Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 11–12, 1986, 8 p.m.–6:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. Side

  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Kampelman
  • Ambassador Rowny
  • ACDA Director Adelman
  • Assistant Secretary Perle
  • Colonel Linhard
  • General Moellering
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Gaffney
  • Dr. Timbie
  • Bruce Burton (notetaker)
  • Mr. Afanasenko (interpreter)

• Soviet Side

  • Marshal Akhromeyev
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Mr. Arbatov
  • Mr. Falin
  • M. Velikov
  • Mr. Groshev (interpreter)

Ambassador Nitze opened the discussion by expressing hope that this working group could solve specific problems. He suggested that the group consider issues in the following order: START, INF, Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), Nuclear Testing, and Defense & Space.

Marshal Akhromeyev replied that he would like to address START, INF, Defense and Space and Nuclear Testing, and NRRCs.

Nitze asked whether the Soviet side saw nuclear testing and Space and Defense as separate issues. Akhromeyev said Defense and Space and nuclear testing were separate, and could be discussed in that order.

Akhromeyev said that the General Secretary that afternoon had given the President a draft agreement, and that the working group could also discuss the content of this document. As a result of the proceedings, the group could have a document to report to the President and General Secretary.

Nitze said he hoped that would be the case, but there were a number of issues to resolve before then. He understood that the document the group prepared would be in the form of draft instructions to foreign ministers. To clear the way for this, it would be wise to be clear on each issue—so that each side understood the other’s proposals, the differences between the two, and how to solve them.

On START, Nitze continued, the two sides appear to agree that:

—there would be deep cuts in ballistic missile RVs;

—reductions on the order of 50% would apply, to be pursued by negotiators;

—within the 50% cuts, neither INF nor FBS would be included;

—the central ceiling on strategic weapons would be on ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicles (RVs);

—there would be limits on ALCMs, and separate limits on SLCMs apart from the central aggregate limit;

—since both sides’ forces have evolved differently, there must be trade-offs. The Soviets were willing to make “considerable” or “significant” reductions in ICBMs.

—there would be effective verification, and the Soviets were willing to negotiate such procedures concurrently with other elements of an agreement.

—There would be an aggregate limit of 1600 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

Akhromeyev responded that there were many areas of common ground, but we have to discuss differences. He agreed that the reduction of strategic offensive arms is the most important one, and the Soviets aimed to reduce them significantly, by 50%. It was possible to have a document.

He continued that the Soviets agree that they would not include FBS and medium-range missiles. This does not mean that the Soviets have given up taking FBS into account, but they would agree to put them aside for now. However, SLCMs must be limited; the two sides must seek a solution beyond the triad of forces—ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers—and the two sides must reach agreement on limitations on these systems.

Akhromeyev agreed that verification is one of the most important subjects and that there should be a single ceiling for ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. In other words, to deal with the triad as a single whole. He suggested the ceiling should be 1600. Gorbachev had suggested 50% reductions from present levels in each type of weapon—ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers—both in delivery vehicles and cruise missiles. What, he asked, did the U.S. side think of this?

Nitze said we would disagree. The President had made clear the vast difference between armaments on ballistic missiles and those on heavy bombers and cruise missiles. A single aggregate which included them as comparable would be inequitable, so the U.S. had difficulties with a single limit.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet side did not consider that some specific features of heavy bombers and ALCMs are less destructive than other systems. Soviet views remained the same, that is, that reductions should be carried out as a single whole.

Nitze answered that the U.S. agreed to limit ALCMs, but not gravity bombs and SRAMs. In an environment of unrestricted Soviet air defenses, we cannot agree to limit heavy bomber weapons.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets could agree to treat heavy bombers with ALCMs differently than heavy bombers with bombs and SRAMs, but there must be agreement to constrain both types. The approach can be different, but it must be specified.

Nitze answered that we can accept specific limits on heavy bombers—a kind of indirect cap on the number of weapons that heavy bombers can carry.

Akhromeyev asked whether we envisioned a sublimit on ALCM-carriers in the SNDV totals, or would heavy bombers be included in the aggregate?

Nitze replied that the ceiling of 1600 delivery vehicles would cover ICBMs, SLBMs and the total of heavy bombers. There would be a sublimit of 350 heavy bombers within the 1600 ceiling. The U.S. thus was proposing substantial reductions in the aggregate of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. There would be 50% reductions in RVs on ICBMs and SLBMs, and various sublimits on specific categories. The negotiators at Geneva could consider these sublimits.

Akhromeyev said there is a difficulty. The Soviets cannot agree to separate heavy bombers from ICBMs and SLBMs. The triad must be treated as a single whole, and all three legs of the triad must be included.

Nitze answered that the U.S. is including all three legs. But there is a difference between the legs. He understood that the General Secretary and President Reagan had reached an understanding that bombers would not be equated with, for instance, SS–18 RVs.

Akhromeyev said he did not think Gorbachev had agreed to this. The Soviets see the difference between heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles and those armed with bombs and SRAMs. But both are heavy bombers and must be included, although they might be counted differently.

Nitze said the U.S. agreed to include heavy bombers, but not to include gravity bombs and SRAMs.

Akhromeyev said he understood the U.S. position was that there would be 350 heavy bombers with ALCMs, which would be limited, but the rest would not be included.

Nitze replied that was incorrect. All heavy bombers would be included in the total. The U.S. has approximately 500 heavy bombers and would come down to 350. Some would have ALCMs, others gravity bombs and SRAMs, but all would be included.

Akhromeyev asked, all heavy bombers? Each side would get 350? Or could there be exchanges for other types or weapons? The USSR, he stated, was not going to build heavy bombers. Could they have an equalizing number of ICBMs or SLBMs?

Nitze said yes, the 350 is a sublimit within the 1600 level.

Akhromeyev asked if each side would have freedom to mix?

Nitze said he understood Akhromeyev’s question and agreed that they would have freedom to mix.

Akhromeyev then said that Nitze had not mentioned the amount of nuclear charges each side could have.

Nitze said there would be no direct limit on gravity bombs and SRAMs. There would be a limit on ALCMs; the U.S. had proposed to set this level at less than a half of planned U.S. deployments.

Akhromeyev said he understood the side with fewer bombers could have more ALCMs on heavy bombers. Each side would be allowed to set its own levels on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.

Nitze explained that, for example, if the U.S. had 350 heavy bombers and the Soviet side had 250, then the Soviet side could have 100 more ICBM RVs. (Note: This was an incorrect portrayal of the U.S. position, which Nitze later corrected, see page 7.)

Akhromeyev said that each side, then, would be able to define its own requirements within the overall limit.

Nitze answered that, for example, the Soviets could have 1500 ALCMs on 250 heavy bombers, and the U.S. could have 1500 ALCMs on 350 heavy bombers.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet Union would not have so many cruise missiles, so it could have more RVs on ICBMs?

Nitze said the Soviets have very large air defenses. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev recognized the historical differences in the evolution of each side’s forces. The working group’s job was to recognize and deal with those differences. So what the U.S. is proposing is very equitable. We would be going too far if we started talking about air defenses in detail. The reason we have deployed ALCMs is because of the need to keep our bombers outside of the range of Soviet air defenses.

Akhromeyev said that the operational capabilities of long-range cruise missiles are no less than those of ballistic missile RVs. The Soviet Union must deal with them.

Nitze said that is why the U.S. had agreed to limit ALCMs. He then asked how the Soviet Union planned to limit heavy missiles?

Akhromeyev said that Gorbachev had explained to the President that the Soviet Union would make “considerable” or “significant” reductions in heavy missiles.

Nitze asked, By what method? A reduction in aggregate throwweight? Reductions in numbers of missiles? A sublimit?

Akhromeyev repeated that there would be a significant reduction in heavy missiles. The number of RVs would be significantly reduced.

After some discussion among each delegation, Akhromeyev asked whether the two sides could begin drafting. Nitze then read the following text:

“a. The sides reaffirm their commitment to the early implementation of the principle of a 50% reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of their existing strategic arsenals. As an immediate first step toward this objective, the sides agree to interim reductions including the following.

“b. The sides shall reduce the aggregate number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 1600.

“c. Within this ceiling, the sides shall limit the number of deployed heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 350.

