Certainly comprehensive reviews of these critical issues should be part
of our efforts to achieve a START
Treaty. However I am concerned about the resource, and associated
schedule, impacts that the suggested studies would have on our existing
START work program if we
initiated them right now. The work program is producing very good
results and, even if our current goal of a Treaty by the May Summit is
unobtainable, maintaining the existing work schedule will allow the
President to address, and resolve, the greatest number of issues with
the Soviets at the Summit. My sense is that the right time to initiate
these studies is right after the Summit or earlier if we decide to
readjust our START Treaty support
activities before then. The studies suggested by the PFIAB would certainly benefit from
having as much of our existing
[Page 1295]
START work program complete as
possible before they were initiated. However, there is the potential
risk, associated with delaying the studies, that they might result in
our having to back out of a position which we had already tabled with
the Soviets.
Attachment
Letter From the Chairman of the President’s
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Powell)6
Washington, April 8, 1988
Dear Colin:
Since sending our February 5 letter7 to the
President regarding our concerns about the proposed START Treaty, PFIAB has continued to work on these
matters. In addition to our discussions with you and other principal
administration officials, we now have had the opportunity to study
the agencies’ responses to our letter. [less than
2 lines not declassified] and the Joint Draft Treaty text
and US-proposed Protocols.
This letter identifies in general fashion some of the issues we
believe require further study. The issues raised serve only as
examples and in no way pretend to be exhaustive. If you agree that
these issues require additional work, the letter makes a
recommendation that a program of study be incorporated into the
START Work Program before the
final provisions of our Treaty language are tabled in Geneva.
While the Board recognizes the enormous burden now carried by those
involved in support of START, it
also believes these studies are critical to the successful
completion of a sound accord.
I. Monitoring the Treaty
When we sent our letter to the President we had not yet had the
benefit of reading NIE 4/11–88 on
US monitoring capabilities against
[Page 1296]
Soviet strategic forces. Little discrepancy
appears between PFIAB’s general
assessment of our monitoring capabilities and the analysis of the
Estimate. Nor do any of the agencies’ responses to our letter differ
markedly with the Estimate. [5 lines not
declassified]
In large measure, therefore, our ability to detect whether the
nation’s supreme interests are at risk will depend on the
cooperative measures now being negotiated with the Soviets. The
Board cannot overstate the importance of accurately understanding
how and to what degree these measures will improve our ability to
monitor and verify Soviet compliance with the Treaty.8
Missile Tagging
In a recent visit to the Sandia National Laboratory, Dr. John Foster
and I saw demonstration models of two concepts under consideration:
missile tagging and portal-perimeter monitoring of Soviet missile
production and assembly plants.
Tagging (in combination with short-notice on-site inspections and
prior notice of eliminations under Article VIII) could, in theory,
frustrate a militarily significant number of covert missiles from
being produced and covertly deployed. Its future effectiveness will
hinge, however, on our ability to negotiate a highly reliable
procedure for ensuring that only tagged missiles are launched from
Soviet test ranges or operational sites, preventing the Soviets from
testing the reliability of a covert production line. This assumes,
of course, that tagging technology and procedures can provide a
unique, tamperproof identifier on the missile itself, a proposition
not yet tested by a thorough, intentionally adversarial
analysis.
Portal-Perimeter Monitoring
Portal-perimeter monitoring (PPM) of
Soviet solid- and liquid-fuel first stage production facilities and
liquid-fuel final assembly facilities as proposed in the US Protocol
would no doubt add to our knowledge of Soviet missile production
operations. Its ability to contribute to monitoring treaty
compliance, however, depends directly on many details still to be
negotiated with the Soviet Union.
