Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

316. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 15, 1988

SUBJECT

• Guidance for the Nuclear and Space Talks

Issue

To document your approval of instructions for the tenth round of Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva.

Background

The Nuclear and Space Talks resumed in Geneva on July 12.

Discussion

Draft instructions for the NST Round X were prepared by the appropriate interagency bodies. Because there were no issues raised warranting Presidential decision, I have authorized their dispatch in your name, after resolving a number of issues. Normal practice is to document your formal approval of all instructions in an NSDD. A draft NSDD is at Tab A;² it includes as attachments individual instructions for START and Defense and Space and overall NST instructions.

The overall instructions reaffirm our current general objectives and our unwillingness to conclude a new treaty until the Soviet illegal radar at Karsnoyarsk is dismantled.

The START instructions are quite long and include instructions to translate the work done during the Moscow summit (especially on ALCMs and mobile ICBM verification) into treaty text. They also record the results of an extensive review of our existing position and provide a number of minor corrections and modifications to our current draft treaty text.

In preparing the START instructions, one significant issue arose. Just prior to the Moscow summit we prepared a mobile ICBM verification scheme for discussion with the Soviets in the event you alter the U.S. position and allow mobile ICBMs under START. Our approach was to confine mobile ICBMs to small peacetime locations except for (1) limited numbers in pre-notified transit or (2) large scale dispersal. During dispersals (which we envision to be rare) there would be no restrictions on mobile ICBM location.

Allowing dispersals was strongly opposed by all agencies except the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the grounds that it increased verification problems significantly. We included dispersals, despite this opposition, because the JCS were convinced that such a provision was essential both for survivability and for continued Congressional support of the U.S. mobile ICBM program. ACDA Director Burns, supported by the Director of Central Intelligence, believes the decision should be reconsidered. His rationale is at Tab B. While I appreciate his concerns, nothing has changed since the pre-summit decision. The Soviets appear to have accepted the broad outlines of our approach and I elected not to alter it at this time.

In addition to the mobile ICBM issue, a number of other issues arose during preparation of the START instructions, none of which involved new policy. My resolution of the issues is at Tab C.

The primary Defense and Space issue was how hard to press our proposal to allow space-based sensors to run free from ABM Treaty constraints. We have discussed this proposal with the Soviets several times, including at the Moscow Summit.

The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency believed we are ready to table draft treaty language on the proposal. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense and Space Negotiator believed we should not table treaty language until the Soviets accept the idea in principle, but that we should be prepared to answer Soviet questions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence opposed even reiterating points we made to the Soviets at Moscow or authorizing the U.S. Negotiating Group to answer Soviet questions. While there is no present urgency to table treaty language, we should be prepared to answer Soviet questions. Therefore, I accepted the advice of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense and Space Negotiator.

In accordance with NSDD 266, Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser to the NSC, has coordinated the attached NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK	No
		That you sign the attached NSDD approving the negotiating instructions for NST Round X.3

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Burns) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)⁴

Washington, July 1, 1988

SUBJECT

• Further Steps on Mobile Verification

Even with the “elements on mobile ICBM verification,” as agreed at the summit, we are a long way from resolving the details and remaining differences for verifying mobile ICBMs. The differences reflected at the summit, in my view, underline the need to add a key constraint to our position.

In particular, the Soviets appear to question our position that operational dispersals would, in practice, occur only rarely. This heightens an already deep concern that the Soviet’s conduct of operational and exercise dispersals—with no constraints whatsoever on dispersal area—would give them a relatively easy opportunity to exercise and integrate the operations of covert forces should they decide to do so. We would have little basis for objecting to legal dispersals and no basis for distinguishing legal from illegal systems, since the former could be anywhere.

Therefore, as we flesh out our position further, I recommend that we reconsider adding a key constraint. We should, in my view, introduce some boundary beyond which systems could not legally go in dispersing—as we have in INF. For road-mobiles, this would mean superimposing a dispersal zone on the Restricted Deployment Area (RDA) we have proposed. For rail-mobiles, this would look again at some concept for defining how far trains could go.