“d. The sides shall reduce the aggregate of the number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the number of long-range air-launched cruise missiles on deployed heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 6000.

“e. The sides shall limit the aggregate number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles to a level not to exceed 4500.

“f. The sides shall limit the number of warheads on ICBMs to a level not to exceed 3000.

“g. Within that level, the sides shall limit the total number of warheads on ICBMs, other than those silo-based light and medium ICBMs that carry 6 reentry vehicles each or less, to a level not to exceed 1500.

“h. The sides agree that Soviet ballistic missile throwweight will be reduced by 50% from the current level, establishing a new throwweight ceiling which will not be exceeded thereafter by either side.

“i. The sides shall agree to a reductions schedule such that the above reductions will be completed within five years.

“j. The sides shall agree that once the above provisions are agreed and their implementation begins, the sides will again enter negotiations within six months, the goal of such negotiations being further reductions toward ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.”

After reading the text, Nitze asked whether the two sides should move on to discuss INF.

Akhromeyev said he saw some new questions or items in Nitze’s presentation, which he would like Nitze to clarify. Specifically, what should the two sides do with heavy bombers armed with bombs and SRAMs? Are they to be included in the 1600 ceiling?

Nitze answered, “Yes, they are.”

Akhromeyev said, “Good.” He then asked, if a side has less than 350 heavy bombers, could they compensate with ICBMs?

Nitze answered that, regarding this question, he had misspoken earlier. Neither side could compensate with ICBMs.

Akhromeyev said he did not understand. Each side would get 4500 ICBM RVs only?

Nitze replied that there are separate aggregates. One is the number of SNDVs. Another is the number of RVs and ALCMs. Neither side could take away from one category and add to the other category in the latter aggregate.

Akhromeyev said, then we can’t agree. The Soviet side wished to agree on 6000, but each side would decide how to allocate its forces.

Akhromeyev and Nitze then agreed to record that there was disagreement on this point.

Nitze asked if there was some way to resolve this? If the 1500 limit on ALCMs were a sublimit in the 6000 aggregate, would that be acceptable?

Akhromeyev said that no sublimit on ALCMs was necessary. The two sides should just agree to 6000, with each side free to decide the allocation of its forces.

Nitze said he thought the Soviet side had agreed to a sublimit on ICBM RVs?

Akhromeyev said no. Each side should be free to allocate its forces. Gorbachev had suggested a good option—to reduce by 50% in ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers and ALCMs.

Nitze said he did not believe the President had accepted this.

Akhromeyev said Gorbachev had not so informed his delegation. The President certainly had not declined Gorbachev’s suggestion. This was another matter. Gorbachev had not said that the President would agree, but the President did not reject the idea out of hand.

Nitze said, “I wouldn’t agree.”

Akhromeyev said very well then, the Soviet side did not agree to set a limit on ALCMs or to set sublimits on ICBMs and SLBMs. There would be an overall limit of 6000 with complete freedom to mix. Heavy missiles would be reduced significantly; the number would be set in subsequent negotiations, but the two sides could record now that they would be reduced significantly.

Akhromeyev continued that the Soviet side had come to the working group meeting with clear instructions from Gorbachev that the Soviet position would be considered—that is, to reduce by 50% each type of weapon, including ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and heavy missiles. Everything else is contingent on that agreement. Akhromeyev would have to get the General Secretary’s approval to change this position.

Nitze said he was not prepared to say that the 6000 proposal was unacceptable. However, the U.S. would have grave difficulty with 50 percent reductions in each category.

Akhromeyev suggested that at this point, the two sides could try to formulate language for instructions to the Foreign Minister and Secretary of State, or they could go on to INF.

Nitze answered they should go on to INF.

Akhromeyev agreed, but then, excusing himself, said there was something else to discuss—how to deal with SLCMs.

Nitze said the U.S. was prepared to say we will consider separate limits on SLCMs outside the 6000 weapons aggregate.

Akhromeyev said that the two sides would record that a solution to SLCMs acceptable to both sides will be sought.

Nitze replied that was correct. The U.S. has very deep concerns about how to verify constraints on SLCMs. That would have to be considered.

Akhromeyev agreed that verification was not a simple matter, but we could not have 50% cuts in one category of strategic weapons and an unlimited increase in another. Both sides should show good will and solve this problem.

Nitze said the U.S. would do its best to find a solution.

Akhromeyev said the discussions could then move on to INF.

Nitze said that in the discussions this summer with Ambassador Karpov, two principles were discussed. If we could agree to a level in Europe, we could agree to a level outside of Europe, with deployments to be limited to the USSR and to the U.S. The longstanding U.S. position was to eliminate the entire class of LRINF missiles globally. Nitze understood, however, that a global limit of zero on LRINF missiles was not what the Soviets were suggesting.

Akhromeyev stated that we were past the stage of Karpov’s discussions. Gorbachev had made a proposal for 0/0 in Europe without taking into account British and French systems. The U.S. must understand what the Soviet Union has conceded for the sake of an agreement. There was a problem with shorter-range systems of less than 1000 km range, and the Soviet Union was willing to enter into negotiations on them. They were also willing to enter into negotiations on medium-range systems in Asia. Akhromeyev acknowledged that the President had not accepted the Soviet offer but he had said it was a far-reaching proposal.

Nitze said the U.S. would try to find a solution. As he understood it, it was no longer a part of the Soviet position that an agreement would take into account modernization of British and French systems. This was what Shevardnadze had said in Washington.²

Nitze continued that the U.S. position was that we were ready for 0/0 globally or for something less than 0/0 in Europe. Karpov had suggested 100 in Europe. The U.S. had said this was acceptable provided there were reductions in Asia. The U.S. had talked about proportional reductions in Asia, but we also had said that at a low level, we could accept equal levels in Europe and Asia. It was also a longstanding U.S. position that there must be concurrent constraints on SRINF.

The principal difficulty, Nitze continued, is what level in Asia is acceptable to the Soviet Union. At one time the Soviet Union had suggested a freeze, but that was not satisfactory. We understand there are 500 to 600 deployed SS-20 warheads in Asia. Zero/zero in Europe and 500–600 warheads in Asia would not be acceptable to the U.S. or its Allies. There are other issues, such as the Pershing II/GLCM mix, and duration of an agreement.

Akhromeyev said he was authorized to discuss the proposal advanced by General Secretary Gorbachev. What happened before belonged to the past. Gorbachev suggested eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe, without taking into account UK and French forces. The Soviet Union had thus made a great move forward, and the U.S. must respond positively. The Soviet Union had also agreed to undertake negotiations on shorter-range systems. The Soviets had made important moves to accommodate U.S. desires, and the U.S. should respond positively.

Nitze answered that the U.S. was not prepared to accept what the Soviets proposed—0/0 in Europe with no comparable limit in Asia. The U.S. is prepared, however, for what had been discussed in Washington—equal levels of 100 warheads in Europe and 100 warheads outside of Europe, an agreement of unlimited duration, and constraints on SRINF.

Akhromeyev said the two sides did have a different approach regarding medium-range missiles in Europe. The President and General Secretary could discuss this the next day.

Nitze suggested the two delegations could try to narrow differences. Perhaps they could start with the question of duration of an agreement. Could the Soviets agree that any agreement would last until superceded by an agreement for further reductions?

Akhromeyev said we have one sticking point on missiles in Asia. We could report this to leaders and let them solve it. So we have this sticking point, he added.

Nitze asked if we could agree on constraints on SRINF, namely, a freeze on SRINF at the current Soviet level, which would then be a ceiling on both sides. Thereafter, there would be negotiations on all INF systems other than medium-range systems.

Akhromeyev replied that if the two sides can agree on INF in Europe, the Soviets would agree to freeze shorter-range systems of less than 1000 km at the level that both sides now have, and then start immediately with new negotiations on further reductions.

Nitze said the main question, then, was what to do about systems in Asia.

Akhromeyev said all right, the leaders can try to solve this tomorrow.

Both sides then agreed to move on to discussion of issues regarding the ABM Treaty.

