Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

319. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, August 11, 1988, 2–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Military Implications of a START Treaty (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President

• State:

  • Secretary George Shultz

• Defense:

  • Secretary Frank Carlucci

• The Joint Chiefs:

  • The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., USN)
  • The Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Robert T. Herres, USAF)
  • Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (General Carl E. Vuono, USA)
  • Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (General Larry D. Welch, USAF)
  • Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral C.A.H. Trost, USN)
  • Commandant, Marine Corps (General Alfred M. Gray, USMC)

• White House:

  • Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell
  • M.B. Oglesby
  • Marlin Fitzwater

• NSC Staff:

  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • William Cockell
  • Captain Linton Brooks
  • Marybel Batjer

• Joint Staff (briefers)

  • Major Michael Kemp, USAF
  • Major Richard Rock, USAF

Minutes

The meeting opened at 2:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. The President opened the meeting as follows:

I was particularly pleased to learn that you had undertaken an examination² of the military implications of our START proposals. We’ve spent a lot of time on the details of arms reduction, but it is even more important to step back from time to time and look at the big picture and remember what we are trying to accomplish. You have a unique responsibility to assess the ability of the United States to perform the military tasks required to execute our strategy and ensure our security. That is why it is especially valuable that you have undertaken this assessment. I’m looking forward to hearing your thoughts. Colin, why don’t you set the stage. (S)

General Powell: Thank you, Mr. President. As you indicated, today we will hear the results of a JCS assessment of the strategic implications of START. There are several reasons why we decided it was timely to have this review. First, we will be completing our START position over the summer. Stepping back to examine the impact of the treaty is logical and appropriate. Second, both supporters and opponents of our position are beginning to assert that we do not understand the strategic result of our proposals. While this charge is unfounded, we thought it was useful to deal with it. Finally, this review will be useful in my discussions with the PFIAB [President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]. (S)

Mr. Secretary [Carlucci], do you want to set the stage? (U)

Secretary Carlucci: No; it’s a good briefing. They even said they would be willing to talk to the PFIAB. (C)

Admiral Crowe: Mr. President, before I begin, let me introduce Major Kemp and Major Rock who helped prepare the briefing. They are on the Joint Staff. This briefing is longer and more technical than I’d like. That’s because nuclear war is a difficult subject. (S)

NOTE: FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE PRESENTATION ADMIRAL CROWE USED A PREPARED SCRIPT. BRIEFING BOARDS, WHICH WERE DISPLAYED AT THE POINTS INDICATED, ARE ATTACHED AS TAB A.³

Title Chart

Mr. President, the NSC has concluded that it is appropriate once again to step back and examine our overall strategic posture after a START Treaty is concluded. (TS)

Certainly current events reinforce this conclusion. For whatever the reasons, both supporters and opponents of arms reductions are directing considerable public attention to START and in the process several criticisms have surfaced. It is important at this juncture that we understand the strategic results of our work, be able to respond to our critics, and reassert the value of such a treaty. (TS)

Let me now lay out the Chiefs’ approach to the question of whether we are better off with a START Treaty. (TS)

A few observers have asserted that we simply don’t know where we are going with the strategic arms reduction process. Much of this concern is created because we have failed to identify publicly a post-START force structure. (TS)

There are a number of sound reasons not to do this—the negotiations are still in a dynamic state and the ultimate force requirements will derive from the outcome of that process as well as the evolving threat, the verification regime, Congressional actions, and fiscal realities at the time. To identify a force mix based on an incomplete START agreement further presents the risk of preempting the negotiators by revealing our bottom lines to the Soviets. So much for that argument . . . (TS)

Other critics, including Dr. Kissinger, have attempted to make the case that we have not adequately assessed the military balance in the post-START world. This is simply not true. (TS)

Chart #1

Strategic Balance Without START (U)

This placard addresses the strategic weapons balance without START. As the left hand columns show, today’s situation is characterized most prominently by asymmetries. The United States still has a superiority in total numbers. The large advantage we hold in bomber-delivered weapons gives us over 2500 more warheads than the Soviets. The Kremlin, however, has concentrated heavily on ballistic missiles, overcoming the advantage we used to enjoy in this category. The Soviet edge is currently over 1600 reentry vehicles and continues to grow. Unfortunately, this trend pushes the overall balance toward a less stable condition. (TS)

