94. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs1
SUBJECT
- Global Negotiations
At Cancun, the President stated that “we are prepared to carry out the commitment in the Ottawa Summit Declaration to conduct a more formal dialogue—bilaterally, with regional groups, in the United Nations and in specialized international agencies.” He further stated that “the United States would be willing to engage in a new preparatory process” for Global Negotiations (GNs) if there were acceptance of four essential understandings:
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- talks should have a practical orientation;
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- talks should respect the competence, functions and powers of the specialized international agencies;
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- talks should be oriented toward mutually beneficial international growth and development taking into account domestic economic policies;
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- talks should take place in an atmosphere of cooperative spirit.
On December 9, 1981, the United States submitted a draft resolution in New York which called for a preliminary conference (i.e. preparatory [Page 254] process) to decide upon agenda and procedures and required that the conference respect the jurisdiction, competence, functions and powers of the specialized fora (see Tab I).2
On March 31, 1982, the developing countries (known as the G–77) submitted a draft resolution (Bedjaoui Text). It did not explicitly require the conference to respect the specialized fora, and it convened the conference directly without a preliminary conference to decide upon agenda and procedures. Already before the Summit, other OECD countries had accepted the G–77 text as a basis for discussion, and the Summit countries pressed the United States to take a similar position.
In the Summit preparations, the United States decided to try and put its allies on the spot by securing their agreement at the Summit to changes in the G–77 text protecting the specialized agencies in return for our willingness to settle agenda and procedures in a preliminary phase of the Global Negotiations rather than in a preliminary conference.
The Summit produced communique language and a separate, confidential working document. The communique accepts the G–77 text as a basis for discussion and foresees a good prospect for launching GNs provided the independence of the specialized agencies is guaranteed. The working document sets out amendments to the G–77 text protecting the specialized agencies and commits the Summit leaders to have their delegations support this text in New York and not to depart from it except by unanimous agreement.
The amendments to the Bedjaoui text (see Tab II) explicitly protect the specialized agencies:3
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- by adding the words “by the Conference” at the end of paragraph 4;
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- by adding “without duplication of existing appropriate fora”
in paragraph 5;
COMMENT: This wording provides better protection than the December 9 US draft. The latter limited the creation of ad hoc groups by the Conference to subjects “where no fora existed.” Under this formulation, the Conference could create ad hoc groups for specific subjects not within the formal mandate of existing fora. The new formulation allows us to argue that, even if the subject is not within the formal mandate of an existing forum, there is an “appropriate” existing forum to handle it. - —
- by rendering harmless other language in the G–77 text (e.g. “coherent and integrated approach” in paragraph 1, giving “due attention . . . to the interrelationship between the central role of the conference and the specialized fora,” and “relevant and appropriate objectives and guidance” in paragraph 5), because the conference, in whatever it [Page 255] does, must now respect the specialized fora, meaning it can do no more than make recommendations to the specialized fora.
The amendments further ensure that the substantive or negotiating phase of the conference cannot begin until a consensus has been reached in the preliminary phase on agenda and procedures. This provision protects the US position that we will not enter into negotiations until we know what it is that we are negotiating.
For the first time in 2 ½ years, the United States has secured explicit protection of the specialized agencies in agreement with its six Summit country partners plus the European Community. We have not only avoided isolation in New York, but locked our Summit country partners into a consensus arrangement whereby no further changes in this text can be made except on a unanimous basis. Since this is a commitment among Summit leaders, our partners can isolate us in the future only if they bring the issue to the heads of government level and have their heads personally intervene with President Reagan (a very unlikely prospect). We will now see if the developing countries can accept these talks on our terms.