Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State¹

Madrid, July 11, 1983, 1359Z

7138. Subject: Madrid CSCE Amb. Stoessel’s Luncheon Meeting With NATO CSCE Caucus. Ref: A) State 185396;² B) State 186240. Geneva for US INF from USDel CSCE.³

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. Representatives of all the NATO CSCE countries were present at Saturday July 9 luncheon offered by Amb. Todman in honor of Amb. Stoessel and his party. Amb. Stoessel made general presentation along lines of ref A, emphasizing that the USG was very interested in learning the ideas of its NATO allies about how to keep the focus on human rights in the USSR after the Madrid CSCE meeting concluded. All of the NATO Representatives welcomed the opportunity to exchange ideas with the members of the Stoessel party and there was general agreement that further consultations would be desirable both bilaterally and multilaterally. Amb. Kampelman outlined a possible joint allied statement,⁴ immediately following the conclusion of Madrid, which would state the intention of the NATO countries to continue systematic consultations on CSCE human rights issues. Italian Amb. Bilancioni suggested an interrogatory letter to NATO governments proposing this course, and Amb. Kampelman suggested that this question might also be taken up at a NATO meeting in the near future, perhaps as early as next week (when Amb. Stoessel will be in Brussels). Much work remains to be done, but it appears that the caucus has accepted this course of action and will be consulting with their respective governments on next steps. For action requested, see comment in para 24. End summary.

3. Amb. Stoessel reviewed USG concerns over human rights situation in the Soviet Union and highlighted need to keep human rights on our agenda after the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. He pointed out that the U.S. has no magic formula for dealing with this matter. He welcomed the opportunity to exchange views with the members of the NATO caucus, which has, like the Madrid meeting itself, been an important forum for exchanging views on human rights issues. Although the Madrid meeting may be drawing to a close, he pointed out, we should not allow our interest in human rights to lapse.

4. Amb. Kastl (FRG) led the sequence of replies to Amb. Stoessel’s opening remarks, emphasizing that everyone wants to preserve a network of fora in which to focus on human rights and human contacts. A major success of the Madrid meeting has been the opportunity it has presented to us to keep public opinion attuned to such issues and to highlight the provisions of the Helsinki Agreements and the commitments of 35 nations to live up to those agreements. There are other ways to do this, he added, noting in passing that Chancellor Kohl’s party, the CDU, had actually opposed the Helsinki Final Act when it was signed in 1975 but now supports it. Most recently, he commented, the FRG has concentrated on emigration problems, especially those of ethnic Germans. He thought that blunt speaking at the Madrid meeting and to Soviet representatives in Moscow and elsewhere can be helpful in improving that situation.

5. Amb. Williams (UK) followed with two warnings about possible future problems. A) We should resist the Soviet line that movement in human rights can only come after progress in detente, rather than vice versa. The neutral and non-aligned countries have not yet understood this question and we need to attack the issue so that they will recognize it. B) The Western press is concentrating too much on the final stages of the negotiations in Madrid, i.e. the textual placement of the human contacts meeting. We should stress instead the fact that the HC meeting is actually going to take place, and to take place before the Vienna Review Conference. This is the icing on the cake represented by the rest of the draft concluding document. As Amb. Stoessel has pointed out, “we do have problems with our public opinion, with some believing that you can’t have better emigration from the USSR while the U.S. is being beastly to the Soviet Union”.

6. Amb. Rogers (Can) commented that he feared there might be a tendency for ministers who come to Madrid for the closing ceremonies not to speak much about implementation. This would be a mistake, since the situation is now worse in the USSR than it has been and getting worse in Poland. We need to focus on this fact rather than on the words in the document. Rechnagel (Denmark) indicated that in his view we already have a forum for pushing our views on human rights: The CSCE process. Moreover, we have improved this forum via the Madrid meeting by providing for regular follow-up meetings. The human rights and human contacts meetings are to take place and Vienna⁵ is expected to add others of the same type. There will also be bilateral human rights roundtables among many participants. Moreover, we can call attention to our spectacular victory on the human contacts meeting.