Without a START agreement, our best estimates indicate that by 1998, both sides would possess about 1300 weapons. The Soviet advantage in ballistic missile warheads, however, more than doubles (to 3548). This is true despite our strategic modernization program which includes some Poseidon submarine retirements. Introduction of the B–2 provides an offset so that total weapons remain roughly equal. But from the U.S. perspective, the significantly larger number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads is the crucial issue. (TS)

The Kremlin could, with a determined effort, increase its total inventory even more by 1998, but all things considered, it is our judgment that we will see instead a gradual and steady growth pattern. This has been the historical approach of the Russians when expanding their strategic inventory. (TS)

Force Structure (U)

Before proceeding to examine START constraints, it is necessary to say an additional word about force structure. As I previously mentioned, we have not settled this question as yet. That does not mean, however, that we have not examined any force structure; to the contrary, we have constructed a number of hypothetical orders of battle which could fit within START limits and then compared them in a number of ways. Having done that, we have reached several conclusions. For instance:

—That there are a number of such force structures which, using the weaponry that we currently own and are seeking in our modernization programs, will be militarily sufficient.

—That once an agreement is reached, we can then refine these force structures in light of the circumstances at the time and choose a recommended alternative.

—That while the mix of ICBMs and SLBMs will vary somewhat with each force structure, there is little variation in total numbers.

—That the choice between alternatives will be dictated not by numbers, but qualitative considerations such as survivability, accuracy, responsiveness, and the like.

—That, to provide structural flexibility, we will require the right to de-MIRV or download our missiles. For instance, it may be necessary to reduce our current Minuteman III missiles from 3 to 2 or even single warheads and/or lower the number of reentry vehicles which SLBMs can carry. Our current START position permits us to do this. It would allow us thereby to increase weapon survivability by reducing the value of a delivery system as a target to the Soviets or changing the number of aimpoints if we deem it wise to do so. (TS)

To do the illustrative analysis which follows, it was necessary to use one of those representative force structures. The one chosen achieves our objectives for survivability and effectiveness, as well as a balance among the legs of the Triad—and considers fiscal realities. (TS)

Chart #2

Strategic Balance With Treaty (U)

As we address the impact of START on the strategic balance, we must recognize the heart of the proposed treaty is its limitation on both Intercontinental and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile warheads. These are the most destabilizing weapons in the inventory and both sides will be limited to 4900. Most important, the Soviet advantage of 1600 that exists today, and which unconstrained would more than double in the next ten years, will disappear. (TS)

At the same time, inclusion of the Reykjavik bomber counting rule in START allows both sides to depend more heavily upon bomber-delivered weapons (i.e., gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles) which do not lend themselves well to sudden pre-emptive or surprise attack. Because we already rely heavily on bombers, we achieve a total weapon count that is larger than the Soviets (i.e., approximately 9500 to 7000). Overall the Soviets would cut about 3000 strategic weapons from today’s order of battle. You will, of course, recall from the preceding chart that without START we projected the Soviets would have a total of about 13,000 warheads by 1998. (TS)

I am not sure I can explain why the Soviets have conceded us the Reykjavik bomber counting rule. But I can show you that the overall advantage which we would enjoy as a result of that rule is very important to us. This is true because of the inherent asymmetry between the target bases of our two countries. Let me elaborate. . . (TS)

Target Base Asymmetry (U)

The relationship between the U.S. and Soviet target bases is fundamental to addressing the strategic balance. We have for years compiled a list of important military and economic installations in the Soviet Union from which we choose SIOP targets. This target base is continually revised as circumstances change. At the same time, we put ourselves in the Kremlin’s shoes and build a “theoretical” Soviet target base for attacking the United States. This permits us to game hypothetical nuclear exchanges between the U.S. and USSR, and to draw relevant conclusions. (TS)

Russia is a nation whose land mass is over two times the size of ours. It has: a greater population; five million men under arms; a much larger security infrastructure; and a more dispersed military industrial base. It produces, for example, submarines, rocket engines, aircraft and tanks at two to four times the rate of the United States. The end result of all this is a pronounced target base asymmetry between the two superpowers which severely complicates the balance calculations. (TS)

