Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

320. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, August 12, 1988, 1–2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• START: Mobile ICBM Verification and Nondeployed Missile Limits (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• State
• John Whitehead
• Max Kampelman
• Defense
• Secretary Frank Carlucci
• Ronald Lehman, II

• Energy

  • Secretary John Herrington

• JCS

  • Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.
  • VADM Jonathan Howe

• Director of Central Intelligence

  • Judge William Webster
  • [name not declassified]

• ACDA

  • George Murphy

• Office of the Vice President

  • Don Gregg

• White House

  • LTG Colin L. Powell
  • M.B. Oglesby
  • Marlin Fitzwater

• NSC Staff

  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • William Heiser
  • Captain Linton Brooks

• OMB

  • James Miller

• Special Advisor

  • Ambassador Edward Rowny

• START Negotiator

  • Ambassador Read Hanmer

Minutes

The meeting opened at 1:00 p.m. in the Situation Room. The President opened the meeting as follows:

Yesterday I heard an excellent assessment by the Joint Chiefs of the military value of START.² I remain convinced that a good START treaty is attainable and that we should strive for it. As I’ve said before, even though we almost certainly can’t have START and Defense and Space treaties ready for signature this year, we must not stop our efforts. I want to leave as a legacy as complete and coherent an arms reduction position as I can. (S)

Shortly before my Moscow meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev we reviewed the subject of verification of road-mobile ICBMs and established the position we presented in Moscow. I understand there are some reservations with that position. I want to clear them up so that we can move forward with discussions of this subject in Geneva. We also need to continue to review our position to make certain our verification regime makes sense and, where possible, to simplify it. Verification remains absolutely central to us, but that doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be subject to critical scrutiny. I’m looking forward to today’s discussion. So, over to you, Colin. (S)

General Powell then reviewed the mobile ICBM verification issue making the following points:

On May 25, prior to the Moscow summit, the President made a set of decisions on the U.S. approach to mobile missile verification.³ On the basis of these decisions, we presented the main points of the approach to the Soviets in Moscow; and they agreed on a package of “common elements” at the summit. Subsequent to the summit, both the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of ACDA have expressed some concerns about our current position. Pending the opportunity to meet and discuss these concerns, we have held up tabling any treaty language in Geneva on this area. In the interim, the Soviets have tabled in Geneva their version of treaty text formalizing the “common elements” as agreed at the summit. (S)

Our purpose today is to see how best to proceed:

a. in resolving any remaining internal USG concerns so that we can table our treaty text on this area; and,

b. in responding to the treaty text that the Soviet Union has now tabled on this subject in Geneva. (S)

The U.S. approach to road-mobile ICBM verification includes the following main elements.

1. All deployed road-mobile ICBMs would normally be located in relatively small (i.e., 25 k2) Restricted Areas.

2. There would be a limit on the percentage (e.g. 20–30%) of such systems that could be outside these areas for training, testing and maintenance.

3. There would be notification requirements associated with all such movements.

4. There could be exercise dispersals of the entire force, without geographic restriction, but these would be limited in frequency and duration.

5. There could also be operational dispersals (intended to ensure survivability in a crisis). These dispersals would not be limited in number or in duration; but both sides acknowledge that they would be rare. (S)

The Soviet approach as tabled in Geneva differs in certain key ways.

1. They agree that all deployed road-mobile ICBMs would normally be located in relatively small Restricted Areas, with each area having no more than 10 deployed missiles. The Soviets would likely deploy 9 or 10 missiles per Restricted Area. Given our current planned basing mode for Midgetman, we would likely have no more than 1 or 2.

2. They would add the concept of a larger Deployment Area which would contain some number of Restricted Areas, a Maintenance Base, and some surrounding area. The Soviets would likely have 5 smaller Restricted Areas per larger Deployment Area. If we were to accept such an approach, we would want quite a few more small areas.

3. There would be a 50% limit on the number of such systems that could be outside the smaller Restricted Areas for training, testing and maintenance at any one time.

4. There would be notification requirements associated with all such movements except for up to 3 launchers per small Restricted Area as long as they stayed within the larger Deployment Area.

5. There could be exercise dispersals of up to 50% of the entire force. It is not clear if these would be confined to within the Deployment Area or whether they would be limited in frequency and duration.

6. There could also be operational dispersals of the entire force. It is not clear if these would be confined in any way and the Soviets have yet to acknowledge that such operational dispersals would be rare. (S)

Three options have been offered for consideration.

