Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

153. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 6, 1986, 4:05–6:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Soviet NST Experts

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Max Kampelman
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny
  • Ambassador Maynard Glitman
  • Ambassador Ronald Lehman
  • Assistant Secretary R. Perle
  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • Mr. M. Mobbs
  • Mr. Norman Clyne
  • Mr. Bruce Burton
  • Mr. D. Arensburger (Interpreter)

• Soviet

  • Ambassador Y. Dubinin
  • Ambassador V. Karpov
  • Ambassador A. Obukhov
  • Col. Gen. N. Chervov
  • Lt. Gen. N. Detinov
  • Mr. O. Sokolov
  • Mr. S. Chuvakhin
  • Mr. V. Kuznetsov
  • Mr. Ye. Zolotov (Int.)

Ambassador Nitze expressed the view that the principal item on today’s agenda should concern an exchange of reports which we intended to submit to our superiors regarding what had transpired at these experts’ talks. On the U.S. side we had just completed a draft of such a report containing individual talking points which had only now been sent to the typewriter and which we expected to receive back in a few minutes. At that time Nitze was prepared to go over that report and he would welcome the Soviet side’s comments thereon. However, in view of the fact that it would take a little time before we had received that report from the typewriter he wondered how Karpov thought we might spend the intervening time most productively.

Karpov responded that, frankly, the Soviet side had thought that the most productive way to spend the time after 4:00 PM today would be to summarize the results of the discussions held thus far. Toward that goal the Soviet side had expected to hear the U.S. side’s responses to those comments and questions to which it had yet to provide positive responses. In this connection Karpov would recall that the U.S. side still owed the Soviet side a response to the question the latter had posed in connection with the possibility of strengthening the ABM Treaty regime and of using this as a basis for resolving the question pertaining to strategic offensive arms. Noting what had been said by the Soviet side today, and what had been proposed by it yesterday, Karpov said that he again wanted to ask the U.S. side to consider in concrete terms the relationship between the issues of strategic arms and a stable ABM Treaty regime.

Karpov went on to say that naturally the Soviet side would prefer to exclude all possibilities for an arms race in space and to achieve this goal, reach an agreement with the United States on a complete ban on space-strike arms. However, taking into account that the U.S. side was not prepared for such a radical solution, and desiring to seek out possibilities for at least a partial solution to the issue of space, the Soviet side was prepared to pursue partial solutions to outstanding issues. Strengthening the ABM Treaty regime was only one available option; there could be other options. The Soviet side had proposed that the sides agree to ban offensive arms in space. This proposal remained on the table and pertained to the “space-to-earth” class of weapons, i.e., those which could be employed to strike targets in the earth’s atmosphere and on the surface of the earth from space.

Karpov went on to say that the President’s letter mentioned here by the U.S. side referred to the possibility of discussing a problem which, though not worded very clearly, appeared to be related to the Soviet side’s approach to some sort of guarantees against the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in space. Perhaps there were some common elements here that could be utilized by the two sides in order to find a joint solution. Unfortunately, the Soviet side had not heard any comments from the U.S. side on the subject.

Karpov went on to say that there was also another subject, namely, a ban on ASATs. The relevant Soviet proposal on this score has been transmitted to the U.S. side. Regrettably, on this question, too, the U.S. side has not voiced any positive judgment at these consultations. Perhaps the Soviet side would yet have an opportunity to hear the U.S. side say something positive on such a specific issue as that of strenghtening the ABM Treaty regime. Thereby the U.S. side would be able to make its contribution to limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms. Speaking of strategic offensive arms the Soviet side had submitted a proposal which should make it easier to make progress toward a mutually acceptable solution. Taking into account the U.S. side’s objections and concerns, the Soviet side had proposed to look for a separate solution on long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. That is, the Soviet side had taken into account the U.S. side’s objection to including SLCMs within the aggregate level of strategic offensive arms to be limited or reduced.