It is imperative that we attempt to understand this asymmetry and account for it in our advice to you. (TS)

Chart #3

This graph displays the difference in targets with and without START. The red cross-hatched U.S. bars represent targets in the Soviet Union that we plan to hit with strategic weapons. For the Soviet Union, the blue cross-hatched bars represent the number of targets in the United States which the Kremlin would strike. As the bars demonstrate, the START Treaty will not have an appreciable effect on the basic asymmetry, or on the number of targets that need to be hit by both sides. (TS)

Our best estimate of the difference is in the neighborhood of 4,000 aimpoints, this figure may seem large and some expert judgments might argue for a smaller number. The fact, however, that the asymmetry exists and is substantial cannot be disputed. (TS)

As you have seen, today we depend upon our advantage in bomber delivery capability to deal with this problem. A START agreement will rectify the latter imbalance and, with the bomber counting rule that you negotiated at Reykjavik, we can continue to safely accommodate the target base asymmetry, although our success here is somewhat attenuated by the elaborate Soviet air defense network. The Kremlin can, of course, also exploit this feature of a START Treaty, but it would take them a good many years to effectively match the U.S. in bombers. We, of course, have always wanted the USSR to shift the emphasis in its force structure from ballistic missiles to bomber delivered weapons which are less destabilizing. The bottom line is that we must have the Reykjavik bomber counting rule to assure military sufficiency in the face of a disproportionately large Soviet military establishment and industrial infrastructure. (TS)

Chart #4

Weapon-to-Target Ratios (U)

With that background, we can now look at the relationship between weapons and targets. On this chart we have overlaid weapons on the targets displayed on the last graph. This measure compares static weapon-to-target ratios. Our projections for this relationship show that by 1998, the impressive Soviet advantage expands to an awesome proportion without a treaty, but is markedly constrained by a START agreement. (TS)

It should be noted that if one takes into account Soviet concerns with the nuclear weapons of China, UK, and France, it would drive down the Soviet ratio accordingly. (TS)

In all candor, a direct comparison of the number of weapons and targets does not tell you much about military consequences because the calculations for a real world attack are much more complicated than a one-on-one relationship. Nevertheless, given the Russian mentality, such a substantial reduction in order-of-battle will undoubtedly have an impact on their confidence, and limit their options. (TS)

Weapon Quality and Modernization (U)

Before examining some real world comparisons, let me comment on modernization and its importance to the strategic balance. As just mentioned, in building the SIOP a good many targets will call for more than one weapon in order to obtain the desired damage levels. The reason of course, is that several factors such as weapon reliability, yield, and accuracy as well as target hardness determine the level of damage that can be inflicted by a specific weapon. In turn, improved weapon quality (e.g., better accuracy) increases single weapon effectiveness and can reduce the number of warheads needed for a specific task. (TS)

Chart #5

This explains why the Chiefs put so much emphasis on the strategic modernization programs which your Administration initiated and is in the process of implementing. The new systems in each leg of the triad will considerably increase the efficiency of our order-of-battle. These improvements can be measured in damage expectance ratios. This placard shows the degree of improvements which three of our most modern systems represent. For example, one Peacekeeper warhead can do the work of two Minuteman II RVs. This is primarily due to better accuracy. Such upgrades are essential, if we are to keep the threshold of deterrence high in the face of treaty reductions. (TS)

Target Coverage (U)

To get a better idea of where we will stand under START, let us look at a real world laydown of our 1988 treaty constrained force against the Soviets. We will examine the results from three perspectives: target coverage, impact on reserve forces and the aggregated damage expectancy levels. (TS)

Chart #6

The blocks on this graph represent the proportionate numbers of targets in each labeled category. On the right hand axis are notations to demonstrate in a rough fashion the relative number of targets which can be covered by various levels of weapons. Today, we plan warheads on about 95 percent of the SIOP list. Without START we could attack the entire list of aimpoints by 1998. (TS)