The proposed PPM sites are designed
to inspect all items entering and exiting the facility that are of
the size and weight capable of containing a missile first stage. The
effectiveness of such inspections is directly contingent on the
accuracy of the data determining the size and weight thresholds
which are to trigger U.S. inspections. If the United States should
actually weigh a Soviet missile stage to set these
[Page 1297]
thresholds, we must have high
confidence that the Soviet sample is authentic and has not, for
instance, had its weight artificially increased. We must also have
high confidence in our understanding of the engineering of Soviet
first stages. [4 lines not declassified]
[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]
On-Site Inspections
On-site inspections (OSI) continue
to be debated by the various agencies, both for their monitoring
utility and for the counter-intelligence impacts of reciprocal
Soviet inspections. Because, [less than 1 line not
declassified], so much of our confidence in detecting and
deterring Soviet cheating must rest on suspect-site inspections, we
are troubled by the difference of views among the agencies on their
effectiveness.9
Assuming the Soviets are unlikely to openly cheat at declared
facilities, initial inspections validating the declared numbers of
accountable items after a data exchange and later inspections during
the Treaty’s duration will do little to lessen current uncertainties
about Soviet numbers of nondeployed missiles. Our chances of
uncovering discrepancies with Soviet declared numbers will depend
heavily on suspect-site inspections. Given the limits we are likely
to agree to because of counterintelligence concerns and the scope of
the problems SSI is meant to
address, we are concerned that the effectiveness of SSI for monitoring purposes may fall
short of expectations.
OSI and Enigmatic
Soviet Facilities
In recent weeks the Board has been gaining a better appreciation of
the enormous challenge of piercing Soviet concealment and deception
practices. [3 lines not declassified]
[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]
We should not be optimistic that technical collection systems will
appreciably winnow down these candidate suspect sites. [6 lines not declassified]
The Soviet Union’s enormous size, [less than 2
lines not declassified] add to our questions about the
monitoring effectiveness of SSI. We
are not prepared to conclude, as the Intelligence Community has
done, that SSI, “would raise
measurably (but not make perfect) our confidence that the Soviets
were not cheating, were not stockpiling weaponry for break out and
were adhering to the letter and spirit of the treaty.” Nor have we
yet seen persuasive evidence that SSI “would increase significantly the risks to the
Soviets of engaging in illegal activities [for] under such an
inspection regime, the Soviets could never be certain that illegal
activities would go undetected.”
[Page 1298]
It is our firm belief that with so much of our monitoring confidence
relying on OSI, we need to have a
realistic understanding of its utility and its limits.
Other Monitoring Issues
PFIAB has additional monitoring
concerns. None of the agencies disputed the point made in our letter
regarding the large uncertainties in times of crisis about actual
Soviet RV counts. Nor did any of
them dispute our concerns about mobile missiles. Some believe
additional investments in our NTM can ameliorate some of these
uncertainties. However, there must be much further study of how
these investments, in combination with cooperative measures, will
improve our ability to detect a determined Soviet strategy of
cheating.
II. Verification
Whatever the monitoring uncertainties, the verification uncertainties
are even greater. As the NIE notes,
any group of US inspectors will encounter unavoidable frustrations
and delays. The Estimate then goes on to state, “the Soviets would
make every effort to thwart any inspection that threatened to
uncover cheating on some provision of an agreement . . .
Nonetheless, [2 lines not declassified] (The
reconciliation of this statement with the monitoring confidence the
NIE finds in SSI is urgently needed.)
Assuming that the U.S. has indeed selected a suspect site that houses
a Soviet violation, we must nonetheless accept, as most analysts do,
that it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will ever permit U.S.
inspectors to find a substantive Soviet treaty violation. If the
violation is removed before U.S. inspectors arrive, the Soviet
reputation for treaty compliance will be enhanced when no violation
is found. [less than 4 lines not
declassified]
Violations detected by our NTM still must be handled within the
framework of a monitoring regime which has recourse to SSI. Because NTM-detected violations
will almost certainly contain a degree of ambiguity, the U.S. will
confront the almost irresistable demand to resolve the ambiguity by
conducting an inspection to “see it with our own eyes.” We can
expect this pressure especially before we make any formal U.S.
finding of Soviet treaty non-compliance. What may have proven a
substantive violation if we could rely on NTM alone could then be
effectively converted to a “procedural” violation should the
resulting inspection be delayed or frustrated.
