321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State’s Delegation1
281983 ToSec 160286. Subject. Information Memo: Our START legacy: Consolidating gains in the coming months (S/S 8825460)
1. (S–entire text.)
2. Summary: There is now virtually no chance of concluding START in 1988. Moreover, there is a risk that, unless we take steps this year to maintain the negotiating momentum and shore up START’s sagging political support, our successors will have difficulty bringing the process to closure and may even decide to alter the basic framework we have created. Therefore, we should capitalize on Soviet interest in preventing START from bogging down or unraveling by pressing in coming months to resolve some key remaining issues (e.g., ALCM counting). We could also smooth the way ahead by adopting more realistic U.S. positions on a few politically sensitive matters (e.g., suspect site inspections). Outside the negotiations, we could help promote a stronger political base for START through such steps as issuing an administration “final report” on START that would explain and defend what we have done and commissioning a study to identify U.S. force [Page 1496] structuring options that would maintain survivability under START. End summary.
Prospects for 1988.
The interagency machinery is moving slowly but steadily to fill in gaps in the U.S. negotiating position on START. But no one believes START can be completed this year. With cautionary signals coming from the Hill and uncertainties remaining especially on ICBM modernization, the Chiefs have insisted on a very deliberate negotiating pace, and the White House has showed no inclination to accelerate the process in order to complete an agreement in 1988.
The Soviets have played a constructive role since NST resumption in early July, with modest moves in our direction on telemetry, ALCMs, throwweight, and other issues. However, they are not behaving as if they have any expectation of finishing this year. Their goal seems to be to make as much progress as possible in 1988 on the assumption that, the closer the agreement is to completion (and therefore the more the final product will bear Ronald Reagan’s imprimatur), the less tempted the next administration will be to reopen major aspects of it.
Passing on a Promising Foundation.
This administration’s main objective in START should be to leave its successor with a sound basis for bringing to a successful and reasonably early conclusion a treaty very much along the lines we have pursued. While we obviously want to achieve as much common ground with the Soviets as possible, our highest priority should be to turn over a joint draft text (JDT) and a set of U.S. negotiating positions that are technically solid and capable of obtaining wide political support. However, in some respects, the START foundation that exists today is not quite as promising as the one we might hope to pass on in January.
—On a number of politically sensitive issues, we initially staked out ambitious tasks (e.g., wide-ranging suspect site inspections) but later found that we had promised more than we really want to deliver. Having raised unrealistic expectations, we are now reluctant to pull back. Unless we come to grips with these issues internally, we will simply pass them on to our successors, who may be less well equipped politically to take the steps necessary to resolve them.
—Key opinion leaders, including Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon, and Brent Scowcroft, have publicly criticized the START limits on the grounds that they would make U.S. strategic forces more vulnerable to a Soviet strike. Although these criticisms may reflect dissatisfaction less with START itself than with certain strategic plans (e.g., ICBM basing), they have created the impression among influential segments of the public that START is strategically flawed. Indeed, this impression [Page 1497] probably contributed to the reluctance of congressional leaders to push START in 1988. Allowing it to go unchallenged would increase the difficulties of finalizing and ratifying the treaty.
—We successfully contained criticism of INF’s verification regime by arguing that a total ban (including on flight testing) simplified the problem and minimized risks. In doing so, we ensured that START would be held to a much higher standard. But the regime that is taking shape might not fully measure up. Faced with trade-offs between, on the one hand, facilitating verification and, on the other hand, either preserving U.S. force structuring options or minimizing the risks of Soviet inspections, we have mostly opted for the latter (e.g, agreeing to count certain missiles with fewer than the maximum number of warheads tested, minimizing OSI for heavy bombers). Usually (though not always) these choices were justified. But they are sure to create ratification difficulties.
Negotiating Priorities.
In light of these considerations, we should use the following guidelines in deciding whether and how to tackle certain START issues in our remaining time.
—We should bite the bullet on a few politically sensitive issues where our current positions must sooner or later be changed. In particular, we should adopt a more modest approach to suspect site inspections. We should also finally agree to permit mobile ICBMs and negotiate a ceiling on mobile ICBM warheads.
