315. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
7836. Subject: NST: Kampelman-Obukhov Conversation June 11.
1. This is NST–X–M–001. Secret—entire text.
2. Meeting Date: July 11, 1988
Time: 1300–1500 hours
Place: Restaurant les Continents, Hotel Intercontinental, Geneva
3. Participants:
| U.S. | USSR |
| Ambassador Kampelman | Ambassador Obukhov |
4. Begin summary: Obukhov was cordial and constructive in one-on-one conversation with Kampelman July 11. He asked for joint plenary to open NST Round X July 12, with indications he may have substantive comments to raise, but declined to be specific about possible new substantive moves. Citing past precedent, Obukhov suggested personally (and not on behalf of his government) a logical break-point of the negotiations would be shortly after U.S. elections in November, “assuming we don’t have a treaty by then,” but quickly added we should still try for that. He assumed issue would be discussed at September ministerial. Obukhov professed disappointment at Kampelman’s statement that Soviet SLCM position made a START treaty in 1988 unlikely. On ABM Treaty review, Obukhov said Shevardnadze wanted NST talks to resume July 12 as announced by leaders. Moscow, he said, was discussing proposed dates. He did not demur at Kampelman’s suggestion the Defense/Space Talks break and not be in session for the period of the ABM Treaty review. End summary.
[Page 1452]5. Begin subject summary. NST talks/U.S. political calendar; request for joint plenary July 12; passing on START to the next administration; Defense and Space; ABM Treaty review; one-sided Soviet concessions. End subject summary.
NST Talks/U.S. Political Calendar
6. Kampelman invited Obukhov for customary one-on-one discussion July 11 as prelude to opening of Round X of NST negotiations July 12. Obukhov was relaxed and cordial. Much of conversation dwelt on how the NST negotiations fit into the U.S. political calendar and transition between administrations.
7. Obukhov asked whether the U.S. has views on how long the round should go, given the U.S. elections this fall. Kampelman replied this was an issue on which the U.S. had not yet taken a position. We believed we should make as much progress as we can now, and face that question later. He was certain that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze would want to discuss this question when they meet in September.
8. Obukhov said he believed that in the past, the nuclear arms negotiations had recessed just after the U.S. elections in November, resuming early in the new year after the new administration took office. Obukhov quickly added that such a scenario “assumes we won’t have a treaty before then,” but of course both sides should work toward that goal.
9. In listing START issues, Kampelman said a START treaty in 1988 was unlikely if the Soviets continued to insist on including SLCMs in the agreement along the lines of their current position. Obukhov expressed disappointment at Kampelman’s view that if the Soviets deferred the SLCM issue for future negotiations it would expedite movement toward a START treaty.
Passing on START to the Next Administration
10. Obukhov asked what would be the likely reaction of Bush and Dukakis to the START agreement now under negotiation. Kampelman replied that he could not speak for either candidate, but he would guess both would want to build on what had been agreed by the Reagan administration. This argued for making as much progress and developing the maximum amount of agreed language as possible before the negotiations adjourn, should a formal treaty not be ready for the President’s signature.
11. Obukhov agreed and asked if Amb. Hanmer would be prepared to work on this basis in START. Kampelman replied affirmatively, noting for example the importance of developing detailed, agreed verification provisions, which was still a “manageable” task. They also [Page 1453] noted the importance of striving for agreed language on mobiles, ALCMs, and suspect sites. Obukhov emphasized the importance of closing on agreed language where possible.
Request for Joint Plenary July 12
12. In response to Kampelman’s inquiry as to how the Soviets preferred to open the round, Obukhov replied the Soviet side would like a joint plenary meeting this time rather than a less formal luncheon meeting of the senior negotiators. Kampelman asked if that indicated the Soviet side wanted to table something new. Obukhov evaded a direct answer, saying only that a joint plenary was a more appropriate way for the formal opening, but he did indicate he was at work formulating substantive language.
Defense and Space
13. Obukhov asked Kampelman’s views on turning the language of the December 10 joint statement on Defense and Space into treaty language.
14. Kampelman replied that the language was very good for its non-treaty purpose, but there would be no prospect of getting ambiguous language which the Soviets interpret one way and we another through the Senate. Kampelman added he hoped progress could be made this round on the predictability measures. He suggested Ambassador Cooper was prepared to arrive at a practical solution.
ABM Treaty Review
15. Obukhov said Shevardnadze told Matlock on Friday July 8 that the Soviets wanted the NST negotiations (including Defense and Space) to resume on July 12, as agreed. As for the date of the ABM Treaty review, the Soviet side was still considering the question and would reply shortly.
16. Kampelman suggested that the Defense and Space negotiations break during few days of the ABM Treaty review, whenever it occurs. Obukhov did not object to this suggestion.
17. Obukhov asked why the U.S. did not want to conduct the treaty review in the SCC, as was done in the past. Kampelman replied the SCC had not been able to resolve the serious Soviet violations. The U.S. wanted a special, high-level review to underline the depth of our concern about Krasnoyarsk.
One-Sided Soviet Concessions
18. In closing, Obukhov complained that an objective review of concessions in the START as well as the INF negotiations showed that nearly all of the major moves had been on the Soviet side. This had been noted in Moscow and could not continue if a START agreement were to be reached.
[Page 1454]19. Kampelman replied that it was unproductive to tote up the moves made by one side or another. What was important was the final agreement and whether it met the security interests of both sides and enhanced stability.
20. The formal opening of Round X will begin at 1100 a.m., tomorrow, July 12, at the U.S. Mission.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880590-0360. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to the Mission to NATO, USNMR SHAPE, and Moscow.↩