Akhromeyev said he wanted to repeat what the General Secretary had told the President. The Soviet Union was prepared, for the purposes of strengthening the ABM Treaty, to agree that the Soviet Union and the U.S. would, for a 10-year period, undertake not to use their right to withdraw from the Treaty, and to comply strictly with all its provisions. There would be a ban on testing of all anti-ballistic missile space elements except for research and testing in laboratories. This would not entail a ban on testing of fixed land-based components which are allowed by the Treaty. After the 10-year period, there would be a five-year period of negotiations to find further mutually acceptable solutions. General Secretary Gorbachev also had asked the U.S. to exert further efforts for a prohibition on anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. Akhromeyev said this was the proposal submitted to the President, and the Soviet delegation was instructed to discuss it with the U.S. delegation.

Nitze said he wanted to ask some questions of clarification. First, the Soviets were talking about a period of 10 years, which we could call Period X. Thereafter, there would be a period of negotiations to find further acceptable solutions, which we could call Period Y. Could the Soviets tell us more about Period Y?

Akhromeyev said the 10 year period would be long enough given the current state of development of arms and science. It is difficult to say what will happen in 10 years. The best solution is not to deploy such a (space-based) system. But the U.S. is not prepared to agree not to deploy, so the Soviets are willing to have this compromise.

Nitze asked if the Soviets were implying that either side had the right to deploy?

Akhromeyev said he was only saying that the sides would have to decide after 10 years what to do, to find mutually acceptable solutions on how to proceed.

Nitze said that the Soviet side had at times said that there should be no testing outside the laboratory, and at other times that both sides should adhere to the terms of the ABM Treaty. Nitze’s recollection was that the Treaty does not mention research. During the negotiations, the Soviet side had, in fact, taken the position that the Treaty should not limit research.

Akhromeyev said the Treaty was very clear. Each side could test fixed land-based systems and components. As to space systems, Article V says each side agrees not to deploy space-based, sea-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems. So the Treaty is clear about space-based systems; therefore, it should be recorded in no uncertain terms that neither side would withdraw from the Treaty, and that each side would comply with all its provisions, including Article V.

Nitze asked, what about Agreed Statement D?

Akhromeyev answered that it could not cancel out Article V.

Nitze suggested the Soviet side go through the negotiating record. The U.S. had suggested a ban on devices based on other physical principles which could be substituted for ABM components as defined by the Treaty. The U.S. tried for many months to get the Soviets to accept this, but the Soviet side rejected it. The Soviet argument was, in fact, intelligent—i.e., that we had spent months trying to resolve the problem of defining the major components to be limited, but that while we knew about then-existing technology, neither side could know about future technology. So to settle the problem, both sides accepted Agreed Statement D, which prohibited deployment of systems and components based on other physical principles, but not research, testing and development, since it contains a reference, “in the event such systems are created. . .”.

In our view, Nitze continued, it is clear what is limited by the Treaty, and the U.S. quite disagrees that the Treaty bans all testing other than of fixed land-based systems. When the Soviets are talking of “strengthening” the ABM Treaty, what they really are suggesting is “amending” the treaty to make it something it was not meant to be.

Ambassador Karpov said Agreed Statement D cannot cancel out Article I or III. Systems based on other physical principles can only be tested if they are to substitute for fixed, land-based systems. It is important that both sides understand what is limited. Agreed Statement D only provides clarifying language to these limitations.

Nitze said the U.S. was prepared to continue talking about strengthening the Treaty, but that this is different than amending the Treaty. Article III deals solely with deployment. Agreed Statement D is a ban on deployment—and thus is a reinforcement of Article III. This is an important disagreement between us. The U.S. is willing to discuss what is provided for by the Treaty, but both sides should be clear about the distinction between amending the Treaty and interpreting it to be something it was meant to be.

Karpov asked why argue about some other formulation; there is no agreement on the meaning of the Treaty. The Soviet point is that the Treaty bans for an unlimited duration the deployment of space-based systems. The Soviet formula is no withdrawal for 10 years, and after that, seek to agree on what comes next.

Nitze replied that Karpov was right, there had been no agreement at first on “testing in an ABM mode”, but subsequently we did get agreement. At one point in the negotiations on the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side suggested that it did not mean testing against objects in orbit but against an object in its flight trajectory from earth-to-earth. We agreed, so the Treaty did not include a prohibition on ASAT testing. The Treaty does not mention a ban on ASAT testing, and thus the Soviet proposal goes beyond the Treaty’s terms. The U.S. would like to make progress about what the Treaty was intended to mean.

Ambassador Kampelman said that a decision on definitions was very difficult to reach given the realities. The two sides have different perceptions of what did take place and what should take place. The U.S. is prepared to discuss these differences, but we are not encouraged about success. Is Marshal Akhromeyev suggesting that we set aside those differences and agree to abide by the ABM Treaty for “x” number of years without having agreement on what it means to be abiding by the Treaty?

Akhromeyev said the question is not theoretical but rather a practical dispute. We debated in the 1970s, when neither side was ready to deploy a space-based defense, but the situation is different today. It is important that the U.S. is considering testing systems in space, which would be a violation of the Treaty with all the attendant consequences. The Soviet side is concerned. The Soviets have tried to reach an understanding, so they have advanced different proposals.

Kampelman said that if the Soviet side is suggesting that we restrict our research only to the laboratory, except for fixed land-based systems, then the U.S. would not agree since that would be a restriction on what we were allowed legally to do under the ABM Treaty.

Akhromeyev said that research on space-based systems is permissible in the laboratories; outside of the laboratory, it would be banned.

Nitze asked what was meant by the Soviet proposal that “neither side would exercise its right to withdraw”? Is that for all reasons, or did it mean that neither side would withdraw for issues regarding research?

Akhromeyev said the Soviet proposal is quite clear—there would be an agreement that neither side would withdraw for 10 years, and both sides would respect all of the Treaty’s provisions.

Mr. Arbatov exclaimed that we were not dealing with abstractions but with a specific package—radical reductions in strategic offensive arms, and the Soviet Union naturally wants some precautionary measures, to know about future U.S. intentions and actions. The Soviet Union and U.S. would be eliminating weapons that were “cast in iron” and which cost both sides lots of money. This was not a theoretical exercise. We are stalemated in the negotiations at Geneva and trying to find a way out. The USSR has to accept radical cuts in its weapons and needs to know what the U.S. is prepared to give up.

Nitze commented that the cuts would affect both sides.

Arbatov rejoined that the Soviet proposal on the ABM Treaty also applies to both sides.

Kampelman said he wanted the Soviets to understand U.S. concerns. The Soviets have suggested non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of time. Article XV of the Treaty refers to extraordinary events jeopardizing supreme national interests. Both sides can anticipate that something might come up, not related to work on strategic defenses but related to supreme national interests. But under the Soviet proposal, the U.S. would not have the right to withdraw. Thus, we should find some language that protects the sovereign national right to withdraw from a treaty if supreme national interests are at stake. Kampelman said he would have to explain to the Senate that the U.S. had tied its hands. Therefore, we need to find some other way. Supposing one side had just violated the agreement. Are we to have no remedy?

Karpov suggested that the two sides address this in practical terms. The text of the Treaty is clear cut. The two sides understand it differently, so we are stalemated. The Soviets are trying to find some formula that would move things along. Strict adherence to the ABM Treaty is a critical element of U.S.-Soviet relations.

He continued that the U.S. has stated that both sides need confidence, trust, verification, control. He agreed. But how could there be agreement to carry out reductions of 50% while one side was building an ABM territorial defense? So, the Soviet side needs assurances that such a danger will not come over the Soviet Union in the next 10 years. Only the U.S. and Soviet Union had the capacity to possess such systems; therefore, the Soviet Union needed confidence, including strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the President is not serious about this, then all our negotiations about reducing arms are a myth. Without agreement on this point, there would be no agreement on 50% cuts in strategic offensive arms.

Nitze said he wanted to cast the overall issue in terms that are more manageable, and thus he wanted to pose two problems:

—Whether or not, after the expiration of ten years, the U.S. is permitted to deploy ABM systems that are not permitted by the ABM Treaty?

—Prior to that right to deploy, does the U.S. propose to live up to the ABM Treaty?

On the second question, Nitze said, the U.S. very much wants both sides to live up to the ABM Treaty. However, we don’t think the Soviet Union is. On the question of deployments, there are different points of view, i.e., whether deployments would take place when agreed by both sides or by some fixed date, but these did not seem insurmountable.

