Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

263. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Newport, Rhode Island, August 3, 1960, 2:45 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Norstad
• General Goodpaster

General Norstad first recalled that he had last seen the President just before Chancellor Adenauer visited the President.¹ When Gen. Norstad saw the Chancellor after the latter’s visit, to discuss with him the idea of a zone in which to test schemes for the inspection of disarmament, Adenauer said the President had never mentioned it to him.² In any event, Gen. Norstad in discussion with the Chancellor got nowhere. The Chancellor was dead set against the scheme. The President recalled that he had forgotten to mention the matter to the Chancellor and, because of this, had called the Chancellor to one side after lunch and raised the matter with him. Gen. Norstad said that it is not unusual for the Chancellor to forget things of this kind, particularly when he is tired, as he gets older.

Gen. Norstad then said that he had visited Turkey on Monday of this week,³ on the urgent invitation of Gen. Gursel extended last week.⁴ He found Gursel to be a steady, honest, dedicated man, capable of running the country. He also met with the “Committee of 38,” young officers who had taken over the government to try to get it on the proper track. Gen. Norstad said that he had reported on this matter to Sec. Herter before seeing the President.⁵ He told Mr. Herter he thought the military junta would succeed in the task it has set for itself. He thought these officers would get out of the government before they became corrupted. General Norstad said he thought the attitude of the U.S. toward the Gursel Government should be sympathetic. The President asked me to prepare a note that he might send to Gursel. (I did so, working out exact text with the State Department; the President approved the note for dispatch later the same day.)⁶

Gen. Norstad next said that he had received a complete “clean bill of health” from the doctors, and has been completely active for the last six weeks. He said his heart specialist was a Colonel Walker, who is to be Mattingly’s replacement at Walter Reed, and is a truly outstanding and fine man. Gen. Norstad next raised the question of succession for himself. He said he is not asking for relief, but can carry on for a reasonable time, such as a year, for example. The President said that he thought it would be a good thing for Norstad to stay for another year. He asked whether Gen. Norstad knows of any foreign government which does not want him to stay on. Gen. Norstad said he was aware of none. The President said Sec. Gates had spoken to him a time or two as to the possibility of assigning Gen. Lemnitzer as SACEUR. The President thought this probably means that Gates would like to have Adm. Burke⁷ as Chairman of the JCS. The President does not want this solution, however, and thinks it is time to give the Chairmanship to Gen. Lemnitzer. The President said there is need for stability in the top echelons of our armed services, and said he will tell Mr. Gates that he does not contemplate a change in Europe until Gen. Norstad wants to be relieved, or his health requires relief. Gen. Norstad said that he had put his personal feelings before the Joint Chiefs earlier in the day, and that none had expressed a contrary view.⁸

The President then went on to say that it is not possible to bring a man in “cold” to the position of SACEUR with prospect of success—that there must be a period in which he and the Europeans get to know each other. Gen. Norstad reverted to the point that he has now served about four years as SACEUR, and thinks this is generally about the correct length of tour. He added that if the Government has a better solution, that at any time he is quite ready to turn over the job. The President reiterated that he thought it would be best for Norstad to stay on for a year or so.

The President next raised the point that he has become very dissatisfied regarding our relationships with our allies in the matter of atomic weapons and missiles. The US Government seems to be taking the attitude that we will call the tune, and that they have inferior status in the alliance. He said he recognizes dangers and difficulties in bilateral, or selective arrangements, with only a few of the countries. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He stressed that we must not treat our allies as secondary in their role, but should solve the problems of the alliance functionally. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We must devise arrangements that will prevent untoward developments or misuse. This will, of course, not be easy. He thought Italy, Germany, France and Britain would all want such weapons. They should be handled as NATO weapons, to be utilized in “over-all or strategic purposes. He thought we should be as generous with our allies in this matter as we think they should be in other questions involving the alliance. He said he had considerable sympathy for the point of view of De Gaulle in this question. He is trying to build up his country, and we persist in treating them as second-rate. The President said this is why he wants the study to be made. He will make his recommendation and then leave the matter to his successor. Gen. Norstad said he strongly favored a multilateral solution, in which the weapons are turned over to NATO as an entity. He thinks bilateral solution would be destructive, and would involve discrimination against the Italians, Belgians, etc., which he thinks it very important to avoid. The President thought this might be accomplished by holding the control of the weapons at or above a certain echelon of NATO command. Gen. Norstad said he thought the problem could be solved on a NATO basis. There would be certain requirements for weapons. The US would make them available to the alliance during its life in its present form. The US could maintain custody, or joint custody, but NATO would exercise the essential control. Specifically, NATO authority would have the power of decision as to their use. The President asked whether Gen. Norstad thought Gen. De Gaulle would accept this arrangement. Gen. Norstad said he might not, but this offer would take away every legitimate complaint that De Gaulle now has. [9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

The President asked Gen. Norstad if he saw any reason why the French should not be helped to build an atomic submarine. Gen. Norstad said he would favor giving them this help. The President commented that the Atomic Energy Act is a very defective and “terrible” law, which has done great harm to the conduct of our relations with our allies. Gen. Norstad commented that the submarine raises an entirely different question with regard to the moral issue. He assumed we are not talking about a Polaris submarine with atomic missiles, and the President agreed. The President thought the allies would be wise to let the US carry the Polaris responsibility. At this point the President asked me to check the status of Gen. Norstad’s multilateral proposal of last year, and make sure that the three agencies studying the question give consideration to this proposal. He said the study should also include submarines.

Gen. Norstad asked that I have the Departments involved let Gen. Norstad know what they are doing in the matter.

Finally, Gen. Norstad said it would be useful to him if he could see some of the President’s letters to Gen. De Gaulle. He realized these are very tightly handled. The President commented that it could be embarrassing to him if this very private correspondence were to be circulated. He agreed, however, that Gen. Norstad might receive a memo giving the gist of the questions when a matter affecting SACEUR’s responsibility is involved. General Norstad said that Gen. De Gaulle is invariably extremely friendly in his manner toward him, and in his references to the President. The President said he would like to make some sort of a friendly gesture toward De Gaulle, particularly in light of recent reports that De Gaulle feels US policy is in the doldrums until a new administration comes in. Gen. Norstad confirmed that this is De Gaulle’s view. He added that De Gaulle is making the most of it to some extent to try to seize leadership, in concert with Adenauer.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 8.
1. A memorandum of Eisenhower’s conversation with Norstad on March 11 is ibid.
2. No record of Adenauer’s conversation with Norstad has been found. Norstad’s plan for an inspection zone has not been found.
3. August 1.
4. On May 27, the Turkish Government was overthrown by a military group headed by Lieutenant General Cemal Gürsel, who became President and Prime Minister.
5. On August 2, Norstad met with Herter and Department of State, Department of Defense, and Atomic Energy Commission officials. Memoranda of conversation on the items discussed are in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
6. Eisenhower’s brief message to Gürsel was transmitted in telegram 233 to Ankara, August 4. (ibid., Central Files, 611.82/8–460)
7. Admiral Arleigh S. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.
8. No other record of Norstad’s conversation with the JCS has been found.