Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 5, 1986, 3–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NST Experts Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Max Kampelman
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny
  • Ambassador Maynard Glitman
  • Ambassador Ronald Lehman
  • Assistant Secretary R. Perle
  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • Mr. M. Mobbs
  • Mr. Norman Clyne
  • Mr. Bruce Burton
  • Mr. D. Arensburger

• Soviet

  • Ambassador Y. Dubinin
  • Ambassador V. Karpov
  • Ambassador A. Obukhov
  • Col. Gen. N. Chervov
  • Lt. Gen. N. Detinov
  • Mr. S. Chuvakhin
  • Mr. Ye. Zolotov (Int.)

Ambassador Nitze offered Ambassador Karpov the opportunity to open the discussion this afternoon. Karpov said he wanted to continue where we had left off in the morning, that is, on the U.S. side’s remark that it was opposed to selective arms limitation. Karpov liked that thought very much. This was precisely what the Soviet side was suggesting. It was consistent with the Soviet thesis that we should aim not at selective arms limitation but at halting the arms race, that is, at achieving genuine arms reduction and limitation with respect to both strategic and medium-range arms, accompanied by guarantees that there would be no arms race in space. Karpov asked the U.S. side to adhere to this standpoint in examining the proposals tabled by the Soviet side at NST, as well as the additional proposals which the Soviet side had presented today.

Karpov said that he also wanted to draw Nitze’s attention to the Soviet side’s statements about the feasibility of, and the need for, halting nuclear arms tests by way of the first of those measures which could be considered and agreed upon at the upcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers. At the present negotiating round, consultations or working meetings—he did not think it was important what he called these discussions, as long as they were productive—the Soviet side was ready to prepare results of the kind which could be recommended for use by the Foreign Ministers on September 19, 1986. Moreover, the Soviet side was ready to discuss in specific terms how to prepare that kind of recommendation to our Foreign Ministers. Therefore, Karpov suggested that we view everything discussed today from that standpoint, and that we take a look at what could be considered by the Foreign Ministers, i.e., that, where possible, we provide recommendations on solutions to questions.

Karpov, turning to the question of the ABM Treaty, said that perhaps we would be able to recommend to our Foreign Ministers not to avail ourselves of the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a minimum of 15 years. In this connection, we were not talking about any change to the Treaty. Rather, we had in mind an additional agreement not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty with the understanding that this period of time would be used for carrying out major reductions in strategic nuclear arms in such a way that the two sides would have the necessary guarantee of stability in the strategic situation.

Nitze wished to say a few words with respect to Karpov’s overall proposition, after which he would turn to Karpov’s specific question. He thought he might also ask Ambassador Glitman to deal with the same area from the standpoint of the INF negotiations and Ambassador Lehman from the standpoint of the START negotiations. With respect to Karpov’s overall introductory sentence, Nitze welcomed the Soviet side’s objection to a selective approach to arms limitation as opposed to what Karpov had termed real reductions and guarantees of no arms race in space. We believe that this was inherent to the approaches of both sides and coincided with the agreement between Secretary Shultz and Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki. Nitze believed that we should deal with our subject in this way. It was our firm position that reductions should be real and that they should expand over time. The U.S. side was prepared to consider interim reductions, but interim reductions should constitute an interim step toward deep reductions. The U.S. position was geared toward that very concept, namely, deep reductions, leading eventually to a situation in which all nuclear arms could be eliminated.

Nitze went on to say that the U.S. side would regret it very much if we were to concentrate on extraneous “practical measures” which failed to take into account the long-term objective. To repeat, the U.S. was not opposed to interim measures, but such measures had to be directed toward the long-term objective. In particular, Nitze would note that the President’s letter had set forth our side’s views on what the Soviet side called an arms race in space. The President’s letter suggested a way in which we could move forward together toward a world in which ballistic missiles could be eliminated and in which there would be no need for substantial defenses in space. Defenses in general would be geared to preventing others from upsetting the regime we had established, that is, a regime in which we would be moving toward a world without nuclear weapons. Nitze suggested that we discuss the question of nuclear testing raised by the Soviet side later and that we first continue with questions related to the NST negotiations per se. Specifically, Nitze wanted to turn to Karpov’s direct question concerning the ABM Treaty and the Soviet side’s suggested provision on not exercising the right of withdrawal from that Treaty while concentrating on deep reductions of strategic arms. Referring to a prepared text, Nitze said:

