Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

32. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, August 9, 1982, 3:10 p.m.

Bud McF—introductory remarks [VP joins . . . Baker, Deaver, Darmon still out—Poindexter not present] . . . missiles above 850, nondeployed—4 groups of constraints—Group A (1) development of capabilities, (2) missiles & equipment at sites, (3) activities to develop reconstitution—recommend adoption, any agency comment?

(nobody comments)

group B, procedural constrains on non-deployed missiles—disassembling/destroying missiles that are taken out of inventory . . . comment on caveat for SS–9/Titan for space launch [Pres comments: but warheads could be destroyed]—some spares, but stored at designated sites—propose adopting measures “1” & “3” of B if no objection

(nobody comments)

as for “2,” there’s still a question on ability to verify (i.e., for old missiles intended to serve as space launch vehicles) . . . agency remarks.

Shultz—difference of opinion within State—question for Bud: verify if tested . . . test to sustain confidence in system

Bud—true you must test to sustain confidence . . . Gen Vessey?

Gen Vessey—based on tests, Soviets can have graph of degradation over time

Pres—what about int’l group responsible for dismantling or destroying—how do you destroy? shoot it off?

Bud McF—Soviets have dismantled SS–7s & 8s

Ikle—we can verify if destruction’s where we can see it

McMahon—we’ve not observe dismantling of a large number of missiles

Shultz—the reason I raise the issue is that verification is at the heart of agency disagreement . . . and of whether or not you want an agreement

McFarlane—if you could even find one instance of cheating, the knowledge that this may happen has some deterrent value

Weinberger—analogy to laws against bank robbery—we’ve always offered on-site verification—we should go in with best set of conditions, even if we can’t verify w/on-site or don’t get in negotiations

Shultz—inclined to go along w/ this . . . but what disturbs me is that if we get an agreement & find they’ve cheated after several yrs, we’re left w/ a serious imbalance

Weinberger—high moral ground, and we should keep it

Shultz—approach on grounds we can’t trust them . . . assume that if we can’t verify, they’ll cheat—evaluate the importance to ourselves on this grounds that it will be done . . . how essential is it to our purpose?

President—[rewords . . . discussion ensues on what the generic issue involves . . . covert]

McMahon—web of verification/network of constraints—Soviets will worry about getting caught

Shultz—but what will they have done over the 5 years

Pres—alternative is we’d have to do it also

Gen Vessey—we don’t want to do certain things . . . can’t go to Congress because we can’t verify

Weinberger—we should go in w/what we want to get—like laws—importance to us a valid issue, but not here

Pres—[discusses zero option]

Grey—we should have opportunity to raise in SCC . . . basis for challenge

McF—agreed to adopt #2?

[no comments]

McF—final one . . . designated locations for storage . . . verification again the issue—comments

Pres—our attitude has to be that of preacher in church who let the only one-armed man pass the basket

McF—last group of constraints . . . question again is verification

Shultz—same arguments apply—I’m not convinced it’s a good thing to go with . . . logic troublesome

Weinberger—reconstitution favors Soviets now . . . again, argues for on-site inspection . . . hollow & shallow w/o it

Shultz—makes it hollow & shallow . . . means if we don’t get this, we don’t have much

Pres—is it easier to verify if we close down production facilities?

McMahon—put inspectors at choke points

Shultz—why don’t we aspire to have a reconstitution capability?

Weinberger—(expensive . . . several reasons)

Pres—30% & 50% worry me . . . how do we explain to nuclear protestors?

Gen Vessey—(explains function of spare launchers)

Pres—I see . . . w/o warheads

Weinberger—anything we can do to get onsite inspection

McF—even w/spares, below SALT II

Gray—(makes point of SCC again)

Meese—isn’t key issue whether to have onsite verification (discussion, briefly)

Adelman—our problem over the years has been calling violations—treaties may have provisions (e.g., re: yellow rain) but we’ve been poor in calling

Pres—challenge immediately, and if we find even one, we’re back in an arms race and we’ll outbuild you

McF—(summarize . . . include in instructions) . . . Middle East

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.]

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 102, NSC 00059 RWR 8/09/82. Secret. Drafted by Wheeler. The original text is handwritten. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix C. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and ended at 4:11 p.m. No formal minutes of this meeting were found. All brackets are in the original, except those indicating the omission of material.