Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

64. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, July 13, 1983, 1525Z

14781. Subject: Consultations in Capitals on Soviet Human Rights—London Meetings. Ref: A) State 186240,² B) State 185396. Madrid also USDel CSCE.³

1. (Confidential entire text.)

2. Summary: British Government officials and members of Parliament expressed appreciation for the Stoessel mission and general agreement with its goals during London meetings on 12 July. The Stoessel party called briefly on Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, met at length with Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Raymond Whitney and FCO staff, lunched with members of Parliament and FCO officials, and held meetings with European Parliament Human Rights Working Group Chairman Lord Nicholas Bethell, and with Soviet expert Prof. Peter Reddaway (London School of Economics). Highlights follow. Meetings with Professor Reddaway and Lord Bethell will be reported separately. End Summary.

3. Call on Foreign Secretary: After an overall presentation of US concerns, Ambassador Stoessel suggested continued consultations after the close of the Madrid CSCE meetings. Stoessel presented President Reagan’s letter to Prime Minister Thatcher,⁴ then asked for British views of the reasons for worsened Soviet human rights behavior, and for suggestions on how the West could encourage improvement.

—Howe agreed that the situation regarding Soviet Jewish emigration had worsened during the past five years, but noted that the high levels of emigration achieved during détente constituted a somewhat anomalous interlude between periods of more “normal” low levels of emigration. FCO Soviet Department Head Broomfield added that although Soviet human rights practices had begun to worsen long before Andorpov’s accession as General Secretary, Andropov could still be regarded as the architect of the policy, part of an overall crackdown instituted during his term as KGB Chief. Abrams noted that the heightened anti-Semitic campaign had begun since Andropov’s takeover.

—In Broomfield’s view, the Soviets regret having admitted the principle that a particular nationality group (such as Jews or Germans) could be allowed to emigrate to a national homeland outside the USSR. This set a troublesome precedent which they now wish to reverse. They will clamp down until the problem disappears, relenting only in particular cases where the political cost in Western public opinion is high.

—Howe felt the West should be able to get much more political mileage out of the Soviet human rights issue, particularly in Third World countries. He called the Stoessel initiative an important one, and hoped it would generate as many constructive ideas as possible.

4. Meeting with Parliamentary Under-Secretary Whitney: Stoessel presented the non-paper (ref A) and outlined its main features. He suggested strong statements by Ministers at the Madrid Concluding Sessions, calling for continued consultations on Soviet human rights violations. He also raised the possibility of a NATO caucus statement registering the progress made at Madrid, and calling for future consultations, but noted that there were pros and cons to this idea and that the Germans favored separate statements.

—Whitney welcomed the opportunity afforded by the Stoessel mission to exchange ideas. He voiced UK support for United States goals. HMG uses every opportunity, in meetings with the Soviets, to press on this issue. The UK advises the Soviets that those members of the British public to whom the USSR tries to present itself as a peace-loving nation are unconvinced of Soviet sincerity, due to human rights violations. HMG presents lists of human rights cases to the Soviets. British Embassy officials visit Soviet synagogues and churches, and meet with dissidents. Prime Minister Thatcher intends to meet with Avital Shcharanskiy later this week.⁵

—Madrid Ministerial Statements: Whitney agreed with the German view that separate but coordinated statements by ministers would be more appropriate than a joint NATO statement.⁶ They would have a greater impact than a single, necessarily watered-down, statement agreed upon by all. The large body of Madrid-generated material available at NATO could be drawn upon in drafting ministers’ remarks. Whitney did not expect great variations in Western governments’ views. The UK saw Madrid as a modest achievement, not a major breakthrough. Others might express dissatisfaction with the lack of concrete improvements, especially since 1979, and a wish that more had been achieved.

—Public Information on CSCE: Broomfield called for advance coordination to harmonize the substance of public remarks, while leaving room for individual variations in tone. Abrams stressed the need to properly prepare the press for a Western “show of unity” at the conclusion of the conference.