—Option 1. Table the US position as approved in May.

This option is strongly favored by the JCS.

—Option 2. Accept the Soviet approach. No one favors this approach.

—Option 3. Table a slight modification of the US position, taking the Soviet approach into account. All agencies except the JCS favor this option. (S)

Under Option 3, we would make only two modifications to the US position:

1. we would accept the idea of a larger Deployment Area surrounding the small Restricted Areas, as proposed by the Soviet Union; and,

2. we would confine exercise dispersals geographically to the larger Deployment Areas. (S)

All other elements of the US position would remain as previously approved. (S)

Secretary Carlucci, would you like to start us off on this topic?

Secretary Carlucci: We favor Option 3. We believe that Option 3 would provide the best mix of survivability and verification. With this modification more people can be on board. We would be permitted to run our dispersal exercises although we would be confined to the larger Deployment Area. That should be OK because of the size of the area. If we needed to deploy for real, any operational deployment can go anywhere it wishes. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Before I start Colin, under this idea could we do maintenance anywhere? (S)

General Powell: No. [For the Record, this is the wrong answer. The right answer is we could do maintenance anywhere if notification is provided.] (S)

Admiral Crowe: The main problem we have with Option 3 is that because we are constrained in exercise deployments we will be unable to train in the same manner as we would fight. One of the main principles of our military has always been that we need to train in the same way as we plan to fight. In addition, this idea is kind of a late entry. We only saw it in the last few days. We need to vet it with the Strategic Air Command. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: We in the Department of State agree with the Department of Defense. We think that Option 3, which adds a slight provision to our current position, will certainly help with verification. We aren’t changing anything. It’s just a slight modification. (S)

Admiral Crowe: From our point of view its quite a bit of a change. You are limiting my operational flexibility. Once again, we need to be able to train as we fight. You know an exercise is really a larger training, it is the use of a lot of force. We need to be able to exercise as we would in operational circumstances, therefore this solution would limit our capability. (S)

General Powell: What you are saying is that an exercise is a full flushing of the force just as we would under operational conditions. If that is the case, the real question is with a larger Deployment Area around the Restricted Deployment Areas, doesn’t this give you enough room to exercise the mobile force in the way you plan to use or operate the force? (S)

Judge Webster: As I understand it, we are talking about 8 to 50 thousand kilometers as the area. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Yes, that’s about the area that we were talking, too. (S)

General Powell: Is there enough land under this to do what we need? (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: I would note that we are not restricted to just one of these areas. We can have more if we need it. (S)

Admiral Crowe: We need to vet this idea with the Strategic Air Command. We may need an area that is as large or perhaps even larger than that cited because we are going to need to check our communications, command and control capabilities. (S)

Judge Webster: The current U.S. approach presents serious monitoring problems. It allows some percentage of the force to be outside the Restricted Deployment Area (RDA) at all times and allows forcewide dispersals of unlimited duration to unrestricted areas. (S)

It imposes the very difficult monitoring requirement to ascertain what percentage of the force is out of garrison at any point in time and whether this exceeds the allowed percentage. Moreover, it would not be possible to determine whether missiles detected outside RDAs were part of the legal force or an illegal force. Under these conditions an undeclared force could train more easily with the legal force. (S)

Finally, the size of the RDA is too small for the Soviets to conduct normal peacetime operations, or to meet survivability requirements, and thus may force the Soviets to adopt new operating procedures. Under these circumstances our confidence in assessments of the force could drop while we reestablished our understanding of revised Soviet operating procedures. (S)

We believe that a larger circumscribed deployment area for each division-sized unit of about 8,000–10,000 square kilometers, within which all road-mobile missiles would have to operate, would be adequate to ensure the survivability of U.S. and Soviet road mobile missile units, while giving us the benefit of being able to brand any missiles found outside the area as illegal. The Soviets have conducted almost all of their operational dispersals within about 50 kilometers of their garrisons (about 7,850 square kilometers). Moreover, the Soviets could not successfully attack U.S. road-mobile forces in an area of this size. [Judge Webster handed out the diagram at Tab A.]⁴ (S)

Admiral Crowe: I want to ask you one thing, Judge. You are worried about requirements for verification, aren’t you? You are not really talking about requirements that we need for targeting, are you? (S)

Judge Webster: That’s right. I am only worried about verification, not targeting. An enlarged area is probably better for us because if we find anything outside of the area we will know it is illegal. (S)

Admiral Crowe: That really doesn’t tell you whether its illegal or not just because it is outside of the area. It could just be an inadvertent movement. But what we really need to know is the overall number of systems so that we know if we have a military set. It’s not important that we just catch one item outside the area. And if they are going to cheat, it seems to me it would be a hell of a lot easier to cheat if you give them an legitimate area that is 10,000 square kilometers large.

