39. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
10874. Subject: (U) Basic elements of a START agreement.
1. This is START II–031. Secret Entire text.
2. This message (and attached draft basic elements of an agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms) represents the delegation’s judgments on matters which need priority attention. It outlines the likely course of events in future negotiating sessions and maps out a strategy for moving the negotiation in a direction favorable to the United States.
3. The US delegation is continuing to present the merits of the US proposal and to lay out additional details. We are stressing the importance of crisis stability as the main reason to reduce the destabilizing Soviet ICBM force. The Soviets continue to claim that the US is seeking one-sided reductions in the backbone of the Soviet force and they charge the US with lack of “comprehensiveness,” in failing to limit US slow-flying systems.
4. The two sides are thus speaking on different conceptual planes and focusing on different limitations. Each concentrates on what it views as the central strategic problem which an agreement should resolve. The US is focusing on the current destabilizing disparity in ICBM capabilities. The Soviets are focusing on what they claim to be the destabilizing potential of US bombers and cruise missiles.
[Page 125]5. We will continue to advocate the fundamental rationale for the US position. Particularly the focus on destabilizing ICBMs. We can expect the Soviets to continue to charge that the US proposal is not comprehensive because it fails to address cruise missiles. In response we will emphasize that, in fact, it is the Soviet approach which lacks comprehensiveness because it fails to address a major indicator of strategic capability, that is, ballistic missile throw-weight. The delegation believes, however, that by the end of the current round, our strategy of continuing to focus exclusively on the constraints the US envisions for the first phase of reductions will have largely exhausted its usefulness in terms of achieving our broader objectives.
6. At the same time the delegation recognizes—and would like to exploit—the fact that the Soviets have shown an intense interest in limits on cruise missiles. This offers us significant leverage with respect to achieving both our phase one and phase two goals. Thus, the delegation believes that we should be in a position by the beginning of round three to discuss the entire range of constraints the US envisions in both phases of reductions. This would include direct limits on throw-weight. A ban on heavy missiles, etc., as quids for further constraints on slow-flying systems. Such an approach would be conditioned on a Soviet willingness to discuss all elements of the first and second phases comprehensively.
7. The delegation believes that apart from its more fundamental merits, the approach outlined above would also mitigate potential political risks for the United States. At some point the Soviets can be expected to go into a high gear propaganda campaign, claiming that the United States is obstructing efforts to reach an agreement in START. Brezhnev may have previewed such a campaign on October 21st by claiming that “difficulties” in the talks are caused by US unwillingness to move toward an agreement based on equality and equal security. The Soviets may also table a draft treaty at an early stage in round three in an effort to put us on the defensive.
8. Under the circumstances it would be to the US negotiating advantage if we were in a position to table the basic elements of an agreement early in round three. Such a document could place our proposed first phase reductions up front in specific terms and indicate comprehensiveness by listing the elements of the second phase specifically where we can, or where appropriate, in a conditional manner or, finally, where desirable, by tabling the document with blanks. An illustration of the type of document which the delegation envisions follows in paragraph 10. Variations of suggested treatments are shown by brackets.
9. Accordingly, it is recommended that Washington complete its current studies on the nature and extent of second phase limits and [Page 126] constraints as soon as possible, so that its conclusions will afford the delegation the option of tabling, early in round three, a refined version of the following basic elements of an agreement.
10. Basic Elements of an Agreement On the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms
I
Each party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms to equal levels and complete the reductions required to achieve these levels within (a specified period of time) after the entry into force of the agreement. Specifically, each party will:
A. Limit to no more than 5,000 the number of warheads on its deployed ballistic missiles;
B. Limit to no more than 2,500 the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs;
C. Limit to no more than 850 the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;
D. Limit to no more than (blank) the aggregate number of its non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs;
E. Limit to no more than 110 the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs and to no more than 210 the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs; and
F. Limit to no more than (blank) the number of its heavy bombers.
II
Each party will carry out the reductions called for in section I in accordance with agreed procedures for dismantling or destruction and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at two-year intervals following the entry into force of the agreement.
