Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

197. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State⁰

Paris, March 7, 1959, 1 p.m.

3241. Last night after dinner at British Embassy Joxe, Jebb and I had long conversation regarding French action in withdrawal their Mediterranean Fleet from NATO. Halfway through conversation we were joined by Spaak.

Joxe was obviously not at all happy at action which had been taken. He thoroughly appreciated arguments put forward by Jebb and me regarding poor timing of move on eve of Berlin, fact that knowledge of step bound to leak, to dangerous precedent for other NATO members.

“Yes, it looks as if we are sabotaging NATO,” Joxe admitted, but insisted this was not De Gaulle intention.

Joxe said Couve de Murville was lunching with De Gaulle today and Joxe hoped very much that following this French would come up with formula for solution to problem. He would have preferred to have complied with my suggestion of several days ago that notification to NATO be held up,¹ but as this had not been possible, he considers that France now has “obligation” to come forth with some definite explanation of exactly what she wants. He had favored having Debre give memorandum to Norstad. Regarding this as first step, he now realizes all of us are without concrete indication of just what France wants.

He referred to such a paper being submitted for tripartite consideration in first instance but was not definite on this. I said I assumed matter would be discussed by Macmillan and De Gaulle Monday,² and both he and Jebb agreed that it would.

Spaak said frankly that in his opinion the French move had no military significance whatsoever, but incalculable psychological significance. He indicated that he would take a quiet week-end and do nothing regarding the notification for a few days. He inquired of Joxe exactly what was basis French action, adding that he thought it was control of the bomb. Joxe said no, it was integration of forces that General De Gaulle opposed. Joxe still seems to think some change in Mediterranean command set-up could solve this problem. We all agreed that in that case a solution was possible.

Joxe emphasized that De Gaulle is definitely not trying to destroy NATO, nor playing any game with Soviets. He had long since abandoned his “bridge” idea. However, Joxe did not feel that package attempt to solve IRBM, atomic storage, integrated air force problems all at one swoop with De Gaulle would be possible, but Joxe did think this specific Mediterranean matter could be worked out satisfactorily.

Spaak emphasized fact that normal NATO formula for consultation had been ignored by France in this instance and also that smaller nations would not concur in French claim that this was purely French national matter. Joxe understood all this.

At one point Joxe said US abstention on Algerian vote was root of whole matter, for it still rankled De Gaulle, who frequently brought it up.

I asked Joxe what France would want from her allies with respect to Algeria but received no clear reply.

He did emphasize, however, at this juncture that he hoped matter would get little publicity for French public opinion could become very worked up against NATO easily as result of repressed frustrations over Algerian war and widespread belief that France’s allies not sufficiently understanding of sacrifices she making, etc., and widespread support of anything which De Gaulle proposes at this juncture.

I remarked that Adenauer–De Gaulle talks two days ago³ had strengthened alliance, but France’s action today had very definitely weakened it.

As matter probably will be discussed Monday between Macmillan and De Gaulle, I would suggest that if Department has any further views they be transmitted London or here before then.

Reference Department’s 7948 to London, rptd Paris 3246,⁴ I trust Department will take no final decision with respect tripartite talks until there has been more time for reflection of exactly what French move means to all of us and what in our own best interests is most efficacious method of dealing with problem French action presents.

Lyon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–759. Secret. Repeated to London.
1. No specific record of Burgess’ suggestion has been found, but in Polto 2525 from Paris, March 6, he reported that he had asked de Leusse “again” if there was any possibility of holding off the French letter. (ibid., 740.5/3–659)
2. Macmillan met with De Gaulle in Paris on Monday and Tuesday, March 9–10. No detailed record of these conversations has been found, but for Macmillan’s brief summary, see Part 2, Document 359.
3. See footnote 1, Document 193.
4. Telegram 7948 to London, March 6, noted that the Department of State did not favor tripartite talks on the French fleet problem because it directly involved NATO. The fact that the French had just announced their decision to NATO raised the question put by Herter to Alphand on March 3 as to the possibility of continuing the talks, since the French action appeared to be the “antithesis in spirit to their expressed desire for closest collaboration with British and ourselves.” No U.S. decision had yet been taken on this issue. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/3–559)