Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

267. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

September 12, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Norstad, Mr. Robert Bowie, General Goodpaster

General Norstad began by saying he brought greetings to the President from Chancellor Adenauer. He had met with Adenauer, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a few days previously for a four–hour discussion on trends and problems in NATO.¹ [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Bowie recalled that his study on NATO² had brought out, among other things, the need for an increased conventional capacity, the view that there could be no limited nuclear war in Europe, some suggestions for dealing with the problem of a European or NATO strategic deterrent, and the view that a proliferation of individual national deterrents would be catastrophic for the free world. He recalled that he had suggested that a deterrent force of the Polaris type would be valuable, since, being sea–based, it avoids the problem of land bases. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] I added that Mr. Bowie had proposed to hold tactical nuclear weapons to a very small total in Western Europe.

General Norstad said the question is as to how much tactical nuclear capability we should have in Western Europe. He did not understand Mr. Bowie to be recommending that we have none; therefore, the difference is one of degree. He said he is in full agreement that we should not lose sight of the importance of our conventional capability in Western Europe. As to the tactical nuclear weapons, he thought the Chiefs of Staff ought to do some detailed study of how much we should have. He thought there were two other suggestions which it would be very profitable for him and Mr. Bowie to discuss with the President. The first of these relates to the control of nuclear weapons, and the question is how to give the Europeans the amount of control they need in order to keep the alliance effective and sound. There are three theoretical solutions: bilateral arrangements; maintenance of the status quo; or a multilateral system. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

The President said that he agrees that a multilateral solution is desirable, but pointed out that De Gaulle is completely obstructionist about such a plan. He suggested that perhaps we ought to take up this plan with the small countries, such as Belgium, initially. General Norstad said he is convinced the Europeans would not want the bilateral form of solution. [15 lines of source text not declassified]

[4 lines of source text not declassified] With regard to a peace–time setup, our problem is the requirement in the Atomic Energy Act amendments of 1954 that a nation to receive the information involved must itself have achieved “substantial progress” in atomic weapons production.³ [6–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General Norstad said his proposal is that the United States should turn over an agreed number of such weapons to NATO. The title would pass to NATO, and there would be agreement that the weapons would not be removed from the NATO area. [8 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bowie commented that the advantage of Polaris is that it is not necessary to put it on anyone’s soil, since it can be kept at sea. General Norstad said it is important to realize that we are not in fact utterly dependent on France. Even if these are land-based weapons, we can base them satisfactorily elsewhere. General Norstad said we should not look for any relief in our problems with De Gaulle. We will have more trouble with him. [5–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bowie said he wanted to make it clear that in the first stage of his Polaris proposal, he thought the weapons should be assigned to NATO. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General Norstad said there are two linked, but distinct, questions: first is the control of the nuclear weapons, and the second is the question of an MRBM. On this point the President asked how we are to get tactical nuclear weapons integrated into the forces in Europe. He noted that we will not have enough Polaris submarines for several years to form a force of the size we want for our own plans. As long as we have just a handful of these submarines, no American Government could or would turn them over to NATO. Mr. Bowie said it is not so necessary to turn them over to NATO now. If we lay out a program now, we will by this action meet the major political need. [8–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The President went on to say that he thinks it is just not practicable, and cited experience with De Gaulle in World War II which shows that on matters of great importance a sovereign nation will exercise its sovereignty on a unilateral basis as De Gaulle did when he threatened to remove his forces from allied command in order to have them protect Strasbourg. He added that De Gaulle will not accept a multilateral solution in his opinion. General Norstad said he agreed that it was not at all sure that such a proposal would be accepted in Paris. He stated that he did not feel that General De Gaulle would go so far as to expel the command from French soil, however. There is plenty of evidence that other French leaders in the government do not go as far as De Gaulle does in these matters. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The President said that what De Gaulle is really aiming at is for the United States and Britain to work with France, on policies affecting Africa, those in Latin America, etc. In addition, if the rest of NATO makes a statement in opposition, De Gaulle thinks the views of the US, UK and France should override. He added that De Gaulle has expounded this theory at great length, asserting that if the leading western nations do not take this action, we will all be lost. General Norstad said he thought these assertions had been effectively answered in the President’s last letter to De Gaulle.⁴ General Norstad added that, in his opinion, to concede to De Gaulle what he is seeking would destroy NATO. On this matter Mr. Bowie suggested that we ought to take a rather radical position, telling our NATO partners that we dispose of ten times the power of any single one of them, that the United Kingdom and France are not our equals by any stretch of the imagination and that only a unified Europe would be an equal to us. He said it would be very bad for the French to put across the idea that they, we and the British are a special group. He added that he thought it all wrong to have the idea that the British have a special relationship with us, commenting that this is a notion the British continually try to promote. The President indicated some disagreement with this, stating that we have many special relationships with the British. He added that in all the time Macmillan has been in office since Suez, he has never said that they are equal to the United States in power and influence.

