Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 5, 1987, 1:40–2:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Amb. Nitze
  • DAS Simons
  • Mr. Burton
  • Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Dep FM Bessmertnykh

SUBJECT

• NST Instructions

BESSMERTNYKH said he understood that the Ministers had talked in Geneva about the subject of instructions, and that Nitze had also had a good talk with Akhromeyev about this topic.² The U.S. side was probably well aware of the Soviet view on the structure of the Summit documents.

NITZE replied that he had in mind two documents. One would be the communique; the other would be instructions to the Geneva delegations which might or might not be part of the communique.

BESSMERTNYKH said it fit his preference to have separate documents. He wanted good instructions and, if they were a separate document, there would be a greater incentive to make them look nice for the public. He preferred 3–4 pages of instructions published as a separate document. The sides could reference these instructions in the final Summit document. If the sides failed to come up with good instructions, however (and he hoped this would not be the case), then they could just put a short reference to the negotiations in the communique.

In the instructions, he would prefer to include first the things already settled. Next could be some of the unilateral commitments on which the sides had already agreed. The sides should try to find such commitments for both; for example, the Soviet commitment to a 50% cut in heavies should be balanced by some unilateral U.S. commitment.

SIMONS noted that there was also the Soviet commitment to reduce throwweight by 50%, and BESSMERTNYKH agreed.

NITZE suggested the U.S. could reconfirm its commitment not to have heavies. It could also agree not to increase its throwweight beyond the Soviet level. BESSMERTNYKH said these were perhaps acceptable, but the key was that unilateral commitments should not be made only by the Soviet Union.

BESSMERTNYKH continued that the toughest part was likely to be the chapter on the ABM Treaty. He hoped the U.S. side had given some thought to what could be done in that area.

NITZE said he had given thought to the form the instructions might take. He could show Bessmertnykh a skeleton version³ of that form to get his reaction. He thought the instructions would be worked primarily in the experts group.

BESSMERTNYKH agreed that such a group could be established; he would refer to it as the arms control working group. It would probably deal with the NST instructions. He doubted it would have time to address other issues, such as CW. In this group, the sides should try to minimize attempts to impose unacceptable things on the other. A three-day period was too short for this. The instructions should include some figures and data to show the world they were practical, and also should include some diplomatic language to cover differences between the sides.

NITZE said this was the last meeting of the leaders before the Moscow Summit. He would hope the sides could achieve agreement on formulations to make the negotiating task easier so the sides could meet their timetable for completing a treaty. This would not be an easy task, but it was important to get it done. INF had been somewhat easier, especially after the agreements reached at Reykjavik, but the sides still had had much difficulty finishing the job. They should try this week to achieve progress wherever possible. At this point, Nitze passed over the skeleton instructions (attached), and Bessmertnykh read and returned them.

SIMONS asked if Bessmertnykh had a text to show the U.S. side. BESSMERTNYKH said the Soviet ideas were those that Akhromeyev had read to Nitze in Geneva. He had only a Russian text of these points, but would try to get an English copy to Nitze on Sunday.⁴

Reflecting on the U.S. text, BESSMERTNYKH said the defense and space part would be the more difficult. He wondered how best to handle it in a general sense, whether the sides should seek a separate treaty or something else. His personal feeling was that it would be difficult to negotiate two treaties by the end of the first half of 1988.

NITZE replied that he felt it would be better if the sides could do that; he would like to try for two. But he was really just trying to indicate the current U.S. thinking on how to structure the instructions. The content of the instructions would be the result of the next several days’ negotiations. He hoped the sides could achieve as much content as possible.

BESSMERTNYKH said he thought the general structure the U.S. side had in mind was fine. The Soviet side was thinking of a short introduction, then the START portion starting with what was agreed, such as the 1600 and 6000 ceilings and certain subceilings.

NITZE interjected that the U.S. view was that, before the sides settled on figures for the sublimits, they needed to discuss counting rules. The sides had an agreed bomber weapon counting rule, but no rules for the number of warheads on ballistic missiles with more than one RV and heavy bombers carrying more than one long-range, nuclear ALCM. The sides needed to know what they meant by “long-range”. This would influence what was meant by the sublimits. Then the sides could address sublimits and other issues. If agreement was reached, it could be incorporated in the document.

BESSMERTNYKH expressed concern that the working group might get bogged down on the definitional issues and not get to the other problems.

NITZE responded that he did not want to get bogged down either, but the more the sides could get agreed over the next few days, the easier it would be to hit the target for a START treaty. The sides should not be too timid about their goals.

BESSMERTNYKH said the issues addressed must include the ABM Treaty and SLCMs. On the former, the Soviet side had made it easier for the U.S. side; the linkage between areas was simpler and the Soviet side was not mentioning SDI. NITZE retorted that the U.S. was not embarrassed about SDI, and SIMONS added that this was particularly true after Gorbachev’s NBC interview.