7. Bilancioni (Italy) commented that we have done a good job in Madrid even if the final document is incomplete and unclear. Above all, the document will be read in the East, much more than in the West. He asked whether the Stoessel mission had spoken at the Vatican about the Pope’s visit to the Baltic States. Amb. Stoessel replied that the subject of Poland had been discussed with Cardinals Casaroli and Silvestrini.⁶ The Vatican, he continued, is still trying to evaluate the results of the Pope’s trip to Poland,⁷ but they consider it in general to have been successful. They consider that the Pope encouraged the Polish people but order was maintained, which could be seen as a gain for the Polish Government. The Vatican thinks that further progress is possible but that a lifting of martial law would not mean the end of strict controls.

8. Greek Amb. Papadakis asked whether there was not another way to keep attention on human rights every day, via foundations for example. Amb. Stoessel responded that we need a combination of things. We can intensify our liaison with public groups dealing with the matter; we can enhance the coordination of official presentations we make to the Soviet Government (démarches on specific cases, replists, etc.); and we can look into ways to increase the role of our Embassies in Moscow, although they are already doing very fine work.

9. Amb. Curien (France) noted that we agree on the many ways our work here in Madrid will have an impact on the human rights situation. We cannot expect the walls to come tumbling down at the first trumpet call, however, reminding his colleagues that it took seven tries for that to work at Jericho. If we fail at Madrid, however, we will lose all those opportunities. In effect, he reasoned, we have to live with the Soviet Union and its various practices, but we must keep trying to improve them systematically.

10. Amb. Mevik (Norway) drew attention to a White Paper published by his government several years ago,⁸ which reported that progress in the human rights field was more likely in conditions of détente. While it was difficult to establish that link conclusively, there was one. He agreed with his Canadian colleague about our lack of enforcement measures. However, we have refined our instruments here and, in his opinion, we have moved the Soviets on this. He recommended that human rights and human contacts be put on the agenda for all talks with Soviet leaders, stressing that we need to adopt an offensive but not an aggressive attitude.

11. Amb. Kampelman said he would try to concretize some of what had been said. As Amb. Curien had said, there is need to deal with the matter more systematically. We could not have moved as far as we have in Madrid without consultations among the 16 (NATO) and the 17 (NATO plus Ireland). We need not lose this system as Madrid ends, but should continue it. Bilateral meetings with the USSR are important and there should be no such meetings without attention to human rights. We should continue to develop consensus within the sixteen and seventeen. On the basis of continued caucus consultations, we should further develop our coordinating system among ourselves. Perhaps we should all designate a senior official to deal with human rights problems in the USSR and those officials might consult regularly among themselves several times a year.

12. In Amb. Kampelman’s view, the West needs to plan and consult on these matters. Words will get lost without a system and we can start in Madrid. We can’t just trumpet our success here at Madrid because the other reality exists and we must highlight its inadequacies. At the end of the Madrid meeting, he suggested, we could have a press conference announcing that our human rights concerns are not over as they have not been resolved. Accordingly, we intend to pursue a systematic method of consultation regarding this subject during the period between CSCE meetings. Amb. Kampelman continued that, in speaking of “we”, he did not mean to prejudge the issue of who would be included in that group. Should we, for example, include countries such as Austria? Perhaps in such cases, it would be better to coordinate on an ad hoc basis.

13. Amb. Croin (Netherlands) spoke briefly to indicate that basically he agreed with everybody else. His minister, he noted, will not be too exuberant about the concluding document. His line is apt to be that the document is deficient but it has good points. Croin concluded that public opinion is very important.

14. Amb. Todman pointed to the intervals which are expected to occur between CSCE meetings. He realized that bilateral discussions were important but pointed out that multilateral meetings, such as the UN General Assembly, could also play a role. They could add to the moral pressure on the Soviet leaders, enhance public awareness of the problems and encourage public action. As did Amb. Croin, he emphasized the importance of public opinion in this area.

15. Norwegian Amb. Mevik took the floor again, this time to stress his view that we should avoid overemphasizing human rights at the expense of other CSCE elements. Without the participation of the Eastern European states there is no CSCE, he commented, and we must give them something so that they will go along with the CSCE process. As examples, he offered such items as economic cooperation and security matters. In his opinion, moreover, we should avoid making too direct links between progress in the various CSCE areas.

16. FRG Amb. Kastl suggested that it is not only states which can play a useful role on human rights. Young people are often more concerned about human rights in Central America than in the USSR or Eastern Europe. We should, therefore, get in touch with non-governmental organizations such as the Socialist International. This would show that our concern for human rights is not a cold war phenomenon.