Karpov went on to say that instead of a businesslike approach to the Soviet proposal on SLCMs, the U.S. side in effect was trying to convince the Soviet side that even though there was a great number of SLCMs and masses of SLCMs launchers, launchers which could be used for nuclear, conventional and every other kind of cruise missile, there was really no need to limit this system, that one should turn a blind eye to SLCMs and act as if they were non-existent and not part of the balance. Karpov said that in his view the Soviet proposal took into account the U.S. side’s desires. Nevertheless, today Karpov had heard something to the effect that the Soviet proposal was irrelevant and that it did not in the least meet the desires of the U.S. side. Efforts by Ambassador Lehman to present the U.S. position as coming closer to the Soviet position were totally unjustified in the Soviet side’s opinion. In effect, Lehman had merely repeated what the Soviet side representatives had heard before from him and his predecessor in Geneva. Thus the Soviet side was concerned that even on the question of strategic offensive arms—the question which as repeatedly said by the U.S. side was of particular interest to it—there also was no U.S. effort to seek mutually acceptable solutions.

Karpov, turning to medium-range missiles in Europe and in broader terms, said that at one time the U.S. side had claimed that the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe was a temporary undertaking and that if agreement could be reached on their prohibition or withdrawal, the U.S. would warmly welcome an opportunity to do so. Yet, when the Soviet side suggested the complete elimination of Soviet and U.S. missiles in Europe, it did not for all intents and purposes receive any sort of positive response. Instead, the Soviet side has been hearing talk about the desirability of discussing not a complete elimination of missiles in Europe but the establishment of some sort of levels above zero.

Considering the above, Karpov continued, the Soviet side had proposed a solution which would provide for the retention of a limited number of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Next, the Soviet side heard talk to the effect that a solution regarding Europe would not be complete without equal limits on U.S. and Soviet medium-range missile warheads globally. Even though the Soviet side did not agree with the motives advanced by the U.S. side in support of such an approach, desiring to achieve a mutually acceptable solution, it had found it possible to meet the U.S. half way and to propose equal levels on medium-range missile warheads in Europe along with overall equal medium-range missile warheads globally. That is, the U.S. would retain the right to have within the continental United States a number of missiles which in terms of their warheads would correspond to the number of warheads on Soviet missiles in the Asian USSR. However, instead of giving positive consideration to this Soviet proposal the U.S. side has taken a position which in essence amounts to seeking ever new complicating elements and to advancing additional elements of that sort instead of attempting to resolve the issue.

Thus, Karpov went on, in all three negotiating areas dealing with nuclear and space arms the U.S. side has failed to move forward in such a way as to permit preparation of mutually acceptable solutions which could be recommended for consideration at the upcoming meeting of our Foreign Ministers. Finally, with respect to what the Soviet side had said about nuclear testing, a matter which it considered to be of major importance, here, too, there was no positive response from the U.S. side. Thus, in his report about the results of his two days of talks in Washington, Karpov would only be able to say that he had presented the Soviet position to his U.S. interlocutors and that it was presently on the table. Karpov had been directly instructed by Minister Shevardnadze to seek constructive and fruitful discussions in the area of nuclear and space arms, including on the subject of nuclear testing, which could subsequently be taken up at Shevardnadze’s meeting with the Secretary. Unless something extraordinary were to happen during the remaining part of this discussion, Karpov would have to report that the Soviet side had not succeeded in carrying out its mission. This was not because the Soviet side had not applied every effort to achieve positive results.

Karpov added on a personal note that the U.S. side was making a major mistake if it believed that the issue of nuclear and space arms was separate from other major issues of international life and international policy. Among the latter, he was including preparation of a summit meeting. He suggested that if the participants of the present meeting had been able to make a contribution toward progress on the issues entrusted to us, that would of course have had a major impact on preparation for that event. Conversely, absence of progress at these consultations on the overall subject of nuclear and space arms, including nuclear testing, will have an impact on the prospects for a summit meeting. Karpov wanted to conclude his remarks on that note.

Nitze pointed out that Karpov had raised a number of serious issues. He thought that many of them merited a comment. Karpov’s first point had dealt with the issue of enhancing the ABM Treaty regime. As Karpov knew, the U.S. side was very much in favor of strengthening compliance with the ABM Treaty. There had been some discussions with regard to that regime but it was perfectly clear that the two sides had different views with respect to the meaning of the Treaty as it applied to such radars as the one in Krasnoyarsk or the radars in Thule and Fylingsdale. Our view was that the radars in Fylingsdale and Thule were grandfathered by the ABM Treaty. We thought that the work underway in Thule was perfectly legitimate under the ABM Treaty and that the same would be true if we were to commence work in Fylingsdale. We knew that the Krasnoyarsk radar was identical to other early warning radars but that it was not located on the periphery of the Soviet Union as required by the Treaty. Therefore, this was a clear violation. This matter had been discussed extensively but we have encountered difficulty in coming to a meeting of the minds on the meaning of the Treaty in this respect.