“When I addressed this subject at our Moscow meeting, I initially indicated that the President’s letter provided, in effect, that the U.S. would set aside its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five or more years. Subsequently, to avoid misunderstanding, I read the relevant sentences from the actual letter. It refers to a time when, if a number of events have earlier taken place, each side would be free to deploy advanced defenses.

“Those events are: First, passage of the year 1991; second, that one of the parties has decided that advanced defenses are feasible and that it wishes to proceed toward deployment; third, that that party has offered a plan for sharing the benefits of this system and eliminating the offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides. If there were no agreement by the two sides after two years of negotiation on such a plan, either side would be free to deploy unilaterally after giving six months’ notice.

“Thus, the President’s letter does not contemplate any change or restriction in Article XV of the Treaty. It contemplates an additional treaty negotiated now which would look forward, after 1991, to a negotiation looking toward the elimination of all ballistic nuclear missiles and a transition to the introduction of advanced defenses.”

Nitze then asked Ambassador Glitman to discuss INF.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XII, INF, 1984–1987.]

Nitze suggested that serious differences remained. In his introductory remarks, Karpov had referred to consensus between the sides on a temporary or interim agreement. Nitze thought that both sides favored an interim agreement, but the U.S. side did not wish a temporary agreement. The U.S. side was in favor of an agreement of indefinite duration until it was superseded by an agreement on more radical reductions. Next, there were serious differences with respect to SRINF. This was not a new issue, though Karpov had suggested that it introduced a complication. As he recalled, this had been a serious part of the INF negotiations since 1980. We needed a solution here even before an interim agreement was concluded. The question of mix also needed to be discussed. Nitze suggested that the Soviet side think about these matters overnight; we could return to them for a short period of time tomorrow and then go on to other questions which also needed to be discussed.

Karpov, noting Nitze’s departure at this point, expressed the hope that Nitze, as well as the other members on the U.S. side, would also give some thought to what had been presented today by the Soviet side, specifically, on what the Soviet side had said about the possibility of concluding an interim agreement with respect to medium-range missiles. Today the Soviet side had taken a number of steps forward and expected reciprocity on the U.S. side.

Ambassador Kampelman, who had taken Nitze’s seat, said that in a way he was in the process of demonstrating the difference between an interim agreement and a temporary agreement. He, Kampelman, was not an interim chairman but a temporary one. Nitze would be resuming the chairmanship. Kampelman suggested that we look more toward an interim agreement which would provide for greater stability. Of course, the U.S. side intended to review and ponder all that had transpired today though, of course, the day was not yet over. He thought that the sides had engaged in a fruitful exchange. With respect to the last point made by Karpov, he would suggest that the Soviet side consider whether its refusal to freeze shorter-range missiles might not lead the U.S. side to conclude that the USSR had plans for building up its systems beyond their current numbers, and if that might not cause us concern. He suggested that the Soviet side assess our proposal with this in mind.

Kampelman wanted to use this occasion to refer to Karpov’s earlier comments about the ABM Treaty and a treaty on space and defense issues. He did not want his silence to be misinterpreted. He thought that this subject could be discussed further tomorrow but he did wish to give a provisional response now. Kampelman wanted to say at the outset that the U.S. side was a bit inhibited in providing its response because it has not as yet received a response to the President’s letter. Thus, we did not have everything on the table to permit a full assessment.

