242. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
-
U.S.
- Amb. Nitze
- Amb. Cooper
- Mr. Stafford (Notetaker)
-
U.S.S.R.
- Mr. Velikhov
- Mr. Sagdeyev
- Mr. Kokoshin
SUBJECT
- Verification, Krasnoyarsk, NST Instructions, Defense and Space
VELIKHOV said the agreed INF verification measures represented an historical step. NITZE agreed, and said he understood the Soviet side had some ideas on how to address the more complicated verification tasks associated with START.
SAGDEYEV said he had been involved in some verification discussions with the National Academy of Sciences CISAC. In these discussions, the idea had arisen of verifying mobile ICBMs by placing a special kind of tag on them. The tag would send periodic electronic signals, perhaps once every few months, for the other side to track. Through these signals, a side could count the mobiles of the other side but could not keep track of their everyday location. Since the force structures of the sides differed, i.e. the Soviet side was the only side with mobiles at present, this approach would probably require some reciprocity for submarines. There could also be permanent monitoring at entry points of bases to count missiles.
[Page 1062]Turning to SLCM verification, VELIKHOV asked if the U.S. really needed long-range, conventional SLCMs. NITZE said it did, because otherwise the U.S. Navy would be outranged by other forces, such as Khadafhi’s.
VELIKHOV asked if it was necessary also to have nuclear SLCMs, since a ban would be easier to verify. COOPER said it was.
VELIKHOV suggested three complementary ways to verify SLCM limits. First, the sides could rely on passive methods to measure the existence of nuclear material on ships. SAGDEYEV explained that the Soviet side has a gamma-ray telescope which can detect nuclear devices. A detection device similar to this telescope could be brought on board ships or flown over them in a helicopter to detect nuclear material. The closer the device could be brought to the ship, the easier the detection task.
VELIKHOV said the second way would be to rely on active methods to overcome shielding of nuclear material. Such a method would be to use a small neutron gun to penetrate the shielding material, trigger a reaction in the nuclear material, and create a somewhat larger response. The third method would be to verify production. Inspectors could count the nuclear and conventional SLCMs coming out of the production facilities, and could use a PAL-like device to lock canisters so that a side could not subsequently convert conventional cruise missiles to nuclear ones. The locking devices would have two keys, one of which would be retained by each side. If a side wanted to dispose of a missile in the future, the sides could work out a procedure using the two keys.
SAGDEYEV said the gamma-ray device or neutron gun could be used for challenge inspections. A special international team could be created, with special procedures to avoid counterintelligence problems. If a ship were powered by a nuclear reactor, the team could check it, so it could discriminate between the reactor and other nuclear material. VELIKHOV asserted that the detector should be able to distinguish between a reactor and nuclear warheads.
NITZE asked how much the gamma-ray detector would cost. KOKOSHIN estimated it at $1 million per device, and SAGDEYEV added that this cost should diminish as more detectors were purchased.
NITZE asked how the sides would know that the production facilities monitored under the third method were the only ones producing missiles. VELIKHOV said monitoring of the production facilities would be supplemented by the challenge inspections Sagdeyev had just described.
NITZE asked if both sides today had gamma-ray detectors like the Soviet side was describing. SAGDEYEV said they did, and added that [Page 1063] he thought U.S. detectors were better than Soviet ones. They were used for several purposes, such as remote sensing of soil by geologists and in astronomy. Such devices were also made by the British, Germans and Dutch.
VELIKHOV suggested that the sides could establish an international working group to develop this approach. NITZE expressed U.S. reservations about international groups, and VELIKHOV said a bilateral effort would be better.
Turning to verification of nuclear testing, VELIKHOV said the Soviet side had developed seismic sensing to the point where they could measure explosions of a few kilograms from 1000 kilometers. By supplementing this capability with OSI of industrial explosions, the sides could solve the problem of verifying a CTB.
COOPER reminded Velikhov that the U.S. has no interest in a CTB as long as there is a requirement for nuclear weapons, and also explained U.S. concerns about seismic monitoring and preference for CORRTEX. VELIKHOV responded that Soviet specialists thought it possible to cheat on CORRTEX, which COOPER disputed.