George Murphy: From our point of view, Mr. President, we should balance survivability and verification. ACDA agrees with the position taken by the DCI. If we find something outside of these deployment areas, it should be a violation. The deployment areas should be big enough to permit the JCS to do their exercises as they need—survivability comes first. (S)

I would also like to note that our original position was that we ban mobiles. You know we are going to have a hell of a time getting mobiles through the Congress. In effect we are negotiating with the Soviets but we have a blueprint while they have missiles. Therefore I think we should keep that in mind as we think about committing to mobile missiles. (S)

In summary though I’m here to support the ACDA position which would be Option 3. And I’m concerned because just like we found with GLCMs, in a crisis we are going to have a hell of a time getting these mobile missiles out of their deployment bases. Some strategist will not want to release them from their bases because of the escalatory signal that such an action would make. (S)

Admiral Crowe: That’s not a problem from the point of the strategist, its a problem from the point of view that we are going to find some politician who is going to want to do that. (S)

Secretary Whitehead: Admiral, I certainly understand that the smaller circle could limit our ability to do training exercises. I would assume that your counterpart in the Soviet Union would agree with this and that he also would like to have the ability to exercise dispersal forces. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Yes, I think so. (U)

Secretary Whitehead: If you both have similar interests then, isn’t it likely you will agree on an area the size of which would be acceptable to both sides? (S)

Admiral Crowe: But they have more political leeway in their ability to agree with something like this. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: And they have the mobiles already and we don’t. (S)

General Powell: Mr. President, this is typical of the type of problem we face in the arms control area right now. It brings into conflict the needs of the DCI to verify provisions of the treaty and the operational requirements of the JCS to operate our forces. Admiral Crowe wants operational flexibility, the flexibility to flush his force during an exercise just like he would if it were for real. (S)

In May you made a decision, Mr. President, and you leaned in favor of the JCS, in favor of operational flexibility. Let’s have the Strategic Air Command look over Option 3. Let’s see if there is a way that we may have an area large enough to meet both the requirements involved. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The crux of the issue is certainly size, the size of the area. (S)

Judge Webster: I can right now take 8,000 to 10,000 square kilometers; and I can go higher if you wish. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Congress places a special emphasis on flexibility as we look at our weapons. You know Mr. President, as we just briefed you, that we too want flexibility. (S)

Judge Webster: From our point of view, Admiral, we need to know what you can live with. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Once again, we like flexibility. This is a treaty of indefinite duration. We may exercise in one area and operate in another, you know, we would not go back to the same spot. We need an area large enough to test our ability to distribute our forces, to test at distances between our missiles and our command and control. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I lean on the side of verification vice operational flexibility. Operational flexibility like that which we are discussing is only marginal anyway. We very well may not get the Midgetman at all, therefore we ought to constrain the Soviets. Option 3 will give us this opportunity. (S)

Admiral Crowe: We have not discussed rail-mobile at all at this time. Is that correct? (S)

General Powell: That’s right. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: There is just not enough money for road mobile. Maybe if Jim Miller would open up the purse, we could really look at this subject. (S)

Secretary Whitehead: Well, if you want to check your links between missiles and C3, is there any reason why you can’t move your C3 elements out as far as you want? And then run what you call a CPX? (S)

Admiral Crowe: We can certainly do that. (U)

Secretary Carlucci: I agree. We can do that. (U)

Ambassador Rowny: I would just like to add that I think its very unlikely that we are ever going to have a road mobile. We ought to do what will restrict the Soviets the most. Let’s make sure we are able to verify a treaty. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Well, Mr. President, that’s really my problem. It’s hard for me to give you advice when I don’t know what kind of weapons or what numbers Congress is going to allow us to have. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: That’s why we argue, Mr. President, that we need to look at the whole regime for all of the verification before we agree to tabling anything on mobile ICBMs. (S)

George Murphy: Again, Mr. President, I am very hesitant about this area because we have got blueprints and they have got missiles. (S)

Admiral Crowe: I would note one last thing. Remember we thought we were not going to have any limits on operational dispersals. And in fact we thought that we could use exercise dispersals to get out of the system first in case we really needed to go into operational dispersals. We could make the dispersal under the guise of an exercise with some period of time prior to an actual operational dispersal. Option 3 will certainly inhibit us from doing something like that. (S)