Kampelman went on to say that he had noted with interest and approval Karpov’s statement about the importance of precise compliance with the ABM Treaty. He considered it important for the U.S. side to tell the Soviet side clearly today that this was an area of major concern to us, as explained many times in Geneva. We had reached the conclusion that with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar the Soviet Union was indeed acting contrary to the spirit of compliance. This was of major importance to us. Kampelman had not wanted to remain silent on this score and thus mislead Karpov, his delegation, or his authorities that this issue might be of lesser importance to the U.S. than it actually was.

Kampelman realized that Karpov had addressed this issue in a different context, that is, he had referred to a possible need for precise definitions of what was permitted under the ABM Treaty and what was not permitted, that is, what was prohibited. Kampelman would note that we did not believe that there was any ambiguity on this question as far as the Treaty was concerned. Of course, this subject needed to be discussed further in Geneva, but not here. It was Kampelman’s perception that the Soviet side was attempting to move toward amending the ABM Treaty so as to restrict what was currently permitted under the ABM Treaty. He was referring to the Soviet side’s proposal to limit research to laboratories. He had to say that he did not see the ABM Treaty imposing any such restriction on testing to laboratories: this was also borne out by the negotiating history of the treaty. Of course, the Soviet side had every right to try and amend the ABM Treaty in order to change provisions that had been agreed upon in 1972. In any event, Kampelman had wanted to make note of this area of disagreement between us.

Finally, Kampelman continued, he wanted to share with his Soviet interlocutors his view that we would need to discuss in Geneva what the Soviet side called not exercising the right of withdrawal under Article XV of the ABM Treaty. Kampelman suggested that this issue could be resolved. Nevertheless, he had a concern because Article XV referred to extraordinary events related to the supreme interests of the countries. These are precise and troubling considerations which involve the countries’ actions to defend themselves. Kampelman did not believe that Soviet or U.S. interests would be served if our hands were tied should such circumstances occur. Of course, he was thinking of circumstances other than the U.S. SDI. We needed to find words which would provide assurance to both sides that we would not be significantly interfering with each other’s sovereign rights of the two countries.

Kampelman, referring to the reception at his house, mentioned the late hour and said that he did not wish to irritate his wife unduly. He suggested that the meeting be ended now, recognizing that there would be ample opportunity to continue the discussions tomorrow. We had not yet heard from Ambassador Lehman, and he thought that tomorrow we might start the discussion with Lehman’s remarks. If necessary, there would be no problem in continuing the discussions tomorrow afternoon. This might very well be necessary in light of what Kampelman considered to be a fruitful exchange today. Upon Nitze’s return, Kampelman yielded the chair and pointed out that this only confirmed that he had been a temporary chairman rather than an interim one.

Karpov noted that since we were approaching the end of the present meeting he was happy to agree with Kampelman’s suggestion about continuing the discussion tomorrow. Moreover, he wanted to mention one question by way of homework, a question that should be given further thought. Karpov noted that Kampelman had touched on the question of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Karpov remarked that the Soviet side, for its part, had repeatedly raised the issue of the construction of a radar in Thule, Greenland as well U.S. plans to construct a radar in Fylingsdale, in Great Britain. These two radars were radars of the kind whose construction was prohibited under the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Thus, the Soviet side would suggest that the U.S. give serious thought to halting construction in Thule and not commencing it in Fylingsdale. As for the Krasnoyarsk radar, it had nothing to do with the obligations assumed under the ABM Treaty.

By the same token, Karpov continued, bearing in mind the repeatedly stated U.S. concern on this score, if the U.S. was prepared to halt construction at Thule and not begin construction in Fylingsdale, the Soviet side would also be prepared to halt construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviet side would suggest that the U.S. side also consider an alternative variant: since the United States believes that the Krasnoyarsk radar was contrary to the ABM Treaty while the Soviet Union believed that the Thule radar was contrary to the ABM Treaty, the two sides might agree to leave these radars alone, but not to build other such radars in these areas, with the understanding that construction would not begin at Fylingsdale. Karpov suggested that the U.S. side ponder this matter and we could continue discussing it tomorrow. He recognized that he had not touched on what Kampelman had said, but he thought that this discussion could be continued tomorrow.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, September 1986. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Drafted on September 6 by Arensburger.