Office of the Historian

226. Memorandum From Linton Brooks, William Tobey, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)1

Washington, November 19, 1987

SUBJECT

  • Summit Preparations

As we understand it there are only two available NSPGs before the summit. Since the most contentious arms reduction issues will be the possibility of movement on START and Defense and Space, we [Page 959] believe Friday’s2 NSPG should be devoted to that. The basis for discussion will be two compartmented (GRIP) papers. The START paper (GRIP 37)3 is a listing of the available options for movement on major issues. It breaks no new ground, but puts in one place all the things that at least some of the President’s senior advisors recommend he consider. In contrast, the Defense and Space paper4 is almost entirely options which have emerged from discussion in the past few weeks.

We envision the NSPG as being the opening round in a dialogue which could, ultimately, lead to decisions on what to propose at the summit. In addition, we believe we should consider an attempt to control the summit through the following ploy:

—Send a letter to Gorbachev with a slight variation of our current START and Defense and Space positions.

—Count on the Soviets to recall that, in the past, what we have deployed during senior level meetings has been almost identical to what we send in a letter. Thus the Soviets will make preparations based on our letter.

—Have a second, more radical, option ready to deploy at the summit. This is particularly relevant in Defense and Space, where we are considering several new options.

The object of this approach is to seize the tactical advantage from the Soviets by having them prepare for one option and be faced with another. We have not shared this approach with the Arms Control Support Group, nor do we recommend overt discussion of it at the NSPG. First, we need to decide if there are acceptable options, next we need some off line, “family lunch” type discussions to close on this approach. You should, however, read the compartmented papers with this thought in mind.

Attached is a memorandum forwarding the final version of the compartmented papers to the President.5 We would have preferred to send these to the President over a weekend, but believe he should have them now in preparation for the NSPG. Because of their length, we suggest you review the Defense and Space options with him briefly during your Friday morning time with him.6

If the President has time to read only one paper it should be the Defense and Space paper. On START paper we have summarized agency positions in the cover memorandum. We suggest that he read [Page 960] the Defense and Space and skim the START paper before the NSPG, and that he then include them in his weekend reading in preparation for further discussions.

In accordance with past practice, we have not indicated the Vice President or the Chief of Staff as “copy to” addressees on the memorandum. Copies of the papers for Senator Baker are attached (Tab III);7 we will provide the Vice President’s office with a copy when we make distribution to Cabinet principals. We suggest you provide Senator Baker his copy directly.

We request you sign the transmittal memorandum at Tab II8 transmitting the final version of the papers to the Cabinet and have the memorandum returned to us. We will then, as we have in the past, make the numbered copies and arrange for distribution. To make this work we need the signed transmittal memorandum as soon as possible.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.9

That you sign the transmittal memorandum at Tab II, and that the signed original be returned to us for packaging and distribution.10

Fritz Ermath, Don Mahley, Bill Heiser and Steve Steiner concur.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, U.S.-Soviet Summit November–December 1987. Secret. Sent for action.↩
  2. November 20.↩
  3. Not attached. See Tab B, Document 227.↩
  4. Not attached. See Tab A, Document 227.↩
  5. Attached but not printed is an unsigned and undated memorandum from Carlucci to Reagan. For the signed version, see Document 227.↩
  6. No minutes were found.↩
  7. Not found.↩
  8. Attached but not printed is an undated and unsigned memorandum to Bush, Shultz, Baker, Weinberger, Meese, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, Miller, and Adelman.↩
  9. Carlucci did not indicate a preference.↩
  10. Carlucci did not indicate a preference.↩