Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

227. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 19, 1987

SUBJECT

• Possible Options for the Summit

On Friday, November 20, we will hold the first NSPG to prepare you for your December summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. I intend this meeting to concentrate on an initial review of possible moves you might make in START and in Defense and Space in an attempt to conclude equitable and verifiable treaties by next summer. To facilitate discussion, I have had two papers prepared through the interagency Arms Control Support Group. Because the issues are complex, the papers, which are attached, are somewhat lengthy.

The first paper (GRIP 38) covers possible options in Defense and Space. It includes a number of options which we have not previously discussed, among them:

—Declaring early SDI deployment as a national objective;

—Terminating those portions of the ABM Treaty affecting ABM radars or devices which could substitute for ABM radars;

—Recast, with some modifications, the position in your July 1986 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev;²

—Agree to resolve Defense and Space issues in the START Treaty; and

—Extend the duration of the non-withdrawal period from the ABM Treaty.

The second paper (GRIP 37) covers all major outstanding START issues and provides agency recommendations on which ones are appropriate for movement. In general:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense favors no movement in any area;

—Most of your other advisors are prepared to make a significant move on sublimits and to tell the Soviets we will accept mobile ICBMs.

—Some, but not all, of your advisors favor moves on heavy ICBM modernization, the method of recording throwweight limits, sea-launched cruise missiles, Backfire bombers and the length of time during which reductions must be completed. Such moves would be intended to meet announced Soviet concerns.

The most contentious issue will be the possibility of altering our current position that all mobile ICBMs must be banned. This position is driven, in part, by the difficulty of verifying numerical limits on mobile ICBMs. While we are working on such a verification scheme, there is not yet consensus on the details, or even on whether such a scheme is possible.

Despite its length, I recommend you read the Defense and Space paper in its entirety before the NSPG. I believe you need only skim the START paper.

Since the NSPG will be only the beginning of the dialogue we must have on this subject, I recommend that you then include both papers in your weekend reading. You will thus be able to review options having had the benefit of hearing the views (which I expect to be quite diverse) of your senior advisors.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group³

Washington, November 19, 1987

GRIP 38C (S)

I. Purpose. (U)

This paper explores options available to the President should he seek to make a new proposal to resolve several Defense & Space issues. Our objectives in the Defense and Space negotiations are:

—to facilitate deployment of effective strategic defenses as soon as possible, should a decision for such deployments be taken;

—to avoid constraints on the SDI program beyond those actually agreed by the parties in the ABM Treaty; and,

—to reverse Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty.

The options set forth in this paper can be judged on the basis of their contribution toward achieving these objectives. (S/G)

II. Current U.S. Position. (U)

The current U.S. Defense and Space position is a package including the following elements.

A. Non-withdrawal. Both parties would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational defensive systems whose unilateral deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM Treaty, provided 50 percent START reductions proceed in accordance with the START Treaty.

B. Freedom to Deploy. After 1994, either side may deploy defensive systems of its choosing under the terms of this agreement without further reference to the ABM Treaty, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

C. ABM Treaty Restrictions. If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems not permitted by the ABM Treaty, any remaining restrictions associated with the ABM Treaty will be terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

D. Withdrawal/Termination. The U.S. rejects a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. Nothing above alters the sovereign rights of the sides under customary international law, including the right to withdraw were a side to decide that extraordinary events jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side must maintain its rights to terminate (in case of a material breach) or to withdraw (in case a side decided its supreme interests were jeopardized.)

E. Failure to Meet START Reductions. Any failure to meet the reductions schedule associated with the START Treaty would represent grounds for either side to terminate this agreement and all related commitments associated with the ABM Treaty.

F. Entry Into Force. This agreement will be documented in a separate treaty which will not enter into force before the associated treaty covering START.

G. Predictability Package. In addition to our previous Open Laboratories proposal and our proposal for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing, this package includes annual exchange of programmatic data. It is not the U.S. intent that this package entail any additional restrictions on U.S. programs beyond those outlined above. (U)

As reflected in instructions to U.S. negotiators issued on May 21, 1987, U.S. priorities are, among other things, to “facilitate deployment of effective strategic defenses as soon as possible, should a decision for such deployments be taken,” and to “avoid constraints upon SDI beyond those existing under the ABM Treaty.” (S)

In a joint statement,⁴ issued at the conclusion of Shevardnadze’s visit to Washington on October 30, the U.S. agreed that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev will consider thoroughly the development of instructions on a future treaty on 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms and a treaty concerning observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period. (U)

III. Current Soviet Position. (U)

During Shevardnadze’s September visit to Washington, the Soviets tabled a proposal that the sides agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years and either:

• agree on a list of devices not to be put into space and thresholds for associated critical parameters; or,

• agree to “strictly abide” by the ABM Treaty as it was signed and ratified in 1972. (U)

Thus, for the first time since NST began, the Soviets have acknowledged that not all research and experimental work on space-based ABM systems must be restricted to laboratories on earth. The question remains, however, as to what research, development, and testing they would permit outside of laboratories. (U)

The Soviets have repeatedly referred to the “list” approach as being complicated and on at least one occasion have stated there was not time to reach agreement on that basis. Thus the baseline Soviet position appears to be the “strictly abide” approach which they have refused to clarify. They have stated that compliance concerns would be settled in the SCC and by the threat of termination of the START Treaty. They have also asserted a view of the ABM Treaty narrower than the restrictive interpretation. (S)

In any case, the Soviets propose that the ABM Treaty would continue after the non-withdrawal period. Beginning 2–3 years before the end of the non-withdrawal period, the sides would be obliged to begin negotiations on the ABM defense problem as a whole in light of the strategic situation which would exist by that time, including 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive weapons. (U)

