Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

152. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 6, 1986, 10 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NST Experts Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Secretary Shultz
  • Ambassador P. Nitze
  • Ambassador E. Rowny
  • Ambassador M. Glitman
  • Ambassador R. Lehman
  • Assistant Secretary R. Perle
  • Colonel R. Linhard
  • Mr. N. Clyne
  • Mr. M. Mobbs
  • Mr. B. Burton
  • Mr. P. Afanasenko, Interpreter

• Soviet

  • Ambassador V. Karpov
  • Ambassador Y. Dubinin
  • Ambassador A. Obukhov
  • Colonel General N. Chervov
  • Lieutenant General N. Detinov
  • Mr. S. Chuvakhin
  • Mr. Y. Zolotov, Interpreter
  • Mr. A. Voytenkov, Interpreter

Prior to beginning the meeting, Ambassador Nitze introduced Secretary of State Shultz to the Soviet delegation and gave him the floor.

Secretary of State Shultz said that he wished to stop in at the beginning of today’s meeting in order to extend his personal greetings to the Soviet delegates. Shultz said he had four points to make. First, he said that he knew some of them, and expressed a belief that they were all here today to discuss an issue of great importance. He said that the subjects discussed today had an important significance as recognized in Geneva by both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Today’s effort would be an important contribution toward movement forward in the upcoming meetings in Geneva and in preparing for his own meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Shultz said that it was in this spirit that he had stopped in to stress the importance of the discussions.

Second, he asked the Soviet delegation to extend his personal greetings to Shevardnadze, whom he now knew somewhat, and with whom he has good personal relations which are very valuable in the ups and downs in the relations between the two governments.

Third, Shultz wanted to make sure that it was clearly understood how disruptive the Nick Daniloff case² could be. He said that such things take place from time to time in the relations between our two countries and that they have a potential to disrupt everything. He said that he is saying this only in order that the Soviet side can find a formula to release Nick Daniloff and send him back home.

Fourth, Shultz said that he wanted to impress upon the Soviet side the importance that is attached in this country to the question of emigration. He said that he recognized that this was not a topic here today for the Soviet delegation and that it had other issues to deal with. However, the Secretary stressed that emigration from the Soviet Union had almost gotten down to zero and was the lowest in decades. He said that this had a deep impact in the U.S. and in other countries. The Secretary said that when one considers the atmosphere, it becomes central to us and it becomes important also for the Soviet Union. He said he must call attention to the important significance of this matter.

Shultz said that he wanted this meeting on arms control to be productive and again wanted to send his personal greetings to Mr. Shevardnadze. He said that the best contribution he could make was to leave the meeting and let the delegations proceed with their work.

Ambassador Karpov responded by saying that the Soviet side wished to express their best wishes to the Secretary and they would extend the Secretarys’ regards to Mr. Shevardnadze. Karpov expressed the hope that the success of the current negotiations would not hinge upon the two points that Secretary Shultz had made which were not related to the arms control talks.

Secretary Shultz responded by saying success depends upon all points; he said the Soviet side could read U.S. newspapers, and watch U.S. television and could even read about what the U.S. side says about itself. He said that the Soviet side knows how important these issues are. He said that he did want to stress that the U.S. wants very much to see reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Karpov said that the Soviets read newspapers but hope that their friends across the negotiating table do not judge progress by what is said in newspapers and on television. Karpov said that it is the Soviet side’s intention to follow the instructions it is given and not what others claim it is doing or is supposed to do. He said that the Soviet side would be proceeding in a manner that would take into account the interests of both countries. He said the Soviet delegation came to Washington precisely with these intentions in mind and with instructions from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Karpov said that their mission was to prepare materials that would be used by both Shultz and Shevardnadze on September 19. He said the Soviet side had done everything it could to accomplish this; unfortunately, for today it could not say that the results of the discussions could lead to positive results or that there will be a possibility to come up with something for the Ministers. Frankly, said Karpov, the Soviet side views the ongoing consultations as a form of litmus test of the U.S. side’s seriousness and its desire to do everything possible to arrive at something for the respective leaders, both the Foreign Ministers and the President and the General Secretary.