17. UK Amb. Williams cautioned that we can’t change things overnight in Eastern Europe. If the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act were actually carried out, the Soviet system would disappear overnight. We should understand the incremental nature of the process and try to get Soviet recognition of what is acceptable behavior. He noted, as an example, that the Soviets in Madrid no longer speak of “so-called human rights” but simply of human rights. Concluding, he asked that we not bad-mouth our real achievements here.

18. Danish Amb. Rechnagel seconded Kastl’s remarks on the need to avoid the appearance that we have a selective human rights policy. He added that both legal and political means are necessary to pursue an effective policy in this area.

19. Italian Amb. Bilancioni suggested that his Budapest experience and that of Rechnagel argued that we insist on talking with the Eastern Europeans as well as the Soviets. This, in his opinion, could serve to widen the gap between them. He also agreed with Kastl about the importance of Latin America. Many European young people are closer socially and culturally to Central America than to the Soviet Union. Bilancioni added that with regard to “Max’s statement” (para 11), he would be inclined to go even further and suggest that NATO caucus members agree on an interrogatory letter to be presented to their governments.⁹ The letter would propose that the NATO caucus call a press conference following the close of the Madrid meeting and declare its intention to continue regular consultations on the human rights aspects of CSCE.

20. Canadian Amb. Rogers, in connection with Bilancioni’s suggestion (para 19), asked whether the regular meetings at NATO of Eastern European experts might not be a useful forum for discussion [of] human rights issues. Amb. Kampelman agreed, and seconded Bilancioni’s suggestion for an interrogatory letter. He also suggested that the question of continued CSCE-related consultations on human rights matters be taken up at a NATO meeting in the near future, perhaps as early as next week. The participants at the luncheon meeting indicated their agreement to start taking the steps necessary to implement the Bilancioni and Kampelman suggestions.

21. Spanish DepRep Cuervo commented that his government understood the need to hammer away at human rights problems. Spaniards of his generation, he commented, had to strive for a long time before attaining their present democratic liberties.

22. Amb. Stoessel concluded the meeting by emphasizing again that his mission was an exploratory one and that we would be getting in touch bilaterally with the countries which he had not been able to visit on this trip.

23. In a conversation with Greek Amb. Papadakis after the luncheon, Amb. Stoessel handed him the non-paper (ref B), asking him to pass it on to his government. Noting the importance of the Greek role as EC President, Ambassador Stoessel told Papadakis that the USG would brief the Greek Government through the EPC channel on the results of the Stoessel mission. Papadakis in turn said his government would be in touch with the USG in the near future to establish consultation dates.

24. Comment: Much work remains to be done, but it does appear that the caucus had agreed in principle that an interrogatory letter should be done along the lines suggested by Rogers, Bilancioni and Amb. Kampelman. It will probably not be possible, however, to coordinate with respective governments before Amb. Stoessel’s NATO meeting on July 13. Therefore, if this initiative is to be pursued vigorously, some follow-up may be desirable in Washington. If Department agrees, Stoessel party suggests that HA, EUR/SOV and EUR/RPM EUR/RPMEUR/RPM brief NATO embassies in Washington on results of NATO caucus meeting with Stoessel party. Purpose of briefing would be to emphasize USG support for continued systematic consultations on CSCE human rights questions following Madrid (whether it be in NATO, on an ad hoc basis, in the UN framework or bilaterally), and to express strong support for Amb. Kampelman’s idea of a closing NATO caucus statement that systematic consultation on CSCE human rights matters, in particular Soviet and Eastern European performance, will continue after Madrid. End comment.

25. Amb. Stoessel reviewed and cleared this message before his departure from Madrid.

Killham

1. Source: Department of State, Soviet Union, 1958–1984, Lot 90D438, Stoessel Mission to Europe, 1983. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to the CSCE Conference Collection. Sent to USUN and the mission in Geneva.
2. Not found.
3. Not found.
4. Not further identified.
5. Reference is to the 1986–1989 CSCE meetings in Vienna.
6. See Document 62.
7. In June 1983, Pope John Paul II traveled to Poland and visited Solidarity leader Lech Walesa.
8. Not further identified.
9. Not further identified.