43. Telegram From the Mission to Geneva to the Department of State1
12018. Subject: (U) Assessment at end of round two—START. Ref: START II–063.2
1. This is START II–073. Secret—Entire Text.
2. Summary. During this round we continued to elaborate the US proposal. The Soviets presented little new. While their behavior continued businesslike, they clearly stalled. Their strategy is to link agreement on reductions in START to agreement that no P–II’s or GLCMs will be deployed. They will probably not make such linkage public but claim that it is the US which is stalling and not negotiating seriously, largely because we refuse to discuss cruise missiles. We have pressed for reductions which will redress the current strategic imbalance and improve crisis stability. The Soviets argued that parity exists and that our modernization programs, especially cruise missiles, create instability and continue “the arms race.” Our strategy should be to demonstrate progress by pressing for a separate agreement on confidence-building measures. Further, we should be prepared to break the conceptual log-jam by tabling our basic elements of an agreement early in round three. This would demonstrate US willingness to discuss the full scope of Phase Two constraints, including cruise missiles. Finally, Washington should step up its diplomatic and public information efforts and prevent significant cuts in our modernization program.
3. What did we do this round? We continued to elaborate the rationale of the US proposal and to lay out additional details. We also tabled President Reagan’s confidence-building measures. For details, see our NAC briefing (Reftel).3
[Page 135]4. We emphasized that the core of our proposal is to enhance crisis stability and lessen the risk of nuclear war through substantial reductions to lower equal levels of strategic capability.
5. We indicated that reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads in a first phase would substantially reduce the 3:1 Soviet advantage in ICBM warheads and their 4–1 advantage in ICBM throw-weight. In a second phase we would reduce throw-weight to equal levels below the current US level. We emphasized that all elements of our proposal are based on equality.
6. When we explained that the large Soviet ICBM advantage put our ICBMs at risk, the Soviets said they too faced an increasing threat to the survivability of their ICBMs. They implied they would solve their problem by making ICBMs mobile. We told them that mobile ICBMs—if permitted at all—would need to be effectively verifiable.
7. Following President Reagan’s announcement on November 22 of the US intention to deploy MX in a closely-spaced basing mode,4 the Soviets said it would be a violation of SALT I and II. We refuted the charge, stating that MX/CSB would not require “new fixed launchers.”
8. What did the Soviets do? Very little. They rehashed what they said in the first round, attacked our position, and defended their own. The Soviets continued to propose reductions to 1800 missile launchers and heavy bombers (SNDVs) by 1990. While repeating that their proposal calls for an equal aggregate number of warheads, they consistently refused to divulge what that number is. The Soviets repeated their proposal to ban all long-range cruise missiles and proposed a number of constraints on modernization, including limiting to 4–6 the number of Ohio-and Trident-class submarines.
9. The behavior of the Soviet delegates continued to be businesslike and—compared to SALT II—relatively non-polemical. Informally they welcomed our laying out the details of our proposal but did not follow suit. They stalled; their only new element in this round was that the treaty should last ten years.
10. Although we had some limited success—in contrast to SALT—in getting the Soviets to discuss concepts, our concepts remain far apart. We argued that the current ICBM disparities are destabilizing. They replied that parity currently exists and that all weapons have an equal effect on stability. They accused us of seeking strategic superiority through our US programs. They argued that the existing strategic relationship does not need correcting and that the way to achieve stability [Page 136] is to curb the arms race.” They refused to join us in a factual discussion of the existing strategic relationship.
11. The main theme of the Soviets was to charge that our proposal is not comprehensive because it does not include cruise missiles. We repeated President Reagan’s statement that “everything is on the table.” We said that provided there is agreement on substantial reductions in ballistic missiles and on counting Backfires, we would limit heavy bombers to equal numbers in the first phase. Additional constraints on slow flying systems could be considered in a second phase.
12. The Soviets continue to claim that Backfire is a medium bomber. Although they provided us with no technical data. They tabled a flight profile “to demonstrate” that Backfire has only a 2200 kilometer radius. When we asked questions about the assumptions on which the profile was constructed they did not respond.
13. There has been limited convergence in one area: Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). Although Soviet CBMs differ from ours and some are clearly designed to place unacceptable constraints on US forces, there are some areas of similarity. The Soviets indicated a willingness to move ahead in this area.