Because the most likely results from an SSI regime are findings of procedural violations, the
ability of short-notice SSI to
deter Soviet cheating may be less than expected. Indeed, multiple
suspect-site inspections which fail to uncover Soviet cheating will
have the effect of enhancing the Soviet reputation for
compliance.
[Page 1299]
PFIAB’s point is not that
cooperative measures have no monitoring value; rather, its concern
is that the limitations associated with these measures be fully
appreciated. Nor do we want to be understood as saying that no
verification difficulties exist when relying on National Technical
Means. The perennial problem of revealing NTM-derived evidence to
substantiate U.S. claims of Soviet noncompliance will also affect
the verification of a START
Treaty as it has others.
To state the obvious, verification is a technically and politically
difficult task. It is made all-the-more difficult by the fact that
the burden of proof will always rest with those proposing a U.S.
finding of Soviet non-compliance. Therefore, the key verification
question will be: can the Intelligence Community produce evidence of
Soviet noncompliance weighty and timely enough to trigger an
adequate offsetting U.S. response? Will we be able to detect Soviet
cheating before the Soviets have achieved a significant military
advantage? Given the possible incentives for the Soviets to
circumvent a START Treaty’s
strictures and past Soviet examples of doing so (even when the gains
seemed to be marginal), it is worrisome that we will be depending on
a monitoring regime whose key element is of unknown reliability.
III. Assessing the Strategic Impact
of START
PFIAB was gratified that Secretary
of Defense Carlucci
and the Department of State shared our belief that a systematic net
assessment of the START treaty be
conducted. PFIAB, however, was
surprised to learn that the JCS at
this stage cannot preliminarily describe the certified military
sufficiency of the treaty or its implications for changes in U.S.
force structure. Given how much of the START Treaty framework already has been agreed upon,
and making assumptions about the outcomes of the biggest unknowns in
the Treaty, the task does not seem unreasonable. It presumably
should be done in some fashion to support the negotiations. Although
final assessments will always have to be made, it would not seem
prudent to delay judgments about the strategic and force structure
impacts of an agreement until the end of the negotiating
process.
Although we understand, as Secretary Carlucci puts it, the
continuing task of “resolving issues and tabling the relevant treaty
text sequentially so that as much progress can be made in the
negotiations as possible,” we believe a constantly updated version
of the treaty’s impacts should inform the negotiations.
Inevitably a comprehensive agreement such as the proposed START Treaty will necessitate
tradeoffs. For example, it is evident that in some critical
instances, such as cruise- and mobile- missiles, judgments about the
difficulties of monitoring these systems might not outweigh the
strategic advantages for the U.S. by their deployment.
[Page 1300]
The program of study
outlined in this letter’s attachment should make clearer the costs
and benefits of those tradeoffs.
Conclusion
We recognize that no strategic arms reduction treaty will be without
uncertainty and risk, just as today, without a treaty, we live with
large uncertainty and risk.
Before entering the Treaty, however, PFIAB believes we need a confident understanding of the
type and level of cheating which would give the Soviets decisive
strategic advantages. The treaty’s verification regime must provide
us high confidence that we can detect such cheating by US monitoring
means. The evidence derived from such monitoring must be capable of
eliciting from us an appropriate and timely response to ensure
Soviet compliance with the Treaty or to safeguard our interests
threatened by Soviet cheating. Finally, we believe we need a net
assessment of the strategic impact of the treaty in peacetime,
crisis, and war that takes into account military systems limited by
the treaty and military systems not limited by it.
Should you agree that the types of issues raised in this letter need
the comprehensive study we have suggested, we submit the attached
Draft Study Program10 as a possible point of departure.
Sincerely,
Anne
L. Armstrong11
Chairman
