92. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Hormats) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel)1
SUBJECT
- Global Negotiations
Given your interest in North/South issues and in US relations with our closest allies, you should know the US position on global negotiations (GNs) which has emerged as part of the preparations for the Versailles Summit and which was adopted by the President on May 21.2 The specific issue was how to respond in New York and at the Versailles Summit to a draft UN General Assembly resolution on GNs tabled March 31 by the Group of 77.
Situation.
Most industrial countries would be willing to accept the G–77 text, but the EC, Canada, Japan, Australia, and other OECD countries have so far refrained from saying so formally in order not to isolate the US diplomatically. The ball is in our court, however, and pressure has been mounting for the US to respond to the G–77 text. Mitterrand and other participants at the annual economic Summit in Versailles June 4–6 are pressing us very hard to send a “positive signal” to the developing countries in the Summit declaration. Currently we have bracketed language in the declaration which calls for GNs by Autumn.
Analysis of the G–77 text.
The G–77 text interrupts the process of accommodation which had been taking place in New York and ignores well-known concerns of the US. Specifically, it contains six points which we do not like. The text would:
- (1)
- launch a UN Conference for GNs before procedures, agenda, and timeframe are agreed;
- (2)
- leave open the relationship between the Conference and the IMF, World Bank, GATT, and other specialized agencies;
- (3)
- grant the Conference the right to set objectives for decentralized negotiations in the specialized agencies;
- (4)
- refer directly to the 1979 resolution on GNs;
- (5)
- allow the Conference to create ad hoc groups to negotiate issues rather than refer them to the specialized agencies;
- (6)
- suggest the negotiation of a package agreement at the end of GNs which might infringe on the specialized agencies.
Review of options.
The US response to the G–77 text has required a review of our substantive position and objectives. Essentially two options were considered: Standing pat with our December 8 position or developing a new US position for Versailles that would indicate some flexibility and show the President negotiating in good faith. Either option necessitated a further tactical decision on implementation.
The Decision.
Interagency consultations as part of preparations for the Versailles Summit resulted in agreement on developing a new position. This recommendation was presented to the President and adopted by him on May 21. The decision is to be prepared in case others raise the issue at Versailles to indicate our willingness to make some procedural compromises in exchange for the other Summit countries’ firm agreement to guarantee all of the language in US paragraph 5 (on the protection of the specialized agencies and on ad hoc groups) and make a united response to the G–77 in New York.3 It was also decided to seek appropriate language for the Summit declaration and to consider using our flexibility on GNs to obtain leverage on other issues at the Summit.
Trade-off.
Inherent in this decision is a procedural compromise which we are willing to make in return for a substantive position to protect the specialized agencies.
The procedural compromise is agreeing to launch GNs before procedures, agenda, and timeframe are agreed. This is reflected in paragraph 1 in the change of prepositions—“of” in lieu of “for”—which determine the relationship of the organizational meeting to the Conference for GNs. Paragraph 4 caveats this position by stipulating that the organizational meeting of the Conference would determine the procedures, agenda, and timeframe prior to the commencement of the formal Conference meetings.
[Page 249]In exchange, we would insist that:
- (A)
- The draft resolution must use the US paragraph 5 language (the protection of the specialized agencies and restricted use of ad hoc groups) and must omit the language of the G–77 text (paragraph 5) which says that the issue of the interrelationship between the Conference and the specialized fora will be dealt with after the commencement of the Conference.
- (B)
- All Summit countries make a united response to the G–77 text and thereafter concert their positions in follow-up negotiations in New York; and
- (C)
- New language be inserted in the Versailles Summit declaration on the need to encourage and support effective development policies and on a commitment to pursue mutually beneficial growth and development as the major objective of GNs.
The trade-off does not affect our previous positions on the reference to UNGA resolution 34/138, the right of the conference to set objectives, the limitation of ad hoc groups, and language suggesting a package agreement. In other words, we would continue to insist that the formulations of any UNGA resolution meet our concerns on these points and not contain the formulations of the G–77 text.
Tactics at Versailles.
If pressed on the issues of GNs, we will implement the foregoing decision by attempting to negotiate with the other Summit countries the text of a draft UNGA resolution which would be used as the basis of our response in New York after Versailles. The texts of our initial and final offers are given in the attached synoptic table. Appropriate language for the Summit declaration will also be negotiated.
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Trip File, Versailles Summit 1982—N/S; NLR–755–13–10–9–9. Secret. Drafted by Lollis (EB/SEN) and Meissner on May 27; cleared in IO, NSC, Treasury, and USUN. A copy was sent to Eagleburger.↩
- See Document 90. Minutes of the meeting were not found.↩
- The “Synoptic Table of Texts Proposed for UNGA Resolution on Global Negotiations,” which includes language for paragraphs 1–7 of the “Initial US offer at Versailles,” and was revised in EB/SEN on May 28, is attached but not printed.↩