Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

122. Letter From President Reagan to Romanian President Ceausescu¹

Washington, November 22, 1983

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of November 2.² I appreciate your continuing interest in U.S. efforts to reach an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement that would reduce and ultimately eliminate longer-range INF missiles. Subsequent to my last letter,³ I outlined at the United Nations General Assembly on September 26 three new INF initiatives designed to meet expressed Soviet concerns.⁴ Unfortunately, the Soviet Union rejected these proposals soon afterward. Chairman Andropov presented new INF proposals on October 26, and although there were some positive aspects, they failed to address adequately legitimate Western security concerns. The Soviet Union in the Geneva negotiations continues to demand compensation for British and French independent nuclear forces and to insist on the maintenance of their monopoly of LRINF missiles.

As I noted in my September 12 letter, the United States and its Allies seek to preserve and strengthen peace in Europe by maintaining cooperative relations among all states and by deterring aggression. Yet, during the two years that we have negotiated in good faith with the Soviet Union in Geneva, they have deployed about 100 additional SS–20 missiles.

The primary Soviet objective in the negotiations continues to be to prevent the deployment of any U.S. LRINF missiles and to maintain a monopoly of these weapons. Since we have not been able to achieve, despite our sincere efforts, concrete results in Geneva, there is no justification for postponing planned U.S. deployments. We, of course, remain willing to cancel the entire U.S. deployment in exchange for the dismantling of all Soviet LRINF missiles. This zero/zero result would be the ideal arms control outcome.

We read with interest your comments on British and French forces. However, as you know the United States and its Allies cannot accept Soviet demands that British and French forces be included in the INF negotiations. British and French forces are minimum national nuclear deterrents. Both Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand have emphasized the independent nature of these forces and have rejected any suggestion that they be included in the negotiations. The Soviet demand to be accorded the right to maintain nuclear forces as large as all other nations of the world combined is not an acceptable basis for arms control and can never lead to agreement between the United States and Soviet Union. The British, and French governments have, however, indicated their willingness to reexamine their attitude toward arms control limitations on their nuclear forces under conditions of substantially reduced U.S. and Soviet forces.

I sincerely share your concern regarding the spread of nuclear arms. We are determined to maintain a credible deterrent at the lowest possible level of nuclear forces. In this regard, the NATO Defense Ministers recently announced in Canada that we will withdraw from the NATO nuclear stockpile an additional 1,400 warheads, beyond the 1,000 warheads unilaterally withdrawn from the NATO stockpile in 1980. Moreover, the planned deployment of new U.S. LRINF missiles to Europe will not mean an increase in warhead numbers since one warhead will be withdrawn for every new missile deployed. Conversely, the Soviet Union has indicated no inclination to match NATO’s reductions. In fact, the Soviet Union continues to deploy nuclear armed SS–20 missiles and has begun to deploy additional nuclear capable short-range missiles to Eastern Europe.

Let me reiterate that I will continue rigorously to pursue every reasonable means to reduce and limit nuclear weapons, including effective implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As you rightly point out, these are issues of the greatest importance for the entire world. I deeply regret that the Soviet Union is threatening to disrupt the INF negotiations in Geneva. The United States is prepared to continue these talks as long as necessary to obtain a mutually acceptable agreement.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Romania—Correspondence (5). No classification marking.
2. See Document 121.
3. See Document 119.
4. In his address to the UNGA in New York on September 26, Reagan proposed several new arms control initiatives. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1983, Book II, pp. 1350–1354). His speech is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. Document 169.