Nitze went on to say that when Karpov referred to enhancing the Treaty regime, he was addressing development and testing in the context of Article V and Agreed Statement D. That subject had been discussed extensively at NST and elsewhere. Again, the U.S. side was clear on what the Treaty said and on what was contained in the negotiating record. It was perfectly clear that the Soviet side had rejected Para. VI.3 of the U.S. draft which would have prohibited devices that were capable of substituting for ABM launchers, missiles and radars. The Soviet side would not accept such a prohibition on testing, developing and deploying devices that were capable of substituting for such components. Moreover, with respect to systems based on other physical principles at that time no joint understanding had been reached on such components because the Soviet Union would not agree to including components that could not be defined. Finally, the sides settled the matter in Agreed Statement D.

Nitze remarked that the typed text of the report he had referred to earlier had just been brought in to him and though he could continue commenting on Karpov’s remarks, it might be wiser to turn now to the report which he suggested might be a more constructive way of proceeding. Karpov replied that Nitze was entitled to do whatever he wished. Nitze remarked that he would read the report and subsequently might return to one or two of Karpov’s other points.

Nitze, noting that the text was entitled “Draft Report of Experts’ Discussions,” remarked that this constituted a draft of his report to the Secretary. Nitze next read the following text:

“The Experts Group on Nuclear and Space Arms met during the periods of 11–12 August and 5–6 September to explore the potential for U.S.-Soviet agreement in this area. As a result of these discussions, the following points emerged, ad referendum:

“1. With regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces:

“a. The sides agree to the goal of eliminating the entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles.

“b. As an interim step, the sides agree to limit the total number of warheads on LRINF missiles deployed in Europe to an equal level above zero. The Soviets have proposed a ceiling of 100. This is acceptable to the U.S., if the Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Asia are also reduced to 100 or less.

“c. The Soviet side has proposed that the U.S. LRINF missile deployments in Europe be restricted to GLCMs. The U.S. proposes that the mix between its GLCMs and Pershing IIs be a subject for further discussion.

“d. The sides agree that, in the context of the European limit, the USSR shall limit the number of warheads on its LRINF missiles deployed in Asia. The Soviet side proposes that the U.S. be entitled to an equal number of warheads on LRINF missiles deployed in the U.S. This is agreeable to the U.S. if the Soviet levels in Europe and Asia are acceptable to it.

“e. As a result of the limits stated in paragraphs b. and d. above, the sides would be limited to an equal number of warheads on LRINF missiles on a global basis.

“f. The sides agree on the need for constraints on SRINF missiles. The U.S. insists this issue be solved concurrently with the establishment of ceilings on LRINF missiles.

“g. The U.S. believes that such an interim agreement should remain in effect until superseded by a later agreement providing for further reductions.”

Nitze suggested that it was appropriate for him to interrupt his reading at this point to see whether Karpov might want to say something with respect to the INF issue. The U.S. side had tried to capture the precise positions of both sides and this text reflected our understanding of where there was a meeting of the minds and where additional work was required. He wondered whether, in Karpov’s view, we had recorded the facts correctly.

Karpov responded that he hesitated to edit the U.S. report to the U.S. Secretary. He would only say that the Soviet side had devoted two days to presenting its proposal and its position with respect to medium-range missiles in Europe which opened avenues for resolution of this issue. In Karpov’s view the Soviet proposal was clear enough. In the course of these two days the Soviet side had answered numerous questions and had made every attempt to clarify its proposal. Accordingly, there was hardly any need to reopen the discussion on this subject now.

Nitze noted that he certainly did not want to report to the Secretary the existence of agreement where there was no agreement and thought that important points of differences should be presented in the report. But if Karpov preferred not to make any comments Nitze would have no objections.