Akhromeyev said the two delegations were getting back onto the road we have been traversing at the Geneva negotiations. The Soviet Union has a proposal. Does the U.S. have amendments, or does the U.S. accept it in principle? This must be solved tonight. If certain particulars are acceptable, all right. But if the U.S. is opposed in principle, then it is destroying everything that the two sides are trying to do today.

The Soviet Union, he continued, will never accept the dangers that the U.S. side is proposing to it. The Soviet Union is fully prepared to reach agreement on any issue. The two sides have been discussing these issues for many years. They have come far on strategic and INF issues. But the Soviet Union needs a clear understanding on where we are. Why not try to formulate where we are?

Nitze said we do have a proposal, and then read the following text:

“To move toward a safer and more stable world, the US and USSR will establish a mechanism to move together toward increasing reliance on defense.

“This mechanism will not eliminate the ABM treaty but will include some new provisions which would take precedence over certain provisions of the ABM treaty.

“This will involve careful management of a transition to a stabilizing balance of offensive and defensive forces, with greater security at each stage; leading to the total elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

“This will ensure that defenses will reinforce the stability achieved by eliminating ballistic missiles.

“This will involve replacement of offensive ballistic missiles with defenses in a phased manner that provides greater stability at each stage in the disarmament process.

“This will involve agreement to share the benefits of strategic defense in conjunction with the elimination of ballistic missiles.

“With the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, defensive deployments would be adjusted accordingly.

“The two sides will consider the timing and phasing of a transition to strategic defense based on the principles of equity and stability at every stage.”

Akhromeyev said he understood that what Nitze had just read was a new proposal, but the proposals by the two sides remained far apart.

At this point, the two delegations took a break.

When the delegations returned, Akhromeyev said that while many of the members of the U.S. and Soviet delegations had been talking with each other for many years, he was meeting Ambassador Nitze for the first time. He therefore wanted to take up the matter of the ABM Treaty, and to give the views of the Soviet military.

It goes without saying that the Soviet military does not discount the dangers of the ABM system of the U.S. because of the possibility it created of the U.S. making a nuclear strike with impunity against the Soviet Union. The state which had a territorial ABM defense could use it to its advantage. But there are realities and illusions. The Soviet Union is aware that the process of developing such a system is a long one. If the U.S. is determined to develop, it will take a certain amount of time. The Soviet Union is concerned and must consider how to respond to the development of such a system.

The U.S. delegation is aware of General Secretary Gorbachev’s statement that the Soviet Union will find a response, that it will be adequate, but that it will not be similar to what the U.S. is doing. That statement is true. There are many ways to find a response. If an ABM system is deployed, there will be no reductions in strategic offensive arms. On the contrary, there will be a proliferation and buildup. There are, of course, possibilities for circumventing ABM definitions. It is up to the U.S. how we are going to deal with this. However, the Soviet Union is no less concerned with an unrestrained arms race. If an ABM system is created, who and when in the future will start the process of reducing arms? Thus, we are at an historic moment—either we have historic reductions, or our countries will have to agree in the future under more difficult circumstances.

Nitze said he appreciated Akhromeyev’s remarks and would take them into account. He suggested that the two sides now move on to the issue of nuclear testing, and wanted to offer some language:

“The U.S. and the Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.”

Nitze said he hoped this language would cover Soviet considerations as well as ours. The language laid out a step-by-step process that could bring progress in the field.

Akhromeyev suggested that we should start negotiations on the prohibition of testing.

Nitze suggested again that we should undertake a step-by-step process. The first step on the agenda would be to resolve verification problems with existing treaties. When this was done, as the text he had read indicated, “the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.”

Akhromeyev said the Soviets have many questions, but he thought the negotiations should start with the issue of the full cessation of nuclear testing. They could proceed on a stage-by-stage basis, beginning with the 1970s treaties. When the two delegations began drafting, he concluded, they would be able to find acceptable language.

Nitze said he had hoped that the U.S. draft language would be acceptable, but if Akhromeyev preferred, we could move on to other topics.

Nitze then read U.S. proposed language on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers:

“The two sides will begin negotiations promptly with a view toward reaching agreement on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers.”

Akhromeyev said that seemed all right, that the two sides could discuss risk reduction centers in principle. He suggested that the delegations return to the issue of strategic offensive arms and try to develop a common view.

On START, he said the General Secretary had given to the President a draft text of instructions to Foreign Ministers. The Soviets would be glad to listen to Nitze’s comments.

Nitze said that he thought the instructions to Foreign Ministers should be more detailed. There was a good deal of common ground on strategic offensive arms, and the sides could thus go further.

Akhromeyev said all right, what are your proposals?

Karpov said that convergence between the two sides was outlined in the General Secretary’s paper, which contains key elements. Specific details could be left to negotiators.

Nitze said the U.S. did not want to agree on a general statement. We were close enough to reflect greater agreement. The U.S. was preparing a new paper, and he asked the Soviet side to hold off discussion for a few moments until it was ready.

Karpov explained that the General Secretary handed over the document with the objective of formulating basic key elements, and leaving the details to negotiators. It is better to reflect common ground. Akhromeyev said that, at the same time, fundamental solutions should be reflected in the instructions. The two sides may have differences on details; besides, we should leave something for Foreign Ministers to do.

Nitze said we want to have a clear view of differences. We do not want to agree to a general formula, then find out that the basis for that was fallacious. He continued that there should be agreement on specific verification measures, and wanted to read to the Soviet delegation some U.S. language pertaining to INF verification provisions:

“There will be specific verification measures which include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of destruction down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining LRINF inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.”

Akhromeyev said we should not just write verification points into the section on INF. In addition to NTM, there can and must be other measures of verification. This should include exchange of data, and the two sides could work on other measures of verification. He believed the U.S. and Soviet Union would be able to agree. The Soviet side was no less interested in verification than was the U.S.

Nitze said that verification applies to START, too.

Akhromeyev said there should be an exchange of data which the two sides had exchanged in connection with SALT II. Both sides then told each other a great deal of information. There must be mutual confidence. He also believed there should be careful monitoring of destruction of excess arms, and continued controls over inventories and existing forces.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet side had given the U.S. a draft text. Whether it was bad or good, the U.S. should give the Soviet side a piece of paper.

Nitze said the U.S. would give the Soviets a paper in short order. Akhromeyev complained about the delay. Nitze reminded him that the two delegations were to work out an agreement tonight. The U.S. did not like the Soviet paper, which was not detailed enough, and thought the two sides could do better.

At this point, there was a break. The U.S. delegation withdrew to caucus upstairs at Hofdi House.³

On returning from the caucus, there was a brief exchange whether the instructions to Foreign Ministers should be public or private. The Soviet delegation said it had instructions to agree on a document that could be published. Ambassador Kampelman said instructions from leaders to Foreign Ministers generally are private.

Nitze then read aloud the following text on START, saying that the U.S. and Soviet Union should seek an early agreement along the following lines:

—“The agreement will involve 50% reductions in strategic arms.

—“The two sides will place highest priority on reductions in ballistic missile warheads.

—“They will seek reductions of 50% in ballistic missile warheads, to a level of 4500 for each side, to be achieved withinyears.

—“These reductions will include 50% reductions in warheads on SS-18s and other heavy ICBMs.

—“There will be appropriate corresponding reductions in all ballistic missile systems—including in the US submarine-launched ballistic missile force (SLBMs).

—“There will be codified reductions and limitations on throwweight to 50% of the current Soviet level.

—“There will be further appropriate sublimits on ballistic missile warheads, for example, on ballistic missile RVs, ICBM RVs, SLBM RVs, on non-silo-based missiles and missiles with more than 6 RVs, and on heavy ICBMs.

—“There will be an overall limit of 6000 strategic nuclear weapons, consisting of ballistic missile warheads and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

—“As part of such a package, the US and USSR should seek agreement in the following other areas:

—“There will be a limit of 350 on heavy bombers.

—“There will be an aggregate ceiling of 1600 on bombers and ballistic missiles.

—“There will be separate limits on sea-launched cruise missiles.

—“Effective verification is essential to both sides. As agreed at Geneva last year, verification measures should be negotiated concurrently with reductions and limitations. The two sides should seek to apply progress made in INF and other areas to the negotiations on strategic offensive arms.