Despite the appearance of Soviet flexibility in Shevardnadze’s recent emphasis on “strategic stability,” the Soviets continue to press in Geneva for restrictions on SDI that would cripple the program. Indeed, what appeared to some as “welcome developments” in Soviet rhetoric have been explained in Geneva simply as shorthand for a longstanding approach that is incompatible with the President’s SDI objectives. Recent Soviet emphasis on “strategic stability” should be viewed in the context of their logic that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability; SDI is contrary to the ABM Treaty; therefore, SDI is contrary to strategic stability. Thus, rather than indicating flexibility and a move toward U.S. views on stability, recent Soviet statements only serve to package to their continuing opposition to SDI in a superficially more appealing wrapper. (U)

IV. Major Differences Separating U.S. and Soviet Positions. (U)

While the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on certain issues (e.g. a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty) each side proposes a different package and set of conditions. Thus, deep differences remain. The most fundamental difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions is that the U.S. seeks to secure a stable transition to effective strategic defenses, while the Soviets seek to constrain the SDI program, even as their own programs continue apace. Indeed, they are holding a START agreement hostage to U.S. concessions in Defense and Space. This difference in approach manifests itself in specific areas of disagreement, including:

• Type of agreement. U.S. seeks separate new Treaty of unlimited duration; Soviets seek to supplement the ABM Treaty, ending after the non-withdrawal period, with reversion to the ABM Treaty.

• Non-withdrawal period. U.S. proposal through 1994; Soviets propose 10 years from entry in to force, i.e. 1998.

• Meaning of non-withdrawal. U.S. requires retention of rights to withdraw from the ABM Treaty under circumstances other than those associated with continuing research; Soviets seek a blanket commitment not to withdraw.

• Right to deploy. U.S. seeks unfettered right to deploy advanced strategic defenses anytime after the non-withdrawal period; Soviets seek to continue the current ABM Treaty regime, i.e., a party could “withdraw and deploy” on 6 months notice.

• Right to test. U.S. would continue research, development, and testing during the non-withdrawal period which are permitted by the ABM Treaty; Soviets seek more restrictions in a “strengthened” ABM Treaty regime. (U)

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

V. Options. (U)

A. Retain our current position. Those who support this option believe that the current U.S. position in Defense and Space is sound. They believe that in return for our promise not to exercise our right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty we must secure a future right to deploy defenses, without further reference to the ABM Treaty. They believe it is equally important to avoid constraints on SDI beyond those which the parties agreed to in the ABM Treaty in 1972, including protecting our rights to test space-based systems based on “other physical principles” (OPP). They note that no move the Soviets have made in Defense and Space would justify a change in our position. (S/G)

This option is supported by OSD, in combination with option B. (S/G)

B. Declare deployment of Phase I SDI defenses as soon as possible an unequivocal national objective. Such a declaration by the President would be accompanied by an announcement that the Defense Department is actively developing specific plans to restructure the SDI program to take advantage of our rights under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Such plans would detail realistic ABM tests based on other physical principles. (S/G)

Supporters of this option believe that it would eliminate ambiguity in current policy. It would emphasize the urgency of the President’s objective of developing and deploying effective defenses, rather than research aspects of the SDI program and their compliance with the ABM Treaty, even to the point of observing an interpretation more restrictive than the parties actually agreed to in 1972. They believe this ambivalence undercuts our ability to maintain support for SDI in Congress. They also believe it damages our case that the assumptions of the ABM Treaty are being called increasingly into question by technological progress, Soviet strategic offense and defense activities, and Soviet Treaty violations. (S/G)

Supporters of this option also believe that it would enhance the attractiveness of our current proposal to the Soviets, by giving them a significant incentive to secure from the U.S. a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to join us in a jointly managed transition to defenses. Thus, we could improve our chances of Soviet agreement to an unfettered right to deploy defenses at the end of the non-withdrawal period. (S/G)

Those who oppose this option believe that an announcement now to restructure the SDI program according to the broad interpretation would endanger the compromise on the FY88 Defense Authorization Bill. They also believe that SDI technology is not sufficiently mature to make a decision now to deploy defenses. Finally, they do not believe the option would make our position more appealing to the Soviets; rather, they believe it would likely make a START agreement impossible. (S/G)

Option B. is supported by OSD to supplement our current position. (S/G)

C. Terminate ABM Treaty provisions affecting ABM radars or devices capable of substituting for such radars. This option would permit development, testing, and deployment of all ABM sensors, whether based on 1972 technology or on “other physical principles.” (S/G)

Those who support this option believe it would resolve Soviet ABM Treaty violation in a logical fashion that furthers U.S. interests by facilitating SDI progress. They argue that removing restrictions on sensors would help us in three respects. First, we could deploy a fully ABM capable Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS) saving time and money and gaining progress toward defenses. We need to deploy a version of this system to improve our early warning capability, irrespective of strategic defense deployments. But, deployment of even a non-ABM capable BSTS for early warning may be jeopardized by misguided Congressional restrictions because it is linked to SDI. Second, sensors and battle management are critical to the solution of the strategic defense problem. Unlimited rights to test and deploy these systems would ease considerably SDI’s burdens in developing effective defenses. Finally, it would enable us to deploy ABM cable sensors like BSTS and the Airborne Optical System which could make militarily useful an option for an initial deployment of 100 midcourse interceptors under the ABM Treaty. (S/G)

