Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

317. National Security Decision Directive 310¹

Washington, July 18, 1988

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TENTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (C)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the tenth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), which begins on July 12, 1988, in Geneva. They include the agreements reached during my June 1988 meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Attachment

Draft Telegram²

Washington, undated

Subject: Overall instructions for Round X of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (U)

Ref: (A) Round X START Instructions³

(B) Round X DST Instructions⁴

1. Secret—entire text.

2. The following is overall guidance for the U.S. NST delegation for Round X, which begins on July 12, 1988. Guidance from previous rounds remains in effect except as modified below. Specific guidance for the START and the Defense and Space Negotiating Groups is provided in reftels.

3. Principal objectives for Round X include:

—To build on the progress achieved during the May 29–June 1, 1988 summit in Moscow.

—To conclude by the earliest possible date the Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms consistent with U.S. principles that we seek only effectively verifiable and stabilizing reductions.

—To prepare the joint draft text of a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington summit joint statement dated December 10, 1987 and to continue work on its associated protocol.

—To continue to resist Soviet attempts to produce a key provisions or framework agreement for either START or DST.

—To continue to counter Soviet efforts to hold START negotiations hostage to progress in Defense and Space.

—To reaffirm our longstanding concern with Soviet failure to comply with and to correct Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty.

—To make it clear that we will not conclude any strategic ARMS agreements, either in START or Defense and Space, while the issue of the illegal Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar remains unresolved, and that we consider the only appropriate resolution to be dismantlement of the radar.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 097, NSDD 310 [NST Negotiations Round X]. Secret. Negroponte distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns under cover of a July 18 memorandum that reads in part: “Agency proposals to limit the scope of technical data exchanged, to specify treaty duration and to define space launch vehicles were deleted from the instructions without prejudice and will be reconsidered as part of the START work program.” (Ibid.)
2. Secret. The Department transmitted the overall instructions to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in telegram 22382, July 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880591-0430)
3. Attached but not printed. The Department transmitted Round X START Instructions to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in telegram 222516, July 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P880088-1905)
4. Attached but not printed. The Department transmitted Round X DST Instructions to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in telegram 222515, July 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N/A)