BESSMERTNYKH suggested the sides have a list of the toughest issues for the working group to address. He and Nitze agreed they could outline such a list in their minds. Maybe the lists would be dissimilar but they would be close in content. Bessmertnykh thought the sides should present each other with draft papers and then tackle the most difficult issues.

NITZE said he thought the sides could settle some of these issues; they were not infinitely difficult.

BESSMERTNYKH said it had been agreed at Reykjavik to handle the problem of limiting SLCMs. He thought the sides could do something about verifying such limits. NITZE replied that the U.S. side continued to study the problem, and thought unilateral declarations continued to offer the best solution.

BESSMERTNYKH responded that there were some things agreed in INF, which had seemed impossible as recently as two weeks ago, that might apply to the SLCM verification problem. NITZE said the U.S. side was prepared to discuss radical steps for verification, but there were limits to what either side would be able to do.

BESSMERTNYKH suggested that scientists be invited to participate in addressing this problem. NITZE noted that he had invited Velikhov and Sagdeyev to lunch on Sunday, and said he would pump them for ideas on this topic.

SIMONS suggested that Nitze preview the topics the U.S. would like to address in the working group. NITZE listed these topics as: (1) those areas already agreed, e.g. 1600, 6000, 1540, 50% throwweight cut, bomber weapon counting rule; (2) clarification of additional counting rules; (3) sublimits; (4) a verification package, for which the sides should build on and augment the verification elements of the INF Treaty, and which would include a data exchange, baseline inspections, on-site observance of elimination, continuous monitoring of portals of production facilities, short-notice inspections of declared facilities, short-notice inspections of suspect sites, no concealment or interference with NTM, and cooperative measures to enhance NTM; (5) possibilities for verifying mobile ICBMs, were they to be allowed; (6) the question of heavy ICBM modernization; (7) SLCMs; and (8) Backfire.

BESSMERTNYKH said the Soviet concept would require also addressing the ABM situation. NITZE replied that, on that, the issues were the same three as at Reykjavik: the length of the time period, what happens after the period, and what happens during the period. It would be useful to agree on these issues or at least get closer.

BESSMERTNYKH asked what the U.S. view was of further negotiations toward the end of the period, at about the 7-year point. NITZE said the U.S. side was sympathetic to the idea of such negotiations, but it should not prejudice the positions on the length of the period.

BESSMERTNYKH suggested that, if the sides finished such negotiations early, the resulting regime could go into effect immediately. If no agreement was reached, the original agreed period would remain in effect. NITZE agreed, adding that the sides would also need a good deal of discussion on the issues of what happened during and after the period.

SIMONS asked if the Soviet concept of the issues to be addressed was similar to the U.S. idea. BESSMERTNYKH said it was, but he was not sure the sides would have time to handle the definitional part. He understood, however, Nitze’s logic about the connection to the sublimits question.

NITZE said that some of the counting rules should be relatively easy. The simplest solution for existing ballistic missiles would be for each side to declare the number of RVs it would deploy on each type. Then the other side could inspect to ensure this was correct. Akhromeyev had seemed to be suggesting such an approach for SS–18s in Geneva. Counting ALCMs would be more difficult.

BESSMERTNYKH said there was a certain degree of pessimism in Moscow about perceived U.S. attempts to back away from agreements reached in SALT II. He knew the U.S. was no longer observing SALT II, but it would not help move things along to reopen old issues. SIMONS said it would be helpful if the Soviet side would provide specific examples of its concerns on this point. BESSMERTNYKH said he understood. There was not much time; the Soviet side wanted a treaty with this Administration, not instructions that would be negotiated on for years.

NITZE opined that there was a greater opportunity to move forward in the next three days than in the next three months. BESSMERTNYKH agreed, and said this was why reopening SALT II issues would not help. He and Nitze agreed that the gist of the Summit was the NST instructions.

BESSMERTNYKH repeated that he would try to make available a copy of the Soviet side’s draft instructions. SIMONS said it would also be helpful to get the Soviet list of the main issues, as well as specifics on where the Soviet side thought the U.S. side was reopening SALT II issues. BESSMERTNYKH said he would try to get the former, or at least get the Soviet delegation to pass it over on Monday,⁵ and would pass along Simons’ request on the latter.

BESSMERTNYKH said he understood the Ministers would be getting together Monday night with experts standing by, and SIMONS confirmed that understanding.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit. Secret. The meeting took place in the State Department.
2. Nitze and Akhromeyev’s November 23–24 conversations are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XII, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1984–1987.
3. Attached but not printed is a December 5 draft set of instructions to the U.S. and Soviet START negotiators “to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related documents during the next meeting of heads of state in the first half of 1988.” It also instructed the U.S. and Soviet Defense and Space negotiators “to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treat Text for a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms.” Finally, it indicated that “to support their efforts to negotiate new agreements, the sides agree that construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, will not be resumed.”
4. December 6.
5. December 7.
6. The memorandum of conversation of Shultz’s December 7 meeting with Shevardnadze is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989, Document 105.