NITZE said a problem related to verification was compliance. A key problem here was the Krasnoyarsk radar. The other day he had speculated on a solution to this problem and had misspoken. The Soviet side had proposed a moratorium on construction of this radar, but the U.S. side needed it destroyed.
VELIKHOV claimed that a moratorium for a few years was equivalent to destruction of the radar. NITZE replied that, in that case, it would be better to just go ahead and destroy the radar.
VELIKHOV tried to draw a distinction between a formal violation and a substantive one, arguing that there was no way that the radar, which the Soviet side had declared was intended for space tracking, could be transformed for battle management. NITZE said the radar was clearly an early warning radar, making it both a formal and a substantive violation, and must be totally eliminated.
SAGDEYEV said a possible compromise was for the radar to be retained only as a monument for future generations. Schukhin had suggested it be used only for purely scientific purposes, with U.S. scientists invited to join in the work there. NITZE said scientific work could include early warning. If it were retained as a nonoperational monument—that is, if the Soviet side took out all antenna elements and removed the power source—the U.S. side could take a look at that, but that was not what he proposed.
NITZE continued that there was one other subject he wished to raise. In discussing the joint document that might emerge from the Summit, he had suggested the possibility of both a joint document and [Page 1064] instructions to the negotiators. The latter should be done by each side; what was jointly agreed should be included in the joint statement.
VELIKHOV asked if Nitze thought it possible to complete a START Treaty in the next year, and NITZE said yes. VELIKHOV asked if pushing START would hurt the chances for ratification of INF, and NITZE said he did not think so but was not sure. SAGDEYEV noted that, if the U.S. side was worried about INF ratification in the Supreme Soviet, three members of that body were involved in this discussion. NITZE said he assumed they would vote for ratification. SAGDEYEV said this was an advantage of a one-party system, but VELIKHOV noted that the U.S. was having trouble within one of its parties.
COOPER said he had seen Velikhov on TV the other day and had a question about his remarks. A number of people in the U.S. had been taken with Gorbachev’s comments about the USSR’s having a program comparable to SDI. Of course, Gorbachev had said the Soviet side had no intention to deploy. But Velikhov had seemed to say that all the Soviet side was doing was basic research.
VELIKHOV replied that Gorbachev had meant that the Soviet side was working on powerful lasers. There were various possible results, but the USSR had no program dedicated to making defensive systems. The Soviet side had not only the ABM limits, but also a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing in space. This put a great restriction on Soviet scientists.
COOPER said the U.S. side was aware of the two lasers at Sary Shagan. VELIKHOV claimed these lasers were only for space tracking. They had insufficient power for an ASAT role. Even Weinberger, in his last report, had changed his charge to a claim that the lasers maybe threatened sensitive parts of U.S. satellites. Damaging such parts would be extraordinarily improbable.
COOPER said that, some time ago, the U.S. side had made a suggestion in Geneva for predictability measures. Why could the sides not exchange visits to Sary Shagan and White Sands to see what the other was doing?
VELIKHOV replied that the powerful Soviet laser was not in Sary Shagan. He had been working for two years to allow a U.S. visit to show the U.S. side, but had run into a diplomatic problem. He had worked for three years to secure the U.S. invitation to Krasnoyarsk. NITZE noted that that invitation had been made to the U.S. legislative, not executive, branch.
VELIKHOV asked if the proposal for an exchange of visits was an official one. COOPER said it was; it had been made about 18 months ago, and involved reciprocal visits to Sary Shagan and White Sands. The response from the Soviet side had been that the sides could talk [Page 1065] about such visits if the U.S. first agreed to a ban on research; then the visits could support verification of the ban. Of course, the U.S. was not interested in a ban on research.
VELIKHOV asked if the U.S. side was asking to see everything at Sary Shagan. COOPER said the sides could talk over the details, but what the U.S. side wanted to see were the Soviet ground-based lasers. This was an example of a more general U.S. proposal for a predictability package, including an exchange of programmatic data, mutual observation of experiments, an exchange of briefings, etc.