General Powell: Well, gentlemen, as I understand where we are I think, Mr. President, we should see if we can get a version of Option 3 that would be satisfactory to the JCS and then check it with the Strategic Air Command. (S)

The President: How come it doesn’t feel like I made a decision here? I remember when I first came on, I wanted to bring back the horse cavalry. (U)

General Powell then reviewed the nondeployed missile issue making the following points:

Nondeployed missiles are those that are not in silos, on mobile launchers or loaded in submarines. Therefore, they are not included in the 1600/6000 limits of START. (S)

Some number of nondeployed missiles are necessary to allow for routine maintenance, to serve as spares, and for periodic reliability testing over the life of the missile system. However, if additional launchers or other means of launching these missiles are available, they could also be used to rapidly increase the size of one’s missile force in excess of START limits. This is called the threat of breakout. (S)

Even without additional launchers, in wartime, nondeployed missiles could be used to reload and refire existing, treaty limited launchers. This is commonly referred to as the refire threat. (S)

Ideally, we would like to keep the number of nondeployed missiles small to minimize these threats. However, to minimize acquisition costs, we tend to produce all of the missiles of any given type we need at one time, and to store the excess missiles until they are required for testing or maintenance. Unless we alter our practice, this means that we tend to have a large number of nondeployed missiles on hand at any one time; and we would have to allow the Soviets a similarly large number. (S)

The threats that we wish to handle are from the use of nondeployed missiles for breakout and refire. The Arms Control Support Group work in this area recognizes that these threats may vary based on the type of ballistic missile concerned. The ACSG has divided ballistic missiles into:

—solid ICBMs deployed as mobile missiles;

—solid ICBMs launched only from fixed silos;

—liquid ICBMs; and

—SLBMs. (S)

The ACSG then considered each type of ballistic missile in terms of the threat involved. (S)

For nondeployed missiles to be used in a breakout scenario, additional launchers must also be available. If we consider silo-based ICBMs or SLBMs, and if silos or submarine tubes are required for their launch, then the breakout threat is relatively low since we should be able to monitor the number of silos and SLBM-capable submarines with high confidence. Mobile ICBMs are much more of a problem since the monitoring of the number of mobile launchers will be so much harder. Finally, if you credit the Soviets with the capability to launch their nondeployed ICBM and SLBM missiles from soft launchers, then each and every nondeployed missile could pose a breakout threat. (S)

For nondeployed missiles to be used as refire missiles, the missiles, some appropriate launchers, handling equipment and trained personnel must all survive the initial nuclear exchange. Should any of these four elements fail to survive, then the refire threat is removed. For this reason, some feel that the refire threat posed by nondeployed silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs is significantly less than threat posed by nondeployed mobile ICBMs. (S)

All agencies except JCS agree that we should demand certain constraints be applied to all non-deployed ballistic missiles including:

—a data exchange on the numbers of nondeployed missiles;

—restrictions on where such missiles can be stored;

—baseline inspections of declared storage locations; and

—short-notice OSI of declared storage locations. (S)

Given the threat that nondeployed mobile ICBMs pose both for breakout and refire, all agencies agree on additional constraints on these missiles to include:

—a ban on the conversion of SLBMs into mobile ICBMs;

—a ban on liquid propellant mobile ICBMs;

—numerical limits on such missiles and their launchers;

—perimeter-portal monitoring, at a minimum, of the five Soviet facilities capable of producing solid motors as large as the smallest accountable stage of such missiles [FYI: OSD would also add all second and third stage production facilities]; and

—tagging of such missiles and their launchers. (S)

Given the threats posed by other types of nondeployed missiles in terms of breakout or refire, and the costs associated with additional constraints, the issue we face is should we apply additional restraints on nondeployed missiles other than those already agreed. (S)

Option I would:

a. apply the full set of constraints listed above to nondeployed missiles capable of using mobile launchers (i.e., numerical limits, PPM, tagging, plus baseline constraints) [i.e., all SS–24, SS–25, PEACEKEEPER and MIDGETMAN missiles if any are deployed in mobile modes];

b. apply perimeter-portal monitoring only at the five Soviet facilities cited (i.e., facilities capable of producing the smallest accountable mobile ICBM stage); and,

c. apply only the baseline constraints (i.e., data exchange on numbers, locational constraints, baseline and short-notice OSI) to all other nondeployed missiles [i.e., silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs]. (S)