Karpov responded that if he were to prepare a report to the Secretary he would write it differently. He would set forth how this issue was viewed by the Soviet side, how it had been discussed, and the direction in which, in his view, work should continue. But since Nitze was avoiding these elements, what would be the point of Karpov’s arguing with Nitze about Nitze’s report to his Secretary?

General Chervov wondered out loud what need there was in discussing a paper that was to be presented to the Secretary. He thought that there was no need for this.

Nitze agreed that there was no need for such a discussion but it would be helpful if we could have a common understanding regarding the accuracy of that report.

Chervov responded that for all intents and purposes Karpov had already summarized what he, Karpov, would be reporting to the Soviet Foreign Minister. Nitze had a different report for the Secretary. In fact, these two reports were completely contradictory.

Nitze pointed out that clearly the report he had read was only a draft, moreover, he had only read the part dealing with LRINF missiles. He had thought that it would be a constructive approach to try and determine the evolution of areas of agreement, items on which additional work was required as well as those on which there were differences. At this point Nitze continued reading his report:

“2. With regard to strategic nuclear forces:

“a. The sides have agreed to the early implementation of the principle of a 50% reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of their existing strategic arsenals.

“b. As an immediate first step toward this objective, both sides have agreed to a ceiling on the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers at a level of 1600. The U.S. reaffirmed that it was prepared to accept a sublimit of 350 on heavy bombers.

“c. The U.S. proposed to reduce the aggregate number of RVs and ALCMs on the delivery systems listed in paragraph b. above to an equal ceiling. The Soviet side has not agreed that gravity bombs and SRAMs carried by heavy bombers should be excluded from this ceiling. The U.S. noted that these weapons would be limited as a consequence of the sublimit on heavy bombers specified in paragraph b. above.

“d. Both sides agree to a sublimit on the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at an equal level.

“e. Within this sublimit, both sides agree to limit the number of warheads on ICBMs to an equal level.

“f. Both sides agree that these reductions, and others to be agreed, shall result in significant reductions in ballistic missile throwweight. The U.S. believes that throwweight reductions should be codified.

“g. The sides agree that agreed reductions will be completed within five to six years.

“g. The Soviet side proposed to limit SLCMs separately outside central Treaty limits. The U.S. believes that limits on SLCMs entail difficulties and has invited the Soviet side to address these problems.

“3. The sides agree, upon concluding agreements on relevant systems, to continue to pursue negotiations for further reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.”

Nitze suggested that we might now return to some other points made previously by Karpov. Perhaps Colonel Linhard could at this point deal with the question of weapons of mass destruction in space.

Chervov interrupted to say that the U.S. report had completely failed to mention the most important problem of “star wars.” What was to be done with SDI and with space-strike arms? Unless these issues were dealt with everything written down in the U.S. report would be impossible in reality and would be non-existent. He wondered whether this was a deliberate omission or whether the U.S. side had some particular designs or plans.

Nitze remarked that the way he had understood it the Soviet side had not intended to comment on our report. He said next that there had been much discussion of the ABM Treaty and some discussion of the President’s letter² which basically presented the U.S. position on how to deal with this issue. The President had not received a response to his letter and we had been told not to expect a reply before the meeting of our Foreign Ministers. Therefore, it was difficult to summarize the position on this score. The U.S. position, Nitze repeated, was set forth in the President’s letter and had been discussed by us. Assistant Secretary Perle had discussed certain aspects extensively in Moscow while other aspects had been discussed here today and yesterday.

The next point, Nitze believed, involved an assessment by our side of the discussions related to the question raised by Karpov when he had said that the President’s letter referred to a discussion of additional guarantees against deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space. He asked Linhard to make a few additional remarks in connection with Karpov’s question.

Linhard said that Karpov in his remarks had referred to the President’s letter. A section of that letter dealt with the President’s view that the General Secretary continued to be concerned that U.S. research into advanced defenses would lead to deployment in space of weapons of mass destruction on earth. This was not our intention. The President did not believe that our research had to lead in that direction. It was also noted in the President’s letter and repeated by Linhard when he was delivering the authentic copy of the letter to Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh, that both sides were already party to agreements in this area. Contrary to the concerns expressed by the General Secretary, U.S. research on advanced defenses was focusing along the lines of providing a direct defense against existing weapons which transmitted through space and were specifically designed to cause mass destruction. Thus there should be no concern here but the President had said that if there was such a concern we were prepared to discuss additional assurances, beyond those which existed today, regarding the prohibition on the deployment in space of weapons of mass destruction on earth. He thought that this was a fairly clear statement that we understood the Soviet concern and were offering to deal with it.