VELIKHOV said he would talk to Moscow about working out visits to Sary Shagan and White Sands. He thought this was a fair proposal, he would like to2
SAGDEYEV said he understood U.S. negotiators were suggesting agreement on some kinds of tests for SDI. If this agreement were not based on precise quantitative analysis, then it would risk confrontation with the U.S. Congress. It could risk ratification in the Senate. He thought perhaps the formula of linkage should be simplified, to agreement that the sides would stay within the ABM Treaty as stated in 1972.
NITZE replied that language like “as stated in 1972” did not say anything. KOKOSHIN suggested “as signed and ratified in 1972.” SAGDEYEV added that he was looking for a compromise that would be acceptable to the U.S. legislative and executive branches.
NITZE said that the words “as signed and ratified” would add nothing but confusion. Marshall Grechko had made a statement that went well beyond what the Soviet side now claimed was “signed and ratified.” KOKOSHIN claimed the U.S. side was using the Grechko statement out of context and exaggerating it. It had not been made to the Supreme Soviet and was not an official statement.
SAGDEYEV said that, if both sides were interested in a START agreement, they could keep loose language regarding ABM Treaty adherence for now.
STAFFORD asked if what Sagdeyev had in mind was language that would commit the sides to observance of the ABM Treaty while allowing the U.S. side to continue to assert the validity of its interpretation of the Treaty. SAGDEYEV said that only the leaders could decide this, but his personal view was that such an outcome should be acceptable to the Soviet side.
VELIKHOV asked if the U.S. envisioned the deployment of defenses on both sides, and COOPER said yes. VELIKHOV said this [Page 1066] would be destabilizing, because the side that struck first would be able to defend against a ragged retaliatory response.
COOPER noted that this would not be the case if the retaliatory forces were themselves survivable—and that defenses could help improve their survivability. VELIKHOV agreed, with some enthusiasm, that defenses could improve the survivability of retaliatory forces, but said the U.S. was not pursuing that course. COOPER said this was not correct; the U.S. was interested in defenses for such a purpose.
VELIKHOV said no space-based ABM systems were necessary for such defenses. COOPER replied that there was no reason to preclude space-based defenses from such a role.
VELIKHOV said that such space-based defenses on both sides would be destabilizing, since each side would be vulnerable to a defense-suppression first strike by the other side. COOPER responded that this would not happen under the U.S. approach, because such space-based defenses would not be deployed unless they were survivable.
VELIKHOV said he doubted that this could be done, and observed that nuclear-armed interceptors could be deployed with such systems. COOPER suggested that the Soviet-proposed gamma detectors could be used to verify that there were no such systems.
VELIKHOV said this would help, but he still doubted that such space-based interceptors could be made survivable, and he noted that Edward Teller had emphasized this problem. COOPER replied that this was a major problem that was understood by the U.S. side, but it believed that solutions could be found. If they were found, space-based ABM systems could be very effective.
KOKOSHIN said the Soviet side wished to talk about “strategic stability.” NITZE commented that in the past the Soviet side had used that phrase to mean something different from what the U.S. side meant by it. The Soviet side used it to mean what the U.S. called “dynamic stability,” and they used it interchangeably with “stopping an arms race.”
KOKOSHIN replied that he was using it in the U.S. sense of the phrase. The Soviet side had done a study of the subject and had come to the conclusion that 600 warheads on each side could be enough to preserve stability under appropriate equal constraints. He thought the sides should not be permitted weapons with more than one warhead and should be permitted a mix of single-warhead systems. Included in the mix should be a number of sea-based systems and a number of land mobiles. A number lower than 600 would raise a risk of cheating.
NITZE said that, before going below 50% cuts in strategic arms, the sides would need to deal with other problems, including the con [Page 1067] ventional imbalance. He also noted that the land mobiles Kokoshin envisaged would create a verification problem. KOKOSHIN responded that he thought that problem could be reduced to manageable proportions through verification means of the type they had suggested be explored.