Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

265. Memorandum of Discussion at the 457th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

August 25, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Increased Nuclear Sharing With Allies (NSC 5906/1, paragraph 24–c; NSC 5910/1, paragraph 42–a; NSC Actions Nos. 2140–b, 2166–b–(9), 2204 and 2274–d and –e; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 23, 1960)¹

Mr. Gray began his briefing on the subject by reading the first two sentences of Paragraph 1, all of Paragraph 2, and all of Paragraph 3 of his Briefing Note. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)²

The President said that a number of new ideas on the subject of nuclear sharing had been presented to him and he thought that they should be thrown in the hopper. One such idea came from Mr. Robert Bowie, for whom the President had a great deal of admiration.³ Mr. Bowie has been making a study in the State Department of the reorientation of some strategic concepts from the political point of view. [9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The President thought that Mr. Bowie’s ideas were sufficiently challenging to old concepts to warrant serious consideration in any discussion of nuclear sharing. The President said that after an hour’s conversation with Mr. Bowie, it had been arranged that Mr. Bowie would return to confer with the President on September 12 together with General Norstad. The President wondered whether it would be profitable to discuss at this meeting the pros and cons of increased nuclear sharing presented in the paper before the Council. The President remarked that Mr. Bowie had convinced him that many current ideas, including some which he (the President) had held, were not sacrosanct.

Mr. Dillon reported that Mr. Bowie is preparing a written report which should be available by the end of the week.

[9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bowie had had a great deal to say about deterring small wars. The President was unable to agree with Mr. Bowie on this point. It seemed to the President that the risk of a small war becoming a general war was so great that we must place our main reliance on strategic deterrence. The President felt so uncertain in his own mind about nuclear sharing that he would like to see the problem restudied.

Mr. Gray remarked that he had exerted a certain amount of pressure in order to have the subject of nuclear sharing discussed at this Council meeting. Some of the agencies concerned were not fully ready for the discussion but he had felt it was desirable to bring the matter up in order that a decision might be made on whether to seek legislation at the present session of Congress. The President remarked that when he had referred to the possibility of seeking legislation on nuclear sharing at this session of Congress (at the August 1 NSC Meeting in Newport),⁴ he had not known what the current session of Congress would be like. It was clear by now that the present session of Congress would engage primarily in politics and that no legislation on nuclear sharing could be passed.

Mr. Gray then referred to the problem of nuclear submarine sharing. [12 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Gray, after expressing a certain amount of surprise that there was no real difference between the agencies on nuclear submarine sharing, wondered whether the Council should not attempt to settle the nuclear submarine problem at this meeting. Secretary Gates felt that the problem of nuclear submarine sharing could not properly be dissociated from the other problems set forth in the paper.

[3 paragraphs (1-1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Gates thought the subject of nuclear sharing had been scheduled on the Council agenda without any intent to arrive at firm decisions at this meeting. He felt some very critical questions were involved, including our attitude toward France, that is, whether we would or would not assist France to achieve a nuclear capability. He believed a decision on this question would be required within the next few months. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Gates did not want to delay recognition of the fact that critical decisions need to be made soon. The main point of the Council discussion today would be to focus attention on the problems of nuclear sharing, to have the Council members understand these problems, and to ask Council members to think them over carefully. However, Secretary Gates felt that decisions on nuclear sharing should not be postponed longer than two months. Secretary Gates also felt that the problem of nuclear sharing with France was the key to the entire problem of nuclear sharing. He asked whether General Twining wished to add anything.

General Twining believed that Secretary Gates’ remarks had covered the subject. He wanted to be sure that the President understood the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [19-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[2 paragraphs (15 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Dillon agreed with Secretary Gates that the nuclear sharing problem was an important one and that decisions concerned with it should not be long delayed. He felt, however, that the way in which the problem had been posed in the paper before the Council for discussion today created difficulties. The problem as stated in the paper was too broad. General Twining had succinctly expressed the views of the State Department. Secretary Dillon agreed that the problem of nuclear sharing was essentially the problem of what to do about France. [51-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Summarizing, Secretary Dillon said the problem of nuclear sharing was really the problem of France and the effect of nuclear assistance to France on our other NATO allies. If U.S. nuclear assistance to France would create jealousy in NATO, then we should be reluctant to give such assistance. In any case, Mr. Dillon believed that the problem stated in the paper was too broadly stated and that it should be narrowed down to focus on France.

