288. Note From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman)1
I agree that as long as the President wishes there not to be an agreement on “prohibited-permitted”, there must be some degree of ambiguity with respect to the Defense and Space issue. Our objective should be to narrow that ambiguity to the degree mutually acceptable. To agree that sensors run free would go far; to establish a test range, a dividing line between testing and deployment, and a confirmation that neither side will “deploy” would go still further. Predictability measures such as exchanges of information regarding the sides’ testing programs could also be helpful as could continuing negotiations on rules governing permitted testing. All these measures are covered in the treaty language under consideration by the Support Group.
I therefore don’t see your views as “not being widely accepted”; though they are inconsistent with the current instructions to the Defense and Space negotiating group, they are the basis on which we are working possible changes to those instructions.
As we proceed with implementation of the directive in last week’s Joint Statement “to expedite preparation of a joint draft text . . . allowing consideration of any unresolved issues at the next meeting of the Secretary and the Foreign Minister in Moscow,” we should work to get as many of these measures as possible included in instructions to the negotiating group.