Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

44. Memorandum From the Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament (Rowny) to Acting Secretary of State Dam¹

Geneva, December 13, 1982

SUBJECT

• Short-Run Tactics and Long-Range Strategy on START

1. What is the situation in Geneva? We finished the second round of START on December 2 and resume the third round on February 2. During the second round the United States laid out most of the remaining details of President Reagan’s Eureka proposal. The Soviets proposed little new and essentially stalled.

2. What is the situation in Moscow? Andropov has moved in rapidly,² is in complete charge, and is putting younger protegés into key positions. He apparently struck a deal with the military and will not reduce the momentum of buildup in strategic arms. Andropov has shown he is well aware of the Soviets’ serious economic and foreign policy situations and will tackle them energetically. In arms control he will be more sophisticated and clever than Brezhnev. He will seek to appear flexible and reasonable while in actuality he will be tougher than Brezhnev. Andropov will exploit public opinion sentiment in the West, giving priority to Europe.

3. What is the situation in Washington? President Reagan achieved a victory in the November elections by keeping intact the Senate majority but suffered a defeat by losing 26 Republican seats in the House. Since the economy has yet to show a conclusive turn-around, defense cuts are the prime objective of an increasing number of legislators. The deletion of funds for MX on December 7 by a substantial majority (and the less publicized deletion of funds for the Pershing II) are severe blows to our defense programs and will have grave implications for START and INF. Meanwhile, the freeze movement and highly publicized Catholic Bishops’ activities, although cooled off somewhat, are still very much alive and need to be actively countered by prominent Administration officials.

4. What is the situation in Western Europe? We are, unfortunately, faced with a tired and weary Europe, reluctant to face up to the threat and the needs of their own security. Europeans are increasingly skeptical about the direction of US foreign policy and about US sincerity in arms control. They show increasing resentment over US role in Europe but at the same time are unwilling to take care of their own needs. The Soviets have skillfully exploited this European malaise and Andropov can be expected to work harder to split us from Europe.

5. What will be the Soviets’ strategy and tactics for START? The Soviet strategy and long-term goals will not undergo any major change. Andropov, while seeking to improve the internal economic and social situation and the external international situation, will continue to rely heavily upon military power to back up Soviet foreign policy objectives. Tactically, he will make arms control proposals and foreign policy moves which will make him appear moderate, flexible, and reasonable. In Geneva the Soviets have linked any reductions in START to no deployments of GLCMs and P–II’s in Europe. While Moscow will probably not make such linkage public, it will undoubtedly publicly accuse the United States of lack of flexibility in INF, and of stalling in START. Dobrynin will attempt to establish the back-channel as a way of exploiting US internal differences and influencing US arms control policies.

6. What should be our long-term strategy and short-term tactics? Our long-term strategy should be to continue the two-track approach of modernization of US programs and arms control. Without a strong defense posture US foreign policy goals will not be achieved. At the same time, only an improved military posture will provide the Soviets incentives for entering into arms control agreements. Most importantly, we need a strong and steady public relations campaign. The President, although the most important player, cannot carry this program alone. Other officials should carry the main burden of the stepped-up public relations program. I would suggest that the President shift his rhetorical style and let others point out that the Soviets lie and cheat. Andropov wants, more than anything, respect; he will react sharply to being humiliated.

As for START, we should do the work now in Washington which will allow us to lay out the full scope of our proposed agreement in Geneva early in round three. This will do much to blunt Soviet criticism that we expect them to “disarm unilaterally” without the US accepting constraints on cruise missile and other modernization programs. Beyond this we need to “show progress” on arms control by pursuing a separate and early agreement on confidence-building measures.

7. What should be our course of action in 1983? 1983 will be a critical year for arms control. Since Andropov will engage in a more dynamic Soviet diplomacy, we should be in a position to initiate action in US-Soviet relations, not just react. Otherwise, the Soviets will be perceived as setting the East-West agenda, not us, and scoring diplomatic gains at our expense. The last full year before the election year of 1984 affords us opportunities to get beyond the stage of tactical skirmishing in START before domestic pressures and Soviet hedging of bets begins to set in. The next year may also be the last chance to achieve a truly effective deep-cuts agreement since the USSR is on the threshold of production and deployment decisions. Allowing START negotiations to stall could mean lost opportunities. From many vantage points, therefore, 1983 could be an excellent time to draw the Soviets into a real bargaining situation.

As for timing, it is too early to make any shifts or take any major initiatives. We should stick to our basic position and extol its virtues. We should see how MX/CSB Peacekeeper fares in Congress, and see how our defense authorizations stand up. We should also wait to see what the Soviet leadership does during the next several months. In April, at the end of round three of START, we will be in a position to evaluate whether it would be in our national interest to move to get an agreement by the end of 1983. This decision should not be tied to domestic politics. Nevertheless, it should be obvious that if we take no initiative by the summer of 1983 nothing will happen until after the elections in 1984. On the other hand, if we decide next spring, after careful evaluation, to move to get an agreement by the end of 1983, it will take us at least six months in Geneva to work out the details. Such an agreement would probably have to settle for:

—Reductions in warheads and deployed missiles to figures higher than our proposed levels of 5000/2500/850.

