Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

268. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

October 3, 1960, 11:45 a.m.–1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NATOMRBM Force

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• General Goodpaster
• Mr. Merchant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Mr. Kohler, Asst Secy
• Mr. Gates, Secy of Defense
• Mr. Douglas, Deputy Secy
• Mr. Irwin, Assistant Secy

By agreement with Mr. Merchant, Mr. Gates opened the presentation to the President of the proposals for the establishment of a NATOMRBM Force. He pointed out that it was basically a weapons modernization proposal. The project did not involve a revision of existing NATO strategic doctrine though this was also being considered apart from the proposal. A fundamental question was raised by the proposal with respect to the US contribution of five Polaris submarines, specifically, whether these should be new submarines beyond the existing procurement program or just considered as being on loan from the US program with some expectation of withdrawal.

The President commented that the proposal, as respects the US contribution, in a sense would not be fundamentally different than the existing situation as respects US contributions of troops to Europe and other national contributions. Basically the Polaris subs were mobile missile bases.

Mr. Merchant then presented the multinational features embodied in the plan and explained their purposes as being three–fold: first, to provide reassurance to our European allies who were beginning to have doubts, in the era of ICBM’s, as to the dependability from their point of view of a purely US controlled deterrent; second, to prevent the development of independent national nuclear capabilities; and, third, to provide a framework within which we might eventually consider the question of nuclear sharing. He pointed out that the plan would have two phases: first, the initial US contribution and, secondly, the NATOcontribution, presumably by the procurement of US Polaris missiles. Mr. Merchant then presented to the President the coordinated paper developed by State and Defense.¹

The President read the proposal through. He commented that it was difficult to see how SACEUR was so interested in targeting so far back from the front lines. Mr. Gates said that basically General Norstad was seeking replacement for his existing air strike force. Norstad needed a missile with a range of 300–1500 miles and had established a requirement for 300 such missiles by 1965 with an initial increment of 80 in 1963. He noted that Polaris is really not suitable for mobile land-based launchers but is the only MRBM available in the time-frame. Mr. Irwin pointed out that on the Soviet side their short range missiles could take out the bases now used by the strike aircraft.

The President then referred to his conversation with Mr. Robert Bowie.² He had listened for a long time to Mr. Bowie and had been thinking a great deal about the problem. He agreed with the proposal, and with Mr. Gates’ remarks about Polaris being too big really to be an acceptable mobile land–based missile. He really believed that if Polaris and ICBM missiles were properly coordinated no change would be required in NATO. There ensued some discussion about targeting, and about the attitudes and apprehensions of the European members of NATO. The President commented that the obligation for the US to act under the NATO provisions specifying that an attack on one was an attack on all was clear and that there was no doubt it would be observed by the US. However he recognized that there was a psychological benefit to more specifically reassuring arrangements. He realized and agreed that the five Polaris submarines should be separate from our own established program for Polaris procurement. Secretary Gates then cited the size of the present US program, with nineteen submarines now on order and plans that in fiscal year 1962 five more should be programmed plus five authorizations for lead items. The President said he had understood the whole program was contemplated for about 40 submarines and he thought we should go ahead now with authorizations for up to 40. Secretary Douglas said there was no agreement as yet among the services as between the figures of 25 and 45, with the relation of the Polaris program and other missiles such as the Pershing still to be decided. Secretary Gates stressed that the immediate problem was that of the financing in the FY 1962 budget which was now being developed. In this connection he said he feared there would be a lot of criticism from Congress about turning over control of these submarines to NATO. The President agreed there might be some difficulties and cited the possibility that there would be some Congressional demand for a stipulation that SACEUR must continue to be an American.

After reflecting for a bit, the President said that he thought by and large the proposal was a good idea. It might help to bridge the differences with De Gaulle if properly handled. Perhaps it would also have a good effect on the Dutch whom the President had always favored as being, along with the British, our staunchest allies. Parenthetically he commented he was also beginning to think that we ought to give the Dutch landing rights on the West Coast for KLM as he would like to help the Dutch. Commenting on this remark, Mr. Merchant pointed out that the submarine in question for the Dutch was not a Polaris sub but one of the Nautilus type, the same in fact in which the French were also interested as well as the Italians. He added that in any event there would be danger in national ownership of Polaris submarines under this program. Mr. Irwin explained further that the contemplated European contribution to the program would not necessarily be in the form of missiles in Polaris submarines but that their contribution might well be placed on coastal vessels instead—a much cheaper method—or other seaborne craft. The five US Polaris submarines would provide a strong base of greater relative invulnerability. This led the President to ask how vulnerable surface vessels would be, to which Secretary Gates replied that they would be vulnerable to air and submarine attack but because of their mobility not to missile attack. He explained further that the European missiles could be placed on coastal ships for a cost of approximately $225 million as against a cost of about $750 million in Polaris submarines.

The President then repeated that he favored the theory of the proposal. He favored the establishment of a multilateral force. He felt it would help pull NATO together and raise the morale of the NATO members. He foresaw that there would be considerable difficulties involving the question of the joint Atomic Energy Committee and the question of financing. In this latter connection he said he assumed that the European missiles would be bought from the United States and, after Secretary Gates had confirmed this, commented that this would please the Treasury in connection with the balance of payments problem.

At this point Secretary Gates pointed out that the most immediate problems were the need to be able to talk about the proposal with Spaak, who had already arrived here,³ and to make decisions in the near future as to the FY 1962 Defense budget.

