Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

266. Report Prepared by the Consultant to the Department of State (Bowie)⁰

August 1960.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC NATIONS: TASKS FOR THE 1960’s

Summary

CHAPTER ONE: Challenge of the 1960’s

1. Basic Goals (pp. 19–23)

The Atlantic nations must try, over the long run, both:

(a) to shape the basic forces at work in the world, so as to create a viable world order; and

(b) to prevent the Sino-Soviet Bloc from undermining that order or from dominating non-Communist countries.

2. Major Tasks (pp. 24–25)

To fulfill this dual goal, the Atlantic nations must:

(a) assure their defense;

(b) assist modernization of less developed areas;

(c) develop a common strategy toward the Bloc;

(d) mobilize the resources required to accomplish their purposes;

(e) create a political framework within which they can work together to these ends.

This report analyzes these five tasks and the kind of actions which the Atlantic nations must undertake in order to discharge them. In pursuing these tasks, the Atlantic Community should rediscover the cohesion and sense of purpose which marked its creation over a decade ago.

CHAPTER TWO: NATO Defense

1. The Problem (pp. 27–38)

During the 1950’s, NATO’s strategy was based on decisive US superiority in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Under these conditions, the strategy was effective in deterring aggression and maintaining the confidence of our allies.

Growing Soviet missile-nuclear capabilities are now eroding the credibility of the threat of a strategic nuclear response to less than all-out Soviet attack. In consequence, NATO Europe may become vulnerable to threats of both limited aggression and nuclear blackmail: Europeans will fear both an excessive NATO response to limited aggression and the absence of a US strategic response to greater threats. The Soviets may seek to exploit this vulnerability for divisive effects.

[2 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. Basic Approach (p. 38)

A viable NATO strategy for the 1960’s must:

(a) enhance the non-nuclear capability of Shield forces to resist attack by Soviet ready forces and substantially lessen their dependence on nuclear weapons;

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. Revised Shield Strategy (pp. 39–51)

The enhanced non-nuclear capability could be based on central front Shield forces somewhere near SACEUR’s target of 30 divisions, which will come within reach when the German build-up is completed. These forces must be better trained and equipped and have more adequate reserves. The added costs may be partially offset by some economies, and should be well within NATO capabilities. Our NATO allies should be the more willing to meet these costs, because they would be related to the only kind of strategy that makes sense for European countries.

[7 paragraphs (2-1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]

5. Evaluation (pp. 65–72)

The above Shield and deterrent proposals would be inter-dependent. Together with US strategic power, they would deter Soviet military actions against the NATO area; they would also safeguard against Soviet blackmail for divisive or political purposes, and go far to meet legitimate European concerns.

CHAPTER THREE: The Atlantic Nations and the Less Developed Countries

1. The Problem and the Atlantic Nations’ Stake In It (pp. 73–79)

The Atlantic nations have a vital interest in the continued independence, internal cohesion, and stability of the less developed nations.

This interest is only likely to be fulfilled if the less developed countries can progress toward modernization under moderate governments and through evolutionary means. The obstacles are formidable; decades or even generations will be required.

Basic responsibility for achieving this progress must rest with the less developed countries. The Atlantic nations can make a significant contribution, however, since they possess most of the needed outside resources.

2. Financial and Technical Aid (pp. 79–86)

Over the next decade, the Atlantic nations should plan to double or triple their financial aid to the less developed countries. If equitably shared, this burden can be reasonably assumed by healthy Atlantic economies.

It will be more difficult to meet the need of many less developed countries for people and institutions capable of effectively launching and prosecuting their own development programs. To do this, they will require the advice and services of outside experts, help in training their own officials and experts, and assistance and encouragement in their self–help efforts.

Bilateral programs by the Atlantic nations will be important in meeting this need. They should be administered for their long–term effect on the less developed countries’ modernization, rather than for short–term political or commercial advantage.

International and private agencies have many advantages in meeting the need defined above: Their intimate participation in nation–building is more likely to be welcome; they are better able to insist on rigorous self–help; and their efforts are less apt to serve as a precedent for Soviet activity. The Atlantic nations should, therefore, make a special effort to enhance the effectiveness of international and private aid to less developed countries.

(a) They should support making the UN Special Fund¹ into a key instrument for helping governments of less developed countries plan and organize their over–all development programs. They should favor enlarging the Fund’s scope and resources and giving it policy direction of related UN programs, as necessary to this end.

(b) They should support an increasing role for the IBRD and IMF in advising governments of less developed countries, and an expansion in the resources of the IBRD’s affiliate—the International Development Association.²

(c) They should establish a Development Center to promote (i) two–way contacts between civic, business, and professional and labor groups in the Atlantic and less developed nations; (ii) the recruiting and training of young people in the Atlantic nations for service in less developed areas; and (iii) research on key development problems.

3. Trade With Less Developed Countries (pp. 87–93)

In view of the dependence of the less developed countries on trade for foreign exchange, the Atlantic nations should:

(a) cooperate in developing feasible methods for mitigating the effects on less developed countries of drastic changes in prices of their primary exports; and

(b) reduce the barriers to these countries’ exports of manufactured products. This reduction might be undertaken simultaneously by all the Atlantic nations, so that its burden could be shared. The domestic impact might be cushioned by compensatory assistance to the groups most directly affected.

4. Public Order (pp. 93–97)

The Atlantic nations should seek to enhance UN capabilities for maintaining peace and order in less developed countries. They should be prepared to earmark contingents or transport facilities for use by future United Nations forces, and they should urge other countries to do the same.

The US and some other Atlantic nations should maintain effective forces which could be used, in limited operations, to help less developed countries to maintain order or resist aggression.