This option could be implemented by declaration. The United States could charge that the Krasnoyarsk radar, in combination with other Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities, particularly involving sensors, constitutes a material breach of the ABM Treaty. As a proportional response to this breach, we could unilaterally suspend or terminate ABM Treaty provisions affecting sensors. In pursuing this approach, we would make clear that the scope of Soviet violation and circumvention of ABM Treaty provisions limiting radars (e.g. Krasnoyarsk, concurrent testing of ABM systems and air defense radars, constructing transportable radars, Gomel etc.) has irreversibly undermined limits on ABM sensors. (S/G)

Under this option it would be possible to tell the Soviets that we intend to remove ABM Treaty restrictions on sensors, that this is not negotiable, but that we are willing to discuss with them the details of the new regime to further our goal of stability. (S/G)

Those who support this option believe that Soviet treaty violation can be either a severe liability in our efforts to reach and ultimately to ratify a START Treaty or a valuable asset in our efforts to clear a path toward defenses. Until the Soviets redress their violation, we can influence how it will affect the political debate. (S/G)

Those who oppose this option believe that it would secure no significant advantage for the U.S. not now available to us under the ABM Treaty, while legitimizing the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar. Under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the U.S. may place an ABM capable BSTS in space for ABM test purposes. Moreover, they believe the option would necessarily involve negotiation of the type of limits on SDI testing and development that we have previously rejected. Another potential problem with this approach is that it appears to put the BSTS program in conflict with the ABM Treaty. This could jeopardize future funding for this important program. Some who oppose this option believe that if we have the legal means to pursue the option, we should terminate the entire ABM Treaty. (S/G)

Option C. is favored by Ambassador Cooper. (S/G)

D. Recast the U.S. Position Drawing on the President’s July 1986 Letter to Gorbachev. With certain new features, this option would entail the following elements:

—Both sides would conduct research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty through 1992;

—After 1992, should either side wish to deploy advanced defenses, the sides would initiate further discussion on the transition to greater reliance on strategic defenses and possible additional measures to facilitate the transition;

—Such discussions would last up to two years. At the end of two years, either party would have an unfettered right to deploy advanced strategic defenses;

—To enhance strategic stability and provide predictability, the sides would establish a Commission on Advanced Defenses, meeting regularly to exchange briefings on each side’s strategic defense programs, and facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities. (S/G)

Those who support this option believe that it provides the best balance between achieving a Treaty that gives us an unfettered right to deploy strategic defenses at the end of a period we control and at the same time avoiding a statement now that we will deploy defenses at some date certain in the future. They further believe that ongoing talks with the Soviets on strategic issues are inevitable, and that we must therefore shape the mandate for these talks in favor of our agenda. (S/G)

Those who oppose this option believe that it would add a significant political obstacle to the exercise of our right to deploy—i.e. a requirement to negotiate and make proposals for a transition. They believe such a requirement would be inconsistent with our central objectives in Defense and Space. They also note that we have already made proposals for at transition, including 50 percent START reductions and a predictability package. Moreover, opponents of this option believe that a proposal to create a Commission on Advanced Defenses would be premature and ill-advised when we are so far from agreement with the Soviets on basic Defense and Space issues. (S/G)

E. Resolve Defense and Space issues in the START Treaty. This option would consolidate key elements of our existing position into one relatively simple package and include the following elements:

—As part of a START Agreement include an agreed period for non-deployment of advanced defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty (to range from 7–10 years);

—While both sides would continue to abide by the ABM Treaty, do not specify broad or narrow as correct; both sides would agree to disagree on this during the period;

—Include some resolution of the Krasnoyarsk radar (preferably dismantlement or at least a moratorium on any further construction or power through the non-deployment period); and,

—Continue for now to push for a green light to deploy after the non-deployment period, with six months notice not related to the ABM Treaty. (S/G)

This option would include the above commitments in a separate protocol or agreed exchange of notes associated with (and thus an integral part of) a START Treaty. (S/G)

Supporters of this option believe that negotiating a Defense and Space Treaty would be enormously complicated and is not necessary to meet (and could be counterproductive to) U.S. interests in this area. They also believe that this simplified approach might have more chances of succeeding while containing key elements of the U.S. position. (S/G)

Opponents of this option believe that it would fail to meet key U.S. Defense and Space objectives. It would accept the Soviet position on a linkage to Defense and Space in the START Treaty, dropping our insistence on a separate Defense and Space Treaty. Also, opponents believe that “agreeing to disagree” on interpretation of the Treaty would leave us vulnerable to Soviet attempts to blackmail Congress into restricting SDI by threatening to reverse START reductions. Finally, opponents of this option believe that concessions on the Krasnoyarsk radar and extending the non-withdrawal period will encourage Soviet recalcitrance. (S/G)

Option E. is supported by ACDA. (S/G)

F. Extend the non-withdrawal period. Under this approach, the United States would propose the following:

—Non-withdrawal through 1996. This would be intermediate between the current U.S. position (1994) and the current Soviet position (10 years from entry into force, i.e. no earlier than late 1998.)

—There would be a period of negotiation in the years leading up to 1996 on the situation after expiration of the non-withdrawal commitment.