—Stoessel stated the need to bring Soviet human rights problems more into the public eye via the media. Abrams called for improved appeals to Western peace activists on this theme. Broomfield signaled FCO plans to publish CSCE results as a White Paper. Parliamentary debate on the paper would be initiated by the Foreign Secretary in a major speech which would focus public attention on the subject and set the tone.

—High-level Attendance at Madrid: Broomfield asked whether Secretary Shultz would attend the Madrid Concluding Session, noting that it would be a shame to leave the field to Gromyko, who had already stated he would be there. Stoessel said the Department had recommended his attendance, but a decision had not yet been made. Abrams noted that if Shultz did attend,⁷ a strong US statement should be expected, in order to take full advantage of the forum.

—Post-Madrid Consultations: Stoessel raised the possibility of using NATO experts meeting, an entirely new Ad Hoc Group, or possibly the UN Commission on Human Rights at Geneva, as ways to intensify post-Madrid consultations, recognizing that each forum had its unique shortcomings. Broomfield noted that the EC–10 East European Working Group already functioned as a forum for consultation which included the neutrals, as did the European Parliament at Strasbourg. “To put it crudely,” he said, there was a US problem, since the US was not included in these groups. The need now is to key in the US interest, as the US “cutting edge” is crucial for continued achievements in this area. NATO is an obvious forum. At Madrid, the neutrals and nonaligned have already formed a consultative body that could be an interlocutor for Western countries, either bilaterally or as a group via its chairman. Whitney expressed reluctance to see any new body created especially for the purpose of post-Madrid consultations, but offered to examine all alternatives.

—Broomfield stated that UK Madrid delegate Williams would be instructed to submit recommendations on the best means of continued consultation, and urged that Ambassador Kampelman be asked to do the same. We should tap their experience of the past two and one-half years.

—Closing the meeting, Whitney said HMG would study the US non-paper with great interest, and would remain in touch.

5. Luncheon with Parliamentarians and FCO Officials: Seven British parliamentarians who are especially active on the issue of Soviet human rights abuses welcomed the Stoessel mission (with acerbic comments by some MP’s on what they saw as FCO’s lack of enthusiasm in this area) and offered a number of suggestions on tactics. Among them:

—Study more thoroughly the underlying reasons for Soviet behavior, so as to achieve more influence over it.

—Persuade the Soviets that their interests suffer more from continued human rights abuses than they would from more liberal policies. Use ridicule where appropriate.

—Mobilize left-wing Western opinion and Third World (especially Indian) opinion, both of which (in the view of one participant) would be more influential on Soviet policy than Western governmental initiatives.

—To maintain Western credibility, apply the same human rights criteria to all countries.

—Use economic incentives to encourage human rights improvements.

—FCO Assistant Under-Secretary and former Ambassador to Poland Kenneth James called for a more extensive high-level dialogue with the Soviets to gain a deeper understanding of their thinking, combined with a high level of public pressure on human rights questions. He felt that potential political costs had successfully kept the Soviets out of Poland—and thus preserved a greater degree of freedom for the Poles than would have been the case otherwise. The West did have cards to play and should use them.

6. This cable was cleared by Ambassador Stoessel.

Louis

1. Source: Department of State, Soviet Union, 1958–1984, Lot 90D438, Stoessel Mission to Europe, 1983. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Immediate for information to USNATO. Sent for information to Bonn, The Hague, Madrid, Rome, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Moscow, Leningrad, and USUN.
2. Not found, but see footnote 2, Document 65.
3. Not found.
4. See the attachment to Document 61.
5. An unknown hand placed a question mark and bracket in the left-hand margin of the two previous sentences.
6. In telegram 9506 from Madrid, September 9, the Embassy transmitted the text of several individual ministerial concluding statements but no joint statement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D830520–0003)
7. Shultz visited Madrid September 7–9 and attended the Final Session of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting.