Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

261. Memorandum of Discussion at the 454th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Force Commitments to NATO (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Issues of U.S. Policy Regarding the Defense Posture of NATO”, dated November 5 and 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2149; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Future NATO Commitments”, dated November 20, 1959; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Force Commitments to NATO”, dated July 27, 1960)¹

Mr. Gray briefly introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)² Mr. Gray then called on Secretary Douglas³ who said that Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin would make the presentation.

Mr. Irwin said his remarks would be concerned with the Department of Defense recommendation for the U.S. force figures to be included in the U.S. reply to the Annual NATO Questionnaire.⁴ This Questionnaire covered major combat force elements of the Army, Navy and the Air Force committed to NATO. Replies to the Questionnaire were due last July 1 in accordance with the regular NATO schedule but last year our reply was not submitted until August 15 and this year apparently NATO does not anticipate a reply until August 15–20. So far, five countries have replied to the Annual NATO Questionnaire. Mr. Irwin felt that no pressure would be exerted on the U.S. because of the tardiness of its reply unless the reply were delayed beyond September 1. Mr. Irwin then explained the meaning of a viewgraph chart showing the Army forces to be supplied NATO by the U.S. to meet MC-70 requirements.⁵ He noted that our proposed reply relating to Army forces raised no problems. He anticipated that NATO would adopt our Army figures without discussion since we are substantially meeting MC-70 requirements in this area. Short-falls in Little Johns are compensated for by an overage in Honest Johns; while a short-fall in Redstone missiles is overcome by an overage in Corporal and Sergeant missiles.

Mr. Irwin then explained the meaning of two charts relating to U.S. naval forces committed to meet MC-70 requirements. He said that the information on the chart with respect to cruisers was somewhat deceptive since “Category C” cruisers, i.e. those available after D+30, were actually in mothballs. Substantial short-falls shown on the chart for early warning aircraft were due to the fact that the original MC-70 plans called for some land-based planes which have now been replaced by carrier planes. Thus the short-falls shown on the chart for early warning aircraft have actually been compensated for by an increase in other capabilities. Mr. Irwin anticipated that the U.S. would have no problems in NATO with its reply on naval forces.

Mr. Irwin explained the third chart which related to U.S. Air Force elements committed to NATO. He said the MACE overage of one squadron was deceptive since it represented a splitting in half of one of the squadrons. The chart also showed a shortage in transport aircraft but the transport aircraft actually deployed had the same ton-mile capacity as the MC-70 requirements. The short-fall with respect to reconnaissance aircraft would be partly compensated for by F–105s as replacements for two B–66 squadrons. This substitution had not yet been accepted by CINCEUR but no problem was anticipated. The major problem in connection with air forces committed to NATO, indeed the major problem with respect to the U.S. reply to the NATO Questionnaire, revolved around the short-fall of six squadrons of fighter bombers in 1962 and 1963. The rationale for reducing our current deployment of twenty-four squadrons by six squadrons lay in the increase of indigenous capabilities, the deployment of IRBMs committed to NATO and the capability of the U.S. Tactical Air Command to transfer tactical squadrons overseas at short notice. If the six squadrons were left in Europe, the cost would be $54 million over the three years 1958–1960 and the personnel cost would be 30,000 spaces. Although the maintenance of U.S. Air Force strength in the NATO area was one of our priority objectives, the Department of Defense had, after much consideration, decided to recommend a reduction in air forces committed to NATO in 1962 and 1963. Such a reduction would permit transfers of personnel and funds to active ICBM squadrons, the addition of a B–52 wing, an increase in SAC dispersal, increased outer space activities, increased efforts to attain the SAMOS capabilities, and improved electronic capabilities. The Air Force had already re-allocated the 30,000 spaces involved.

Secretary Herter noted that Mr. Irwin had been speaking from time to time about reduction in our forces committed to NATO. Secretary Herter felt that the short-falls were not so much reductions as a failure to make planned increases. Mr. Irwin said the short-falls represented failure by the U.S. to meet the goals set for it by MC-70. Secretary Herter wondered whether the short-falls were not a reduction from some figure which it was intended to attain in the future. The President said real reductions were involved since the Defense Department reply to the NATO Questionnaire proposed the elimination of some U.S. forces presently stationed in Europe, e.g. the fighter bomber squadrons.

Mr. Irwin said the principal problem connected with the proposed U.S. reply to the NATO Questionnaire revolved around the short-fall of six fighter bomber squadrons. Secretary Douglas believed this was a difficult political problem. Last year we had proposed a reduction in these forces but had failed to secure proper consideration of the matter in NATO. The twenty-four fighter bomber squadrons now committed to NATO will remain committed through Calendar Year 1961. Mr. Douglas felt this was the point at which we became involved in the “numbers racket.” In fact, the capabilities of our forces committed to NATO had substantially increased. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Douglas said there were now 201 NATO alert fighter bombers of which 145 were U.S. planes; in 1963 there would be 356 such alert planes, 240 of which would be U.S.

The President, turning to Mr. Gray, said that studies and reports should be prepared on the whole concept of NATO, covering the way we became committed to MC-70 requirements and the current problems requiring consideration. We frequently discuss giving more support to our friends all over the world. Everyone seems to be in agreement that Europe is self-sustaining and is becoming wealthy. The President wondered why the European NATO countries could not defend themselves. Perhaps we had been carrying out our programs of assistance so long that we tended to take these programs for granted. Any studies prepared would of course be primarily for the use of the next administration. Such studies should provide an historical account of NATO, indicate what commitments the U.S. had made, describe how the MC-70 commitments came to be made, and estimate what Europe could do to defend itself. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary Herter reported that a study on NATO was being prepared in the State Department by Mr. Robert Bowie and would be completed in the next few days. Also, problems relating to NATO would come up tomorrow at a meeting the President was having with General Norstad and other officials.⁶ [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (13-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary Douglas said the long-range study of NATO was not directly related to the short-fall of six fighter bomber squadrons referred to by Mr. Irwin. Secretary Herter said the six squadrons were a morale factor. Secretary Douglas thought the importance of the six squadrons as a morale factor could be eliminated if their redeployment were properly explained.

Mr. Irwin noted that the NSC agenda contained four related items: U.S. Force Commitments to NATO, which the Council was now discussing; Commitments for Grant Military Assistance to Certain Free World Nations with Well-Developed Economies, the next item on the agenda; Contributions of the U.S. and other NATO Nations to the Collective Defense Posture; and the Future of NATO. The Contributions study had been delayed until the study on the Future of NATO was completed. Perhaps a more orderly procedure would have been to complete all the studies before considering the U.S. reply to the Annual NATO Questionnaire.

Mr. Gray felt that the discussion gave added impetus to the requirement which the Council had previously laid down for a review of the question of making nuclear weapons available to France and also to the broader studies of a multilateral nuclear authority and increased nuclear sharing.

Mr. Gray then said he wished to raise a technical question on the way short-falls were shown on Mr. Irwin’s charts. He wondered why a short-fall was shown in cases where NATO had agreed to accept some other form of force as compensation for a shortage. He had transport aircraft in mind particularly; while we had not provided all the transport aircraft shown in MC–70 requirements, we had provided aircraft with the same ton-mile capacity as the requirements. He thought we were putting ourselves in a bad light by showing a short-fall in such a case. Mr. Irwin replied that this was a matter of NATO bookkeeping. NATO follows the practice of showing any shortage from MC-70 requirements as a short-fall unless there is an exchange of written documents indicating General Norstad’s agreement to the substitution of one kind of force for another. Mr. Irwin agreed that it might be preferable to handle the matter as Mr. Gray was suggesting but believed the NATO bookkeeping practices raised no serious problems. Mr. Gray said he had a different view. Whenever the figures show a U.S. failure to provide the complete requirement, the U.S. will be accused of not doing its share. The President suggested that it would be desirable in the future to try to have MC–70 goals expressed in terms of specific items or their equivalents.

[3 paragraphs (28 lines of source text) not declassified]

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral presentation by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on the reply proposed by the Department of Defense to the NATO Annual Review Questionnaire (transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 27, 1960).

b. Agreed on the desirability of exploring the feasibility in the future of expressing MC–70 goals in terms of specific items or their equivalents.

c. Noted that studies on “Contributions of the U.S. and Other NATO Nations to the Collective Defense Posture” and “The Future of NATO” are in preparation by the Departments of State and Defense and will be submitted to the Council for consideration or discussion at an early meeting.

d. Noted the President’s directive that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, jointly report to the President on the advantages and disadvantages of arrangements which would permit the President, whenever he determines it to be in the U.S. security interest to do so:

(1) Either to sell or otherwise make available nuclear weapons to selected allies; or

(2) To seek creation of multilateral arrangements to assure nuclear efficiency in NATO.

e. Agreed that the study of “A Multilateral European Nuclear Authority directed by paragraph 24–c of NSC 5906/1, the study of “Possible Nuclear Assistance to France” directed by paragraph 42–a of NSC 5910/1, and the report on “Increased Nuclear Sharing with Allies” being prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2166–b–(9), should be completed promptly.⁸

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman, AEC, for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items. Regarding agenda item 2, see Document 262.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on August 4.
1. Regarding the November 5 and 10 memoranda and NSC Action No. 2149, see footnotes 1, 4, and 6, Document 228. The November 20 memorandum transmitted the President’s November 16 request that no NATO commitments be made without prior consideration by the NSC. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017) The July 27 memorandum enclosed a memorandum from John N. Irwin, II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, on U.S. force commitments to NATO. (ibid.)
2. Gray’s briefing note is not printed. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings held in the Eisenhower administration are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.
3. James H. Douglas, Jr., Acting Secretary of Defense.
4. Reference is to the 1960 NATO Annual Review Questionnaire, which has not been found.
5. Neither this chart nor the ones mentioned below has been found, but enclosures attached to Irwin’s July 27 memorandum (see footnote 1 above) contain breakdowns of U.S. MC-70 requirements, including shortfalls and overages, for the Army, Navy, and Air Force for calendar years 1960–1963.
6. The President actually met with Norstad on August 3; see Document 263.
7. Paragraphs a–e and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2274, approved by the President on August 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
8. Paragraph 24–c of NSC 5906/1, “Basic National Security Policy,” August 5, 1959, called for development of plans within the executive branch for the development of NATO arrangements for the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. NSC 5906/1 is scheduled for publication in volume III. Paragraph 42–a of NSC 5910/1, “U.S. Policy on France,” November 4, 1959, noted that the United States should seek French support and participation for a “multilateral European nuclear authority,” and study the possibility of providing France with nuclear information and weapons. (Department of State, S/S–OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385) See also Part 2, Document 144. NSC Action No. 2166 was taken by the NSC on December 16, 1959, and approved by the President on December 23. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)