—“They should work out the details of this agreement as soon as possible.”

Akhromeyev then asked in what way was the U.S. text different than the proposal the U.S. set out in Geneva this year?

Nitze answered that it was a clear statement of our position. It was not materially different from our September proposals.

Akhromeyev said these were U.S. proposals as of September this year. The General Secretary had advanced a new proposal for 50% cuts, with U.S. FBS and medium-range missiles not being taken into account. That was a new proposal.

Nitze said that, substantively, what we had put forward was a 50% cut in strategic offensive arms.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets had offered significant reductions in heavy missiles. There should be a package of measures, but instead they were only getting from the U.S. what they had got before. Thus it turns out to be impossible to agree to some kind of joint statement.

Nitze said the U.S. would agree to a joint statement with these points.

Akhromeyev said this is an agreement to the American conditions. The Soviet Union cannot agree to this.

Nitze asked, how would the Soviets change it?

Karpov said that this morning, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had proposed a new solution, which was to cut the strategic weapons of both sides by 50%. The 50% would be applied to all categories of delivery vehicles and weapons. Now, something that is not an absolute cut of 50% is being introduced. The U.S. has some 2200 SNDVs, which the U.S. proposes to reduce to 1600; the Soviets have to ask, where is the 50% cut? The U.S. proposal is a proposal already known to us. It cannot be regarded as constructive compared to the radical proposal voiced today by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Karpov continued, to agree upon or offer amendments to this package, to reach a mutually acceptable directive to Foreign Ministers about 50% cuts being put into effect, turns out to be unacceptable and impossible.

Kampelman said this meeting had begun at 8 P.M. We had had a discussion. We had talked about 1600 SNDVs. The Soviet side had never mentioned any other figure. If the Soviet side had one, then give it to the U.S. side.

Akhromeyev repeated the proposal to reduce strategic offensive weapons by 50%, with the number of delivery vehicles and warheads to be cut by 50%. Under these conditions, it was agreed to cut the number of heavy ICBMs by 50% as well. The U.S. side could not agree to this, at least for the bomber part of it. After that, the Soviet side began to hear out the American proposal. The Soviets asked to get it in writing. It turned out that the U.S. proposal in no way took account of or responded to the proposal by the General Secretary.

Karpov interjected that it was strange that it had taken the U.S. so much time to develop their formulation—it would have been quite sufficient for the Americans just to say that they wished to repeat their proposal of September 18 this year.

Kampelman said the date was irrelevant. The U.S. does refer to 50%. If the Soviets differ, they should tell us where. Everyone on the U.S. side believed we had agreed on 1600. If this were not so, the Soviets should tell us what their number was.

Karpov replied that the U.S. was at about 1100 ICBMs. How many warheads are carried by these systems? The warheads for every category should be cut by 50%.

Kampelman asked, does that mean 1600 is not the Soviet position? Are you proposing 1100 SNDVs?

Karpov answered that he had proposed 50% cuts.

Kampelman asked, what number is that, 1100?

Akhromeyev said the U.S. had something in the area of 1018–1020 ICBMs, so after a 50% cut, the U.S. would get approximately 510 ICBMs. The Soviet Union has 1398 ICBMs, which would be cut by one half. The General Secretary had handed to the President the composition of that reduction.

Assistant Secretary Perle asked, then you are not proposing equal levels?

Akhromeyev answered, that is correct.

Nitze said that this raised a very important point. The U.S. had never agreed to cut to unequal levels. We had not thought there was a significant issue between the two sides on this, either with regard to SNDVs or RVs. The entire pattern of discussions had been that we would wind up with equal levels. When the two sides had begun talking this evening, we were talking about 6000 and how that would work, about 1600 and how that would work, and about a subceiling of 350 on heavy bombers.

Akhromeyev asked if he could ask some questions on INF. In the conversations between the General Secretary and President Reagan, the Soviets had proposed to begin negotiations as soon as practically possible on medium-range missiles in Asia and negotiations on systems of less than 1000 km range. The U.S. side did not agree, so the two delegations would have to let leaders decide on the level in Asia.

Nitze said we could agree to zero in Europe if there were zero globally, in other words in Asia. If not zero in Europe, then an equal level in Asia. What we could not agree to was zero in Europe without zero in Asia.

Akhromeyev said he understood.

Akhromeyev continued that he saw nothing in the American proposal on the ABM Treaty. Perhaps this was an error?

Nitze said that U.S. language on that point was being translated into Russian.

Akhromeyev took note of the U.S. language regarding nuclear testing. He suggested that the delegations agree to take a coffee break to report the situation to their leaders. He proposed they return at 3:00 AM.

Nitze agreed. The meeting recessed at 2 A.M.⁴

The delegations resumed discussions at 3:15 A.M.

Akhromeyev started by noting that since the Soviet side had requested the recess, he wished to say a few words.

He continued that the Soviet team had reported to its authorities the shape of the positions of the Soviet Union and U.S. As a result, he wanted to specify one point of agreement on strategic offensive arms. The point is that the two sides propose to negotiate an agreement on 50% reductions in the strategic offensive arms of the U.S. and Soviet Union, to have equal limits for delivery vehicles and warheads, taking into account the historic four specific features of the force structures of the sides.

At the same time, he said, the Soviets note that as regards the far-reaching proposals made in the meeting between the General Secretary and the President with respect to all questions under discussion—strategic offensive arms, medium-range missiles, the ABM Treaty, a total prohibition on nuclear testing—the U.S. side has not provided a reaction, but rather has explained and set forth those proposals which they had submitted in Geneva or in letters between the President and General Secretary. The Soviets had hoped that since they had submitted new proposals, the U.S. would do likewise. That had not happened.

Nitze responded that the first part of what Akhromeyev had just proposed was somewhat different from what the Soviet side had been discussing earlier, and Nitze welcomed that. The Soviets had said 50% reductions to equal levels on SNDVs and warheads. Was the Soviet side in fact interested in 50% reductions revolving around 1600 SNDVs and 6000 RVs and ALCMs, leaving aside refinements about what might happen below that?

Akhromeyev said that was correct. The two sides would specify the level of SNDVs and warheads, and these would be equal for both sides.

Nitze repeated that he welcomed that, noting that if the delegations were looking for instructions for Foreign Ministers, they could be based on what Akhromeyev had just said.

Akhromeyev said that if we were to have agreeable, acceptable accords on this, we could move on to other areas. He repeated that the Soviets had offered an INF agreement with 0/0 in Europe which would not take into account UK and French systems, with later negotiations on SRINF which would be frozen and reductions in the East. As to the ABM Treaty, there were fundamental differences. The two sides understand the problem in two different ways. The same goes for the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear testing.

Nitze asked if it would be agreeable to the Soviet side to specify a level of 6000 on nuclear weapons and 1600 delivery vehicles when we talk about START.

Akhromeyev said that while the numbers could be discussed in the Geneva negotiations, an agreement could be approximately at these levels. That would be subject for negotiation.

Nitze said that, on INF, we still have difficulty with the Soviet position. As Nitze had said earlier, the U.S. has no difficulty with 100/100 in Europe and Asia, or zero in Europe and zero in Asia, but we do have difficulty with zero in Europe and a figure in Asia to be negotiated. The major difference between the two sides is right there on the numbers in Europe and Asia. We saw no reason for the Soviet side to object to what the U.S. was proposing on duration of an agreement or on SRINF. Perhaps the two sides could find some language.

Akhromeyev said that, in this case, he would like to go back to START. The difficulty here is, even now, when we try to outline limits, the U.S. tries to set certain ceilings and limits. In the Soviet draft, we suggest a broader view—outlining principles for Foreign Ministers to work out specific agreements. If the U.S. agrees, the two sides could negotiate principles taking into account U.S. views and suggestions. If the two sides try to consider the numbers the U.S. had suggested, it would be impossible to negotiate a document, since the two sides have great differences.

Nitze rejoined that he did not believe the differences were that great on START, or on INF except for the Asia question. The U.S. would insist on comparable levels and arrangements regarding Asia, but we could not accept zero in Europe and a freeze in Asia. Foreign Ministers could be instructed to consider that question.

