322. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
9953. Subject: Official-Informal No. 17—Defense and Space at the September Shultz-Shevardnadze
[Page 1500]As preparations are made for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting later this month, several considerations affecting the D&S talks are worth bearing in mind.
1. In NST as a whole since 1985, the Soviets have agreed to much of our agenda. INF was a major victory, and the Soviets have come a long way in START. While progress in D&S has been slow, our priority has been offensive reductions.
2. True, a D&S treaty on our terms could be valuable. Congressional support for SDI would go up, and we would have uncontested freedom to develop and test whatever promising SDI technologies appeared on the horizon.
3. A D&S treaty that fell short of this, however, could be controversial. An ambiguous accord would fail in the Senate if we and the Soviets disagreed on meanings. A compromise treaty might alienate conservatives—or even diehard SDI opponents—and stumble in the Senate.
4. Fortunately, such dilemmas are not here and now. At present the Soviets seem in no mood to conclude even a compromise treaty. They appear to be waiting for another president less committed to SDI than Ronald Reagan. In the meantime, the Soviets continue to demand that we agree to sharp constraints on SDI as the price for a START treaty. But some Soviet comments outside Geneva suggest eventual flexibility. Karpov and others have downplayed the threat of SDI (and implicitly the urgency of a D&S pact to corral SDI), and Vorontsov has hinted that some testing in space could be possible.
5. It remains important for us to be ready if and when the Soviets do decide to negotiate on a more realistic basis. While this may or may not happen soon, we do not at present have a complete position on one of the most essential issues for the United States in a D&S treaty—What development and testing activities could be undertaken during and after the nonwithdrawal period, until a side elects to deploy. With this exception, the rest of our position is on the table and the Soviets understand it.
6. If not now, then later—perhaps in the START endgame—the Soviets will seek to exploit our interest in offensive reductions by squeezing us on D&S. If we are ready at that time we can deal. If not, our choices would be less attractive, and pressures on us greater. In any event, not until the Soviets come off the idea that we will pay a D&S price for START will a realistic D&S agreement be possible. The Senate would not ratify a D&S treaty that did not stand on its own.
7. From this perspective, we should take in stride the current limited prospects for D&S, while persisting in efforts to complete a technically sound position on testing. At this point it seems clear that D&S is not [Page 1501] worth much of the Secretary’s valuable time with Shevardnadze. He would do better to concentrate on Krasnoyarsk, which may be ripe for solution and is fundamental to getting START and D&S treaties anyway.
8. The Secretary should, however, lay down a few markers on D&S (the Experts Group would follow up):
• Your negotiators in Geneva have yet to make good on high-level Soviet pledges to work out a joint draft text of the treaty/agreement. Thus, it makes no sense for us again to restate this pledge in the joint statement for our meeting.
• Not until the Soviet Union is ready to agree to a balance of benefits in a D&S treaty will progress come on the main issues. We will not pay in D&S for a START Treaty. A D&S treaty must be worthwhile on its own.
• We hope progress can be made on the more modest predictability CBMS. But it is inhibited by Soviet insistence on binding verification measures. We think these would be ineffective for technical reasons, and would jeopardize the security of essential programs.
• When the Soviet approach in D&S becomes more realistic, our negotiators in Geneva will be ready for more productive negotiations.
9. Shevardnadze should not leave Washington thinking the rocky road in D&S causes sleepless nights on the Potomac. The D&S talks today resemble the INF and START in 1982–83—when there were gaping differences on basic concepts and the Soviets were out of touch with reality. We were patient and determined then, and should remain so today.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, D880798-0138. Secret; Niact. Sent to Moscow.↩