Mr. Merchant then brought up the specific issue disagreed between Defense and State as respects the proposed requirement of mixed manning, summarizing the opposing positions.⁴ The President commented that he thought SACEUR would have to establish a multinational school in this connection to train the crews and commented this would be quite a problem. Mr. Merchant replied that the State Department did not think it would be too difficult. He explained that our concept would not be of multinational crews each representing all countries of NATO but rather of selected mixing of crews. The President said this would raise the problem of leadership and discipline. At present this had to be done by the separate laws and regulations by sovereign governments. At sea the captain must really be in charge and have the loyalty and obedience of the crew. He thought we might need a treaty between the member governments if we wanted to establish a NATO discipline.

Secretary Gates then set forth the Defense views, expressing strong opposition to the requirement for multinational manning. This was a very complicated and intricate problem involving questions of national psychology, religious differences and the like. Of course it would be possible to have a few riders of various nationalities on the submarines. On the whole, the Pentagon thought that NATO command and control was sufficient to establish the multilateral nature of the operation, though he said it was true that even the US Polaris subs were overloaded by about 20% for training purposes and that this might be possible with other nationalities.

The President wondered whether if the law were amended to permit the assignment of these submarines to SACEUR it might not in practice be necessary that each submarine have a national crew, so that while they operated under common command one unit, for example, would be Dutch, another German, etc.

Mr. Merchant again repeated that the State Department view did not foresee that each ship be a complete cross section of NATO but rather the selected mixing of relatively compatible nationalities in each crew. In any event he said we should not foreclose the possibility of such mixed manning.

The President turned to the question of ownership. He said that he understood that the title of the five initial submarines would stay vested in the United States. Mr. Gates confirmed this understanding.

Mr. Merchant then returned to the subject of manning and said that the State Department was willing to accept the formulation of Defense to the effect that this manning should be mixed to the extent considered feasible by SACEUR.

The President then repeated that he was in favor of the plan. He commented that we must get it understood in the Congress that we must have faith and confidence between allies if we wished our alliance to work. He said that he would like to see the necessary studies go ahead to implement the project. He referred to his meeting with Spaak the next morning (i.e., breakfast on October 4) but thought he would not discuss this MRBM proposal at this stage. Both Mr. Gates and Mr. Merchant cited the conversations Spaak had already had with Norstad on this general subject and the importance of being able to say something to him during his current visit.⁵ The President then agreed that the MRBM proposal could be discussed on a confidential basis with Spaak.

Secretaries Gates and Douglas then turned to the question of the Defense budgetary problems connected with the project and considerable discussion then ensued between them and the President as to whether all five submarines should be added to the FY 1962 budget or whether authorization should simply be sought, whether the procurement was funded in full and related matters. General Goodpaster pointed out in this connection that while authority for the full funding of the Polaris programs had been sought in the past, expenditure actually was stretched out. Summarizing this phase of the discussion the President said that we should go to Congress and show what the full plan involves. It was not sufficient to talk only in terms of the initial US contribution but we must disclose the eventual program including the NATO multilateral concept. We must be completely honest on the subject. He thought we should seek authorizing legislation probably as a separate package.

Mr. Merchant then returned to the matter of State-Defense differences and read the revised formula relating to multilateral ownership, financing, control and manning.⁶ Indicating his assent, the President commented that we must explain what is involved in the question of ownership including the matter of who gets the ships at the end of the treaty period. Mr. Merchant agreed that this question should be spelled out clearly. Some inconclusive discussion then ensued as respects the difference between the concepts embodied in the word ownership and those embodied in the word financing. In this connection Mr. Merchant emphasized that multilateral ownership was essential to the concept of a really integrated NATO force as distinct from national ownership.

In conclusion the President directed that the planning should go ahead in connection with the project on an urgent basis. It was important that the case be got ready for the Congress and presented. In the second stage at least he felt we were bound to have to have an amendment of the law. As to financing, he suggested that Defense could perhaps budget for two additional Polaris submarines in FY 1962.

Following the meeting Messrs. Gates, Irwin, Goodpaster, Merchant and Kohler met in General Goodpaster’s office to iron out remaining differences in the wording of the paper. (See Mr. Merchant’s letter to Mr. Irwin for final text.)⁷

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, NATO. Secret. Drafted by Kohler. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text is a memorandum from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Director of the Executive Secretariat, to Goodpaster, October 12, noting that Merchant had approved the memorandum and requesting his approval prior to distribution. A note in Goodpaster’s handwriting on Stoessel’s memorandum reads: “28 Oct. 60: Told State OK. G.”
1. Entitled “NATOMRBM’s”; attached to another memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Goodpaster on October 13. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
2. See Document 267.
3. In a briefing memorandum to the President dated October 2, prepared in connection with Eisenhower’s breakfast meeting with Spaak on October 4 (see Document 269), Herter noted that “we invited Spaak to come to Washington for a general discussion of the state of the Alliance.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
4. As stated in paragraph 4a of the State–Defense paper on NATOMRBMs (see footnote 1 above), the Department of State preferred the following language: “that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral ownership and control, and with a feasible system of mixed manning designed to guard against the possibility of the force being broken down or diverted into national forces.” The Department of Defense preferred the following version: “that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral financing and control, and with mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
5. One of Norstad’s conversations with Spaak on MRBMs is summarized in telegram 1024 from Paris, September 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/9–1060) Parts of this conversation were repeated by Norstad in Document 267. No other record of Norstad’s conversations with Spaak on MRBMs has been found.
6. The revised version of paragraph 4a agreed to by the Departments of State and Defense, which is attached to a letter from Merchant to Irwin, October 3, reads: “that the force be developed on the basis of multilateral ownership, financing and control, and with mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5611/10–360)
7. The revised version of the paper on NATOMRBMs is attached to the letter from Merchant to Irwin, October 3.