Not surprisingly, with treaty limitations we would not be able to strike all the targets we could under an unconstrained regime. You do give up something when you cut large numbers of weapons. As suggested by the graph, our sample laydown does cover those aimpoints in the “critical” and “essential” categories as well as a number of those in the “significant” group. (TS)

In interpreting this picture, it should be kept in mind that our damage criteria are very conservative and do not take into account fire, wind or radiation damage. Moreover, once we have concluded a START agreement, the entire targeting policy of the United States should be reviewed in the light of the new circumstances. This would, of course, include a rigorous scrub of the target base geared to the new order of battle. We have already commenced this process and are confident that such a review will improve this picture somewhat. (TS)

Chart #7

Reserve Weapons (U)

At the same time we look at other factors as well. A START Treaty would cut heavily into the Soviet strategic reserve, i.e., the residual weapons available to them after committing their initial and primary strike against our territory. We are convinced that an integral part of the Kremlin’s strategy is to hold back a large weapon reserve. This accounts in part for their current excessive numbers and is consistent with their historical warfighting philosophy. The comparison, displayed here, shows the dramatic effect START has on this aspect of Soviet capabilities. In my judgment such a reduction will be especially painful for the Kremlin. (TS)

Chart #8

Damage Expectancy (U)

Another way of looking at our 1998 hypothetical force is to calculate its aggregate damage expectancy and to compare it with today’s SIOP. This graph makes such a comparison. (TS)

Damage expectancy predicts the qualitative results obtained from the number of weapon systems committed against a certain class of targets. This measure of merit has historically been our primary instrument for judging trends in our effectiveness. (TS)

The bar on the left depicts our current damage expectancy of [amount not declassified] percent. The bar on the right shows that in 1998, with a START agreement, we achieve an aggregated damage expectancy of [amount not declassified] percent. The significant point of this comparison is that the trend is one of improvement, even with the limitations of a START Treaty. I again emphasize, however, that the favorable figures you see here would not occur without modernization and the essential counting rule we desire in START. (TS)

Uncertainties (U)

Mr. President, we have shown you a number of analytical views of the strategic impact of a START agreement, but you should be aware that it is not possible to reduce all considerations to graphs. (TS)

I have mentioned that we don’t know a good way to bring all the effects of our weapons into our calculations. We don’t put into our equations the attrition that conventional hostilities might exact on strategic systems. For example, the Soviets are persuaded that in the conventional phase before a nuclear exchange our attack submarines will sink a number of their own ballistic missile boats. (TS)

We, of course, have a great many warheads outside of those considered today, for instance, our theater nuclear weapons. Their impact on a general nuclear exchange is extremely difficult to estimate. But undoubtedly these systems would play a major role in the outcome. (TS)

In a word, this business is not an exact science and our intelligence cannot tell us all we need to know. Fortunately, most of these uncertainties would weigh in our favor if we could quantify them. (TS)

As a consequence, final assessments must, of necessity, be a mixture of mathematical analysis, military experience, and a knowledge of our enemy. This means that human judgment still plays a significant role in the reasoning process. The Chiefs work hard to make those judgments informed ones. (TS)

Chart #9

Verification

All in all, the foregoing calculations support the adoption of a START Treaty. They do not, however speak to verification or the possibility of Soviet cheating. That subject has likewise been receiving a great deal of scrutiny during the current debate. (TS)

The JCS have, in fact, spent considerable time reviewing not only each negotiating position, but also the ramifications of potential Soviet cheating and breakout, and their possible effect on our strategic balance. We will continue to do so. (TS)

We believe the verification provisions emerging in the treaty combined with the programmed improvements to our national intelligence systems will provide a reasonable assurance that we will detect cheating early enough to offset its impact before the Kremlin could gain a militarily significant advantage. That type of compromise strikes the best balance between reality and risk. If we negotiate a regime that is dependable and practical, the Soviet potential gain from cheating is far outweighed by the potential losses. (TS)

There is, of course, a lot of detail work that has yet to be completed. Unlike much of the treaty, verification does not lend itself to general principles—the devil is in the details. Moreover, we will be breaking new ground as we attempt to work out a satisfactory scheme for tracking mobile missiles. The verification provisions of START will be many orders of magnitude more complicated than those in INF. Also the costs in both people and resources will probably be a great deal higher than expected. We have yet to come fully to grips with this aspect of the treaty. In essence, negotiating the verification arrangements will be complex, difficult, and above all protracted. (TS)