Akhromeyev agreed that the delegations could report the question to the General Secretary and the President, but then the question of defensive arms enters the picture. On START, we shouldn’t agree on numbers without a general approach. Thus, it was better to outline a general approach on the basis of the Soviet draft, taking into account U.S. views.

Nitze answered that this was a problem we had faced all along—general principles without some idea how they would work. We need to see how general principles would translate into specific results. There were two tentatively fixed points; a level of 1600 SNDVs and, more important, a level of 6000 ICBM RVs, SLBM RVs and long-range ALCMs.

Akhromeyev said that regarding specific limits on the Soviet SS-18, the Soviets could not agree to it now. On the question of throwweight which the U.S. side had raised, the Soviets could not agree to it now. Wouldn’t it be possible, if we agreed on the overall approach, that it would be easier for the Foreign Ministers to solve the issue? The two delegations could go on discussing these questions, as the U.S. side was suggesting, and could talk about sublimits—but there would not be agreement tonight. It would be impossible to get agreement in one night.

Nitze asked, suppose we changed the language to read numbers no higher than 1600 SNDVs, and no higher than 6000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMS?

Arbatov interjected, “That doesn’t help; nothing helps.”

Akhromeyev said the Soviets would agree to try to formulate language on 1600 and 6000, so long as other limits were not included.

Nitze stated that the U.S. believed sublimits were needed. He added that he had a preliminary question regarding what the Soviets meant when they said “historically distinctive” features of each side’s strategic force structure.

Akhromeyev said the sides should not try to break the existing balance in the force structures of each side. If the two sides agree to 1600 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, then each side should be free to determine the mix of systems, taking into account that the sides will reduce heavy missiles. Each side would independently determine the number of cruise missiles and warheads on ballistic missiles.

Nitze said that the Geneva negotiators should address another question: Sublimits that would enhance stability, if they can find them. He then read proposed language for instructions to Foreign Ministers:

“The sides agreed to refocus the attention of negotiators to achieving a 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms of the U.S. and USSR consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, taking into account historically formed distinctive features of force structures on each side. Within this approach, there would be no more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6000 reentry vehicles and air-launched cruise missiles, and a reduction of 50% in heavy missiles, in addition to other limits and sublimits to be mutually agreed, so that the destructive potential of ballistic missiles is reduced.”

Akhromeyev said that he had listened to Nitze with hope, and the two sides had been close, but then Nitze had mentioned sublimits. Given that the two sides had agreed to such severe cuts, sublimits were unnecessary, and the Soviets wished to decide for themselves how to allocate their forces. Besides, if one removed the sublimit issue, then the Soviet formula had everything present. There was one exception—sublimits—and that had to be removed.

(The Soviet formula, which Akhromeyev read, was as follows: “. . .to reduce by 50% the strategic offensive arms of the U.S. and USSR, to an equal level of delivery vehicles of approximately 1600 units, with no more than 6000 warheads for the sides, taking into account historically formed features of the force structures of each side. Reductions would apply to all types, including significant reductions in heavy missiles. The reductions should include sea-launched cruise missiles.”)

Akhromeyev added that a formula should be found for including SLCMs. We just need to get rid of the idea of sublimits.

Nitze said that, regarding SLCMs, one might say “the sides will attempt to find means of effectively verifying and significantly limiting long-range SLCMs.” He was not sure how this could be done, but the U.S. was perfectly agreeable to trying to find a solution.

Akhromeyev said Nitze’s proposal was not helpful. The 50% reduction would be a specific and binding obligation. What would be the value of 50% reductions if we could not find a specific solution on SLCMs, and each side could deploy large numbers of SLCMs? The obligation on SLCMs should be as binding as limits on other strategic offensive arms. Perhaps the Soviets could just say they could reduce heavy missiles. This is not merely a question of format. The Soviet side suggested that the two delegations find a more binding form, the U.S. side a less binding form. It is a question of whether the two sides assume an obligation to limit SLCMs. The Soviets could not agree not to limit SLCMs.

Nitze proposed language to the effect that the U.S. agreed to limitations, provided agreement could be reached on verifying limits on long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Akhromeyev said the two sides were able to solve problems when they took into account the security interests of the other side, on the basis of equal security. The Soviet side cannot accept that they will assume obligations, that is, for 50% reductions, but obligations that they need on the American side are expressed as a wish.

Nitze said the U.S. had a genuine question about how one would limit and verify SLCMs.

Akhromeyev said that experience indicates that the two sides could solve the most difficult problems, such as how to count and verify MIRVs in SALT. Thus, regarding SLCMs, the two sides should find language that is binding. If it was possible to do so regarding 50% cuts in strategic offensive arms, it should be possible for SLCMs as well.

Perle said he wanted to say a few words about SLCMs. Akhromeyev’s point about finding a solution was well taken. The problem with SLCMs is that the box launchers used for nuclear SLCMs are those which launch virtually all of American naval armaments. You can go aboard any Navy ship and see these box launchers. It simply is not realistic to ask us to dismantle the U.S. Navy for what is, after all, a very small part of the strategic equation. That is why the U.S. says that limitation of SLCMs is such a difficult issue for us—it is not that a relatively small force is so important for us, but rather because the whole of our naval armament is involved. The Soviet Union is asking us to agree to solve a problem for which we do not see a solution.

Akhromeyev answered that the problem is so serious that we have to find a way to deal with it. The two sides were faced with a similar problem on how to count heavy bombers with cruise missiles. They tried for a year to solve this, and did in the end find a solution. We say that agreements should be verifiable, but no matter how we say it, there must be a certain measure of trust, that given good will we will find a solution. The sides would have to choose the types of ships on which SLCMs would be deployed and would have to have a type rule. Inspection would be applied as on other systems. Without a solution, there would be no agreement. This is a big problem, not a minor one.

Nitze asked if there is no real solution, what value would be attached to limitations on SLCMs?

Akhromeyev said there was another consideration—a connotation of diktat, that there will be no agreement on verification, therefore no agreement on SLCM, therefore no agreement at all. The Soviet side cannot accept 50% reductions unless SLCMs are limited.

Nitze asked, suppose the sides exchanged declarations of their SLCM programs. Nitze couldn’t envision verification of these, but would such declarations be a way out?

Akhromeyev said the sides would have to define numbers involved.

Nitze said that was all right.

Arbatov said the sides should state that certain numbers of weapons would be deployed on certain types of ships and not on others. Compared with 50% cuts, the SLCMs issue is a relatively minor negotiating problem. But the U.S. wanted an escape clause, not a real effort to find a solution.

Nitze said the real U.S. interest was in conventional SLCMs; thus, he had suggested declarations in which we might describe our nuclear SLCM program. But there might not be high reliability on verification of these declarations. The Soviets would have to rely on our statements, and the U.S. on theirs.

Akhromeyev proposed that both sides undertake an obligation to achieve effective verification measures, so that neither would seek strategic advantage. At the same time, we could not have 50% reductions without dealing with SLCMs.

Perle said that he saw no problem to agreeing to limit nuclear SLCMs to a small number. The U.S. does not plan on large numbers. But he still did not know how to verify these limits since a large number of ships will have launchers.

Perle continued that he wished we did not have the situation we do regarding nuclear SLCMs, since they are not that important a part of the strategic force. He also wished that our armaments program had developed differently than it had. Nevertheless, SLCMs were a unique case—for reasons of standardization and efficiency, it was decided years ago that there would be box launchers capable of launching a variety of systems. If the Soviets could accept a statement on the U.S. SLCM program, we could give one. If it were a matter of dismantling launchers which are crucial to our conventional capabilities, it would be impossible.

The U.S. was prepared to limit nuclear SLCMs provided the Soviets accepted our number. There was an abundant public record on U.S. levels of nuclear SLCMs. The Soviets could read the Defense Department’s authorization bill and would thus know that the U.S. does not have more than a minimal number of nuclear SLCMs. The Soviets could accept that number, since they know that there would be no more nuclear SLCMs than Congress had authorized. If the Soviets could accept that number as stated, then they could have confidence in its accuracy. If the Soviet Union could not verify that number, then it would simply prove the point the U.S. had been trying to make about the difficulty of verifying SLCM limits. As Ambassador Nitze had said, perhaps unilateral declarations were the way out. Such a solution would have to be carried out by both sides, and we would try to work out verification.