—We should press the Soviets for solutions to some other key remaining issues. While progress on SLCMs and the ABM-START link seems unlikely, we should try to reach agreement on ALCM counting rules and range, the ICBM warhead sublimit, heavy ICBM modernization, and some other manageable issues.
—We need to ensure that our positions promote, and are perceived to promote, survivability. For example, we should seek to flesh out the agreed treaty elements on mobile ICBM verification in a way that blunts criticism of the restricted areas approach (e.g., permit a substantial percentage of the force to be outside restricted areas on a day-to-day basis).
—We can afford to retain blanks in our negotiating position on certain issues that, if decided now, would likely be decided in a way that would add to future problems. For example, early decisions on counting rules for future missile types and “downloading” (i.e., whether and how much to permit lowering the number of warheads deployed on and attributable to ballistic missiles) would probably side with the JCS desire for maximum flexibility, which would raise concerns about Soviet “breakout” opportunities. Later, when our force [Page 1498] plans are clearer and we need not protect so many theoretical options, these might be handled in a less troublesome way.
Efforts Outside the Negotiations.
We can help promote a more promising foundation for START not only through our negotiating posture but also—and perhaps more importantly—by what we say and do outside the negotiations.
—So far, we have done very little publicly (other than an op-ed piece by Paul Nitze2 and a letter to the editor by Allen Holmes3) to counter arguments that START makes our forces more vulnerable. We have a strong case on this, and should look for opportunities during the next several months to help shape the public debate—speeches, op-ed pieces, articles in specialized journals, etc. An unclassified version of the JCS study recently briefed to the President could be very helpful.
—Continued domestic paralysis on means of enhancing ICBM survivability could be a serious obstacle to ratifying START. Although the election campaign rules out any possibility of forging a workable consensus on ICBM modernization at this stage, we should consider whether there are actions we could take that would increase the prospects for such a consensus under our successors. One device might be to ask several former Secretaries of Defense (Weinberger, Brown, Rumsfeld, Schlesinger) to study how to maintain the survivability of our strategic forces (not just ICBMs) under the emerging START regime. Such a study might identify options for the new administration rather than try to recommend a single approach. It could be conducted after the election to reduce partisanship and perhaps be coordinated informally with the transition staff. The main argument against this idea is that it might be seen by the incoming administration as prejudicing its own options. The main argument for it is that it could help build a consensus for modernization programs, especially survivable ICBM basing, as well as for START.
—To explain what this administration has accomplished in START and to increase the likelihood of continuity, we should consider issuing a “final report” on START at the end of our tenure. It could be signed by the President and sent either to the Congress or the President-Elect, or both. It would be a public report but a classified version could also be prepared. It could outline the status of the negotiations, provide rationales for some of the elements already agreed as well as U.S. positions taken on remaining issues, and discuss the implications of [Page 1499] the START regime for stability and U.S. security interests. It would thus give us an opportunity to explain and build support for some controversial trade-offs affecting verification (e.g., scaled-back suspect site inspections) and, in so doing, could strengthen the case for eventual ratification. At the same time, we would have to guard against the possibility that some might try to use the report to complicate the task of the next administration.
Suspending the START Negotiations.
A few issues arise as to how and when we suspend the negotiations.
—A date for suspending the Geneva talks could be announced at the end of Shevardnadze’s September visit.
If substantial progress on START issues is made in Washington, the delegations might need to stay in session until just before the election in order to crank the new material into the JDT. If there is less for them to do, they might break somewhat earlier.
—Various means have been suggested for codifying and giving status to what will have been agreed to at the time of suspending the talks. But there does not seem to be any need for a joint high-level, highly-visible blessing of agreed elements. It would suffice for the negotiators to exchange an up-to-date JDT with its accompanying documents, brackets and all. This would, of course, be classified, but the unilateral “final report” discussed above would enable us to give the public an account of where the negotiations left off in whatever detail we considered appropriate.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, D880759-002. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Einhorn; cleared in S/S and S/S-O; approved by Solomon.↩
- Paul H. Nitze, “The Case for Cutting Strategic Arms,” Washington Post, June 21, 1988, p. A19.↩
- H. Allen Holmes, “Sound Approach for Mobile ICBMs,” Washington Post, July 5, 1988, p. A18.↩