Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

305. Paper Prepared for President Reagan¹

Reykjavik, undated

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Summary

A negotiating team led by Paul Nitze met with a Soviet team headed by Marshal Akhromeyev for about 10½ hours last night to develop draft guidance to foreign ministers on START, INF, Defense and Space, and nuclear testing, with the following results.

The groups made considerable progress on START, but the Soviets made this contingent on their position on Defense and Space which would involve additional restrictions on SDI. The Soviets stuck to their unforthcoming position on INF, and refused to accept U.S.-proposed language aimed at bridging the differences between the two sides on characterization of negotiations on nuclear testing.²

START

The group agreed that there would be an overall limit of approximately 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs and Heavy Bombers; and, an overall limit of no more than 6,000 nuclear weapons consisting of ballistic missile warheads, ALCMs, and heavy bombers armed with bombs and SRAMs, with such heavy bombers to count as a single reentry vehicle. The Soviets repeatedly refused to consider sublimits on these systems, saying each side should be free to allocate its 6,000 nuclear weapons as it saw fit, although they did not preclude further discussion of sublimits at Geneva. The Soviets agreed that reductions would involve significant cuts in Soviet heavy missiles.

Both sides agreed that they will seek mutually acceptable limits on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), with our side making clear that the only feasible option we had yet identified was a declaration by each side of its planned nuclear SLCM deployments. The groups developed agreed language (attached) for consideration by you and Gorbachev today.³

The Soviets reiterated, however, that their agreement to such strategic reductions remains linked to an agreement in Defense and Space calling for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 10 years and additional restrictions on research.

INF

The Soviets did not budge from the formula that Gorbachev gave you yesterday—agreement on zero/zero in Europe, with no cuts in Asia until a subsequent negotiation. After some discussion, they suggest a freeze on SRINF at the current levels for each side (which codify an advantage to them of approximately 120 to 0). The U.S. team was just as adamant that there would be no agreement on systems in Europe without a simultaneous agreement substantially reducing SS–20s in Asia.

Nitze said we could agree to zero in Europe and zero in Asia—but if the Soviets wanted to retain SS–20s in Asia, we would not agree to zero for the U.S. in Europe.

We pressed them on duration of an agreement and on SRINF, saying we saw no reason why the two sides could not agree on these points while acknowledging differences over the question of SS–20s in Asia. Akhromeyev would not agree even on the question of duration of an agreement.

Defense and Space

The Soviets refused to consider any formulation other than their own—agreement to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty [for] at least 10 years, and agreement to a ban on all but laboratory research on space-based ABM systems. The U.S. team suggested that foreign ministers be instructed to examine three questions:

—How can activities with respect to the investigation of advanced strategic defenses be synchronized with the shared goal of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles?

—Under what conditions and in what general timeframe could both sides consider a transition to an increased reliance on advance strategic defenses?

—Until those conditions are met, what common understanding about ABM Treaty restrictions on activity associated with advanced strategic defenses can be reached?

In response, Akhromeyev reiterated the proposal which Gorbachev outlined earlier to you, and insisted that without such an agreement, the 50 percent reduction proposal in START could not be consummated.

Nuclear Testing

There is essentially no difference between the U.S. and Soviet position except that the Soviets wish to portray the negotiations, which we both agree should take place immediately, as being for the purpose of prohibiting all nuclear testing. We introduced language (below) which laid out our step-by-step approach and made clear that the ultimate aim was elimination of nuclear testing in parallel with elimination of nuclear weapons. Even when we pointed out to them the extent to which this language accommodated their agenda, they insisted on their alternative formulation, which is unacceptable to us because it indicates no linkage between the retention of nuclear weapons and the need to test them.

The U.S.-proposed language was as follows:

“The U.S. and Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.”

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, President-Gorbachev Meeting Reykjavik—October 1985 (5/5). Secret. There is no drafting information. A memorandum of conversation of this overnight meeting on arms control is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 159. Notes of this meeting by Soviet participant Georgy Korniyenko are in Savranskaya and Blanton, eds., The Last Superpower Summits, pp. 192–200.
2. Palazhchenko wrote in his memoir: “By the end of the day, Reagan and Gorbachev had decided to ask their experts to consider the issues in light of their discussions. Gorbachev went back to the Soviet ship George Ots, where he and his team stayed. He met with his delegation.” He continued: “Gorbachev asked me to read through my notes of his discussion with Reagan. I did so while everyone listened, and he commented from time to time on certain points. He then appointed Akhromeyev to head the Soviet group of experts that was to discuss the issues with the U.S. group, led by Paul Nitze, overnight. The next morning the experts reported that they had agreed on the general scheme of a fifty percent strategic arms reduction, which was more complicated than what Gorbachev had proposed but still fairly simple and nontechnical.” (Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, p. 56)
3. Not found.