Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

240. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 5, 1987

SUBJECT

• Events Prior to the Washington Summit

The following events occurred prior to the President’s first meeting with Gorbachev² at the Washington Summit:

1) On December 3, 1987 at a meeting³ in the Tank at the Pentagon, chaired by the Secretary of State, the discussion turned from the previously announced agenda, to a review of U.S. positions in START and Defense and Space, with a view to changing them. The Secretary of State averred that the December 3rd meeting was a more appropriate forum for such discussions than the NSPG scheduled for the next day⁴ because fewer people were in attendance. NSPG participants not present included the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the White House Chief of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the White House Science Advisor, and Ambassador Rowny.

The consensus on changes to U.S. arms control positions the Secretary of State believed he had achieved proved illusory and an NSPG meeting was held, despite the Secretary of State’s objections.

Although the National Security Advisor was invited to the meeting, he was unaware of the intended change of agenda. NSC staff first learned of the meeting from his debrief.

2) At 5:00 p.m. on December 3, 1987, Allen Holmes, seemingly inadvertently admitted to Bob Linhard that the State Department was working with the Soviets on agreed joint statement language on chemical weapons, despite a clear understanding with the NSC staff that no such discussions would take place, except in the context of arms control working group discussions during the Summit.

3) On the afternoon of December 4, 1987, during or shortly after the NSPG meeting, Dan Howard was called by [a] reporter[s] saying that “those in a position to know” say that the U.S. intended to make the following concessions on arms control:

—Recognizing that mobile missiles are an integral part of Soviet strategic forces;

—Extending the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to October 11, 1996; and,

—Accepting a moratorium on construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

These positions represented the State Department’s recommendations at the NSPG, but not the consensus of those at the meeting. Indeed, the Krasnoyarsk radar issue was not dealt with.

4) At about 2:00 p.m. on December 5, 1987 NSC staff learned that Nitze intended to meet with Soviet scientists Velikhov and Sagdeev at Nitze’s farm in Southern Maryland. NSC staff learned this from Hank Cooper who had also been invited. Velikhov and Sagdeev had been closely involved in discussions with U.S. scientists of a list of parameters limiting SDI experiments.

5) At about 2:00 p.m. on December 5, 1987, NSC staff learned that Nitze had met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmyrtnikh.⁵ In that meeting, Nitze allowed Bessmyrtnikh to read but not to keep papers outlining the U.S. positions on language for a joint statement on START and Defense and Space. Nitze also showed Bessmyrtnikh a paragraph describing a solution to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation whereby there would be a verified moratorium on construction and destruction of power supply to the transmitter. This proposal is incompatible with U.S. policy which is that the radar is a violation and must be dismantled. Nitze also tabled a paragraph on START which the ACSG had agreed to defer until the first working group meeting on December 7, 1987.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Pre-Summit Pearl Harbor File December 6, 1987. Secret. Drafted by Linhard and Tobey. Printed from an uninitialed copy of the memorandum. All brackets are in the original.
2. The memorandum of conversation of Reagan and Gorbachev’s conversation the morning of December 8 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume VI, Soviet Union October 1986–January 1989, Document 107.
3. No minutes were found.
4. See Document 239.
5. See Document 241.