This option is supported by the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the START negotiator. The JCS are reviewing the need for even the baseline constraints for non-mobile systems because of concerns that we may set an adverse precedent for ALCMs. (S)

Option II would:

a. apply the full set of constraints listed above to nondeployed mobile ICBMs (i.e., numerical limits, PPM, tagging, plus baseline constraints) [i.e., all SS–24, SS–25, PEACEKEEPER and MIDGETMAN missiles if any are deployed in mobile modes];

b. apply an additional numerical limit of 100 to the number of nondeployed heavy ICBMs plus modern high-throwweight ICBMs (i.e. those deployed after 1985 with throwweights above 1,500 kilograms, and tag all such missiles [i.e., the SS–18 and the PEACEKEEPER if not deployed in mobile mode];

c. apply only the baseline constraints (i.e., data exchange on numbers, locational constraints, baseline and short-notice OSI) to all other nondeployed missiles [i.e., older, smaller, silo-based ICBMs and all SLBMs]; and,

d. add additional sites to the basic perimeter-portal monitoring list (i.e., production facilities for all stages of mobile ICBMs and production facilities). (S)

This option is supported by the Secretary of Defense. (U)

Option III would:

a. apply the full set of constraints available (i.e., numerical limits. PPM, tagging, plus baseline constraints) to all nondeployed missiles (i.e., mobile ICBMs, silo-based ICBMs and SLBMs); and,

b. add additional sites to the basic perimeter-portal monitoring list (i.e., liquid rocket assembly facilities). (S)

This option is supported by ACDA and Ambassador Rowny. (U)

The issue for discussion, then, is whether we should apply numerical limits, perimeter-portal monitoring, and tags to nondeployed missiles other than ICBMs that can be launched from a mobile launcher. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman, would you like to kick off the conversation on this subject? (U)

Ambassador Kampelman: The State Department recognizes that an excess number of missiles above those that are committed and deployed is a problem. The issue though is what is practical. What, as a practical matter, can be done? The danger of excess missiles seems to be simply less for all types except for mobiles. For all the other types of missiles, other than mobiles, the extra expense for verification on silo-based systems and SSBNs may be too much. It’s not clear that what we get in return for what we have to pay is worth it for that excess. For that reason, State Department thinks we ought to limit these concerns to mobile missiles. And we will work with the JCS on how to approach this. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I think we should have a limit on missiles that are nondeployed. If we don’t, you know we could go through this whole treaty and destroy all the deployed systems which tend to be tied to launchers and not cut up one single missile. They could just declare them to be nondeployed. (S)

Another scenario that we need to consider, and this is not a warfighting scenario, also drives the issue. Someday we may want to deploy SDI. The Soviets may say fine. If you deploy SDI, we will put all our spare SS–18s into silos. We need some kind of a constraint on their doing something like that because silos could be constructed. So I offer a compromise, the compromise that is captured in the OSD option. Let’s try to capture the SS–18 in a follow-on in some undeployed limit. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Mr. President, if we try to capture nondeployeds, we are going to pick up an awful lot of missiles. No one has yet said how many, but the number is sizable. If you look just at the US, the number is likely to be about 2000 nondeployed missiles. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: That number certainly needs to be scrubbed. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Well, in operational terms we have got a normal requirement for about 800 nondeployed ballistic missiles. The SDIO says that they need 528 for their purposes. And the Ballistic Missile Office for their testing says they need another 480. These are big numbers. The Soviets are going to object to the size of our number of nondeployed missiles. If we have a number that high, then the limitations on nondeployed missiles are basically meaningless. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Our option just tries to capture mobile missiles and the PEACEKEEPER on our side. It doesn’t try to capture the Minuteman III and all the others. Therefore the number that would be required wouldn’t be as high. (S)

Admiral Crowe: This is a very, very dicey subject, Mr. President. We must ensure that we don’t emasculate our ability to do testing or to store the missiles we require. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I’m not trying to beat up on the SDIO, but I want to go check those numbers. All we are proposing is, in addition to the first option, which is the least comprehensive option, a cap on heavy nondeployed missiles. That should help us politically, too. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The JCS feel that the real threat is mobile missiles. Max Kampelman is right. We ought to go ahead and focus on these. (S)