CHAPTER FOUR: Relations with the Communist Bloc

1. Basic Approach (pp. 99–101)

In concerting their strategy regarding relations with the Bloc, the Atlantic nations must reconcile the requirements of simultaneously competing with and dealing with the Bloc. They need to maintain both:

(a) an unremitting awareness of Bloc hostility, even when the Bloc is following a soft line; and

(b) a continuing desire for useful relations with the Bloc, even when tensions are at their peak.

2. Economic Relations (pp. 102–105)

The Atlantic nations should maintain existing limited controls on trade, partly as a stand–by safeguard, and should also agree to hold the annual volume of private credits to the Bloc to approximately the existing level.

3. Exchanges (pp. 105–107)

The Atlantic nations should press for widening contacts with the Bloc, and should:

(a) try to agree on common objectives and guidelines for their bilateral exchange programs;

(b) exchange information secured through these programs among themselves.

4. Psychological Warfare (pp. 108–109)

The Atlantic nations should seek greater coordination of objectives and actions in psychological warfare against the Bloc, in order to increase its potential impact.

5. Arms Control (pp. 109–113)

The NATO countries should seek more actively to develop arms control measures which would serve to reduce the risk of accidental war, to hinder the spread of national nuclear capabilities, to stabilize deterrence, and possibly to enhance regional security in Europe.

In order to facilitate genuine negotiation, the NATO allies should consider allowing the US to negotiate with the USSR in accord with agreed policy. In that case, the US should consult regularly with its NATO partners about the progress of negotiations.

CHAPTER FIVE: Resources of the Atlantic Community

The steady growth and effective use of resources in the Atlantic nations is essential for meeting the tasks ahead. To this end:

1. The Atlantic nations, especially the larger ones, should concert their economic policies more effectively through OECD to stimulate more rapid growth. They should be willing to discuss freely all aspects of domestic economic policies and should seek to arrive at a common view of appropriate policy objectives and priorities. (119–121)

2. They should consistently seek to reduce and remove restrictions on trade. The US should take the lead by drastically revising its trade agreement legislation to permit negotiation of substantial tariff restrictions in GATT. The long–range goal should be to move toward free trade, at least among the more advanced nations. (121–127)

3. The US should join a reconstituted European Monetary Agreement. (127–128)

4. The Atlantic nations should make a renewed effort to ensure fuller and more concerted use of their scientific capabilities. (128–134)

5. They should expand research and development to meet NATO’s need for non–nuclear weaponry; and should intensify efforts to secure coordinated production of major military matériel in Europe, and eventually throughout the Alliance. (134–141)

CHAPTER SIX: Requisite Political Framework

Concerting of policies and actions by the Atlantic nations, as discussed in prior Chapters, will require a firmer political framework.

1. Evolving Relations (pp. 143–148)

The creation of an adequate framework is complicated by the fact that relations among the Atlantic nations are in transition. With booming recovery, European nations have regained their confidence and aspire to a larger role in the Alliance and in world affairs. Their total potential would justify and support such a role, if effectively marshalled in an integrated Europe. With the existing disparity in strength and influence, however, even the largest of the existing European nations cannot now be an equal partner with the US. Tensions are generated by this conflict between desire and reality and by differing policies for curing it on the part of the British, and the European Community, and among the members of that Community.

2. Structure (pp. 149–154)

The most radical answer would be Atlantic Confederation. But whatever its ultimate merits, it would be premature at this stage—a source of division and weakness and not of strength. It should not, however, be foreclosed.

The more practical course is to encourage the European Community to become an effective entity, if possible with Britain as a full member, in the interests of the Atlantic Community and of Britain. With comparable resources, the US and a European Community could become full and equal partners for joint policy and action and could fashion the necessary instruments to give effect to their partnership.

3. Improving Existing Instruments (pp. 154–159)

In the meantime, NATO and OECD must be strengthened, especially for the concerting of basic planning and policies of their members. Several measures are suggested:

• [1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]
• (b) An Atlantic Planning Group should be created to help develop a consensus on the common Atlantic interests on basic issues. Composed of three to five senior and distinguished men, not representing any nation but speaking as individuals, this group would recommend to NATO Foreign Ministers long–range objectives and policies.
• (c) To facilitate NATO–OECD coordination, key member states of both agencies should have a single national delegation to both, under a representative able to speak for his Government and to influence its policy making.
• (d) To foster wider public understanding and support, it would be desirable: (i) to expand the NATO and OECD information program; (ii) to develop the role of the NATO Parliamentarians in relation to both NATO and OECD; (iii) to foster the nascent Atlantic Institute, especially as a basis for wider public activity.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Bowie Report. Secret. The report comprised a title page, table of contents, Bowie’s letter of transmittal to Secretary Herter, a summary, and six chapters. Only the summary is printed here. Herter first proposed such a report at the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Paris on December 15, 1959; see footnote 7, Document 238. Background on the invitation to Bowie, former Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, 1955–1957, and the kind of study the Department of State wanted prepared is in a memorandum from Ivan B. White to Merchant, February 20. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017)

   Attached to the source text is a memorandum from John A. Calhoun (S/S) to Goodpaster, August 29, which noted that the Secretary had not yet seen the report. That memorandum bears the President’s initials. Comments on the Bowie report are ibid.; additional documentation is ibid., Central File 740.5. An October 10 letter from Herter thanked Bowie for preparing the report. (ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017)

1. The U.N. Special Fund, established on January 1, 1959, assisted less–developed countries to accelerate their economic growth by sponsoring projects designed primarily to facilitate public or private capital investment.
2. The International Development Association, an international agency composed of 15 nations for financing economic growth in the less developed nations, came into being on September 26 as an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.