[2 paragraphs (25 lines of source text) not declassified]

General Twining remarked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had known Mr. Bowie for some time. They felt he was a very persuasive individual but they did not always agree with him and they hoped that any proposals which he might make would be passed along to the JCS for comment. The President said the JCS should be present when Mr. Bowie makes his presentation on the future of NATO. Secretary Dillon remarked that Mr. Bowie was preparing a written report which would be transmitted to the JCS.

[2 paragraphs (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Anderson noted that the Council had discussed the question of whether MC–70 is still a valid planning document. He pointed out that if any changes were to be made in the MC–70 concept, such changes might have considerable effect on the U.S. budget. Since December would be budget time, he wondered whether State and Defense could accelerate their consideration of the MC–70 requirements.

Secretary Gates did not believe that MC–70 requirements could be changed in time to have any effect on the FY 1962 budget. MC–70 was a plan for the years 1958–1963. However, it would be possible to take a close look at the 1963 MC–70 figures. Mr. McCone asked when the review of MC–70 requirements would come up. Secretary Gates said that the review was now going on. Secretary Dillon said the fundamental review for 1963 would take place next year. Mr. Irwin pointed out that General Norstad was engaged in an extensive review of MC–70 as it concerned the last two years of the 1958–1963 period. He did not know whether the Norstad review was directed toward a fundamental change in MC–70 or whether it was focussed on extending the MC–70 plan beyond 1963. In any case, the Norstad study which was due to be completed in about two months, would provide a framework for a review of MC–70 within this government. Secretary Gates remarked that thus far General Norstad had been unwilling to reduce any MC–70 requirements.

Secretary Dillon believed that if the U.S. desired a change in MC–70, it should inform the NATO Council that a review is necessary. The U.S. should then suggest that the NATO Council examine the political directive under which MC–70 was prepared and ask the NATO military commanders for a new plan. The earliest time at which we could begin this process would be the NATO Council meeting in December. However, he would not want to suggest to the NATO Council a review of MC–70 unless there was agreement in this government as to the military direction we wished to take in NATO. Mr. McCone felt the development of Polaris since the formulation of MC–70 was a good reason for a review of the MC–70 concept. Secretary Dillon agreed but repeated that he would be reluctant to suggest a complete review of MC–70 before our own military objectives were clarified. Mr. Stans pointed out that both the U.S. and its allies had failed to fulfill MC–70 requirements. Secretary Gates believed that General Norstad would argue that Polaris would only be a substitute for the fighter bombers that he has been losing. General Norstad would probably oppose any fundamental change in the policy reflected in MC–70. Mr. Stans asked whether Mr. Dulles’ report on reductions in Soviet forces had any bearing on a review of MC–70.⁵ Secretary Dillon believed the key factor was whether we could develop a new concept as to the ground forces needed on the front line in Europe. If it was determined that thirty divisions were still needed, a reshuffle of forces rather than a fundamental review of MC–70 was indicated. Secretary Anderson felt that an equally important question was whose divisions are needed on the front line. Secretary Dillon believed that if we did not have some of our own divisions there, we would have to provide military assistance to nations whose divisions were there as long as a level of thirty divisions was considered necessary.

The President felt it was difficult to understand why the European countries could not provide more divisions. He pointed out that France and other European countries had maintained very large armies until 1914. Secretary Dillon said these armies where largely conscripted armies. The President agreed. However, these conscripted armies did not have the wealth of equipment present day armies possess. The President repeated his view that Europe should provide the ground force if the U.S. is to be expected to provide SAC, a navy, and nuclear capability. Secretary Dillon felt the Germans could certainly provide a few more divisions. The President believed the Germans were dragging their feet.

Mr. Gray remarked that the discussion had been a long one in view of the fact that the President had asked for no discussion. He then asked whether or not the JCS should consider the desirability, from a military point of view, of recommending changes in MC–70 in preparation for possible U.S. proposals to the NATO Council in December. Mr. Gray also hoped that the President would set the deadline for resubmission of the report on nuclear sharing to the Council. He wondered whether the President wanted the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, to prepare a revised report or whether this was a task for the Planning Board.