The SS–18 issue that Secretary Carlucci raises is a big change. If they were to build additional SS–18 silos, they would violate the basic START Treaty. I doubt any of us really think they could re-load silos in the middle of the environment you are facing in a real war. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I am very concerned about the SS–18 threat. (S)

Admiral Crowe: If you are really worried about breakout with the SS–18, the real threat is that they would put more warheads on the SS–18s than the number permitted under START. (What the Admiral is referring to here is that the START Treaty caps the SS–18 at ten warheads, however, we know it was optimized at 14 warheads and could hold perhaps as many as 20 to 24 warheads.) (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I certainly want to capture the warheads, too. (S)

Admiral Crowe: I am concerned on some of these limits because I want to avoid a spill over in capturing ALCMs. That’s why we are even a little concerned with this baseline idea. That we would tell each other how many nondeployed missiles we have and put additional constraints on them. We don’t want to count our nondeployed ALCMs. We don’t want them to count in any way. (S)

Judge Webster: The Intelligence Community agrees basically with Admiral Crowe. We agree that we should support Option 1. (S)

Although evidence indicates the Soviets intend to use some nondeployed missiles for refire, we judge that the Soviets do not have the capability, nor do we see an intent, to engage in 1) large scale reload of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 2) reload of older missiles, or 3) soft launch of strategic missiles. Therefore, our principal concern should rest with constraining nondeployed mobile missiles which represent the most significant refire threat. (S)

Our insistence until now on tagging all ICBM and SLBM nondeployed missiles was based largely on the policy requirement for us to monitor strict limits on these missiles. If large numbers of legal nondeployed missiles are permitted, I see little value in pursuing limits on other than mobile missiles. The large number of legal non-deployed missiles that the Defense Department is planning for US forces (800–1250, nearly as many as the number of deployed missiles) makes such limits of little consequence. (S)

However, I support the full panopoly of constraints on nondeployed missiles of the types tested in a mobile mode, and their launchers. A large number of extra mobile missiles can constitute an effective refire or force augmentation capability. I believe that tagging and portal perimeter monitoring of solid rocket motor and mobile missile final assembly facilities is vital to a strong verification program. Production facilities for liquid fueled missiles need not be portal monitored, in our opinion. Such nondeployed missiles constitute a much less significant threat. (S)

George Murphy: ACDA supports Option 3. We are more worried about the Soviets than about maintaining our own capabilities. They really can cheat. We can’t cheat. (S)

We are also worried about the Congress. If we get this treaty through, we need to be able to tell the Congress how many deployed and nondeployed missiles exist. We absolutely need to know. And we need to keep the numbers down. If you don’t, you are going to repeat SALT II, where launchers only were constrained not the missiles. For all those reasons, we support Option 3. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: The problem with the compromise proposed by DOD is the number is too low. We are going to need 130 spare nondeployed missiles for MX PEACEKEEPER alone. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Well, I am open to readjusting the number. However, I will also say that if Option 2, the one we propose, loses, then I would prefer we go to Option 3 and restrict everything. (S)

Admiral Crowe: The only way we can do that is if we are set to handle a number of 2000 nondeployed missiles with a basic limit on all other strategic nuclear delivery vehicles of 1600. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: I can’t see how we can get this treaty ratified unless we have a cap on non-mobile, nondeployed missiles. It will be difficult enough just to limit the mobiles. (S)

Ambassador Hanmer: Mr. President, my concern is that if we limit everything, as Option 3 does, it’s going to constrain us and hurt us more than it will the Soviets. If we just look at the situation that Secretary Carlucci raised, we have a situation where even if we constrain them, we are not constraining Soviet capability. They have live production lines and will keep their production lines warm. We do not. So it’s not going to be a real constraint on them. It will be a real constraint on us. (S)

General Powell: Mr. President, we should also consider what was said earlier, too. If we go to Option 2 or Option 3, the overall cost to the United States is going to go up. So we have got to make sure that the costs and the threat and the benefits are all in balance. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: Why don’t we go back and look at some number, some option between Option 2 and Option 3. I think we can compromise on this. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Look at the dollars that are involved in all this stuff. We have to look at the payoff on investment and watch our appetites for verification to make sure it’s keyed to our needs directly. (S)

General Powell: Well, Mr. President, that concludes our conversation. We will wrap this up into an appropriate decision document and forward it to you for your views. (S)

The meeting ended at 2:05 p.m.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 196 08/12/88. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. All brackets are in the original text.
2. See Document 319.
3. Apparent reference to Document 305, dated May 27.
4. Attached but not printed is a diagram of the deployment area.