225. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva to the Department of State1
11928. Subject: START: Lehman-Obukhov meeting, November 10, 1987.
1. This is NST/START MEMCON VIII-M-158. Secret—entire text.
2. Meeting Date: November 10, 1987
Time: 5:30 P.M.–7:15 P.M.
Place: Hotel Richemond, Geneva
3. Participants:
| U.S. | USSR |
| Amb. Lehman | Amb. A.A. Obukhov |
4. Summary: In a very agreeable meeting, Obukhov confirmed that the Soviet side shares the objective of completing a START treaty by spring for signature in the first half of next year, and that, in order to do this, the sides must take measures in management, manpower, and substance to ensure completion of the task.
5. Obukhov argued that the Soviet position on ABM treaty issues was that the Soviet Union requires some simple, specific language that provides for a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years. If there is any disagreement about what the existing ABM treaty entails, this would be discussed in the SCC. Obukhov said that the two sides could negotiate a list of parameters, but that this would not be mandatory. When Lehman asked how the Soviet position related to START, Obukhov responded that, if the sides agree not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years and to deal with any disputes in the SCC, then the Soviet side could agree to a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. Obukhov said that if there were a “rude” violation of the ABM treaty, then the parties would be “free” from the START provisions. Aside from some “details” yet to be worked out, such as follow-on negotiations, the Soviet Union is willing to accept such an agreement.
6. Obukhov and Lehman agreed that an NST break beginning before the summit would probably be best. Obukhov thought that Lehman’s personal plans to depart on December 3 with December 2 the last day for meetings was in line with his own thinking. It was [Page 953] agreed that Lehman would make a formal recommendation on an exact date to Masterkov shortly. End summary.
START Agenda
7. Lehman welcomed Obukhov and said that he appreciated the latter’s invitation to dinner, but was sorry that he could not accept. Lehman said that he had a previous black tie commitment this evening in which he was to play an important role. Lehman said that he appreciated the fact that Obukhov was willing to meet to discuss issues. Obukhov observed that he had not had an opportunity to meet privately with Lehman for some time. He thought that these important and useful meetings should occur more often.
8. Lehman proposed to discuss how the two sides could guarantee that all tasks outlined by the foreign ministers could be completed in the time remaining in order that a START treaty could be completed by spring and be signed in the first half of next year. Lehman said that if the sides were to finish by the first half of next year, each side would have to devote more resources to the tasks at hand and be more effective in managing the process.
9. Obukhov agreed and said that this was his thinking as well, although he was concerned about developments in INF. He said that it had been expected that the treaty would be much farther along by now and that this was cause for concern. Obukhov opined that AMB. Glitman was introducing new ideas and also introducing START issues. Lehman countered that no issues were being discussed which did not derive from all issues that were before the two sides. Obukhov asked about the “25th missile” and the “20th missile,” asserting that Glitman had produced the problem of missile stages.
10. Lehman said that the Soviet side itself had quite clearly indicated that it understood the problem. Obukhov responded that the Soviet side had acknowledged that the missiles were similar but that they were different missiles and that the only problem derived was with respect to the first stage. Obukhov said that this did not permit the U.S. to propose to eliminate the SS–25 in INF. Lehman said that the intent was nothing more than to guarantee that elimination of SS–20s meant exactly that.
START Organization
11. When Lehman suggested that they move on to START issues, Obukhov said that that was exactly what he had done. Lehman proposed turning to the issue of how to complete a START treaty in time for signature in the first half of next year. He asked whether the Soviet side agreed to this objective. Obukhov confirmed that he did. Lehman said that he had done some calculations and that it was his view that the sides could successfully complete the START treaty and the relevant [Page 954] integral documents in such a timeframe. Lehman stressed that this would, however, require additional manpower, more meetings, and more working groups to ensure that the process was carried out in the best manner possible. Obukhov said that this was his thinking as well, but that the additional working groups would put a great premium on management. Obukhov stated again that he thought this was the proper way to proceed.
NST Break
12. Lehman ventured that there still remained the question of a break. He observed that there was a trade-off between time to prepare in capitals and time to complete work there. Lehman recalled that he and Obukhov had discussed the issue before and had agreed to discuss it again. Lehman said that in his view the U.S. negotiators would have to leave for Washington before the summit began on December 7. Since the 5th and 6th would be a weekend, and if Lehman were to be in Washington on a week day before the summit, he would have to leave earlier in the week. Lehman added that he could return after the summit, but there was also the question of whether or not the delegations would have instructions quickly after the summit and whether or not the delegation could be usefully engaged during the summit.
