Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

84. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

Geneva, March 21, 1986, 1640Z

2780. Subject: 42nd UN Human Rights Commission: Draft Summary Report.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: After six arduous weeks, the 42nd session of the UN Human Rights Commission concluded near midnight on March 14. The meeting was a success for the United States. Judged against its pre-session objectives,² the US Delegation, led Assistant Secretary Richard Schifter, achieved nearly all its goals including the adoption of US-drafted resolutions on Chile and religious intolerance. In contrast, the Soviets were forced to back down on a number of items and ended the session in disarray. Beginning with an opening statement on the budget crisis by Assistant Secretary Herndl,³ the Commission was unusually preoccupied with its own mechanics and that of its subordinate Sub-Commission. The session was also contentious, with divisions apparent between African and Latin American members. At a postmortem on the Commission March 19,⁴ MissOffs from Australia, India, Argentina, and the Philippines agreed that among the most positive aspects of the Commission was the unprecedented activity of the US Delegation in introducing and lobbying for its own resolutions. End summary.

3. After six arduous weeks, the 42nd session of the UN Human Rights Commission concluded near midnight on March 14. The meeting was a success for the United States. Judged against its pre-session objectives, the US Delegation, led by HA Assistant Secretary Richard Schifter, accomplished the following:

—Adoption of a resolution establishing a new Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance;

—Adoption of a US-drafted resolution on the human rights situation in Chile;

—A show of solid support among Western donor countries on a procedural vote relevant to our resolution critical of the Ethiopian resettlement program;

—Adoption of resolutions on Afghanistan and Iran which extended the mandates of the special rapporteurs for both countries;

—Adoption of a Costa Rican draft resolution on El Salvador; and,

—Adoption of a resolution on Guatemala which terminates the mandate of the special rapporteur and moves that country under the commission’s program for advisory services.

4. On the down side, the US failed by narrow margins on separate votes on two “name calling” paragraphs in resolutions dealing with the Middle East. We were also unable to obtain a resolution condemning apartheid which we could support. As in the past, African moderates (Senegal and Kenya) were unwilling to oppose the radicals (the National Liberation Movements and Tanzania) in order to remove objectionable paragraphs from the text. The US was joined by two other Western countries in abstaining on the resolution.

5. The USSR: While the US could look back with a sense of achievement, the Soviets must have left Geneva feeling that something had gone awry. In a series of abortive efforts the Soviets and their allies:

—Failed on a procedural motion to block consideration of the US resolution on religious intolerance by a vote of 7–22 (US) –14;

—Substantially modified their resolution on “Totalitarianism, Nazism and Facism” and accepted biannual consideration in the future in the face of a UK proposal to take the item off the agenda;

—Withdrew a draft resolution calling for the dissemination of only “truthful and balanced information on human rights”;

—Backed off on allegations against the Special Rapporteur on Torture and demands that the job be rotated annually on a geographical basis in allowing the resolution extending the rapporteur’s mandate to be adopted by consensus;

—Lost by a vote of 32 (US) –4–5 on an annual UK procedural motion to provide on a contingency basis for extra meetings for next year’s Commission. (The Soviets had argued for more than an hour that the West was acting in disregard for the UN’s current financial problems); and,

—Failed by a vote of 10–28 (US) –5 to defer consideration of all cases under the Commission’s Confidential 1503 Procedures until next year.

6. In a major intervention under the Commission’s agenda item on human rights violations worldwide, the Soviets alleged that the greatest threat to human rights was the US policy of training armed bands and sending them against emerging nations such as Angola, Afghanistan and Nicaragua. This theme was picked up in speeches by bloc members and reflected in a resolution on the use of mercenaries to impede the exercise of the right of self-determination in Southern Africa which was introduced by 18 African and Eastern co-sponsors and adopted by a vote of 31–5 (US) –7. The Soviets turned aside a Western procedural challenge and then easily adopted their biannual resolution on “the right to life”. They also succeeded in adopting a much watered down resolution on the right to adequate housing introduced by Mongolia.

7. Procedures: Beginning with Assistant Secretary General Herndl’s opening statement on the budget crisis, this Commission seemed preoccupied with the mechanics of its own operations and those of its subsidiary body the Sub-Commission (SC) on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Debate on the Sub-Commission was advanced in the order of business and 45 speakers were heard on the item. Comments were almost uniformly critical and there were numerous suggestions for reform. Finally, after the issue was also considered by an ad hoc working group, the Commission adopted resolutions which (A) placed restrictions on reports prepared by Sub-Commission rapporteurs and ended the practice of their personally reporting to the Commission; (B) extended the term of SC members to 4 years; (C) provided for review by the Commission and ECOSOC of all SC actions having financial implications; and, (D) encouraged greater independence from government influence on the part of SC members.