III
Neither party will begin bracket develop, end bracket produce, flight-test, or deploy new begin bracket types of end bracket heavy ballistic missiles.
IV
Neither party will flight-test or deploy ICBMs with more than 10 reentry vehicles nor test or deploy SLBMs with more than 14 reentry vehicles.
V
Neither party will flight-test or deploy reentry vehicles with a mass greater than approximately 200 kilograms on new ballistic missile systems. Begin bracket for new types of ballistic missiles the combined weight of the maximum number of reentry vehicles assigned thereto [Page 127] must be greater than 50 percent of the missile’s throw-weight. End bracket.
VI
Each party will undertake constraints on non-deployed ballistic missiles in addition to the numerical limit on non-deployed missiles in Section I. These will include a ban on ICBM rapid reload capability. A ban on excess ICBMs and hardened storage facilities at ICBM complexes and limits on the quantity and location of ground support equipment. In addition, each side will destroy missiles that have been retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit, destroy missiles of non-deployed types, dismantle or destroy launchers associated with deployed missiles retired to achieve the 850 deployed ballistic missile limit, and store all non-deployed missiles in designated storage facilities.
VII
Begin bracket beginning on (blank) end bracket or begin bracket following completion of the reductions called for in Section I end bracket, each party will carry out additional reductions and limitations. Specifically, each party will:
A. Limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ballistic missiles to no more than (blank) kilograms;
B. Destroy all its heavy ICBMs and dismantle or destroy all its launchers for heavy ICBMs.
C. Limit to no more than (blank) the number of its heavy bombers;
Begin bracket D. Adopt other limitations. If determined appropriate, with respect to further reductions in missiles and missile warhead levels” and “other constraints on slow-flying systems end bracket.
VIII
Each party will carry out the reductions called for in Section VII of this document in accordance with agreed dismantling or destruction procedures and with schedules which provide for equal intermediate ceilings at specified intervals.
IX
All of the preceding provisions will be carried out in accordance with agreed definitions counting rules, and type rules, which would specify for the purposes of the limitations set forth in the agreement:
—The definitions of systems to be limited.
—The relationship among deployed ballistic missiles, ballistic missile launchers, ballistic missile warheads, and ballistic missile throw-weight;
[Page 128]—Criteria to distinguish between deployed and non deployed missiles;
—Physical and performance criteria to distinguish between existing types and new types of ballistic missiles;
—Criteria for inclusion of aircraft as heavy bombers;
—Criteria for inclusion of begin bracket cruise missiles end bracket or begin bracket Slow-flying systems pursuant to Section VII of this document end bracket; and
—Agreed numerical values for the definitions of light, medium, and heavy ICBMs.
X
For the purposes of providing assurance of compliance with the preceding provisions each party will use national technical means of verification, supplemented by specific, agreed cooperative measures. Interference with agreed verification measures or with national technical means of verification will be prohibited, as will concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement by agreed measures or by national technical means. Encryption of telemetry during flight-testing of systems limited by the agreement will be banned and specific provisions regarding access to flight-test data will be adopted. Prior to signature of this agreement, each party will provide data to the other for the purpose of establishing an agreed and substantial body of data concerning their strategic arms subject to limitation by the agreement. These data will reflect specific numerical values for all of the characteristics of weapons systems covered by agreement. This agreed data base will be established upon signature of the agreement and thereafter will be updated every six months. Begin bracket the standing consultative commission will be used, pursuant to regulations to be agreed, to promote implementation of the provisions of the agreement. End bracket.
XI
The agreement embodying these provisions will be of (blank) duration subject to review at specified, regular intervals and will be subject to withdrawal after six months’ prior notification if a party decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each party will be free to propose amendments at any time which, like the agreement itself, will be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820565–0400. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