38. Letter From the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to President Reagan1
In response to your May 13 tasking,2 several members of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board have been meeting regularly to examine the Intelligence Community’s ability to monitor and assess SALT/START compliance and verification issues.
We applaud your recent decisions which have provided additional policy guidance on the U.S. approach to the START negotiations and which have addressed the important initial issues raised in our Semi-Annual Report to you.3
To implement your decisions and to focus activities of the START teams, we believe that certain actions, if taken promptly, will allow the Intelligence Community to better fulfill their responsibilities. We recommend four actions directly related to START, and one that is indirectly related:
1. A Draft Treaty be Prepared. Past arms control negotiations demonstrate conclusively that until very specific options and provisions are stated in written, treaty form, one cannot come to grips with the critical aspects and details regarding verification. Indeed in the past, the Soviets have explicitly made the provisions ambiguous in order to circumvent the intentions of the treaty rather than agreeing to specifics that would constitute a violation. The vagueness and lack of comprehensiveness in the language of SALT I, the interim agreements, and of SALT II have caused much of the uncertainty connected with the question of Soviet compliance with those agreements.
It is not possible to make informed judgments as to the adequacy of the START proposals without reviewing the legal language codifying these proposals. For this reason, it is important that draft treaty lan [Page 122] guage be developed as soon as possible so that the requirements for verification and avenues for circumvention can be addressed.
2. A Verification Monitoring Mechanism Be Created. At present there does not exist within the Executive Branch a high level interagency group entirely devoted to all aspects of the verification problem. In our view, this is a serious deficiency. We believe that such a group should be formed (chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security) and turn its attention to the following issues without delay.
—First, it should establish a “Red Team” whose function would be to anticipate how, in what ways, and for what purposes the Soviets (viewed from their perspective) might try to cheat on a START agreement.
—Second, as a closely related matter, a critical and detailed study should be undertaken of possible Soviet Cover, Concealment, and Deception (CC&D) activities directly related to strategic arms. [4 lines not declassified] This may require a carefully chosen team of both government and non-government experts.
—Third, the group should study intensively the utility of on-site inspection in careful detail. Our impression is that, as important as National Technical Means of verification are, and will remain, on-site inspection may be essential to START for two reasons: a) to provide the necessary level of assurance of Soviet compliance; and b) to enhance deterrence of the Soviet temptation to cheat.
3. A Set of Compliance Actions be Generated. A range of specific appropriate and credible actions should be developed which the U.S. could take if violations were detected. The current Soviet activities regarding the SS–16, a mobile ICBM system, illustrate the dilemma which we face when a possible violation occurs in the absence of a predetermined alternative set of responses. [7 lines not declassified]
We recommend that an effort be initiated to develop alternative actions (possible “measured responses”) to respond to Soviet actions which would constitute violations of the treaty (trade, public information programs, U.S. military developments, foreign aid, etc.). We do not imply that abrogation of existing agreements should be excluded as an option, but rather that it, together with other possible responses, should be assessed before we enter into another arms control agreement with the Soviets. Only in that way can we judge what the practical political inhibitions and consequences will be to drawing a conclusion that a violation has occurred.
4. An Analysis of Military Balance be Performed. There is an implicit presumption that the U.S. position in START, if eventually accepted by the USSR, would be manifestly in the strategic interest of the U.S. This may well be the case. The matter is directly relevant to verification in at least two important respects:
—Depending upon what the strategic analysis demonstrates about the reduced capabilities on the two sides, verification of violations may [Page 123] be of greater or lesser significance. If, for example, the strategic balance which emerges from START is a delicately balanced one, then obviously, cheating could change that balance and vitally affect our national interests. If the resulting balance is grossly stable within reasonable assumptions on a possible US-USSR nuclear exchange, then cheating at the margin could still have major political implications but might not fundamentally impinge upon U.S. military security.
—If, however unlikely, the analysis should demonstrate that an acceptance of START would be strategically disadvantageous to the U.S. then the issue of verification takes on a very different meaning. We would presumably take little comfort from an assured capability of virtually perfect verification of an agreement which resulted in a fundamentally unstable military balance.
We wish to underline as clearly as possible that we have no apriori assumption about the nature of the strategic logic underlying START. We do recommend, however, that you request the DoD prepare a report assessing the consequences for the military balance of an acceptance of the U.S. START position and likely alternatives with, as a subsidiary point, the sensitivity of this balance to possible Soviet cheating.
5. A Study of ABM Treaty Compliance as it Relates to START be Initiated. As you know, the ABM Treaty requires a review every five years; 1982 is a review year. The possible utility of an ABM defense for U.S. security requires closest scrutiny.
The Soviets have used the 10-year period of the Treaty to pour enormous resources into their ABM effort while we have permitted ours to atrophy. The danger exists that if we do not reverse our present course, permitting the Treaty to continue without modification and our own programs to languish, the Soviets will come even closer to choosing an optimum point for abrogating the Treaty and execute a major strategic “breakout.” Such an action could make START and its verifiability irrelevant. [5 lines not declassified]
While several efforts are underway within the government (including an Intelligence Community estimate on Soviet ABM activities) to consider our policy with regard to the upcoming ABM Treaty review, none seem to have the urgency, high-level policy direction, or coordination with START which is warranted.
We suggest that a senior level group under the NSC be tasked to pull together on-going efforts on an urgent basis. The report should include, but not be limited to, the following points:
—What do we understand about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and what actions might be deemed inconsistent with the spirit or letter of the Treaty?
—How could continued adherence to or abrogation of the ABM Treaty relate to U.S. START objectives?
—What would be the consequences if the Soviets choose an optimum time to abrogate the Treaty and effect a strategic “breakout”?
[Page 124]—How good are our verification and compliance capabilities against the possibility in 3 above?
Mr. President, the Board plans to continue to pursue this subject and will report again in the next few months. In the interim, we would be grateful for any reaction you choose to provide.
Sincerely,
Chairman
- Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, CVG (Consolidated Verification Committee) December 1982. Top Secret.↩
- According to an undated paper titled “Tasking for PFIAB Review of START monitoring,” Reagan told the PFIAB at a May 13 meeting: “I would like you to examine the intelligence community’s capability, methodology, and organization for monitoring, assessing, and acting on SALT/START compliance issues. What are the scope and limits of the intelligence community’s ability to monitor possible violation and to pursue compliance issues.” (Ibid.) [TS] Minutes for the May 13 PFIAB meeting were not found.↩
- Not found.↩