33. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
8375. Subject: (U) End-of-round report: START
1. This is START–091. Secret–Entire text.
2. Our primary objective during the opening round of START which ended on August 12 was to set forth the US proposal as outlined by President Reagan on May 9 in Eureka.2 We explained the major criteria on which our proposal is based: stability, equality, reductions, and effective verification. We pointed out that the Soviet buildup of highly accurate ICBMs capable of a disarming first strike against US ICBMs has brought about a destabilizing situation. It is our intention in START to encourage force structures in both the US and the USSR which are more stabilizing. We made it clear that we are not seeking identical force structures, but rather equality in the most significant measures of strategic capability. We rejected the Soviet concept of [Page 106] “equality and equal security” as a basis for START agreement because they use it to justify Soviet claims to a right to a greater strategic capability than ours. Throughout, we stressed that our proposal calls for substantial reductions to equal and verifiable levels.
3. Once we had laid out the US criteria, we presented the detailed elements of the US proposal:
—A phased approach; highest priority on the most destabilizing strategic systems—namely, ballistic missiles.
—First phase
—5,000 warheads on deployed ballistic missiles, no more than 2,500 of which would be ICBM warheads.
—850 aggregate ceiling on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs.
—Three collateral constraints:
—No more than 110 heavy ICBMs;
—A ban on new heavy missiles;
—No more than 210 heavy and medium ICBMs.
—If the Soviets accepted substantial reductions in ballistic missiles and counted the backfire, we could agree to equal numbers of heavy bombers in the first phase.
—Ceiling of approximately 200 kg on the mass of reentry vehicles on new ballistic missile systems and limits of 10 warheads on ICBMs and 14 on SLBMs.
—Effective verification is essential including, whenever necessary, going beyond NTM.
—Stressed the importance of data exchange and proposed a ban on all encryption of telemetry during flight-testing.
4. The Soviets presented three sets of proposals:
—First, a freeze on the numbers and modernization of strategic arms, which we rejected.
—Second, phased reductions in ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers to a level of 1,800 by the year 1990. (They conditioned their proposal on no increase in so-called “FBS.”) They said they would reduce the aggregate level of nuclear weapons on systems limited by their proposal, but refused to specify the number pending “resolution” of the cruise missile issue. They also called for a ban on all cruise missiles and ASBMs over 600 km.
—The reductions would be accompanied by restrictions on modernization, focusing mainly on sea-based systems. Their proposal would prevent most of our programs but allow most of theirs to go ahead.
—Third, a series of confidence-building measures as part of a START agreement.
[Page 107]—Second phase
—A direct and equal limit on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current US level.
—Consider, in the second phase, reductions in heavy bombers and other constraints on slow-flying systems.
5. The Soviets did not call for compensation for British and French forces in START. They did, however, indicate they would, under some circumstances, seek compensation for Chinese nuclear forces. We told them that third country forces would not be included or compensated for. As in the past, the Soviets said there should be a non-circumvention and non-transfer provision. We responded in post-plenary that we would not change existing patterns of cooperation with our allies.
6. It is evident that there are considerable differences between the US and the Soviet positions. We told the Soviets that the basic deficiency of their approach is that it contains no objective and coherent concept for enhancing the stability of the US-Soviet strategic relationship. In contrast to our approach, theirs provides no incentive to move away from reliance upon destabilizing systems. We told the Soviets they fail to recognize: (1) the destabilizing nature of ICBMs, (2) the distinction between fast-flying and slow-flying systems, (3) the importance of ballistic missile throw-weight as a measure of strategic capability, and (4) the current asymmetries in destructive capability cannot be allowed to continue.
7. The Soviet proposal calls for reductions of only 20 percent from the high aggregate level of SALT II (2250). Moreover, by failing to use proper units of account, their reductions would not have a major impact on the destructive capabilities of strategic forces. Finally, the Soviet proposal would not channel modernization in a way that promotes stability and reduces the risk of nuclear war.
8. We told the Soviets that our proposal, by contrast, promotes stability and reduces the risk of nuclear war through substantial reductions to equal levels in the most significant measures of strategic capability. We said both nations would stand to benefit from the US proposal. Under our proposal we would both have to reduce ballistic missile warheads by about one-third. The US would have to reduce its deployed ballistic missiles by about one-half. The Soviets would have to reduce more deployed ballistic missiles and more ICBM warheads, but this simply reflects the fact that the Soviets have built up more. We will have to reduce more SLBM warheads, but the ongoing Soviet programs to deploy new MIRVed SLBMs on Delta and Typhoon Class submarines will allow the Soviets to build up to the 2,500 level.
[Page 108]9. Although there are some tentative signs of similarity in our positions, the differences between us are serious and fundamental. In contrast to the early rounds of SALT, however, the Soviets came prepared to get into specifics early in the talks. The Soviet delegation adopted a businesslike tone and, for the most part, avoided polemics. As a result, we are considerably further along in understanding each other’s position than we were at an equivalent stage in the SALT negotiations. I attribute this to three reasons. First, the Soviets, in my opinion, want (and may need) an agreement. Second, they were caught off-guard by the boldness and appeal of our START proposal outlined by the President in Eureka on May 9. And third, Karpov and I know each other and have debated most of the issues in SALT II.
10. We have proposed to the Soviets a sound and equitable approach to achieving a strategic arms reduction agreement. We have spelled out, in detail, the advantages of the US proposal. We have pointed out that our proposal requires substantial reductions in the more destabilizing systems. We have adopted meaningful units of account and called for equal quantitative and qualitative limits on ballistic missiles. We told the Soviets we have serious problems with their proposal and at the close of the round we strongly urged them to reevaluate their position.
11. In conclusion, I think there are three courses of action we must pursue simultaneously if we are to preserve our security and move toward a satisfactory START agreement. First, and most important, we need to keep our defense programs intact. Nothing will impress the Soviets more than the knowledge that we have the will and resolve to fund the programs we need for force modernization. Therefore, only when the Soviet leadership is convinced that we will match them will they sign an agreement. Second, we need a sustained public information campaign which keeps before the public the fact that our proposal is better than theirs. The Soviets must not be allowed to recover their traditional propaganda edge. Third, we need to maintain a firm, reasonable and patient posture at the negotiating table.
12. The US position is a reasonable one. It seeks to reduce the risk of nuclear war by focusing first on the most destabilizing weapons. The Soviet position, by contrast, would simply preserve current destabilizing Soviet advantages. The essence of any negotiation is to build on common ground. Nevertheless, it is entirely premature to believe that the Soviets have presented us with sufficient positive points for us to begin making concessions. Experience in past arms control talks has shown that when the US seeks points of compromise prematurely the Soviets simply dig in their heels and then raise their demands. During the next round, which opens in Geneva October 6, I think we should continue to elaborate, in a firm and patient manner, the US position [Page 109] and to demonstrate how it benefits both our nations. But in the final analysis my success will depend on the maintenance of our defense programs and on holding our current advantage in the public relations arena.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820421–1039. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to DOD, USIA, the White House, JCS, Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.↩
- See Document 17.↩