On this note Secretary Shultz bid farewell to the Soviet delegation and left the conference room.

Ambassador Nitze took the floor by suggesting that the talks resume and maybe some progress could be achieved. He then called on Ambassador Lehman to continue with his presentation.

Lehman said the two new ideas the Soviets had tabled yesterday could be summarized as the issue of SLCMs and ballistic missile warheads. Lehman said, in regard to SLCMs, the Soviet side said it was prepared to treat these separately and it had expressed the concern that SLCMs could be used to circumvent an agreement on strategic arms. He said that we agree that SLCMs are not central to an arms control agreement and we are ready to deal with them in a separate agreement as long as they do not become an obstacle to an agreement to central systems. Lehman said he did not believe that SLCMs would be used to circumvent an agreement, at least at the levels the sides were currently discussing. He said he did not want the issue of SLCMs to become an obstacle to a START agreement. He said that both sides have many numbers to suggest but because of the ranges, numbers and payloads of SLCMs, these would be very hard to verify. He said that he was not confident that the proposals of either side were such that they could assure verifiability and stability for both sides.

Turning to the limits on ballistic missile warheads, Lehman said the U.S. side emphasized that concrete results were more important than the form which such limits might take, even though both were related. He said that this was clear from Soviet ideas expressed yesterday. Lehman said he first wanted to start from the substance of limitations. If the U.S. side applies the 80–85% limit on the overall number of 8000 warheads this would mean that warheads on ballistic missiles would be limited to between 6400 and 6800 units. He said that if we applied the Soviet 60% proposal related to warheads on any one category of delivery vehicles, that would mean that it would be 4800 RVs on ICBMs. Lehman said that this is much higher than what should be permitted under an agreement. He said that, as the Soviet side knows, the U.S. side had previously proposed that a limit of 4500 and 3000 be set respectively on these categories of warheads. Previously the Soviet side had proposed limits of 6000 and 3600 respectively while the U.S. proposal of 5000 warheads on ballistic missiles, proposed earlier, is still on the table and is still in force. As a result, Lehman said the new Soviet proposal would be from 1400 to 2300 units more than the ballistic missile warheads proposed by the U.S. side. He said that, according to Soviet proposals, there would be 1800 units more on ICBM warheads than what the U.S. side proposes. Lehman said that the U.S. would be prepared to establish higher levels than it is currently proposing in the hope that the Soviet Union could compromise and bring their own proposed levels down to a much lower level. He said that this might provide for some progress.

Having addressed the concrete numbers, Lehman wanted to move over to the form of the various limitations. He said the U.S. had looked at the Soviet approaches bearing in mind the interests of the sides in setting limits on different systems. It had looked at other approaches, some of which were even better, including some of the proposals that the two sides had agreed on previously. Lehman expressed the idea that concrete numbers would be better because they were more predictable. He said that the U.S. side liked an alternative approach which provided a hierarchy of sublimits—something it had spoken of before. Lehman said that the U.S. side is most concerned about ballistic missile RVs in terms of their range, capabilities, and potential. He said that limits on these RVs would be a central core around which other pieces of an agreement could be structured. It is the belief of the U.S. side that concrete agreements reached at these consultations in this area are central. Lehman noted that instead of working on aggregate totals, it would be better to work on sublimits, to agree to them, and in turn they would result in a total aggregate. Lehman said that we could not see how the Soviet side’s proposals presented here would address the distinctions in ballistic missile capabilities or how they would provide for predetermined limits on throw-weight. Lehman maintained that the Soviet side said that all weapons are alike, yet it called for specific limits on heavy bombers. It seemed to him that this was one-sided. Lehman said that if all weapons are alike, arriving at restrictions should not be too tough. He also said the Soviet side did not like the distinction between fast-flying and slow-flying systems, yet in the INF talks it had raised this issue to the U.S. Lehman said Soviet proposals should contain definitions and limits on slow-flying and fast-flying systems. In short, said Lehman, the U.S. continues to believe that undifferentiated aggregates of nuclear weapons are one-sided, dangerous, and destabilizing. He said that to avoid differentiation would be a step back in arms control. Lehman said that the U.S. knows of the new Soviet proposals and they are only one step away from calling for undifferentiated aggregates. The U.S. recognizes that if significant stability is to be achieved, limits could be arrived at for nuclear weapons using, for example, hierarchical limits. He said the U.S. side could accept some sort of aggregate limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and that the 1600 number which the Soviet side had mentioned might be appropriate in order to set up proper limits on ballistic missile RVs and ICBM RVs. Lehman also said that the U.S. side remains concerned about bomber and ballistic missile weapons and that it finds them to be different. However, the U.S. side said it would consider ALCMs. In the interest of moving ahead to set up a proper hierarchy of limits on ballistic missile warheads and ICBM warheads, the sides might want to set a specific limit on the total number of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. Lehman said that there were many issues that could be discussed in the current negotiations but he thought it would be good to answer the two new ideas the Soviets had raised and to transmit the U.S. side’s thinking on our own ideas today.