—Either side could withdraw from the ABM Treaty after 1996 upon six month’s notice. (S/G)

Under this approach, the current differences regarding interpretation of the ABM Treaty would be put off to subsequent negotiations. The Congress could be expected to apply strict guidelines in approving funds for SDI activities in order to avoid jeopardizing START reductions. However, this is already happening. This approach would protect future options, and would not impose constraints on SDI testing beyond those agreed to in the ABM Treaty in 1972. (S/G)

Opponents of this option believe that it would compromise critical elements of the U.S. Defense and Space position by failing to obtain an unfettered right to deploy defenses after the non-withdrawal period and leaving SDI vulnerable to Soviet pressure for Congressional restrictions on testing beyond what was agreed in the ABM Treaty. They also believe that extending the non-withdrawal period would simply whet the Soviet appetite for concessions. (S/G)

Option F. is supported by the State Department. (S/G)

G. Define deployment vs. testing for space-based systems. The key to the current U.S. Defense and Space position is the distinction between deployment and testing for space-based OPP systems; under the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, testing is permitted but deployment is prohibited. This option is intended to facilitate exercising our right to test. There are a variety of ways to draw the distinction between deployment and testing. They could be used singly, or in combination and include: declaring an ABM test range in space; a limit on the number of space-based ABM systems in orbit at any time that would allow full testing but would fall short of the number required for full ABM capability; and, a time limit on space basing of ABM systems. (S/G)

None of the concepts for distinguishing deployment from testing are presently favored by any agency. However, there is general consensus that they warrant further study, including associated verification issues. (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁵

Washington, November 19, 1987

GRIP 37D (U)

Purpose. To examine possible START tradeoffs which might be employed during the 7–9 December summit meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev. This paper considers what, if any, new flexibility on START issues might facilitate reaching an agreement in the U.S. interest. (S/G)

Background. Of the large number of issues between the United States and the Soviet Union, the following are the most significant (items marked (**) were identified by General Secretary Gorbachev as “artificial impediments” which should be removed, although, despite Soviet claims, all have important policy implications):

—Linkage to SDI

—The Soviet Union insists on linking agreement in START to restrictions on SDI in Defense and Space.

—The United States opposes.

—Sublimit structure

—The United States proposes sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads, 3300 ICBM warheads, and 1650 warheads on heavy or highly MIRVd ICBMs.

—The Soviet Union has offered limits of 3000–3300 ICBM warheads, 1800–2000 SLBM warheads and 900 ALCMs, but with no freedom to mix. They have suggested that 3000 ICBM warheads may be acceptable.

—Allowing mobile ICBMS (**)

—The Soviet Union insists such missiles be allowed.

—The United States seeks a mobile ICBM ban.

—Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) (**)

—The United States, while agreeing in principle that there must be a mutually acceptable solution on SLCMs, knows of no verifiable way to limit such missiles.

—The Soviet Union has proposed a limit of 400 SLCMs on no more than two types of submarines (the U.S. also plans deployment of a much larger number of SLCMs on surface ships).

—Allowing modernization of heavy ICBMs (**)

—The United States would ban such modernization and includes a flight test ban on existing heavy ICBMs.

—The Soviet Union insists modernization be allowed.

—Required broadcast of unencrypted, readable telemetry

—The United States requires such broadcasts.

—The Soviet Union is opposed.

—Time frame for reductions

—The United States proposes completion in 7 years.

—The Soviet Union prefers 5 years but is willing to consider 7 years.

—Range cutoff and armament for ALCMs under a treaty

—The Soviet Union seeks a cutoff range of 600 km (as in SALT II) and would count all ALCMs as nuclear.

—The United States has not arrived at a position; some advocate a significantly higher range and/or exceptions for conventional ALCMs.

—Inclusion of Backfire (**)

—The United States insists the Backfire bomber be included in strategic totals.

—The Soviet Union is opposed, claiming Backfire is a theater weapon.

—Limiting throwweight

—The United States seeks a formal treaty commitment to a 50% reduction in Soviet throwweight and a binding commitment not to exceed the revised level.

—The Soviet Union is unwilling to agree to treaty provisions, but have proposed a unilateral statement that their proposals will result in such a decrease and will not lead to an increase thereafter.

—Non-circumvention and Trident II transfer

—The Soviet Union, under the guise of non-circumvention, seeks provisions which would ban transfer of the TRIDENT II (D–5) missile to the United Kingdom.

—The United States cannot accept such a limitation.

—Verification details

—The two sides differ on a number of important verification details. In many cases the United States has not yet tabled its position (we have not yet put forth an inspection protocol, for example); in other cases (conversion, destruction and dismantlement) the Soviets have not set forth counterproposals.

Approaches at the summit. All agencies agree that (a) since non-circumvention and linkage to SDI are matters of principle, we should display no flexibility, (b) the absence of a U.S. position on ALCM range and armament makes it inappropriate to discuss the issue at the summit, and (c) verification details, including telemetry encryption, are not suitable for summit level discussion. These areas are not treated in this paper. Brief summaries of the positions and available options for other major areas are attached. These summaries include only limited discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of options, under the assumption that the pros and cons of movement are familiar to Cabinet level participants. (S/G)

Verification. In many instances there are no apparent new verification problems introduced by the options discussed in this paper; the different options are neither more nor less verifiable than our current position. Options to change our current position to ban mobile ICBMs, however, raise significant verification and stability issues and would represent much more of a major policy decision. Verification of limits on mobile ballistic missiles is discussed in a separate paper (GRIP 34).⁶ Options to relax our position on heavy ICBM modernization or on throwweight would also have significant verification implications. (S/G)

Agency Positions. Agency positions on each issue are shown in the attachments. The Director of Central Intelligence’s representative makes no policy recommendations on these issues. (C)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁷

Washington, undated

Attachment A—Sublimits

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START Treaty states:

“Each party shall . . . limit its ICBM and SLBM warheads . . . so that . . . the aggregate number does not exceed . . .

(C) 4800, for warheads on its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(D) 3300, for warheads on its deployed ICBMs;

(E) 1650, for warheads on its deployed ICBMs, exclusive of those warheads on its deployed, silo-based ICBMs which are not heavy ICBMs and which have six or fewer warheads.”