13. Obukhov responded that he had been considering this question as well since it was his belief that the round should end before the summit. He wondered whether Lehman agreed, and Lehman said that he was coming to the same conclusion. Obukhov asked whether Lehman had in mind a possible date. Lehman responded that he himself would like to leave Geneva on December 3. Thus, December 2 would be his last day for meetings. Lehman said that he could consider the matter and make a formal recommendation to Masterkov in the next few days if that would help. Obukhov said that was helpful to him and that Lehman’s thinking on timing seemed exactly right. Obukhov said that he had one problem which was that he could not guarantee precisely when INF would be finished. Therefore, he feared that the INF negotiating groups might remain in Geneva as late as December 6, but he hoped that the INF groups would complete their work long before in order that the treaty could be carefully reviewed in capitals. However, he clearly recalled the experience of SALT II and cautioned that the sides remain wise and understanding of these matters.
14. Lehman said that the sides should plan to use the time between now and the break and the summit productively and be prepared to return and stay in session until a treaty is finished in time for signature in the first half of next year. Obukhov agreed. Lehman asked what Obukhov thought would be the most productive course in START between now and the summit. Obukhov responded that the sides should continue to refine the draft treaty. Lehman said that the long [Page 955] pole in the tent would be verification and that it would be important for the two sides to present their verification proposals in detail as soon as possible, and preferably before the summit. Obukhov said that the Soviet side would do its best.
15. Lehman inquired about the status of the Soviet conversion, dismantlement or destruction protocol, and Obukhov responded that the U.S. document was still under review in Moscow. He conceded that he understood what Lehman was saying and that the Soviet side would do its best, but that the sides should make the best use of the time available between now and the summit with whatever is available. Lehman said that this was being done in INF, but that it seemed to him that the sides could move faster in START.
Defense and Space Meetings
16. Lehman said that he was also puzzled by developments in the defense and space group, where Amb. Kuznetsov had cancelled the two meetings for this week. Obukhov said that “he had run into Kuznetsov in the hall” and that the latter had informed him of this action. Lehman asked for an explanation and Obukhov said that all the U.S. side wanted to do is talk—talk about what the U.S. position means and what the ABM treaty means and this could go on forever. Lehman said that he thought that this was what the Soviet side wanted to do. He thought that it wanted to understand clearly the U.S. position and the meaning of the ABM treaty.
Soviet Objectives with respect to ABM treaty
17. Obukhov responded that all the Soviet side really wants is to work some simple, specific language that provides for a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years. Lehman said that it was not clear at all that that was the Soviet position. Rather, the Soviet side seemed to be proposing the negotiation of complex and technical provisions. Obukhov responded that the two sides could, of course, negotiate a list of parameters, but that this would not be mandatory. Obukhov said that all that is required is a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years, and, if there is any disagreement about what the ABM treaty means, this would be discussed in the SCC. Lehman said that he had not understood this to be the Soviet side’s position. Did Obukhov mean the ABM treaty as it now existed? Obukhov responded, “exactly, word for word.” Lehman said that, if this were the Soviet position, it certainly had not been made clear.
Relationship of ABM treaty issues and START treaty
18. Lehman wondered how the Soviet position related to START. Obukhov responded that, if the sides agree not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years and to deal with any disputes in the SCC, [Page 956] then the Soviet side could agree to a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. Lehman asked whether this was the entire relationship, and Obukhov responded that it was. Obukhov said that, of course, if there were a “rude” violation of the ABM treaty, then the parties would be “free” from the START provisions. Obukhov said “rude” or, perhaps, “great.” Lehman offered “gross,” and Obukhov thought this was the word.
19. Lehman asked whether this could be negotiated in the Defense and Space Group and thus free the draft START treaty from this problem. Specifically, would the proposal that the 50-percent reductions called for in START be contingent on the ABM treaty proposal be negotiated in the Defense and Space Group? Obukhov said that he did not want to prejudge where it would be negotiated. Lehman said that he did not understand. He thought that the issue pertained to Defense and Space. Obukhov agreed but said that it was also related to START. Lehman asked Obukhov to confirm the Soviet position as being that the 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms would require that the sides commit not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for ten years, exactly as it is worded today, and that, if there is a dispute over the meaning of the ABM treaty, then it would be dealt with in the SCC; if there were a “rude” or “crude” or “gross” violation or something like that, then the parties would be free from the provision of the START treaty. Obukhov confirmed this impression, but added that there might be some other details.