Ambassador Obukhov said he had one question to ask and that others might arise later. He said that at the end of Lehman’s talk, it was mentioned that the U.S. side would be ready to move ahead in setting up a total aggregate level on ballistic warheads and on heavy bomber weapons, more properly called ALCMs. Obukhov said that he wanted to know more specifically what would be the structure of the limits that the U.S. side was proposing. Would it be a total limit or would it be a mechanistically combined sublimit. In addition, Obukhov wanted to know whether they understood Lehman to say that, as before, the U.S. side is against counting aggregate levels of nuclear delivery vehicle as in the case of heavy bombers equipped with short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs.

At this point, General Chervov said that SLBMs such as the Trident I and II missiles, in their military capability (power, accuracy, range), were exactly equivalent to ICBMs. He asked why there was a need to set a separate limit on ICBMs.

Obukhov went back to his line of questioning by saying that since we are talking about such items, it seemed to him that Lehman correctly started presenting a tentative, approximate form describing the approach of the U.S. side on strategic offensive arms limitation as applied, as Obukhov understood, to an interim option. He asked how the U.S. approach would take into account the issue of preventing an arms race in space. So far, said Obukhov, existing arms reductions agreements had been closely tied to the issue of not extending the arms race into space. How did the U.S. side see this new agreement tying into this question. Additionally, Obukhov wanted to know the U.S. side’s reaction to the Soviet proposal that there be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15–20 years. He said that such a non-withdrawal would be needed if strategic defensive arms limitations were to be arrived at in an interim agreement. Obukhov said that since time was short, it would be helpful if Lehman could give some specific values or numbers in his approach to limitations. He was asking not for general comments but for specific numbers. He wondered if there was anything new or different in the U.S. numbers as compared to the numbers the Soviet side had already heard about. Obukhov said that from the Geneva negotiations the earlier numbers were already known. As a final question, Obukhov asked what it was on which Lehman was basing his idea of small-scale SLCM deployments when he said that he did not want it to be a way of circumventing a strategic arms agreement. Obukhov said he was bearing in mind the U.S. plans to deploy several thousand such SLCMs on surface ships and submarines.

Lehman said that if his count was correct he had seven Soviet questions to respond to and apologized in advance if he missed any. He asked the Soviet side to help remind him of their questions. Lehman first moved to the question of weapons in outer space. In answering, he said the President, Ambassador Kampelman and Ambassador Nitze had all spoken about weapons in outer space and that this was not really a START issue. Moving to other questions, Lehman said that the U.S. side had proposed a total limit on ballistic missile RVs and on ALCMs and could see a possibility of supplementing this limit in a number of ways. One way to do this, said Lehman, would be to set up a hierarchy in which there would be one way freedom to mix, the same type of way that had been used in previous agreements.

