85. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schifter) to Secretary of State Shultz1

SUBJECT

  • Human Rights in the USSR

EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Tom Simons and I met on August 1 with Ambassador Kashlev, the head of the new Administration of Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs in the Soviet MFA. It appears that the Soviet intention in creating this office was to imitate our own Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, but it is clear that Kashlev has no interest in discussing specific cases of Soviet human rights violations.

Kashlev’s new office will apparently focus on areas such as social welfare, culture and information which the Soviets have traditionally tried to use as counterpoints to U.S. charges of specific human rights violations. This, of course, means that the new office will concern itself with what the Soviets consider major human rights problems outside the borders of the Soviet Union. Kashlev mentioned apartheid, hunger, and a freeze on nuclear testing. The new office may also have an important role in the current Soviet media campaign to sell the Soviet Union as a progressive state on humanitarian issues. But Kashlev emphasized that U.S. concerns about specific cases and other human rights issues would continue to be the responsibilities of the Consular Office of the Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Ministry of the Interior. He also mentioned that the Soviets are busy reconciling their legal regulations with their international commitments and ridding their practices of “bureaucratism and voluntarism” in the humanitarian area.

Tom and I said we welcomed the creation of the office as an opportunity to engage in dialogue on the issues and we made a major effort to present Kashlev with a list of our principal human rights concerns, including emigration, Sakharov, and cases of imprisoned or exiled Helsinki monitors.2 Tom made the particular point of emphasizing that human rights is an international rather than just a bilateral concern and is an integral element in our overall agenda for relations with the Soviet Union. He also made the point that poor Soviet perform [Page 257] ance on Jewish issues puts “quiet diplomacy” under strain and promises real problems for an eventual summit, since it provides speculation that a Soviet policy decision had been made to get rid of the Jewish emigration issue once and for all.

Kashlev was either unprepared or unauthorized to deal with the political aspects of the situation. His only relevant comment was that there has been no change in the way Jews will be treated, i.e. not differently from other Soviet citizens for emigration purposes.

Though the meeting was conducted in a reasonably friendly atmosphere, the benefits, if any, were small. It may help if Kashlev were to report accurately to his superiors what we said. On the other hand, he had very little to say. As long as his office is not prepared to discuss cases, the value of dialogue with him will be limited.

Your meeting with Shevardnadze3 will be an opportunity to deliver our human rights message directly to a top Soviet official.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P860121–1589. Confidential. Drafted by Schifter and cleared by Simons and Schmidt. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it.
  2. Not found.
  3. In telegram 299682 to USNATO, September 23, the Department provided a summary of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860724–0917)