Should the Soviets decide to cheat or breakout of the treaty, the United States has the ability to respond in a number of ways:

—ReMIRVing our ballistic missiles;

—Protecting our current production lines;

—Reopening lines of production for systems that are currently deployed (ALCMs, etc.);

—Increasing the alert rates for our strategic forces;

—Taking advantage of our theater nuclear weapons, such as dual-capable aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. (TS)

Our response will only be constrained by our national will to act. Our potential growth in the face of Soviet noncompliance could more than offset the military gains they may have hoped to achieve and the Kremlin knows this. The Russian leaders respect our industrial capacity and remember the huge bursts of industrial and military energy the United States has put forth in past national crises. (TS)

Chart #10

Conclusions (U)

In terms of national security strategy, the Chiefs are convinced, that on balance the United States will be better off with a START agreement if it includes the counting rules the U.S. has proposed and a proper verification regime. Similarly, this judgment assumes continued modernization. (TS)

While the asymmetrical target base gives the Soviets a built-in advantage, treaty limits will present them with a host of difficult decisions and greatly reduce the more important advantages they enjoy today. The character of the reductions will make for a more equal nuclear balance and a more stable world. To recap the main conclusions:

1) Total weapon inventories would be significantly reduced and future strategic weapon growth would be capped.

2) The continued widening of the already large gap in ballistic missile weapons will be arrested and restored to parity by START.

3) The disproportionate weapon-to-target ratio that would exist in ten years is brought down to more reasonable levels.

4) The United States will exceed the total number of weapons the USSR has. This is extremely important from a “deterrence” stand point since deterrence rests mainly on each nation’s general perceptions rather than complex calculations. For the Soviets to redress this balance would require dramatic change in their strategic policies. Even that possibility would lead to a more stable balance than exists today.

5) While we would not be able to strike all the current SIOP targets, those in the “critical” and “essential” categories would be adequately covered as well as a number of those designated “significant”. In our judgment, this would be sufficient when viewed in company with the other measures we have discussed.

6) We still possess the strategic capability to support a strong deterrent policy or,

7) In the event of nuclear war, to achieve high enough damage levels in the USSR to render further Soviet actions ineffectual.

8) All of this equates to military sufficiency. (TS)

General Powell: Comments? (U)

Secretary Shultz: This is a very powerful statement. It is exceptionally worthwhile to have gone back to square one and reviewed our position. We have come out where we were before; START is to our advantage. When the President first proposed what is now become START, some people saw that it was to our advantage and claimed that he was therefore not serious. Yet we got the numbers. We’ve got a lot of work to do to screw everything down, and we’ve got a SLCM problem, and an ABM problem, but we have the basic numbers. What you are telling me is that it is a hell of a deal. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Colin, may I ask the Chiefs to comment? (U)

General Gray: Colin, we face difficulties because we are a democracy. We have to negotiate flexibly because we don’t know what kind of support we will get in the future. They don’t. We have to take our Allies and Congress into account. When Akhromeyev was here he said he could speak for the Warsaw Pact. That is obviously quite different. (S)

General Welch: Colin, when you see this you have to question why the Soviets have agreed to it. One possible reason is that they will still have the numbers to cover the U.S. targets. But this is still a better deal for us. (S)

Admiral Trost: Colin, this briefing points up how important strategic modernization program is. Without that program we can’t do the job. We can’t allow euphoria for a possible arms control treaty to kill the strategic modernization program. (S)

The President: Colin, this strengthens what I have always taken for granted. Our approach reduces the danger of nuclear war. Some of our so-called friends are saying we gave away the store. Your briefing says its quite the reverse. I see why the Soviets are willing to accept it; we know how their economy is. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Also their enormous conventional advantages allow them to accept strategic arms reductions. (C)

The President: That is why, with respect to things like battle field weapons, I have always said that we can’t do anything to reduce tactical nuclear weapons until we have addressed the conventional balance. That is what we have to do next. (S)