Secondly, regarding gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles, Lehman said there would not be a limit on these other than through a limit on heavy bombers within the framework of overall limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Obukhov asked whether short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs would also have a total limit in the same way that the U.S. had proposed limits on other types of weapons. Lehman came back by saying these would not be limited in the way that ALCMs and ballistic missile warheads were being limited. Chervov asked the same question of whether there were no limits, no specific limits, on these types of weapons. Lehman reiterated that short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs would not come under a total aggregate limit, except indirectly through limits on heavy bombers.

Chervov said that if one were to limit, say, bombers to 300, and if cruise missiles on these bombers were to come under a separate limit, would not the short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs have no limits of their own. Lehman said that this was correct—that gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles would have an indirect limitation only through the limits placed on heavy bombers. Chervov referred to Karpov’s clarification that these types of weapons would really be limited only through the loading of heavy bombers. He asked if this was correct or did the U.S. side deny this also. Lehman said this was correct, and there was a good reason for it—reasons that had been developed through past practice and which were helpful in reaching an agreement. He recalled that General Chervov had asked why the U.S. differentiated SLBMs and ICBMs. Lehman said in response that the U.S. heirarchy established real differences in the military capability and in the stability that these two systems provided. He said that both in SALT I and II this had been recognized. Lehman said that he wanted to try to reduce the differences and set new precedences as a way of finding a compromise solution to make progress. Chervov retorted that SALT I & II really talked about different types of systems, unlike those that exist today. Therefore, Lehman’s reference was not quite appropriate. Lehman said in response that proposals under SALT I & II recognized that the sides viewed stability and force structures differently and that this was why the U.S. side was proposing other ways to find solutions since there were indeed real differences between SLBMs and ICBMs. He said that there were things like different alert rates, different capabilities to strike hardened targets and area targets, and differences in the stability these systems provided. On the other hand, ICBMs are fixed points that can be viewed as provocative systems or vulnerable systems. But these are all complex issues, said Lehman, and we are not here to resolve differences in strategic outlook, but to find specific steps that can remove our differences in the way we view force structures. Lehman said that his approach was intended to bring the sides closer together, to remove the differences of the past and to find solutions.

Assistant Secretary Perle said there was an additional point about not counting gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles in the aggregate numbers. He said it seemed to him as he listened, that the U.S. was being told that the U.S. was the only one that had bombs and cruise missiles. That was not true. He said that any freedom in an agreement would apply not only to the U.S. side but also to the Soviet side. He said that even though the sides wanted to achieve equality, this was not quite so, simply because the Soviet side had an air defense system, while the U.S. has virtually none. Gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles mean a lot more to the Soviet Union than they do to the U.S. as a result of this situation. He said that since the Soviet side will not encounter any air defense systems against Soviet heavy bombers, an equality in the number of bombers, with gravity and short-range attack missiles, would certainly favor the Soviet Union.

Secondly, Perle said that SLCMs were referred to by the Soviet side as nuclear weapons when, in fact, U.S. SLCMs were mostly non-nuclear. For many reasons (many of which it is too late to change) launchers capable of launching different types of cruise missiles are identical. He said that the dilemma that the U.S. was facing might mean that it would be impossible to get an agreement or, by simply recognizing that this dilemma exists, the sides could go ahead and achieve an agreement anyway. He said that the number of SLCMs with nuclear weapons is small in relation to the total of U.S. SLCMs. It would be hard to imagine a situation where U.S. SLCMs would have any significance in a conflict between the U.S. and USSR, let alone a decisive impact. Perle said that it was quite true that the U.S. is planning to deploy a large number of SLCMs, however, most of these are non-nuclear and are designed to support the fleet or to be used in conventional warfare. Perle said that it was correct when General Chervov pointed to the significance in the number of launchers that could be used to launch non-nuclear cruise missiles. However, this did pose a dilemma. Rhetorically, he asked the question of what would be the reaction in Moscow if the U.S. proposed that, in order to reach an agreement on nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union withdraw a large percentage of its Soviet naval forces. He answered his own question by saying that there would be the same answer in Moscow as there would be from our own Navy. He said he was saying all of this only to urge the Soviet side to keep these issues in perspective in the same way that we do—the fact that the impact on both sides would be similar. Perle said that the U.S. cannot carve out a portion of its conventional naval forces to reach an agreement and that, in fact, the Soviet side is posing such a problem for the U.S. by asking for a limitation on SLCM launchers. He said that, given the fact that launchers for all sorts of weapons are identical, they could be used to launch nuclear and non-nuclear warheads. By the way, said Perle, there are not only non-nuclear cruise missiles but there is a variety of missiles around which our forces are structured. He said that he was sure that the Soviet side could see our problem. Perle said that the U.S. was not trying to carve out a portion of its forces to keep them outside of agreed limitations but is merely trying to solve a real problem.