20. When Lehman pressed Obukhov on what he meant by details, Obukhov gave the example of follow-on negotiations. Lehman asked if he meant the follow-on negotiations that the Soviet side proposed at the end of the 10-year period. Obukhov said that this was the type of thing he had in mind. Lehman asked whether, once such an agreement were reached and if there were not any further clarification of what the ABM treaty means, would then the D&S negotiations cease until late in the 10-year period? Obukhov replied that that was his view, but asked whether Lehman was making a proposal. Lehman averred that Obukhov should not play that game with him—Lehman was simply trying to follow Obukhov’s logic. Obukhov then said that, frankly, he had been thinking about this concept (i.e., a hiatus in the D&S negotiations) but that it was not the same as the Soviet position. Lehman asked if the overall clarification of the Soviet position had been made clear or would be made clear to Amb. Cooper. Obukhov said that he was simply summarizing the Soviet position but that perhaps in discussions with Minister Vorontsov, this could all be made very clear.
Sublimits
21. Lehman asked whether it would also become clear that the Soviet side could agree to the U.S. proposal for 4800 ballistic missile [Page 957] warheads. Obukhov said that surely Lehman knew the Soviet position. Lehman said that the new Soviet proposal was one-sided and could not be viewed as a positive step at this stage unless the Soviet side meant to apply it to the flexibility which Secretary General Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said was there.
22. Obukhov said that he was familiar with this argument because he had read Lehman’s statement. (Comment: Obukhov was probably referring to Lehman’s November 4 speech in Vienna. Several Soviet and Eastern Bloc diplomats were in the audience and were observed picking up copies of the address. End comment.) Lehman responded that if Obukhov had read his statement, then he must have a view as to whether or not he was correct in his interpretation of the situation. Obukhov said that he understood but that Lehman also had to understand that the ball was in the U.S. court. The Soviet Union had taken a step and now the time had come for the U.S. to take a step. For example, it was time for the U.S. side to take a step on the 1650 level and the Backfire.
23. Lehman responded that his view was entirely different, that the ball remained in the Soviet side’s court, and that certainly Obukhov was familiar with the discussions held in Moscow. Lehman asked whether Obukhov had anything to say in this regard. Obukhov replied that this was an issue that Lehman should take up with Vorontsov when he arrives. Lehman asked whether or not he would have an opportunity to meet with Vorontsov on this matter. Obukhov certainly remembered the conversation in Moscow that he, Obukhov and Vorontsov had during which Vorontsov had left a different impression of the Soviet proposal. Obukhov said that Vorontsov intends to meet with all the negotiators.
24. Lehman asked whether Vorontsov would be bringing new guidance. Obukhov responded that Vorontsov would be prepared to discuss all the issues. Lehman asked what the sides could do in Geneva to expedite the work, to prepare for the summit and a final treaty. Obukhov said that he had already answered that question by saying that the sides should stress work on reducing differences within the treaty in anticipation of the summit and, in this regard, he was aware that there would be experts discussions in Washington.
25. Obukhov then complained that Amb Matlock had personally attacked Obukhov in Moscow, charging that he was blocking progress. Obukhov suggested that the next time Amb Matlock wished to attack him personally that he should do so when Obukhov is not in Moscow to defend himself. In fact, said Obukhov, he had been in Moscow when the charge was made and did defend himself.
26. Obukhov continued that efforts could be made to define and resolve differences and, in fact, Masterkov had told him that the U.S. [Page 958] side was not working at full speed. Lehman proposed that rather than exchange recriminations, he and Obukhov focus on work to be done. Both sides should attempt to present verification details before the break and study the proposals and be prepared to resolve them upon resumption. Obukhov said that he had not been making recriminations, and that he agreed with Lehman’s objective. He would do his best but other issues such as the Backfire, SLCMs, and mobile ICBMs needed to be dealt with now. Lehman said that if the Soviet Union wanted the U.S. to take the Soviet position on mobile ICBMs at all seriously, then it should table its inspection protocol so that the U.S. could study the details of how mobile ICBMs deployments would be verified.
27. Obukhov said that the Soviet side would detail its entire verification proposal on all issues, not only mobile ICBMs. Lehman asked whether Obukhov wished to raise any other issues. Obukhov demurred, and Lehman said that, if the sides were to get their work done, they would need to be concise. Lehman said that he would instruct his delegation to seek areas where work could be expedited and to eliminate any possibility for polemics and long-winded repetitions of positions if Obukhov would do the same. Obukhov agreed.
28. The meeting concluded with Obukhov suggesting that he and Lehman and their wives get together again after the Vorontsov meeting.
29. Moscow minimize considered.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870903–0824. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Moscow, the Mission to NATO, and USNMR SHAPE.↩