Akhromeyev said the U.S. should agree to limit the ships on which SLCMs could be placed. The U.S., not just the Soviet Union, would have to work out the verification procedures for limits on SLCMs. Both sides face difficult problems. For instance, the USSR had to deal with the issue of British and French systems, which was not an easy problem for them.

Nitze said the U.S. was doing its best to find a solution, but we did not see measures that are verifiable with high confidence in distinguishing conventional and nuclear SLCM launchers. That was why the U.S. was proposing declarations. We did not want to destroy our capability for conventional SLCMs. That is what the U.S. is trying to protect.

Akhromeyev suggested both sides limit the number of SLCMs and their carriers. If a ship carried only conventional SLCMs, there would be a right of inspection. The Soviets know this would not be convenient for the U.S. and are trying to overcome the problem. Navy ships would be verifiable on a reciprocal basis. The U.S. would have a reciprocal right to verify conventional versus nuclear-armed SLCMs on Soviet ships.

Falin asked whether both sides could not just say that they intended to find a solution to the problem.

Perle said that the Soviet side had asked the U.S. to take into account “historical” differences between the evolution of the forces on each side. The fact is that our SLCM deployments had evolved in a certain way that made a solution difficult. Perle suggested that there be language committing each side to “undertake to find” a solution.

Akhromeyev rejoined that finding a solution on SLCMs should be expressed not just as a desire but as an obligation. Perhaps there could be a way to distinguish between launchers, the same solution as was applied to bombers. The Soviet Union was not trying to destroy the U.S. Navy. It did want to find a functional solution. The sides found a solution once on heavy bombers armed with ALCMs; they could try a similar solution on SLCMs.

Perle said the solution on heavy bombers was made possible because aircraft had to be modified for ALCMs. It was too late for that regarding SLCMs. That was an unhappy fact that we were stuck with.

Akhromeyev suggested that perhaps certain modernization could occur. He continued that the U.S. had suggested that the Soviet Union destroy heavy missiles. This was not easy for the Soviet Union. SLCMs were a similar case. You say it cannot be done, but you should try to find a solution.

Nitze answered that the U.S. was trying to find acceptable language on this point for instructions to ministers. He suggested “both sides undertake to find a solution to the problem of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs.”

Akhromeyev reiterated that there must be an obligation, not just an expression of desire to find a solution.

Nitze said the U.S. language involved an obligation to try.

Akhromeyev suggested language which said “the sides will find. . .”

Nitze said we would put the Soviet wording in brackets.

Akhromeyev said he would agree to leave the issue unresolved for now but warned that a solution must be found since SLCMs pose a grave threat to the Soviet Union. He then read the following language:

“On strategic arms, there is agreement by the sides that they are prepared to reduce by 50% the strategic arms of the U.S. and the USSR to equal numbers of delivery vehicles (approximately 1600) and warheads (not more than 6000) for each side, taking into account historically formed features of the forces of each side. Within this framework, reductions will apply to all types of strategic arms, including significant numbers of heavy missiles. A solution [should also be found] to the problem of limiting long-range SLCMs.”

Nitze said he had a matter he wanted to be sure of, namely, that the 6000 includes RVs on ICBMs, SLBMs, and ALCMs, but does not include gravity bombs and SRAMs.

Akhromeyev replied that the 6000 figure does not include gravity bombs and SRAMs. A heavy bomber with gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one RV.

Nitze said that he wanted to be sure that the term “nuclear-armed” was placed before the word “SLCM” in the draft language. Akhromeyev agreed.

Nitze noted that the language should read “. . .no more than 6000 SLBM warheads, ICBM warheads, and ALCMs.”

Akhromeyev repeated that heavy bombers with gravity bombs and SRAMs would be counted as a single reentry vehicle.

Nitze asked, if we have a bomber with one ALCM and gravity bombs and SRAMs, how do we count it?

Akhromeyev answered that a heavy bomber with gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one delivery vehicle in the 1600 number, and one RV in the 6000 number. He continued that under the hypothetical case Nitze had mentioned, the bomber would count as one delivery vehicle but two warheads. This was simple logic.

Akhromeyev commented that he had been thinking throughout the year about the problem of gravity bombs and SRAMs, and had tried to put himself in the Americans’ shoes. So, while this was a difficult decision for the Soviet Union, he was ready to accept that heavy bombers armed with gravity bombs and SRAMs would be counted as a single RV. He reiterated that it was logical to count a heavy bomber with bombs and SRAMs in the total of delivery vehicles; he was sure the Americans would agree with this. And, in the warhead total, such bombers would count as one RV.

Nitze reiterated that this would have to be spelled out, since it was kind of complicated.

Akhromeyev said we were not formulating a treaty or other agreement for signature now. If Ambassador Nitze had a question, he would try to clarify it. On Nitze’s suggestion regarding language on SLCMs, he could agree to language that said “a solution will be found on nuclear long-range SLCMs.”

There was then a debate among various participants on both sides about the language on SLCMs. Akhromeyev said the delegations should write bracketed language and hand it over to their leaders.

Nitze then suggested that there be language which said “nothing in the above shall foreclose other sublimits that are equal for both sides.”

Akhromeyev asked, what sublimits?

Nitze answered that the U.S. wanted to leave this open and that we were not implying that the Soviets were agreeing to them.

Akhromeyev said, if it’s not prohibited, it’s allowed. The delegations need not put Nitze’s suggested sentence down. The Foreign Ministers would discuss this question. In the Soviet viewpoint, however, the issue was solved by virtue of the fact that the two sides had decided on the total number of delivery vehicles and warheads, and that an agreement would take account of the historical development of the force structures of each side. The U.S. proposed language would, in fact, create a loophole that would break the historic strategic force structure of the two sides, so the Soviets were against it.

Nitze rejoined that from what Akhromeyev had just said, it sounds as if any sublimit would “break the historic structure”. Nitze didn’t understand what that meant.

Akhromeyev said he did not see any need to speak of any sublevels. The two sides have the number of delivery vehicles, number of warheads, and limits on numbers of heavy missiles. He did not see any reason why it was necessary to introduce any sublevels. At this stage, he added, the working group wouldn’t be able to finish its work by 10 A.M., since it still had four more issues on its hands.

Nitze said that, regarding SLCMs, the U.S. would agree to drop its brackets on the Soviet proposed language, so long as the Soviet side understood that the only solution the U.S. side foresaw was the one he had described earlier (i.e., unilateral declarations by each side). Nitze added that the U.S. also did not want to foreclose other sublimits on strategic forces.

Akhromeyev said that regarding Nitze’s first remark, the Soviets could not agree. Limits on SLCMs should have a binding character. There would be no value to the sentence if the U.S. did not intend to cooperate with the Soviets.

Nitze said he could not undertake the obligation on SLCMs if he could not find a solution on SLCMs. The only solution he could see was the one he had mentioned earlier. The U.S. was willing to look for another solution, but the only one we knew of was what the U.S. team had described.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets had never heard any objection to their proposals.

Nitze said why not put it in the words “mutually acceptable solution”?

Akhromeyev said the language would read, “a mutually acceptable solution shall also be found.” Nitze agreed.

Akhromeyev then said, regarding sublimits, that each side can raise such questions in the future. There was no need to write it down.

The discussion then moved to INF. Akhromeyev said there was agreement on the complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, and that the nuclear potentials of Britain and France would not be taken into account. However, the two sides had not solved the problem of medium-range missiles in Asia.

Nitze stated that the sides had not solved the problem either of Europe or Asia, since the two were linked.

Akhromeyev said he understood there was no objection to the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe if the nuclear potential of the UK and France were not taken into account. He would agree to put language on Asia in brackets.

Nitze said this was not agreed. The U.S. had never proposed zero in Europe. We had proposed zero globally. We did not accept zero in Europe, and had never moved away from that position. At any other level except zero in Asia, the U.S. was not prepared to accept zero in Europe.

Akhromeyev stated that we would have to bracket the entire section on INF.

The discussion then turned to Defense and Space.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets had suggested formulas. He suggested the delegations take a look at them.