Karpov responded that the Soviet side had been suggesting something different while the U.S. side was switching concepts. Instead of referring to offensive arms, that is the space-to-earth class of arms, the U.S. side was referring to non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction. But the very idea of some sort of additional guarantees on the non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space was not understandable. Linhard had hardly any grounds to advance such a thesis. After all, we had a relevant international treaty which prohibited the introduction of weapons of mass destruction in space and placing them in orbit around the moon and celestial bodies. Both the U.S. and the USSR were party to that international treaty which was in force. It went without saying that the provisions of that treaty must be complied with and, to Karpov’s knowledge, so far it had been complied with. Thus, what sort of additional proposals was the U.S. making, or did it envisage something entirely different from what was contained in the 1966 treaty.³ Linhard noted that as he had explained earlier the President had tried to deal in his letter with the concerns of the General Secretary. If, in fact, the General Secretary did not have any concerns in this area—and Linhard confirmed the existence of the relevant treaty which had also been mentioned in the President’s letter—then he would be happy to tell the President that there was no such concern in the USSR. Perhaps we had misinterpreted the existence of concern. As for additional guarantees, as mentioned by the President in his letter, we were cognizant of the existing treaty in this area and that we are surprised at what we perceive to be the General Secretary’s concern but we are prepared to discuss the matter further. If there were no such concerns, then there was no problem. In that event, Linhard would be happy to tell the President that there was no such concern.

Karpov responded that there was a limit to how naively one could act. But Linhard had really gone too far. Karpov could not believe that Linhard, a member of the National Security Staff at the White House, was ignorant of the history of the subject under discussion. Linhard would know that the President had said that he was not pursuing plans of putting offensive arms in space and that the U.S. was prepared to discuss this subject with the USSR. This was the issue raised in the President’s letter to the General Secretary a year ago.⁴ In response, the General Secretary had written to the President that he agreed to discuss this problem with a view to exploring ways of ensuring a ban on offensive arms in space,⁵ that is, on weapons of the space-to-earth class. Somewhat later the President came up with a new version; he began to refer to weapons of mass destruction. To be specific, the President had first mentioned this to the departing former Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.⁶ Subsequently this new formulation was incorporated in the President’s July 25 letter. All this had occurred not because of some Soviet expression of concern but because there had occurred a shift in concepts. This was not the idea that had been originally conveyed to the Soviet Union. Karpov remarked that he did not know who was responsible for this change; Linhard could determine this for himself. The fact remained, however, that in the July 25 letter the wording referred to possible additional guarantees for the non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space. That was the wording used by the President in his letter. Thus, the Soviet side would seem to have legitimate grounds to inquire what meaning the U.S. side was attaching to this proposal. Or was one to assume that the President did not know what he was signing but that would be highly surprising.

Linhard suggested that perhaps the most constructive response on his part would be simply to note that he did not care to comment on the evolution of the issue but that he had tried to reply to Karpov’s question in connection with the President’s letter. If the Soviet Union had no concern in this specific area, he, Linhard, would be happy to report that to the President. On the other hand, if the Soviet side had a concern regarding possible offensive characteristics of our research or regarding other aspects of that research, we are prepared to discuss this in Geneva as well as in Moscow; we were not ignoring these problems. We had tried to provide straightforward answers. But we would be happy to put the matter to rest if there were no concerns. Conversely, if there was a concern, we were prepared to discuss it further, specifically to a view of additional guarantees. If the Soviet side wished to pursue additional aspects of this matter, Ambassador Kampelman and the U.S. Delegation would be happy to do so.

Karpov said that he had drawn the conclusion that the wording in the President’s July 25 letter referring to his offer to discuss with the Soviet Union additional guarantees on the non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space was meaningless, or else Linhard was thoroughly concealing its meaning.

Linhard wanted to say that if there was no concern in this area, he would certainly be happy to report this to the President.

Karpov interjected that he had heard Linhard say this before but he had not heard anything concrete. Linhard should say what he was referring to unless he was unable to explain what he was saying.

