119. Letter From President Reagan to Romanian President Ceausescu1
Thank you for your letter of August 19.2 I want to assure you that the American people share the concerns of the Romanian people for effective arms control and increased security in Europe. I wish to stress my personal commitment to the deepest possible reductions in nuclear and conventional forces.
The United States and its Allies seek to preserve and strengthen peace in Europe by deterring aggression and by preserving cooperative relations among all states. For more than 30 years, NATO has made clear in word and deed that its purposes are purely defensive and that it will maintain only those defensive forces necessary to fulfill its strategy of deterrence. At the same time, the United States and its Allies have vigorously sought to improve stability and security in Europe through equitable and verifiable agreements to limit and reduce military forces.
I thus would like to address the suggestions in your letter for a postponement of the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear [Page 324] (INF) missiles in Europe, a freeze on military spending, and establishment of nuclear free zones in Europe.
The U.S. and its NATO Allies decided in 1979 that it was necessary to address a growing imbalance of military forces in Europe caused by a massive and unwarranted Soviet build-up in longer-range INF missiles aimed at NATO. While NATO made clear its determination to deploy deterrent systems of its own if necessary, the NATO Allies also offered to seek an arms control agreement that would eliminate or at least significantly reduce these systems to equal levels on a global basis. The negotiations began in late 1981.
The United States, in consultation with its Allies, has made far-reaching offers in these negotiations; we have proposed the total elimination of the entire category of U.S. and Soviet land-based longer-range intermediate-range nuclear missiles. As a step toward this goal, the United States has proposed an interim agreement that would achieve equal, substantially reduced levels of such systems on a global basis. The United States and its Allies also have stated repeatedly their willingness to consider any serious alternative proposals that meet the security concerns which prompted their 1979 NATO decision. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has yet to accept either of the U.S. proposals or to advance one of their own that takes into account NATO’s security.
It is my most fervent wish that the Geneva INF negotiations make rapid progress toward an equitable and verifiable agreement that would, at a minimum, substantially reduce nuclear forces in Europe. I am convinced that a delay in NATO deployments would eliminate any possibility of such progress. It would remove any incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously. Moreover, it would perpetuate the tension arising from the threatening Soviet monopoly in longer-range intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
A freeze on military spending, by itself, would also perpetuate, and perhaps aggravate, military imbalances that undermine collective deterrence. As you know, the United States has been working with other states in the United Nations to develop standard guidelines for comparing and reporting military expenditures. We will continue this effort and urge other states which have not done so to join us.
The United States has long recognized that nuclear weapons free zones which take account of existing security situations and defensive arrangements may enhance security in certain regions of the world. However, the United States and its Allies have long expressed their concerns that a nuclear weapons free zone in all or part of Europe would not meet these criteria. A nuclear weapons free zone there would not take account of the existing security situation, since it would not constrain the threat to such zones from Soviet nuclear weapons adjacent [Page 325] to it. Indeed, such zones could well undermine rather than enhance security. I believe that a more practical and effective goal is substantial and verifiable reductions in the strategic and theater nuclear arsenals of both sides.
Despite the differences in our views on some European security issues, I appreciate your interest and concern about this problem which is of vital interest to all of us. I value the private exchanges of views on this and many other issues which we maintain with you and other members of your government. I believe that the continuation of such diplomatic dialogue is in the interest of both of our countries and peoples. Vice President Bush will be prepared to discuss European security and other issues of mutual interest with you during his visit to Bucharest on September 18–19.3
Sincerely,
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, Romania: President Ceausescu (8106944) (2). No classification marking. Bush presented the letter during his meeting with Ceausescu. See Document 120.↩
- See Document 118.↩
- See Document 120.↩