The Soviets have proposed:

“Each party shall . . . limit its ICBM and SLBM warheads . . . so that . . . the aggregate numbers . . . do not exceed . . .

(C) 3000–3300, for nuclear warheads on its deployed ICBMs;

(D) 1800–2000, for nuclear warheads on its deployed SLBMs;

(E) 800–900 nuclear warheads for its deployed ALCMs.

“Within the aggregate number of 1600 . . . the [Soviet Union] shall reduce its deployed launchers of heavy ICBMs . . . to a level not to exceed 154. . . . this means a limit of 1540 reentry vehicles for deployed heavy ICBMs” (S)

The Soviets have withdrawn an earlier suggestion for a limit of 60% of the total warheads (i.e. 3600) on each Triad leg. (S)

Discussion. The U.S. position on sublimits has been extensively reviewed during the past six months. In April 1987, in preparation for Secretary Shultz’ trip to Moscow, the President issued NSDD 267,⁸ in which he noted he was “reluctant to alter our sound position on sublimits.” The President did authorize, for the Moscow meeting only, the Secretary of State to “explore raising the ICBM warhead sublimit from 3300 to 3600.” The President rejected suggestions to provide additional flexibility on the 1650 sublimit. Since there was no constructive Soviet movement, there was no discussion in April of raising the 3300 ICBM sublimit to 3600. In the October Moscow ministerial, the Secretary of State stressed the importance of the 4800 sublimit, implying the possibility of flexibility in the remaining sublimits. (S/G)

In the past, all agencies have agreed we should not display any flexibility with respect to the 4800 sublimit. We have revised this limit several times, settling on 4800 because it corresponded with an earlier Soviet proposal for a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads of 80 to 85 percent of the permitted total, while permitting the U.S. adequate flexibility to structure militarily sufficient forces. (S/G)

As a result of past decisions, we have raised all our proposed sublimits. Agencies disagree on the wisdom of further modifications, especially to the 1650 sublimit, which seeks to capture highly fractionated ICBMs, heavy ICBMs, and, should they be permitted, mobile ICBMs. Some consider this sublimit to be primarily a place holder, designed to facilitate agreement on other issues. They note that retention of such a sublimit would encourage development of a 6 RV variant of the SS–19 or SS–X–24 which could be much more capable than current versions of these missiles. (S/G)

Others view the 1650 sublimit as intrinsically important, since it directly limits the ICBMs we find most destabilizing. They note that replacing the 1650 sublimit with a 1540 sublimit on heavy ICBMs alone would result in a 1300 RV increment in allowable modern (e.g., SS–24) Soviet RVs. [less than 5 lines not declassified] Those who support this view believe that falling off our position on sublimits, especially in conjunction with falling off our position on mobiles, would dramatically increase the threat we face. (S/G)

Options. Three options currently have some agency support:

—Sublimit Option 1—Make no change to our present position. (S/G)

Those who favor this option believe that our position has already been sufficiently modified to meet Soviet concerns and believe we should await indications of Soviet flexibility before we make further concessions. They also believe the 1650 sub-limit is crucial to stability. Constraining the SS–X–24, they note, is vital in view of the fact it is comparable to MX. Others note that a 6 RV variant of the SS–X–24 or of an SS–19 follow-on, which the 1650 limit would encourage, could be more capable and thus present a greater threat. (S/G)

—Sublimit Option 2—Propose sublimits of 4800 ballistic missile warheads and 3300 ICBM warheads (current position), but change the 1650 sublimit to 1540 and redefine it to include “warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs” (thus dropping highly fractionated (more than 6 warheads) ICBMs such as the non-mobile version of the SS–X–24 from the limit). Negotiate a separate mobile ICBM sublimit inside the 1540 limit if mobiles are allowed. In return, require the Soviets accept 50% cuts in throwweight. (S/G)

Those who favor this option believe this formulation would pocket the 50% reductions in heavy ICBMs as a warhead limit while still retaining leverage on mobile ICBMs, would increase the chance of Soviet acceptance, and, if mobile ICBMs are permitted in the future, would force a Soviet tradeoff between mobile and heavy ICBMs, the two systems we seek to constrain. They believe that our most important interests in limiting destabilizing systems would be adequately protected and that increases in permitted SS–X–24s, given other constraints, would not significantly increase the threat. Some who favor this option also believe that retaining the 1650 limit will encourage the Soviets to build even more capable 6–RV variants of existing missiles. (S/G)

Opponents note that, in addition to effectively pocketing a 50% reduction in SS–18s, the 1650 sublimit places a de facto constraint on Soviet ICBM modernization by precluding substitution of SS–24s for SS–19s, a substitution which could result in 1300 additional SS–X–24 warheads, a significant threat increase. They consider the 1650 sublimit is crucial in constraining the most destabilizing Soviet systems and in forcing Soviet tradeoffs between heavy, mobile (if ultimately allowed) and highly fractionated systems, and that eliminating it could result in an almost ten-fold increase in the deployments of SS–24s, an increase they believe is clearly unacceptable, [less than 3 lines not declassified] Opponents also believe a trade-off between heavy and mobile ICBMs is illusory since they believe we cannot effectively verify mobile ICBM limits. (S/G)

—Sublimit Option 3—Press for the 4800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit as part of the following package which includes a 50% cut in Soviet heavy missiles (the 1540 limit on heavy ICBM warheads only) and a 50% cut in Soviet throwweight. Attempt to pocket the 3300 ICBM sublimit, but be prepared to fall off if the Soviets accept the other elements of the package. Negotiate a separate mobile ICBM sublimit separate from the 1540 limit if mobiles are allowed. (S/G)

In addition to arguments for and against option 2, those who favor this option believe that (1) with agreement on the remaining items the 3300 sublimit would not add any significant constraint on Soviet ballistic missile capabilities in terms of hard target kill and throw-weight capability, and so we should not spend anything seeking it, and (2) this package approach offers a better chance of getting Soviet agreement to key limits which will actually decrease Soviet capability for a first strike. (S/G)

Opponents note that this proposes dropping a sublimit the Soviets have already indicated they can accept and one which is important to our attempts to drive the Soviet strategic force in more stabilizing directions. They further note that, unlike option 2, this does not force a Soviet tradeoff between mobile and heavy ICBM warheads. Some who oppose this option believe Soviet first strike potential would increase under this proposal even if the Soviets comply with it. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense supports Option 1 (current position).

—Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny support Option 2 (4800 ballistic missile RVs, 3300 ICBM RVs, 1540 heavy/mobile RVs, 50% throwweight reduction; mobiles, if allowed, part of the 1540 limit).

—The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency support Option 3 (4800 ballistic missile RVs, 3300 ICBM RVs, 1540 heavy RVs, 50% throwweight reduction; mobiles, if allowed, constrained by a separate limit; drop 3300 if needed). (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁹

Washington, undated

Attachment B—Mobile ICBMs

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START Treaty provides (Art. IV 7.) that “Neither Party shall deploy ICBMs in a mobile mode.” The Soviet treaty explicitly allows mobile ICBMs. This issue has been identified by General Secretary Gorbachev as an “artificial” impediment which must be removed. (S)

Discussion. The United States currently seeks to ban mobile ICBMs on grounds of both verification and stability. In addition, we have no ability to effectively target Soviet mobile ICBMs, nor are we likely to have such a capability in the near future. Finally, there is dispute over the likelihood of the U.S. actually being able to deploy mobile ICBMs of its own, given the cost of the small ICBM, the political opposition to additional MX in any form, and inevitable environmental and political opposition to actual mobile deployments. (S)

Limits on mobile ballistic missiles present some of the most difficult verification problems in the strategic arena. With comprehensive verification measures like those developed for INF missiles we could have [11 lines not declassified] Verification of mobile ICBMs is discussed in detail in GRIP 34; there is as yet no interagency agreement on the details (or even the existence) of an effective verification scheme for mobile ICBMs. (S/G)

The stability concerns arise from the reload capability and cheating potential associated with mobile ICBMs, especially (but not exclusively) large, highly fractionated ones. [9 lines not declassified]

The Intelligence Community senior officials responsible for assessing Soviet strategic force structure, political matters, and arms control policy concur in the judgement that the Soviets will not give up all mobile ICBMs because of such factors as the counterforce threat from all legs of the U.S. triad and the fact that substantial resources have already been devoted to deploying these systems. Only with major concessions on MX/D5 might they even consider such an action. If the Soviets were prepared to compromise at all on the issue of mobile ICBMs (which the Intelligence Community considers unlikely), the Intelligence Community assumes that, while they would prefer to retain some of each system, they would be more inclined to insist on retaining the MIRVd rail-mobile version of the SS–X–24 than the single-RV road-mobile SS–25. (S/G)

Some policy agencies disagree with the Intelligence Community assessment and consider cancellation of the PEACEKEEPER and Small ICBM programs could be an adequate trade. They note that many in government had an equally strong belief that the Soviets would neither agree to eliminate their entire SS–20 force nor accept inclusion of SRINF systems in a global agreement. (S/NF/G)

Options. Two basic options exist for the summit:

—Mobile Option 1—Continue to reject allowing mobile ICBMs, on the grounds that they are incompatible with an effective and verifiable START agreement, and that, while a less meaningful SALT-style agreement which permitted mobiles could be pursued, a decision to permit such missiles would require substantial revision of our objectives and standards for a strategic arms agreement. (S/G)

Those who favor this option believe that, given the stability problems and the inherent problems with effective verification, we cannot consider altering our position as long as we seek an agreement providing for deep reductions. They believe that to permit mobile ICBMs would be a radical departure from our standards for equality and stability in a START agreement and that the de facto result of an agreement permitting mobile ICBMs will be a START (deep reductions) agreement for the U.S. and a SALT-like (no reductions) agreement for the USSR. They further believe there are large uncertainties in our own ability to deploy mobile ICBMs in the face of expected public resistance. They also believe that Congress will strongly oppose any START Treaty rendered unverifiable by permitting mobile ICBMs. Finally they note that the verification of mobile ICBMs has been thoroughly studied without a solution being found. (S/G)

—Mobile Option 2—In return for appropriate Soviet movement in other areas (which some believe must include accepting virtually all of the current U.S. positions), acknowledge that we are prepared to consider allowing mobile ICBMs in limited numbers if effective verification provisions can be agreed upon, using this movement to facilitate Soviet agreement to sublimits and the necessary verification provisions. (S/G)

Those who favor this option believe that a START agreement should permit mobile ICBMs in limited numbers and under specified verification arrangements in order to allow the U.S. to deploy survivable ICBMs and to accommodate the Soviet investment in the mobile missiles they have already deployed. Others who favor this option believe that, while a ban on mobile ICBMs may be preferable, the United States may eventually have to yield. The focus should therefore be on determining the price we will extract for modifying our position. Accordingly, they believe a marker should be laid down that limited deployments of mobile ICBMs would only be acceptable in the context of an agreement which incorporates virtually all other elements of the U.S. position. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense supports Option 1 (current position).