[5 lines of source text not declassified] The President noted that General De Gaulle puts the claim for a special status on two bases. The first is the special US–UK–French responsibility in Berlin. The second is that, except for Belgium (and this is doubtful), De Gaulle feels that only these three nations have substantial responsibilities outside of NATO. [5–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Bowie observed that De Gaulle, on the issues of nuclear weapons and tri–partitism, has taken hold of a valid, limited segment of the problem, but has turned it into a device for enhancing French prestige. He is entitled to more than has been done on these two matters, but he is not entitled to what he is asking on them. [15–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

General Norstad said he would like to offer a specific recommendation. The first is for a study of the type and level of reaction we should be prepared to make in the event of an incident in Europe. He said that he is in full agreement that we must watch our conventional capability very carefully, and that we must have such a capability. Then he thought the Chiefs of Staff should study in detail how much nuclear strength we should have, and what our non-nuclear strength should be. [7–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

However, he thinks there should be a new missile, mobile on both land or sea, weighing about one-half as much as the Polaris, held as a command reserve in Europe and not assigned to any particular country. He commented that the United States has always been sensitive to any charge that it tends to throw its weight around in the NAC. He thought the time had now come when most of the Europeans would recommend having the United States exercise an influence in NATO more nearly equivalent to the actual power of the United States. In short, he thought we should take a tougher line.

Mr. Bowie thought that the question concerning the more mobile, light–weight missile should be related to the question of tactical nuclear weapons and the two decided together. He did not believe that this decision should be made in the framework of Mr. Gates’ reference to the NAC on the MRBM.⁵ He thought we should explicitly back away from that proposal. Also, he thought we should not wait for the NATO ten-year planning to show what the need is. General Norstad agreed with this and took the position that we should decide now.

The President said the tough part of this is that his hands are tied by the Congress. He said he could solve this problem quickly if he were given a free hand, as he would be if he were a military commander. Without authority from the Congress, he had no basis on which to begin negotiations. He observed that he had no power to delegate the authority to use atomic weapons in event of attack to an allied officer, and doubted if he could ever get that from the Congress. He stressed his belief in NATO and the collective defense concept. He thought probably the only way Europe will ever really become secure is through the creation of a United States of Europe, but felt that NATO moves in this direction. He said he would be glad to send De Gaulle another suggestion on this matter, commenting that De Gaulle has been requesting a meeting of himself, the President and Macmillan.

With regard to the proposal to limit the tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of the forces of Europe, the President said it must be recognized that this process cannot be carried too far. Otherwise our forces would say they are being left without the most effective weapons for their self–defense. Mr. Bowie said that he feels the essential thing is to get the point across that there can be no thought of conducting a large–scale tactical nuclear war in Western Europe—that it will necessarily become an all–out contest.

The President then said that he has just over four months left in the Presidency. He observed that he has spent many years in the NATO business, and enjoys a certain standing and reputation—that his views receive a certain acceptance. He asked what it was thought he could do in the time he has left in office. Mr. Bowie said he thought the President could put forward a multilateral scheme, either along the lines he had suggested or along the lines General Norstad has suggested. He could throw his weight completely against any acceptance of the national approach. Separate national deterrents do not make political, economic or military sense.

[4 lines of source text not declassified] The President recalled that at the beginning of his administration be had told the Defense Department he would eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the world if he could. At that time the Defense Department people stormed that this would be dangerous and unacceptable. Now he thought they all agreed he was right, because there is no threat by conventional forces that approaches that of the nuclear weapons. He said Mr. Bowie’s presentation leaves one big question—how the Western alliance is to meet the large requirements for conventional forces. Mr. Bowie and General Norstad commented that these requirements are not tremendously large, and that the Western alliance exceeds the Soviet Union and its European neighbors in manpower.

The President expressed his appreciation to General Norstad and Mr. Bowie for the discussion and for the thoughtful studies they each have made.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on September 16.
1. A summary of Norstad’s lunch and discussion with Adenauer, [text not declassified] on September 9 was transmitted in telegram 1024 from Paris, September 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/9–1060) A copy of the telegram bears a notation in Goodpaster’s handwriting: “12 Sept. 60: Reported orally to President by Gen. Norstad. G.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Norstad)
2. Document 266.
3. See footnote 4, Document 217.
4. Part 2, Document 197.
5. See footnote 6, Document 254.