8. In a debate which ranged over the entire session, the Commission also chewed over the institution of “special rapporteurs” and other types of Commission representatives. Members seemed to agree that including the Sub-Commission, there were too many rapporteurs, too many studies in progress, and no real plan for ensuring that the end product was worthwhile or even relevant. Beyond that [illegible] countries argued that there was a hierarchy among “special rapporteurs”, “special representatives” and “independent experts” and that the choice of one or another of these “mechanisms” indicated the seriousness with which the Commission viewed the human rights situation in a given country. Non-aligned members supported by the East claimed that rapporteurs were drawn mainly from Western countries and that this practice could not continue. Greater concern was also shown over the role of NGO’s with highly critical views expressed by Brazil and Colombia. The issue did not surface in the WEOG, but suggestions were reportedly advanced in other groups on ways to curtail interventions by NGO’s, especially their attacks on governments.

9. In particular, concerns over procedure were evident in the commission’s consideration of countries under the confidential procedures established under ECOSOC Resolution 1503. Starting with the abortive GDR effort to defer the proceedings and the annual Soviet attack on their legitimacy, the Commission largely ignored the substance of the complaints and instead concentrated on debating which of the procedures available to it would send what signal to what country. Voting on countries was heavily influenced by a common perception that implementation of the procedures is unfair and that only small and friendless countries are caught while major offenders are not questioned. It also reflected changes in governments which occurred during the session. The Commission generally disregarding the recommendations of its working group terminated consideration of Gabon and the Philippines, and selected “milder intervention mechanisms” for Zaire and Haiti. The debate over Zaire and Haiti surfaced a regional division between the African and Latin American groups which developed into a bitter relationship between Commission Chairman Charry (Colombia) and African group leader Ambassador Sene (Senegal) that may affect the future role of both groups in the Commission.

10. General issues: While the Commission’s actions on the Philippines and Haiti were influenced by recent events in those countries,⁵ the Commission’s consideration of the Middle East and Southern Africa failed to reflect events in those areas. The debate on South Africa was pro forma and the resolutions adopted nearly identical to those of previous years. On Israel the debate and resolutions were also close reproductions of last year.⁶ The Israeli Delegation felt it scored minor victories: (A) When seven Western countries voted against the application of the Third Geneva Convention, to “Palestinian fighters captured by Israel” (Resolution L. 12B, OP. 6); and (B) by raising the issues of Soviet Jewry and human rights abuses in Arab countries. Israeli accusations that GDR Representative and Commission Vice President Hermann Klenner was a former member of Hitler’s SS received wide coverage in the US and European press.

11. On other issues of importance the Commission extended the mandate of its Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary and Summary Executions and, on a trial basis, the mandate of the Working Group on Disappearances for two years. The right to development was dealt with in a largely procedural resolution which left the task of drafting a declaration to the General Assembly, but provided for the convening of the working group for three weeks in January 1986 to “study measure necessary to promote the right”. Annual resolutions on self-determination in Western Sahara, Cambodia, and Afghanistan were adopted by large majorities in a form unchanged from previous years. An Argentine/India resolution on disarmament was adopted by a vote of 34–0–8 (US) after all references to placing disarmament on the Commission’s agenda were removed from the text. Finally, the Commission adopted a resolution condemning hostage taking which was introduced by France in a move motivated by the French elections.

12. In a “postmortem” on the Commission attended by MissOffs from Australia, India, Argentina, and the Philippines March 19, participants agreed that one of the most positive aspects of the Commission was the unprecedented activity of the US Delegation in introducing its own resolutions and lobbying on their behalf. All felt that adoption of the US-drafted resolutions on Chile and religious intolerance were the major achievements of the Commission. Although MissOffs may have disagreed with US on specific issues, all appeared reassured by this US expression of interest in the Commission.

Carmen

1. Source: Department of State, Subject Files, Human Rights, 1986, Lot 88D242, PREL—UNHRC 1986. Confidential. Sent for information to USUN New York.
2. See Document 77. In telegram 145 from Geneva, January 8, USUN further refined its strategy for the UNHRC. (Department of State, Subject Files, Human Rights, 1986, Lot 88D242, PREL—UNHRC 1986)
3. In telegram 2796 from Geneva, March 24, USUN outlined the rumored cuts to the UNHRC budget. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, DD860224–0771)
4. No record of this meeting has been found.
5. Reference is to the exiling of Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines, and Jean-Claude Duvalier, President of Haiti.
6. See footnote 2, Document 77.