This constraint would be important to a mobile verification regime whether or not we get tagging. If an effective tagging scheme can be devised (which is still uncertain) and sold to the Soviets (who so far have rejected the idea), it will at most help deter mixing illegal and legal systems at declared facilities (e.g., missiles in garrisons or RDAs). Nothing in our current position is designed to help deter mixing or coordinating illegal and legal systems during exercises or other dispersals.

An outer boundary for dispersals, or dispersal zone, would provide such a deterrent by providing a basis—indeed, the only basis—for distinguishing between legal and illegal systems by NTM. Since we would define the outer boundary by a number that would not adversely affect our expected operations and survivability, I see little, if any, disadvantage to this approach.

An added advantage of an outer boundary is that, for verification purposes, we would not need to impose any restrictions on movement within the dispersal zone. Thus, this scheme would permit much greater survivability on a day-to-day basis and satisfy the concern that our systems might, in effect, be stuck in small areas and very vulnerable. Moreover, regular movements within the larger dispersal area would not raise the alarms that could easily be triggered by the very infrequent dispersals envisioned under our current approach.

Therefore, I believe consideration should be given to introducing this constraint in the upcoming round. Without such a constraint, we would have less confidence for strategic mobile ICBMs than we were willing to accept for the 100-100 INF approach, and that would not be acceptable.

I am sending similar memoranda to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵

William F. Burns

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁶

Washington, undated

RESOLUTION OF START ISSUES

I resolved minor START issues as follows:

—Agreed to consider the Joint Draft Text as an authoritative U.S. position, consistent with past practice. (OSD and JCS opposed)

—Included instructions in START on the need to dismantle Krasnoyarsk before concluding a START treaty. (State and ACDA preferred to cover this only in overall instructions)

—Authorized the START delegation to explore an ALCM counting rule attributing 10 ALCM per B52, 8 per Soviet BEAR H and 6 per Soviet Blackjack. (OSD opposed)

—Authorized discussing a Soviet proposal on functional differences for bomber distinguishability. (OSD and ACDA opposed)

—Authorized tabling treaty text on mobile ICBM verification (OSD and the DCI opposed)

—Declined to limit the technical data we will exchange, pending additional review. (JCS opposed)

—Declined to allow the Negotiator to discuss allowing heavy ICBM testing and modernization without further Washington approval. (State opposed)

—Declined an OSD request to reconsider our position on perimeter portal monitoring and a JCS request to reconsider restrictions on movement of ballistic missiles before inspections.

—Accepted a proposal to allow provide separate limits on different types of non-deployed ICBM at a single launcher deployment area. (State opposed)

—Declined to authorize language on treaty duration pending a policy review. (ACDA and the Negotiator opposed)

—Agreed that, consistent with INF, the entire area inside a site boundary should be subject to inspection. (JCS opposed)

—Disapproved a proposal to make the number of exits to sites subject to perimeter portal monitoring the subject of agreement after ratification; retained current treaty provisions. (State opposed)

—Authorized tabling some new definitions despite a JCS belief that they required further study. (JCS opposed)

—Reaffirmed our existing position that launchers for rail-mobile ICBMs must be tagged. (State, ACDA and JCS opposed)

In addition, I resolved several minor wording or clarity issues.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 097, NSDD 310 [NST Negotiations Round X]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Brooks and Tobey. Copied to Bush and Duberstein. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “The President has seen 7/17/88.”
2. Printed as Document 317.
3. Reagan initialed his approval.
4. Secret.
5. Not found.
6. Secret. In a July 8 memorandum to Powell, Brooks, Tobey, and Linhard wrote: “Normal practice is to submit NST instructions to the President for his approval, documenting that approval in an NSDD. We believe that the issues raised are not deserving of the President’s time; they are either (a) minor issues of nuance or (b) issues where it is only necessary to reaffirm existing U.S. policy. Thus, we propose that you resolve the issues and authorize the issuance of the instructions.” Powell approved all of the recommendations offered by Brooks, Tobey, and Linhard in the memorandum. (National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 097, NSDD 310 [NST Negotiations Round X])