287. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- December 10 Statement and ABM
My views on “ambiguity” and our ABM problem are not widely accepted, but I do want to share them with you. I recognize the importance of clarity in an agreement, but I also have experienced benefit from ambiguity on occasion where clarity is unachievable or not in my interest. We have such a potential here.
We will, I believe, not be able to arrive at an agreement with the Soviets as to the meaning of the December Summit Joint Statement language on “observation of the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.” This is not the time that either we or the Soviets will retreat from our established position on the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the President has taken a consistent position that we should avoid a “permitted-prohibited” agreement.
Were this ambiguous statement to be a provision of our START Treaty, thereby providing the Soviets with the opportunity to withdraw from their 50 percent commitments when we conduct SDI activities which they consider inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, then I would certainly be opposed to such a provision. We could, however, insist that the December 10 provision be limited to the separate agreement, and kept out of the START agreement. As a fallback, we could agree to a START provision which would free the parties from pursuing their START obligations in the event the other party deploys a space-based ABM system, an obvious violation of the ABM Treaty.
With respect to sensors, however, you will recall, from my earlier report to you,2 that from my first meeting with Karpov during this ministerial, we pushed the concept that both parties would be free to work with sensors in space, i.e., either test or deploy. Karpov reaffirmed at the end of our talks yesterday that he would give this idea very serious consideration. He raised no objection to it during our exchanges. Were we able to achieve this goal we would be providing “legitimacy” to the principal SDI testing objective in the foreseeable future. This [Page 1292] would be an important plus, even if ambiguity remains with respect to the rest of the provision.
The Soviets have suggested that our concerns about ambiguity be considered as part of a predictability package and incorporated as a protocol to the agreement, with the agreement limited to the December 10 words alone. (Karpov promised to cable me the text of such an agreement as they see it.) The Soviets have agreed in principle to the idea of a legally binding protocol which would be an integral part of the agreement.
We may be able to add to the protocol a few other clarifying details in the confidence building area, but I don’t know how significant they will be. Karpov is reviewing some of these ideas and has already indicated opposition to others. An important issue that would have to be resolved is whether we are required “to decide (our) own course of action” (the right to deploy) at the end of the nonwithdrawal period, or whether our freedom to deploy remains a right given to us by the December 10 statement as reflected in the agreement to be executed. The Soviet position is that the new agreement ends with the termination of the nonwithdrawal period. Our own position is that the new agreement be of unlimited duration. Karpov was concerned that our preference for unlimited duration was a backdoor effort to have them agree now that the ABM Treaty will go out of existence at the end of the nonwithdrawal period. Both Hank and I assured him that we are not now making any such decision; and that, from our point of view, we are assuming the ABM Treaty would continue in force at the end of the period.
There is one final question. My own inclination is to favor an additional understanding between us that we would begin to resolve the issues we didn’t settle now in a new negotiation that begins sometime in 1989. I favor that for two reasons. First, I believe that where we and the Soviets have a serious problem we should continue talking in order to see if we can resolve that problem. Secondly, I believe that establishing such a firm negotiation to take place in a year or so permits us to argue with the Congress that they ought not to legislate any further SDI restrictions since we should not have our feet cut out from under us.
In summary, I am prepared to accept ambiguity as to what can be done (other than deployment) during the nonwithdrawal period, as long as the ambiguity does not extend to the text of the START Treaty and as long as we get an agreement permitting us freedom in space-based sensors.