Admiral Crowe: Of course Secretary Carlucci and I hear the Soviets say that there is rough parity in the balance now. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: They say all their stuff is just junk, until you actually see it! (C)

Secretary Shultz: I remember that Gorbachev told us that there were a lot of nuclear weapons sitting around ready to be detonated by conventional capability. He was referring to Chernobyl. He said France was particularly vulnerable. If we hit the nuclear power plants, it would put France out of commission. (S)

The President: [Interrupting] They have the most don’t they? (U)

Secretary Shultz: [Continuing] Colin, if you hit a nuclear power plant, its the same thing as a nuclear weapon in Gorbachev’s view. Do you agree? (S)

Admiral Crowe: Maybe. (U)

General Gray: We have all types of safety mechanisms that the Soviets don’t have. (C)

Admiral Crowe: Yes, but they are talking about bypassing safety mechanisms with a bomb. (C)

Admiral Trost: Yes, he’s talking about a plant operating at power. That’s a real problem. If it is a light water plant you will have substantial amounts of radioactive steam. And if you have melt down, there will be a substantial release of radioactivity to the environment. (U)

Secretary Shultz: How about if it is shut down? (U)

Admiral Trost: Even then the exposure is bad. (U)

Secretary Shultz: I used to build these . . . (U)

Admiral Crowe: [Interrupting] And he [Admiral Trost] used to operate them. (U)

Secretary Shultz: [Continuing] We have cement walls and everything but we are still vulnerable to conventional attack. (C)

Secretary Carlucci: Mr. President, I would like to make another point. You said they could not sustain the economic competition. That is true, but they are willing to devote a very high percentage of their resources to that competition. In my talks with the Defense Minister [Yazov] he said we [i.e., the Soviets] made an enormous mistake in not going into computers some years back. I think they are showing us all this fancy equipment to suggest that we should make a deal now because they are going to catch up. When in reality they can’t cut it from the standpoint of technology. That’s why they are going after SLCM. (S)

The President: You know that at the first Geneva meeting, the two of us were sitting alone in front of the fire. I pointed out that we were two men alone in the room who had the power to create world war or to create world peace. I told him there was no way we would allow military superiority on his part. His choice was either arms reductions or an arms race, a race he could not win. (S)

Secretary Carlucci: But they still have not done any reductions. (C)

Admiral Crowe: They don’t know how. (U)

The President: But they have accepted zero INF and a 50 percent START agreement. I received a letter sometime back with two verses from Revelations about a third angel who brought down the star Wormwood and where the star hit the earth at a place from which a third of the water of the earth sprang, the water was poisoned. The letter pointed out that in Russian wormwood was “Chernobyl”. And I had some of the NSC staff look it up and they were right; it was a Ukrainian word, but of course Chernobyl was in the Ukraine. (C)

General Powell: I think that concludes the briefing. (U)

Admiral Crowe: When Akhromeyev was here he used the word “thank God” so much that I was beginning to wonder. But the translation said it was just a Soviet phrase that didn’t mean anything from a religious standpoint. (U)

The President: Yes, I am told that it is a figure of speech. Its God with a small “g”. (U)

Admiral Crowe: Akhromeyev had another expression. After our discussion on doctrine he said “I feel like I have just been to confession.” (C)

The President: That reminds me of my most recent Soviet story, one I heard from my Secret Service Agent during the summit. It seems there is a joke in Moscow that Gorbachev and I, along with the head of the KGB and the head of the Secret Service, were driving in a car seeing the sights. We stopped by a waterfall, and got out to look at it. Gorbachev turned to my Secret Service Agent and said, “Jump into the waterfall.” The Secret Service Agent said, “I’ve got a wife and three kids”, and refused to jump. Gorbachev then turned to the KGB Agent and said, “Jump into the waterfall.” He did so. When the Secret Service Agent pulled him out and asked him why he had jumped he said, “I’ve got a wife and three kids.” (U)

Thereupon the meeting ended at 2:45 p.m. (U)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, JCS Mtg on START, August 11, 1988. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. All brackets are in the original text.
2. See Document 313.
3. Attached but not printed are a set of briefing boards dated August 11 and entitled “START: ARE WE BETTER OFF WITH A START AGREEMENT?”