At this point, Lehman said Perle had already answered the Soviet question on SLCMs. Therefore, he would move to the last two Soviet questions which were related. He said as he understood it, one of these two questions had to do with whether or not the new U.S. ideas apply to the existing proposals on the table or to a new interim approach. Lehman said that they could apply to the ideas expressed today, for example, in regard to a regime which called for less than 50% cuts. Going further, Lehman addressed General Chervov’s question on specific parameters. He said that he had already mentioned 1600 as the number of total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and the conditions under which it would be acceptable. Lehman said that if we took some of the new ideas and applied them to proposals already on the negotiating table, they might lead to some good possibilities. He said that the U.S. side could see the possibility of applying a number of 6000 as a total number of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs, of which no more than 4500 could be on ballistic missiles and of which no more than 3000 could be on ICBMs. Lehman said that as far as other limits were concerned, in order to reach our objective of achieving 50% cuts in throw-weight, both sides had already agreed on the appropriateness of reaching that level. Lehman said that he believed that this was a good way to go, however, it was clear to him from Soviet statements yesterday that the Soviet side preferred much higher levels for ballistic missile warheads and much higher for ICBM warheads. Lehman said that the U.S. side was ready to negotiate on these but that the levels mentioned yesterday by the Soviet side were too high. As he had mentioned earlier, Lehman said that this was an area where good progress could be made if both sides showed flexibility.

Obukhov said that from Perle’s words it was clear that one could assume that SLCMs could be dangerous in terms of circumventing a strategic arms control agreement. He said that Perle’s words confirmed this possibility, and that the sides should avoid this. Obukhov said that another question arose in his mind when Perle said that there was almost no possibility of reaching an effective agreement on SLCMs—at least that was Obukhov’s impression. On the other hand, said Obukhov, Lehman had previously spoken in a way which suggested that a separate solution for SLCMs could be found. He asked, in order to clarify the approach of the U.S. side, what the U.S. side was in favor of—reaching a separate agreement on long-range SLCMs or not? Here Karpov chimed in and asked what kind of an agreement could it really be?

Lehman said that the Soviet side proposes that limits be set on SLCMs; the U.S. side does not believe that such are needed at the levels of reductions that we are talking about. We do not want the SLCM issue to divert us from the important task of limiting central systems. Lehman said that he could imagine the possibility of a separate agreement but we do not believe that it is necessary, especially in view of the fact that it is hard to see how limits can be formulated so that they are equitable, stable, and verifiable. If the Soviet side can find a way to do so, we could consider such limits. That would be all right, said Lehman, but he did not consider it necessary, and did not want it to become an obstacle.

Speaking on the issue of circumvention, Perle said that he was not addressing this question in order to defend the U.S. negotiating position, but in order to look at the military logic. He said that the dilemma this poses is not one of circumventing the limits but of circumventing the purposes of an agreement. Perle said we agree on the fact that the purpose is to achieve stability and security at lower levels for both sides. One could say that after an agreement is reached, it would be possible for the Soviet side to make large improvements in their air defense system as it is now in fact doing. That in itself, said Perle, could circumvent the purposes of an agreement. Stronger air defenses could neutralize bombers—one of the elements of our security and an element which helps provide our two sides with stability. Yet, air defenses are something which we are not discussing under our limitations. Similarly, said Perle, he believed that SLCMs would be outside of an agreement since they do not pose a threat to stability and security. Their number is small and their role is neither primary, nor secondary, but in fact tertiary. The Soviet Union also has cruise missiles. That, said Perle, is the heart of the matter. He said that the Soviet side knows U.S. military doctrine, sees U.S. exercises and knows that neither side’s security would be affected if both sides had a modest number of cruise missiles. He said that the Soviet side must judge for itself and might not believe his words. Perle said that the Soviet general staff have people that know how to count the systems and what they mean. He said that we must dispassionately look at the question of reducing the possibilities of circumvention. He said that SLCMs would not help a side to circumvent in any big way.

