91. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State and the White House1
New York, May 26, 1982, 2153Z
1480. For Secretary Haig and Hormats From Ambassador Kirkpatrick. White House for Clark and Deaver. Dept Pass Treasury for Secretary Regan and Leland. Subject: Global Negotiations and Versailles Summit. Ref: My Memo of May 23 Delivered To NSC—Henry Nau.2
- 1.
- (S—Entire text)
- 2.
- I remain concerned about strategy for treatment of Global Negotiations issue at Versailles Summit.
- 3.
- I understand that current strategy is to hold no consultations with our allies about Global Negotiations between now and the Summit, but for the President or aides to be ready to discuss issue at the Summit if it is raised by others. We would then seek to persuade Summit participants to agree with text proposed by us. If U.S. text was unacceptable at Versailles, U.S. text would nevertheless be presented in New York after the Summit.
- 4.
- This approach is dangerous. If Summit countries could endorse one of U.S. texts this would, of course, be ideal, but in my judgement this is unlikely. Most European leaders very much want Global Negotiations to go forward as a political gesture to developing countries. For that to happen G–77 must agree. Europeans know that neither U.S. texts I have seen are acceptable to the G–77, if for no other reason than language suggests there would be an ad hoc group only on energy. Europeans will therefore reject our texts and press the President at Versailles to make more concessions. Anything Europeans would want is not likely to be acceptable to us. We would then be faced with the probability of returning to New York completely isolated, presenting a text which had already been rejected by our closest allies.
- 5.
- In my view the President would be better protected from pressure at Versailles, and our credibility enhanced, by tabling U.S. text (text would be the already approved text which U.S. is prepared to first present at Versailles) in New York no later than the middle of next week which makes a step towards meeting G–77 concerns, but would not be accepted by the G–77, thus demonstrating U.S. flexibility, and perhaps isolating and again exposing OPEC hardliners as guilty of blocking agreement. With most G–77 leaders at NAM meetings, the G–77 is not likely to be able to put forward an authoritative counter-proposal before Versailles. We then could ask other industrialized countries to support our text, and the President would be protected at Versailles.
Kirkpatrick