Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 4, 1982

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting on START—August 5, 1982

Issue

How should we constrain “non-deployed” ballistic missiles, and should we propose an overall inventory limit on such missiles? This issue is addressed in the Interdepartmental Group discussion paper attached.²

Facts

Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union maintain extra missiles to serve as maintenance spares and to be used in training and flight testing. These “non-deployed” missiles were not effectively constrained in the SALT agreements and are not constrained by the U.S. START proposal, which currently limits only “deployed” missiles (i.e., missiles in/on their operational launchers).

There is great uncertainty in the intelligence community about the number of “non-deployed” missiles the Soviets may have (as many as 1,000 +), and concern that such Soviet missiles could be used to reload silos or permit the Soviets to rapidly break out of treaty constraints in a crisis.

The U.S. delegation has been instructed to tell the Soviets that we intend to deal with “non-deployed” missiles, but not to propose any specific approach without additional instructions. They have done so.

Discussion

The problems caused potentially by these extra missiles are:

—Rapid Reload: Could be used to reload launchers within several hours of initial use;

—Reconstitution: Could be used to reload launchers later in a protracted war;

—Soft Launch: Could be set up to be launched from simple, above ground-launch sites and augment a silo force in a crisis; and

—Breakout: Could provide the basis for quickly breaking out of constraints.

Three groups of constraints have been developed to address all four aspects of the “non-deployed” missile problem.

—The constraints are discussed in the long paper provided by the Interdepartmental Group (Tab C).

—They are summarized for your review at Tab A,³ and the agency position on each is provided at Tab B.⁴

We have Interdepartmental agreement on all constraints in Group A. There is disagreement on two of four constraints in Group B, and there is disagreement on the constraint in Group C. Thus, three of the total of nine proposed constraints will require discussion.

While the specific topic appears technical, the basic issues upon which the discussion of the three contentious constraints will hinge are:

—How much monitoring confidence do we need before proposing a constraint (especially in light of your emphasis on not just “adequate,” but “effective,” verification)?

—Can we claim that we can “effectively verify” a network of constraints if some elements can be monitored only with low confidence?

—How serious are we in going beyond National Technical Means of verification, and are we ready to negotiate such measures?

—Are we really going to constrain missiles, or by only limiting “deployed” missiles do we fall into the pattern of a SALT-type launcher limit? [FYI: The SALT agreements’ failure effectively to constrain the large inventory of Soviet missiles produced, but not “deployed,” was viewed as a major flaw by Senate critics and by Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny.]

My talking points (which frame the issues for the meeting) are provided at Tab D⁵ for your review. We have not provided any talking points for your use.

Recommendation⁶

OK	NO
________	________	That you read the Talking Points at Tab D, then the summaries at Tabs A and B, and scan the long IG paper at Tab C (especially pp. 14–18), time permitting, prior to the meeting.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 102, NSC 00059 RWR 8/09/82. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. Brackets are in the original. A stamped notation indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum.
2. Attached but not printed is the Interdepartmental Group Paper.
3. Attached but not printed is the IG Summary of Constraints.
4. Attached but not printed is the IG Summary of Agency Positions.
5. Attached but not printed are Clark’s Talking Points.
6. Reagan initialed his approval.