Here Rowny added to Lehman’s earlier statement that we are ready to listen in detail and hope that the Soviet side will lay out its answers in great detail, especially on the issue of verification.

Detinov joined the conversation by saying that he had listened carefully and would like to ask Lehman whether it was possible that the U.S. positions on arms control were different from what the U.S. had said at earlier rounds. Lehman said that this was not correct, and apologized for possibly not being clear in his explanations. He said that there were many new ideas and numbers on the table that were different but that were aimed at achieving a first step toward an agreement which was our purpose. Lehman said that we spoke about different numbers, about different forms, and about other new issues. He said that this was in response to the ideas that the Soviet side had raised and obviously there were many more significant steps that could be taken.

When Karpov asked Lehman whether he could summarize all of the new U.S. positions made today, Lehman said he would gladly do so and hoped that the Soviet side would study his remarks carefully since he had prepared carefully to help the process. In highlighting the new ideas, Lehman said that the U.S. side had offered new aggregate numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; that it had said that, in the right context, the number could be approximately 1600, that again, in the right context, the U.S. side would be prepared to consider the aggregation of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs, that is, that the U.S. side could agree to a total number on ALCMs and ballistic missile RVs; that it could agree to a stabilizing heirarchy of sublimits and that those sublimits would have a one-way freedom to mix. With regard to specific numbers, Lehman said that we were ready to increase our levels above those that were on the table now, but that the Soviet numbers were too high. Lehman said that he hoped that his summary did not detract from his earlier detailed words. He hoped that this summary would be helpful.

Obukhov referred to Lehman’s earlier statement that the central element of strategic arms limitations in the U.S. approach should be limits on ballistic missile warheads. If he understood Lehman correctly, all other issues were on the sideline but that this was central. To assess what was new in the U.S. approach, said Obukhov, one needed to know what those limitations really were, and it would be important for Soviet understanding. Obukhov said that he could still not understand, no matter how many words were said by the U.S. side. It was true that the answer Lehman had given earlier to Chervov’s question on the numbers did not in substance differ from what Lehman is saying now. Obukhov said that in Geneva the Soviet side had said that the U.S. November 1, 1985 proposal was basically flawed, that it was basically a disruptive proposal from the point of view of Soviet strategic forces, and that it called for the continuation of the build-up of U.S. strategic forces in those areas that the U.S. sees as important to itself. Obukhov said that the new U.S. proposals provided for higher levels of ballistic missile warheads by thousands of units than the November 1, 1985 proposal. It would provide the U.S. with a unilateral advantage. However, since Lehman chose this as an example of what the U.S. considers appropriate levels, Obukhov asked if he could assume that today’s new proposals will have the same deficiencies and flaws as did the U.S. November 1 proposal.

Lehman addressed the last point first, by saying that there were no deficiencies in the proposals since the U.S. has differing force structures and differs with the Soviets on concepts and philosophy. He said that what he mentioned today was designed to see if a way could be found to take into consideration differences in structure and differences in numbers. Lehman said his intent was not to force his views on the Soviet side, but to reach a compromise. Going back to the first of Obukhov’s questions, Lehman said that the U.S. seeks to limit items other than ballistic missile warheads and the Soviet side is seeking to do so as well. However, it would seem to be a possible compromise to begin with something in order to build an agreement. Lehman said that the sides differ on many things, but have been discussing numbers. For instance, in terms of ballistic missile warheads, the Soviet Union has been talking about levels of 6000–6400, while the U.S. has been using the numbers 4500–5000. On ICBMs the Soviet side is using limits of 3600 to 4800 while the U.S. side is talking about 2500 to 3000. In each of these categories, said Lehman, there should be a way to set a number that would be agreeable to both sides and that would be acceptable. Lehman said that maybe, if agreement could be reached in this area, that it would make for better progress in other areas. Point-blank, Lehman asked whether or not the Soviet side was authorized to discuss in Washington numbers of ballistic missile warheads at levels smaller than those that were in earlier Soviet proposals.