—The Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny support Option 2 (allow mobiles subject to effective verification) subject to the following conditions:

—The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would allow only single-warhead, road-mobile ICBMs, and would retain a ban on rail-mobile ICBMs.

—Ambassador Rowny would make agreement contingent on the Soviets accepting U.S. positions in virtually all other areas.

—Ambassador Lehman would make agreement contingent on (a) agreement on sublimits and (b) a limit of 300 warheads (within the 1540 sublimit) on mobile ICBMs. (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹⁰

Washington, undated

Attachment C—SLCMs

Current Positions. The current U.S. position is:

“The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. . . .” (Joint Working Document)

The Soviets have proposed (Soviet Draft Art. III.5):

“. . . each Party shall limit its submarines with SLCMs, so that the aggregate number of SLCMs deployed on them shall not exceed 400. . . . shall install SLCMs only on submarines of the following types [two types maximum] . . . . the Parties undertake not to install SLCMs on surface ships.” (S)

Discussion. Several years of study have failed to produce any meaningful SLCM limit that is even remotely verifiable. While we remain committed to finding a solution, some believe that a face-saving fig leaf such as an exchange (one time or annual) of declarations on planned deployments or a unilateral commitment not to exceed certain limits is the best solution. (S)

The Soviets have pressed for specific proposals beyond a general reaffirmation of the Reykjavik commitment to find a solution. Their approach is unacceptable since it (a) would limit both conventional and nuclear armed SLCMs, (b) conflicts with our plans to deploy on surface ships and several classes of submarines and (c) is unverifiable with a high breakout potential. (S)

Options. The following options exist:

—SLCM Option 1—Defer any U.S. initiatives to “solve” the SLCM problem. Those who favor this option believe that any movement which suggests a willingness to accept a unverifiable agreement, however phrased, will compromise our position during the remainder of the START negotiations. Since unilateral declarations are all we can accept, we should hold this card in reserve awaiting the end-game. (S/G)

—SLCM Option 2—Reintroduce the concept of an exchange of unilateral declarations on planned deployments as a part of a settlement of principal START issues, including sublimits and throwweight. Those who favor this option believe we should be prepared to address the SLCM issue once the Soviets move on sublimits. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense and Ambassador Rowny support Option 1 (current position).

—ACDA and the Department of State support Option 2 (reintroduce an exchange of unilateral declarations).

—Ambassador Lehman believes that, if the Soviets first accept our position on sublimits, the President should consider a package in which we accept a unilateral declaration on Backfire (Backfire Option 2) in return for Soviet acceptance of a unilateral declaration on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM Option 2). (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹¹

Washington, undated

Attachment D—Heavy ICBM Modernization

Current Positions. The Soviets have offered to reduce heavy ICBMs to a limit of 154. The U.S. draft START treaty provides that neither party shall:

“. . . produce, flight test or deploy new or modernized types of heavy ICBMs.

“. . . produce or deploy additional heavy ICBMs of existing types.

“. . . conduct flight tests of existing types of heavy ICBMs.” (S)

The Soviet treaty contains no restrictions on the throwweight of heavy ICBMs and no restrictions on mobile heavy ICBMs. It allows modernization and flight testing within the limit of 154 heavy ICBMs. The issue of heavy ICBM modernization has been identified by General Secretary Gorbachev as an “artificial” impediment which must be removed. (S)

Discussion. Heavy ICBMs have long been identified as the most threatening Soviet systems. A long-standing U.S. goal is to bring about their elimination. The U.S. draft treaty seeks to preclude a follow-on to the SS–18 heavy ICBM (such a missile is now in testing). By banning flight tests the United States seeks to prevent covert modernization; a flight test ban could also decrease Soviet confidence in the reliability of their existing systems. (S)

[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

Allowing modernization of heavy ICBMs would sanction qualitative improvements in Soviet heavy ICBMs, although other treaty provisions would preclude increases in the numbers of such ICBMs. Some believe that allowing such modernization increases significantly Soviet cheating and breakout potential. Others believe that the United States has never been able successfully to limit (or define) modernization and will be equally unsuccessful in this case, given the nature of the problem. (S/G)

Options. There are three options:

—Heavy Modernization Option 1—Maintain the current position. (S/G)

—Heavy Modernization Option 2—Allow flight testing of existing SS–18s, but not modernization. (S/G)

—Heavy Modernization Option 3—Accept heavy ICBM modernization within the heavy ICBM warhead limit in return for Soviet acceptance of direct throwweight limits. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense supports Option 1 (current position).

—Ambassador Lehman supports Option 2 (allow limited testing of existing SS–18s) and, if the Soviets accept both throwweight limits and a 1540 sublimit, Option 3 (allow heavy ICBM modernization) as well. (S/G)

—The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency support Option 3. (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹²

Washington, undated

Attachment E—Reduction Period

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START treaty provides for reductions to be completed within seven years of such a treaty coming into effect. The formal Soviet position is five years, although they have said seven years could be discussed. (S)

Discussion. The United States initially favored reductions over a five year period. Following review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States altered its position to seven years. The primary concern was to ensure sufficient time for the strategic modernization program to take effect, since we require modernized forces if we are to accept deep reductions. (S)

The U.S. decision to seek reductions over a seven year period was made in the context of a possible agreement by the end of 1987. Since it now seems unlikely that an agreement can come into effect before the end of 1988, some would argue that the United States could accept a six-year reductions period with little impact. Thus, given apparent Soviet willingness to accept longer than five years, we may have an easy compromise which could eliminate one outstanding issue. (S/G)

Options. The following options exist:

—Reduction Option 1—Maintain our position in favor of a seven year reduction period. (S/G)

—Reduction Option 2—Suggest a six year reduction period as a compromise. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense and Ambassador Lehman support Option 1 (current position).