14. What is the Soviet strategy? The Soviets have linked agreement on reductions in START to agreement that no P–II’s or GLCMs be deployed in Europe. This provides them great flexibility and a number of ways to tactically exploit such linkage. The most likely way would be to stone-wall in START while shifting the blame for delay on us. Another might be to hold out promise of major achievements in START if “reason” prevailed in INF. At the same time, they will probably deny publicly that any linkage exists.
15. Moscow can be expected, however, to continue to claim that it is the US which is not negotiating seriously. They will complain that we are asking them to disarm unilaterally and to dismantle the backbone of their force—their ICBMs. They will claim that they need “equal security” and cannot settle for equality. Further, that the US is not willing to “curb the arms race” because we refuse to ban cruise missiles or to freeze modernization and thus seek strategic superiority. At some stage they may press for their 1800 proposal as a “way station” to our 850 proposal.
16. What should be our strategy? First, we should demonstrate progress by pressing for a separate agreement on CBMs. Next, we should be in a position to table the basic element of an agreement early in Round Three, a recommendation we made on November 2 (START II–031).5 The Soviets have made it amply clear that no US proposal [Page 137] can be seriously considered if it does not include cruise missiles. The Soviets argued that leaving out cruise missiles would allow us to deploy 4000 cruise missiles, while cutting ballistic missile warheads to 5000. They do not acknowledge that air-launched cruise missiles are bomber weapons needed to make our retaliatory force effective in view of their formidable air defenses. Rather, they argue that cruise missiles are first-strike weapons. Unless we are in a position to discuss the full scope of US Phase Two constraints, including slow-flying systems, the Soviets will continue to charge us with a lack of comprehensiveness. We could break the conceptual log-jam and lay out the scope of our proposal without in any way falling off from our proposed reductions or our priorities for dealing with them.
17. President Reagan’s speech of November 22 was very helpful. Now, Washington needs to step up its diplomatic and public information efforts. It should stress US commitment to arms control and continue to call for deep reductions as a way to enhance crisis stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Administration officials should vigorously refute any Soviet charges that it is the US which is stalling or not negotiating seriously.
18. At an appropriate time Washington should announce that the US START delegation has categorically rejected Soviet linkage of START to non-deployment of GLCMs and P–II’s on substantive and procedural grounds. US officials should rebut Soviet assertions that our proposal is one-sided; it calls for reductions on both sides to equal levels. They should emphasize that the current imbalances are destabilizing and urgently need to be corrected. Further, that our proposal is comprehensive and will address other systems once the priority task of dealing with the current destabilizing situation has been resolved. Meanwhile, that the US will continue the necessary modernization of its US programs so as to maintain deterrence and enhance stability. Finally, US officials should be prepared to expose the hollowness of the Soviet 1800 proposal on grounds that it could lead to little or no reductions in Soviet strategic capabilities or the current strategic imbalance.
19. We should resolutely adhere to President Reagan’s Eureka proposal. However, significant cuts in our modernization programs including the MX/CBs system will seriously jeopardize our ability to achieve a strategic arms agreement. It is not enough simply to have a good proposal. Soviet leaders, including Andropov, understand military power and will not give us something for nothing.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820627–0847. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to the Department of Defense, the United States Information Agency, the White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.↩
- Reference is to telegram 11715 from Geneva, November 24, which transmitted the draft text of a briefing to be given by Rowny to the North Atlantic Council on December 3. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820611–0805)↩
- According to the draft briefing transmitted in telegram 11715 from Geneva, November 24, (see footnote 2, above), the U.S. delegation proposed confidence building measures in three areas: advance notification of all ICBM launches, a measure that “would equalize current practice for advance notifications, since all US ICBM launches extend beyond US borders, while relatively few Soviet launches do,” as well as advance notification of all SLBM launches; advance notification of major military exercises; and “exchange of information on strategic nuclear forces,” which was not only “an integral element of the US START position,” but would build “confidence since it could reduce the risk that actions involving strategic forces could be misinterpreted,” and “enhance understanding of the capabilities and limitation of each nation’s forces.”↩
- On November 22, Reagan spoke to the nation from the Oval Office on the subject of “Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence.” See Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, vol. II, pp. 1505–1510.↩
- See Document 39.↩