—Reductions in throw-weight less than could be achieved through reductions to the Eureka levels.

—Limits on the number of ALCM-carrying bombers. We should explicitly link any willingness to constrain cruise missiles to Soviet willingness to agree to substantially lower levels of ballistic missile throw-weight.

Thus, while some current US goals, such as equal throw-weight, reductions to low levels of missiles and warheads, and limits on the number of non-deployed missiles, might not appear achievable the near-term, we would want to retain them as long-term objectives and continue negotiations toward these ends. We would need to retain sufficient leverage with which to achieve our long-term goals.

However, these are not decisions we need to make now. By round three we need only be prepared to table our Basic Elements and certain definitions.

8. Relationship of INF and START. As the time for INF deployments draws nearer, Soviet agitation will act on Allied nervousness to make our political position in these negotiations less secure. The Soviets can be expected to make their major propaganda efforts in Europe. They will contrast their supposed flexibility with our unwillingness to consider any possibility other than zero-zero. They may also indicate a willingness to move ahead in START if we show “reasonable” in INF. In my view this is the time to be firm and patient. The United States should adhere to zero-zero and not reevaluate it until after the German elections in March.

9. What surprises might we expect and how should we react? As indicated above, Andropov will be energetic and clever; he can be expected to deal us some surprises. We should anticipate these and make preparations now to head them off or turn them to our advantage. These surprises can be grouped under three clusters: (a) The Soviets may try to appear more reasonable and forthcoming; (b) The Soviets may opt to play hard-ball; and (c) The Soviets may seek interaction between INF and START.

a. The Soviets may try to appear more reasonable and forthcoming. Soviet leaders and negotiators in Geneva may make new proposals, such as offering to include missile throw-weight if we include bomber “throw-weight,” may make new proposals on warhead and cruise missile limitations, or may try to show that the 1800 proposal is a good “way station” on the way to further cuts. Counter: We should be prepared to table our Basic Elements, to demonstrate that bomber throw-weight is not the same as missile throw-weight, and that the 1800 proposal (in the absence of limitations on missile warheads) could lead to little or no reduction in Soviet strategic capability.

b. The Soviets may opt to play hard-ball. This could cover a number of actions. They might charge that since we are deploying MX/CSB, the Soviets need not be limited by SALT. This could be followed by decisions to build new systems and to cease to dismantle older systems, for example, Yankee submarines, as newer systems are deployed. The Soviets could stop their current “moratorium” and begin deploying additional SS–20s or SLCMs against Europe. They could also announce a decision to deploy Soviet GLCMs against Europe and offer to trade them for US GLCMs. They could carry out Brezhnev’s threat to place the US in an “analogous” position should INF deployment proceed by deploying SS–20s or cruise missiles in Cuba or by stationing SLCM-carrying submarines off the US coasts. Counter: We should make the necessary preparations now so that we can play hardball in return.

c. The Soviets may seek interaction between INF and START. They could play this card in a number of ways. For example, they could offer us concessions in START if we offer them concessions in INF, walk out of INF because we are not being “flexible and reasonable,” and offer to fold INF into START. Counter: We should insist that intermediate and strategic systems are separate, that no concessions can be made for so-called “FBS,” and that no compensation can be made for UK and French systems. We should fold INF into START only when it is in our interest to do so.

Whatever happens, the Soviets can be expected to intensify their propaganda efforts that the US is stalling while they are moving ahead. This could take the form of renewed calls for a freeze, saying we are fueling the arms race, exploiting the Bishops’ movement, etc. We must start now to devote the time and effort to our public affairs planning and implementation. The effort at the negotiating table could be won or lost depending on whether we succumb to public pressures or turn public opinion around.

10. Back-channel. The use of the back-channel by Dobrynin or others in Washington should be discouraged. It can only lead to a repetition of past exploitation of US internal differences and cause confusion and erosion in our negotiations in Geneva.

11. Conclusion. The above is a realistic approach to continuing the bold initiative in START announced at Eureka. Now is not the time to compromise on START. Now is the time to get MX/CSB and defense expenditures approved. It is also the time to step up the public affairs effort and prepare to react to surprises. Now is the time to invigorate the Washington bureaucracy.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Country File, USSR (12/08/1982–12/13/1982). Secret. From December 7–19, Shultz traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
2. On November 12, 1982, two days after Brezhnev’s death, the Communist Party’s Central Committee selected Andropov to succeed Brezhnev as General Secretary. (John F. Burn, “Ex-Chief of K.G.B: New Communist Leader Emphasizes ‘Invincible Might’ of Military,” New York Times, November 13, 1982, p. 1)