—Ambassador Rowny supports Option 2 (propose six years) if the JCS concur. (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹³

Washington, undated

Attachment F—Backfire

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START treaty lists Backfire among the heavy bombers to be constrained. The Soviets assert Backfire is not a strategic bomber. This issue has been identified by General Secretary Gorbachev as an “artificial” impediment which must be removed. (S)

Discussion. The Intelligence Community is unanimous in agreeing that the Backfire is an intermediate-range bomber. They also agree on the approximate range and payload capabilities of the Backfire and that it is best suited for employment for theater strikes. Under certain conditions, the Backfire has a limited technical capability to conduct strikes against targets in the contiguous 48 states. On a one-way, subsonic, all-high-altitude mission, the Backfire could cover all or almost all of the continental U.S. using either Arctic staging or aerial refueling. On a two-way, subsonic, all-high-altitude mission, even using both Arctic staging and aerial refueling, the Backfire could only cover about half of the continental U.S. If relocated to Arctic bases, the Backfire could strike targets in Alaska. The Intelligence Community judges, however, that the Soviets do not intend, and would be unlikely, to use Backfire aircraft as part of an intercontinental strike force against the United States, even after major missile strikes. (S/NF)

Some policy agencies believe that, if it is excluded from START, the Backfire would be the most capable Soviet system with strategic strike potential not limited by arms control constraints, making it an obvious candidate for Soviet circumvention of START limits. (S/G)

Failure to limit Backfire in a START treaty could be a major issue in Senate ratification deliberations. (S/G)

Options. There are three basic options:

—Backfire Option 1—Maintain the current position. (S/G)

—Backfire Option 2—Be prepared to agree that Backfire bombers (but NOT U.S. systems such as FB–111/F–111) would be dealt with along with SLCMs outside the 1600/6000 aggregates by an exchange of unilateral declarations. Those who favor this option believe that SLCM and Backfire are both end-game issues. By offering to deal with them in a similar manner, the U.S. provides the Soviets an incentive to accept a less restrictive solution on SLCM while still retaining some constraints on Backfire. Others note, however, that setting up a category of theater aircraft to be limited could risk constraints on F–111/FB–111 and thus reverse a long held U.S. policy. (S/G)

—Backfire Option 3—Be prepared to deal with Backfire though a Soviet statement recording the total number to be built and a commitment not to give the aircraft an refueling capability or to exercise at refueling. Those who favor this approach note it provides some Backfire constraints and could serve as a model for dealing with SLCMs. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassador Rowny support Option 1 (current position).

—The Department of State supports Option 3 (accept a Soviet statement recording the total number to be built and a commitment not to give the aircraft a refueling capability or to exercise at refueling).

—Ambassador Lehman believes that, if the Soviets first accept our position on sublimits, the President should consider a package in which we accept a unilateral declaration on Backfire (Backfire Option 2) in return for Soviet acceptance of a unilateral declaration on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM Option 2). (S/G)

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹⁴

Washington, undated

Attachment G—Throwweight

Current Positions. The U.S. draft START treaty states:

“Each party shall . . . limit the aggregate throwweight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs to a level 50 percent below the higher of the levels possessed by the two Parties as of December 31, 1986 . . . . by either side. (START Treaty Art. III 2.)”

The Soviets have stated that the practical result of their treaty will be that throwweight (which they reject as a valid measure of strategic capability) will be reduced by 50% and will not increase thereafter. They have been unwilling to codify this result, but have expressed willingness to make a unilateral (i.e. nonbinding) statement. (S)

Discussion. Throwweight has long been identified by this Administration as the single most relevant measure of ballistic missile destructive capability. It has, therefore, been U.S. policy to seek a direct limit on ballistic missile throwweight. Such a limit constitutes an important constraint on Soviet ability to cheat or breakout of the agreement; abandoning our position would be a major step which could allow the Soviets to build a strategic force suitable for cheating or rapid breakout. As a result, it could be seen as an unacceptable concession by Congress, particularly if the United States alters its position in other areas, especially mobile ICBMs. (S/G)

On the other hand, we have not yet been able to translate our general desire to constrain throwweight into agreed, verifiable treaty language; our draft throwweight protocol is not near interagency agreement. Thus some would argue we should accept a unilateral Soviet declaration and seek to constrain throwweight indirectly through ballistic missile sublimits and limits on heavy ICBMs. Others argue that throwweight limits are no more or less verifiable than other limits (such as those on numbers of warheads) and that throwweight both can and should be dealt with through direct treaty limits. (S/G)

Options. The following options exist:

—Throwweight Option 1—Continue to seek formal treaty limits on ballistic missile throwweight. (S/G)

—Throwweight Option 2—Accept a ceiling on Soviet throwweight in a subsidiary document such as an agreed statement, common understanding, or side letter. (S/G)

Agency positions are as follows:

—The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Ambassadors Lehman and Rowny support Option 1 (current position).

—The Department of State supports Option 2 (accept a Soviet commitment in a subsidiary document). (S/G)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 170 11/20/1987. Secret. Prepared by Brooks. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum on November 23. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.
2. See Document 138.
3. Secret; Grip.
4. See footnote 2, Document 222.
5. Secret; Noforn; Grip.
6. Not found.
7. Secret; Noforn; Grip. Brackets are in the original.
8. See Document 190.
9. Secret; Noforn; Grip.
10. Secret; Noforn; Grip. Brackets are in the original.
11. Secret; Noforn; Grip.
12. Secret; Noforn; Grip.
13. Secret; Noforn; Grip.
14. Secret; Noforn; Grip.