The President said we would be studying this question in a vacuum until we knew what we would get Congress to do. He felt careful consideration should be given to the problem of consultation with Congress. Mr. McCone said it was clear from the law and from legislative history that not even France at the present time qualified for receipt of U.S. nuclear information or material. We could, of course, endeavor to change the law or reinterpret the legislative history. Secretary Dillon asked when France would qualify. Mr. McCone said that this was a difficult question to answer. From legislative history it was clear that conducting a few nuclear tests did not qualify a country to receive U.S. nuclear information or material under the law.

[1 paragraph (6-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Gates believed the legislative question should be studied carefully and that the Administration should seek to diminish the influence of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on these matters. The Attorney General⁶ felt the law could be reinterpreted if such reinterpretation were believed desirable. He believed such a reinterpretation would be acceptable if we could show Congress that it was in our security interests.

The President did not favor an attempt to reinterpret the law. He believed we should place our case on nuclear sharing before the military committees of Congress and ask them to secure Congressional endorsement of our program. The defense of the Western world was involved in this question and the President did not want to take up such a question with the Joint Committee. Secretary Gates agreed. The President said Senator Russell and Representative Vinson⁷ would give serious attention to Administration proposals. Secretary Gates said we should at least consult the military committees of Congress at the same time we consult the Joint Committee. The President preferred to put the problem where it belonged, that is, with the military committees of Congress. We need not apologize for talking to the military committees about this problem. We might even want to talk to the foreign relations committees. Consulting with the Joint Committee only amounted to letting politicians tell us how to carry out our defense policy. Mr. McCone agreed with the President’s remarks.

Mr. Gray suggested that the President ask the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, taking into account General Norstad’s views and Mr. Bowie’s recommendations, to prepare a revised report on nuclear sharing. The President believed that the Secretary of Defense together with the Chairman, JCS, should consult with the military committees of Congress. The committees should be made aware of our problem; they should be told that the present pattern is not necessarily the best for purposes of defense and that we could do better in the nuclear field for less money under new arrangements. Secretary Gates agreed that such a procedure would at least dilute the present influence of the Joint Committee.

Secretary Gates then suggested that Mr. Gray should set the deadline for resubmission of the nuclear sharing report to the Council and should make the arrangements for preparation of the report. Mr. Gray said he hoped the President would assign the responsibility to some official or officials. The President said that in talking to the chairmen of the military committees of the Congress, Senator Russell and Representative Vinson, we should present our whole case. Mr. Gray said that the difficulty was that we did not yet know what our case is. He hoped the President would issue a directive concerning future Council consideration of the problem. The President said that Mr. Gray should arrange for preparation and early submission to the Council of a revised report on future nuclear capabilities in the NATO area, including recommendations regarding France.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the draft report, prepared by an Interdepartmental Working Group consisting of officials of the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, as a response to NSC Action No. 2274–d and –e, and transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 23, 1960.

b. Noted the President’s directive that the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs arrange for the preparation, not later than October 15, 1960, of a report on U.S. policy regarding future nuclear weapons capabilities in the NATO area, including recommendations as to whether or under what circumstances it might be in U.S. security interests to enhance the nuclear weapons capability of France. This report should contain suggestions regarding appropriate legislative action, if necessary, to carry out policy recommendations. This report should take into account two studies on NATO, one by Mr. Robert Bowie for the Department of State and the other by the Department of Defense which is being prepared in connection with the joint State–Defense report to the Planning Board and the Council on “The Future of NATO”, as called for by NSC Action No. 2219–b, and the forthcoming consultations with General Norstad.

[Here follows the remaining agenda item.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs.
1. Regarding paragraph 24–c of NSC 5906/1, paragraph 42–a of NSC 5910/1, and NSC Action Nos. 2166 and 2274, see footnotes 7 and 8, Document 261. Regarding NSC Action No. 2140, see Part 2, Document 144, footnote 9. NSC Action No. 2204 is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The August 23 memorandum transmitted the draft report on nuclear sharing with Allies prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC. (ibid., NSC 6017)
2. Not printed.
3. See Document 266.
4. See Document 261.
5. At the preceding meeting of the NSC on August 18, Allen Dulles “indicated that he had intended to brief the Council on Soviet military realignment and force reduction but that he would either postpone this item to a later meeting or would circulate the material.” (Memorandum of discussion, August 25; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) This material, if circulated, has not been found.
6. William P. Rogers.
7. Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
8. Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 2292, approved by the President on September 13. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)