Linhard suggested that he said at least three times already what the President had meant. But if there was some concern in this area, he would be glad to report to the President that there was no concern in this area.

Perle added that since he was expected to know everything there was to know about U.S. plans for placing weapons of mass destruction in space, he could say that the U.S. had no such plans. We have not even studied this subject. When we hear the Soviet side’s concern we will be pleased to respond. If these discussions are to be carried any further it would be helpful if the Soviet side were to identify the systems it had in mind. We did not know of any.

Ambassador Kampelman suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union was engaged in this kind of activity and that the results of its research might have suggested concerns in the event that we were to pursue a similar path. In that event it would be helpful to us if the Soviet side were to discuss and explain what had generated its original concern, if it were to tell us what it had achieved in this respect. Perhaps this would help us to discuss this issue.

Karpov remarked that Perle was clearly smarter than Linhard but had sidestepped the issue. Chervov added that Kampelman on the other hand confused the issue. Karpov agreed with Chervov, noting that after what he, Karpov, had said about the history of the issue, Kampelman had evaded the entire subject.

Nitze suggested that it might be appropriate to contemplate adjourning.

Karpov agreed because he did not think that further discussion of weapons of mass destruction in space would lead toward any sort of mutual understanding. Still, he wanted to express his gratitude for several minutes of fun.

Nitze thanked the Soviet participants for participating in these discussions and expressed the view that more progress had been achieved than the Soviet report to Shevardnadze would indicate. Be this as it may, what progress was made, was made, and what difficulties were encountered, were encountered. He was looking forward to new opportunities for making further progress.

Perle remarked that if Karpov, upon his return to Moscow, were to find it possible to submit a more optimistic report than the one he had cited today, this would not be held against him.

Karpov thanked Perle for his remark which he valued. But he would be able to follow up on Perle’s suggestion only if upon arrival in Moscow he were to find a cable from Perle or Nitze indicating genuine movement in the U.S. position on the questions discussed these two days. He would be grateful for such a cable.

Ambassador Lehman wanted to remind Karpov that much of what he knew about negotiating had been learned by observing Karpov. He wanted the record to show that yesterday the Soviet side had offered two new ideas in the START area while today Lehman had offered seven; thus, the Soviet side owed us five.

Karpov countered that the Soviet ideas could be clearly seen with naked eye whereas the U.S. ideas could not be observed through the most high-powered microscope.

Ambassador Rowny wanted to conclude on a simple and serious note. He suggested that on a number of points important progress had been made with respect to reducing strategic arms. Both Ministers have told us to pursue our work in this direction and Rowny thought that there had been real forward movement. He saw some positive aspects on which we should build.

Karpov remarked that it was always useful to be serious, especially in the positive terms expressed by Rowny. Of course, he, Karpov, too, was in favor of developing positive trends and of studying the positive elements in the sides’ positions. Still, in his view, the two sides had not carried out the principal task of these discussions, that is, to provide quality material for the upcoming Ministerial meeting. This, despite the fact that the Soviet side had done everything in its power.

Kampelman remarked that given the conclusions he had drawn, his most constructive comment might be not to make a comment.

Nitze said in conclusion that it would be appropriate, he thought, if the participants of this meeting were to maintain a policy of no contact with the press. Karpov said that he expected to maintain contact with the press by reading what the press publishes but he agreed that the substance of these discussions should not be disclosed.

Nitze thanked the Soviet participants for coming to Washington and said we were looking forward to subsequent meetings, in particular the meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze as well as to progress of a different kind between the delegations in Geneva at the coming round of negotiations. Nitze suggested that the Soviet side had moved on a number of points as had the U.S. side though it might not be necessary to count the number of these points which might be of a different order of magnitude. Still, some progress had been made even though both of us wish that the progress would have been more extensive.

Karpov said that he did not want his last words to express disappointment; and thus he preferred not to comment. He thanked Nitze for his hospitality and expressed regret that so little had been achieved in practice. Hopefully, more would be achieved as a result of his upcoming negotiations with Kampelman in Geneva.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, September 1986. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Drafted on September 7 by Arensburger.
2. See Document 138.
3. Reference is to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which was signed in Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967.
4. November 28, 1986. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 163.
5. December 5, 1985. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 166.
6. See footnote 3, Document 139.