Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXXVIII, International Economic Development; International Debt; Foreign Assistance

93. Report Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, June 8, 1982

REPORT: GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS AT THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT

There are two results on Global Negotiations coming out of the Versailles Summit.²

1. The language in the Declaration (Communique) which reads:³

“The launching of global negotiations is a major political objective approved by all participants in the Summit. The latest draft resolution circulated by the Group of 77 is helpful, and the discussion at Versailles showed general acceptance of the view that it would serve as a basis for consultations with the countries concerned. We believe that there is now a good prospect for the early launching and success of the global negotiations provided that the independence of the specialized agencies is guaranteed.”

2. The working document of a North-South group of experts chaired by Jean-Claude Paye (Tab B)⁴ which sets out the agreement of the Summit leaders to a series of amendments in the G–77 text and commits the Summit leaders to have their delegations stand by the so amended text in New York and not depart from it except by unanimous decision.⁵

The two results are not formally related, since there is no mention in the Communique of the agreement among the experts. But the process by which we arrived at the two results and, more importantly, the discussion in the last plenary session among the heads of government and state confirmed the relationship between the two commitments.

The North-South Working Group reached the agreements recorded in the working document at a 3 hour Saturday morning meeting.⁶ The entire discussion at that meeting was premised on the commitments expressed in paragraph 1 of the working document, meaning that the US would retract any commitment to the amendments if the commitments in paragraph 1 were altered. In addition, as the document indicates, I reserved on “recalling” since I had no instructions to accept it.

The Working Group agreed to meet again Saturday afternoon by which time I hoped to have a decision on “recalling.” I had no opportunity to meet with Hormats, Leland and Darman and also had to serve as notetaker during part of the afternoon session among the heads of government. So I came to the afternoon meeting of the Working Group one hour late. The group in my absence had already drafted new Communique language reflecting an optimism based on our morning session. It had also modified the working document in one critical respect from my point of view—substituting in paragraph 1(c) the words “common agreement” for “unanimous decision.” I asked for a delay and said I would review the working document.

Saturday evening, we briefed Haig and Regan on where we stood, and in discussions among ourselves, generally agreed that if “unanimous decision” was restored in the working document, we would drop our reservation to “recalling.” Sunday morning, we briefed the President, Baker, Clark and Deaver.⁷ The President gave the go-ahead to this approach.

The Working Group never reconvened. The issue passed to the plenary session Sunday morning where the following exchange ensued:

1. Secretary Haig introduced an amendment to alter the third sentence of the Communique language on GNs (see above) to read:

“We believe there is now, on the basis of agreements reached by our experts at the Summit, a good prospect for the early launching and success of the global negotiation.”

2. President Thorn said it was inappropriate to cite experts in a declaration of heads of government and state.

3. There ensued a discussion of an amendment to the Communique introduced by PM Thatcher that eventually resulted in the addition to this same sentence of the phrase “provided that the independence of the specialized agencies is guaranteed.”

4. Following this discussion, Secretary Haig intervened to assert that it was his understanding that we would be acting in New York on the basis of unanimity. (He did not specifically mention the amendments.)

5. President Thorn said he wanted to make it clear. “We will be acting on these amendments in New York on the basis of unanimity.” (He did refer specifically to the amendments.)

6. It was so agreed.

After the conclusion of the Summit, I conferred with Paye and told him that if all of us had the understanding that the exchange among the heads constituted a clear commitment equal in force to Communique language to implement the agreement expressed in the working document, we would conclude that we had an iron clad agreement. Paye agreed but said that he wanted to check one more time with Cheysson who seemed to have given some slight indication of doubt (probably smarting from our clear victory on “limiting export credits”). Paye called me on Tuesday, June 8, to confirm the agreement. He is sending me a final copy of the working document.⁸ If it conforms to our discussion, the agreement is final.

Analysis of Agreement

1. The Communique language goes beyond Ottawa and Cancun by:

a. approving GNs as a major political objective;

b. accepting the G–77 text as “helpful” and a basis for discussion;

c. projecting “a good prospect for the early launching and success of the global negotiations, provided that the independence of the specialized agencies is guaranteed.”

2. It is premised on the agreement to amend the G–77 text as recorded in the working document and not to depart from this amended text in New York except by unanimous decision.

3. The amendments implement the US delegation’s instructions to trade procedural flexibility for protection of the specialized fora as follows:

a. by agreeing to go to GNs and settle agenda and procedures in a preliminary phase as long as it was clear that the conference could not go beyond this preliminary phase without consensus (see Amendment 2b of working document);

b. by requiring insertion of “by the conference” in paragraph 4 (see Amendment 2c of working document).

4. It goes technically beyond those instructions as follows:

a. by accepting the language “without duplication of existing appropriate fora” as a substitute for “where no such fora exist” (see Amendment 2d of working document);
Comment: The two are the same except for the word appropriate. It provides us with additional protection since without it, the conference could create ad hoc groups for specific subjects not within the formal mandate of existing fora. With appropriate added, we can argue that, even if the subject is not within the formal mandate of an existing institution, there is an “appropriate” institution to handle it.

b. by not requiring changes in other parts of the G–77 text, including language about “coherent and integrated approach” in paragraph 1, the first part of paragraph 5 down to specialized fora, and the word objectives at the end of paragraph 5.
Comment: The reason for not contesting these other parts is that they are all now governed by paragraph 4. The conference must respect the jurisdiction, competence, functions and powers of the specialized agencies, meaning it cannot do more than make recommendations to the specialized fora in ensuring a “coherent and integrated approach” or in considering “the interrelationship between the central role of the conference and the specialized fora” or in providing “relevant and appropriate objectives and guidance.”

5. It goes beyond the instructions by accepting “recalling” in place of “noting” (see Amendment 2a of working document). The decision to accept “recalling” was made on the spot by the President.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Norman Bailey Files, International Economics File, Global Negotiations June–August 1982. No classification marking. Drafted by Nau on June 8. Sent under a June 14 covering memorandum from Nau to Clark, in which Nau wrote that he used the June 8 report to brief agencies on what was done at the Versailles Summit on Global Negotiations. The covering memorandum was stamped: “WPC Has Seen.”
2. Minutes of the Versailles Summit meetings are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXVI, Trade; Monetary Policy; Industrialized Country Cooperation, 1981–1984.
3. For the text of the Versailles Summit Communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, July 1982, pp. 5–6.
4. Tab B is not attached.
5. Nau drew an arrow with a line after the word “text” and wrote “(Tab C)” in the right-hand margin. Tab C is not attached.
6. June 5.
7. June 6.
8. Telegram 19892 from Paris, June 8, transmitted the text of the North-South Group’s report with instructions to pass to Nau. (Reagan Library, Norman Bailey Files, Versailles Summit [1982])