Karpov said that the Soviet side had stated yesterday that it was prepared to talk about what Lehman had begun earlier, i.e., stricter limits on ballistic missile warheads. The Soviet side had already said that it was prepared to set a limit of no more than 80–85% of all warheads allowed on all strategic nuclear delivery systems. Karpov said that they came to Washington with this new proposal. He said he didn’t understand why it was the U.S. side wanted to talk about everything except this.

Obukhov added that the U.S. side expected the Soviets to have a precise understanding and not an indirect understanding on sublimits. He claimed that the U.S. side did say that it was in favor of sublimits but did not say what sublimits. Obukhov said that if we can clarify these things here, the Soviet side will understand what the U.S. approach really is.

On the question of the U.S. Nov. 1, 1985 proposal having separate heavy bomber limits, Obukhov said that now the U.S. side is not setting a limit. He wondered what would be the new approach of the U.S. side or would these limits come out in some other guise.

Lehman said that he had answered Soviet statements from yesterday with the aim of finding ways to narrow the differences between us. In some ways the Soviet proposals of yesterday were helpful and in some ways they were destructive. Lehman said that there was no doubt that the Soviet delegation was authorized to discuss higher limits, but can it discuss lower limits—limits within the range of what the two sides had been proposing, namely, on ICBM warheads. On specific numbers, Lehman said that he had given numbers in the hope that it would lead to a compromise solution and he had intended this for a first proposal.

Regarding Obukhov’s question on heavy bombers, Lehman said that it is the Soviet position that there are no distinctions and the Soviet proposal said nothing of distinctions. Lehman said that it was for that reason that he had offered an aggregate on strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limits. But as the Soviet side knew, previously, there had been reached an agreement on heavy bombers at a figure of 350. Lehman said that, if the Soviet side sees no distinctions, the sides could use this figure of 350 as a first-step approach. Lehman then wanted to turn the floor back to Nitze.

Karpov said, before going to other questions, he felt compelled to say that Lehman was confusing the issue of numbers. He said that the Soviet side was ready to talk about any number as long as this led to a cessation in the arms race and as long as it would bring the sides to a real solution as the Soviet side had said yesterday. Karpov said the Soviet side had offered 50% cuts on nuclear arms and narrower cuts of 30%, taking into account U.S. statements that 50% cuts were too large. Now we are looking at these types of cuts. Karpov said that the U.S. side should not try to make it look like the Soviet side is in favor of high levels and the U.S. side is in favor of low levels. This is a barrel with double bottoms where one bottom appears to have lower levels but hides another bottom with higher levels of nuclear weapons. Karpov said that the U.S. side does not want to seriously deal with reductions in nuclear arms. He said that what was needed was to cut off all channels leading to the possibility of an arms race and to concentrate on reducing nuclear confrontation. Karpov said that the Soviet side was ready to talk about each and every number, even in addition to those he had already mentioned.

Lehman said he could not agree, but that the sides had discussed this many times before, that what was needed was practical steps and compromise solutions in order to provide help to the Geneva negotiations and to our leaders. Lehman said that he used shorthand explanations and if the Soviet side had any other areas to discuss, the U.S. was ready.

At this point, Nitze closed the morning discussions and the delegations broke for lunch, agreeing to what Karpov made appear as a suggestion from Nitze to resume talks at 4 pm.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, September 1986. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State.
2. Reference is to American journalist Nicholas Daniloff, who was arrested in Moscow on September 2.