his television interview with Mr. Macmillan⁸ and said that if the Russians really understood this question, they ought to cooperate themselves.

General de Gaulle then said he would like to speak about NATO. He said that he was heartily in favor of the existence of this alliance and that it should be maintained and developed. He knew General Norstad well and had the highest esteem for him; but NATO had been set up under an immediate threat which was aimed at Europe alone and it was necessary to work quickly and, under these circumstances, it had been felt that the best method was integration. NATO is still useful but he felt that this integration took away from peoples and the governments, as well as the commanders, the feeling of responsibility of their own defense. One trusted in an exterior agency and the member nations became in a sense spectators rather than participants. This involved a question of organization which should be gradually reviewed insofar as the larger countries are concerned. In the specific case of France, there were additionally the Mediterranean and Africa which are not really covered by NATO and this leads to France feeling herself torn between her Mediterranean and African responsibilities on the one hand and her NATO responsibilities on the other.

President Eisenhower said that he recognized the serious nature of this problem. From the beginning he had wondered how it could be possible to conciliate the need for integration (inasmuch as the idea of a coalition was no longer adequate for modern war) with the need of maintaining the national and patriotic spirit in the member states. His successors, Generals Gruenther and Norstad, had likewise been conscious of this. In the light of the psychological difficulties involved in maintaining in Europe troops from a nation which deep down was reluctant to undertake foreign commitments and in the light of the need to maintain confidence among the Allies, that is to say, to guarantee the maintenance of a powerful American force in Europe, he felt that the idea of a coalition was not sufficient. If there were purely national armies, where would the U.S. put their forces? He felt the best formula was to obtain a greater degree of national support for the idea of NATO rather than to undertake a policy which might run the risk of disrupting this alliance.

General de Gaulle said that this question had become more acute in view of the fact that atomic weapons today were fundamentally in the hands of the U.S. and in a lesser measure Great Britain. The facts of life were that the United States alone was in a position to engage upon an all-out war and that France ran the risk of being committed without even knowing it. This in no wise implied the lack of confidence in the United States but it was merely a question of fact. It was in the light of this that he had sent a memorandum to President Eisenhower and Mr. Macmillan last September.⁹

President Eisenhower said he wished to make it quite clear that unless it was a case of an attack by surprise directed against us, that is to say, a question of defending oneself¹⁰ against bombers in the sky overhead, he would never unleash an atomic war without consultation with his principal allies; and, furthermore, with the exception of questions strictly involving NATO (where he felt that the notion of equal partners was essential), he would be very happy to have General de Gaulle participate with the British Prime Minister and himself in a study of all the problems relating to world strategy in order to attempt to reach decisions taken by joint agreement.

The President said he felt it would be very difficult to “institutionalize” these consultations but he would be quite ready to install a direct telephone line to General de Gaulle to enable the same type of discussion when crises occur as now exists between Washington and London to the British Prime Minister. General de Gaulle said that he had felt that the representatives on the Standing Group could discuss the military questions while the ambassadors could handle political questions and the governments could draw their own conclusions without undertaking any changes in NATO’s organization.

General de Gaulle then said that France was preparing to explode a nuclear weapon of low yield, that she will continue to work in this field and will eventually build thermo-nuclear weapons. She feels she has to do this because other powers have nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons were done away with by all parties, France would be delighted to stop her work in this field.

President Eisenhower then said that in 1946, when the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, they had attempted to transfer this monopoly to the United Nations so that this whole effort could be used for peaceful purposes.¹¹ The Soviet veto, which arose from the fact that they felt their spies had obtained enough information to enable them to build nuclear weapons themselves, had compelled the U.S. to maintain sufficient nuclear strength to deter the Soviet Union from any aggression. Since then, enormous sums had been expended to build a very great number of installations to manufacture U-235 and plutonium and all of our forces right down to battalion had nuclear weapons. It was clear to the Russians that any attack would result in atomic reprisals. There are many people in the United States who are horrified by what has to be envisaged, but as long as you have a man like Khrushchev with the great resources he controlled with the centralized totalitarian dictatorship of which he is the head, it will be necessary to maintain this nuclear strength. General de Gaulle said that he certainly would never think of advising the United States to abandon their deterrent strength as long as the need for it continues to exist.

President Eisenhower then spoke of the U.S. law relating to the disclosure of nuclear information. He said that he had always felt this law was a mistake. He had fought it as Chief of Staff. Under it, only the United Kingdom could presently receive assistance in nuclear matters as it had demonstrated the capability to detonate nuclear weapons. It seemed to run counter to common sense, but France could receive assistance only after she had expended large sums of money and a great deal of time and had herself detonated nuclear weapons. He regretted this but there was no way he could get around it, although he had succeeded in obtaining two changes to the law.¹² General de Gaulle said that he was not asking for anything.

At this point, it was indicated to the two Presidents that they must leave and the conversation was concluded.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Meetings. Top Secret. Presumably drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Walters. The conversation was held in de Gaulle’s office.
1. Khrushchev visited the United States September 15–28.
2. The words “to fight” were crossed through and the word “despite” was handwritten above.
3. The French Community came into being on September 28, 1958, when the majority of citizens in metropolitan France and the French overseas departments and territories voted in favor of the referendum that approved the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The French Community included metropolitan France, its 19 overseas departments, 5 overseas territories, and 12 autonomous republics.
4. Documentation on the State visit to the United States by Sekou Touré, President of the Republic of Guinea, October 26–November 4 is in vol. XIV, pp. 693–706.
5. In his radio-TV address on September 16, de Gaulle offered the Algerian people the right to self-determination, including independence from France. For text, see Statements, pp. 52–56.
6. The word “by” was crossed out and “while” was handwritten above.
7. After Emperor Haile Selassie’s talks with Soviet officials in Moscow June 29–July 12, the Soviet Government agreed to grant Ethiopia a long-term low-interest loan of 400 million rubles for the development of industry and agriculture. In an agreement signed in Moscow on August 26 the Soviet Union agreed to grant Guinea a loan of 140 million rubles to cover the cost of technical assistance for developing agriculture, constructing roads, and building industrial establishments.
8. For text of the report made on television by Eisenhower and Macmillan, broadcast from the Prime Minister’s residence on August 31, see Department of State Bulletin, September 21, 1959, pp. 405–409.
9. Document 45.
10. The word “once” was crossed out and “oneself” was handwritten above.
11. When the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission began meeting on June 14, 1946, the United States proposed the creation of an international atomic development authority to control atomic energy production and to establish effective safeguards in order to provide security from atomic warfare.
12. Reference is to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, known as the McMahon Act, which was signed August 1, 1946. (60 Stat. 755) It was amended August 30, 1954, to become the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 919), and amended again July 2, 1958. (72 Stat. 276)