Nitze said the U.S. had a proposal regarding three questions which the Foreign Ministers could be instructed to discuss:

“How can activities with respect to investigation of advanced strategic defenses be synchronized with the shared goal of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles?

“Under what conditions and in what general timeframe could both sides consider a transition to an increased reliance on advanced strategic defenses?

“Until those conditions are met, what common understanding about ABM Treaty restrictions on activity associated with advanced strategic defenses can be reached?”

Akhromeyev said he could not agree with what Nitze had just read. The Soviets had agreed with the U.S. to consider reducing strategic offensive arms by 50%. The Soviets needed assurances regarding the viability of the ABM Treaty. They had suggested a realistic agreement that for a 10-year period, neither side would exercise its right to abandon the Treaty, and that they would abide by all its provisions. All the work on space-based defenses would be banned except for that in laboratories. The U.S. must consider the link to 50% cuts in strategic offensive arms.

Nitze responded that what the U.S. had proposed would meet Soviet concerns and hopes. We understood that the Soviet Union thinks it is desirable to eliminate ballistic missiles. The U.S. had talked of a timeframe and common understandings.

Akhromeyev said the Soviets were skeptical. They did not believe the sides would share technology on space-based defenses and deployments. No reality backed up that offer. The U.S. was not even prepared now to share technology in elementary civilian areas, so it was unrealistic to say it would share technology on defenses. The Soviet view was that space-based ABM defenses should not be developed in the first place. The Soviet Union needed to have assurances on its security, as it was proposing.

Nitze said he had not referred to sharing the benefits of defense research. He could say that the circumstances would be quite different if the two sides were well on the road to eliminating ballistic missiles, rather than the situation of today where competition is virtually unlimited.

Akhromeyev declared that if strategic defenses are developed, all opportunity for offensive reductions would be lost, because the time would come when the Soviet Union would have to deploy additional systems. In Geneva and the SCC, the Soviets have tabled proposals for a complete prohibition. The U.S. did not agree but made its own proposal, which safeguards the Soviets to a degree against certain surprises.

Nitze said that, regarding instructions for Foreign Ministers, the two sides could just characterize their own proposals, but he thought the U.S. approach was more constructive.

Akhromeyev said there were two problems with the U.S. approach. One is that it was not binding. The second was that a territorial defense is prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Arbatov said the two sides must face the truth squarely in the face. The Soviets are looking for a way out. The President and Ambassador Nitze were speaking in favor of complying with the ABM Treaty. Both sides are looking for a way of signing a treaty for 50% reductions. Ambassador Nitze spoke of “synchronizing” and had some thoughts as well on the offense/defense linkage. There was talk of a degree of trust—such a degree that we could eliminate ballistic missiles while the U.S. built this space-based, very costly system. The Soviet Union was not trying to convert the U.S., but the Soviet Union has very firm positions, which have been voiced more than once, as in letters between the General Secretary and the President.

Nitze, commenting on Akhromeyev’s earlier remark that the U.S. proposal was not binding, noted that the working group was not dealing with obligations but rather with instructions to Foreign Ministers to find arrangements that would be mutually agreeable and binding.

Akhromeyev said that if the group told the Foreign Ministers there would be binding obligations on 50% reductions, the Soviets would need the same binding obligation towards the ABM Treaty. Thus, he asked the U.S. side to take into account the Soviet proposal and to give a positive reply.

Nitze noted that Arbatov had said that the Soviets were good pupils, that both sides were interested in the offense-defense relationship, and that the Soviet side had good proposals on this relationship. Nitze said both sides have known these issues for a long time. Nitze recalled Gerald Smith’s statement that a failure to achieve offensive reductions would be grounds for withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. was searching for greater security and stability. Nitze believed that what the U.S. was proposing would lead in that direction.

The Soviet side agrees that defenses are useful—a large percentage of the Soviet military budget is devoted to defenses. The Soviet side says that if all ballistic missiles are gone, defense would be a problem. That is not how the U.S. side sees it. Defenses would be a guarantee that a stable situation would continue. We are talking about synchronizing defense activities with the agreed goal of eliminating ballistic missiles. What is inherently wrong with what the U.S. is trying to work out?

Akhromeyev exclaimed, what can I say? It is true that the USSR has work going on regarding a ground-based ABM system permitted by the Treaty and is trying to perfect systems permitted in one area. The Soviet Union is not, however, trying to develop space-based systems prohibited by the Treaty. Such development, if carried out by the U.S., would be a violation of the Treaty.

Akhromeyev then repeated the Soviet position. The Soviet Union was trying to agree on 50% reductions, and more significant steps could follow toward eliminating nuclear weapons by the end of the century. The ABM Treaty involved an unlimited obligation. The Soviets agreed that there could be fundamental research, but this could not be carried outside the laboratories because it could lead to space-based systems.

Nitze reiterated that U.S. policy was wholly consistent with the ABM Treaty. So, in his third point, he had mentioned that we should seek common understandings on what is permitted. There was not a single thing that the Soviets wished to do that the U.S. was unprepared to discuss.

Akhromeyev said that, as to a ground-based ABM, it was all correct, including research on ground-based defenses based on other physical principles. However, the ABM Treaty prohibits testing and deployment of space-based systems. If the U.S. says it is not going to violate the ABM Treaty, what prohibits the U.S. from accepting the 10-year period as the Soviets had proposed?

Nitze answered that the U.S. is prepared to bridge differences between the sides as to the time the two sides could move to a jointly managed transition.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet position is based on elimination of systems, the elimination of which would make any deployment of space-based defenses unnecessary.

Ambassador Rowny said that defenses would be useful against such contingences as a break-out or the forces of third countries. Defense was always useful, even if you do not have offensive weapons.

Nitze commented that time was moving on and he wished to return to the subject of INF. He noted that both sides agree to pursue a global zero/zero solution, but if that is not agreed at this time, the sides would seek expeditious agreement on an interim INF agreement with equal ceilings on US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe, and an equal ceiling on US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads worldwide. However, there was no agreement on missiles in Asia. Resolution of this issue would have to be found on a priority basis.

Nitze then read the following points from a U.S. draft instructions paper:

“There will be limits and constraints on SRINF missiles to the current Soviet level, taking into account the capabilities of these systems and the need for a nuclear arms reduction agreement to reflect equality between the US and the Soviet Union.

“There will be specific verification measures which include: (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; (2) on-site observation of destruction down to agreed levels; and (3) effective monitoring of the remaining LRINF inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

“US and Soviet INF missile systems will remain subject to and constrained by this legally functioning treaty regime until the sides negotiate further reductions in these systems.”

Akhromeyev said the whole thing hinges on systems in Asia.

Nitze said he took it then that there were no serious problems with the things he had just said.

Akhromeyev answered that Nitze had highlighted the problem of Asia systems. Only the Asia problem hampers a solution. Either the leaders will arrive at an agreement today or the problem will remain in Geneva. The two sides had solved the problem of systems in Europe, but cannot solve the whole issue tonight because of the problem in Asia. He could not agree with what Nitze had said regarding the other issues, but he thought they would be resolvable if the Asia problem were worked out.

Nitze said that the working group experts could report in writing to leaders that “the sides recognize that what hampers a far-reaching solution is the treatment of LRINF missiles in Asia. They anticipate that leaders will address this issue today.”

Akhromeyev suggested the sides report that orally. The leaders will consider it, or the problem would remain to be solved in Geneva.

Nitze asked if the Soviet side had anything to say regarding Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers?

Akhromeyev asked, what about the Soviet proposals on the ABM Treaty?

Nitze answered there were two different positions.

Akhromeyev asked if the Soviets could have the U.S. position in writing? (Nitze then gave him a copy of the Defense and Space portion of the U.S. draft of instructions to Foreign Ministers). Akhromeyev commented that the working group had established that they have no agreement.

Karpov, turning to nuclear testing, said he did not understand why the U.S. did not accept the Soviet formula. The U.S. statement was complicated and ambiguous. The two sides should agree to start negotiations to eliminate nuclear testing, and these talks could deal with a wide range of issues.

Nitze disagreed with Karpov and said the U.S. text is clear. To do it the Soviet way would be to short-circuit the step-by-step approach the U.S. had laid out. Nitze then read aloud the U.S.-proposed text. After doing so, he told Karpov that the Soviets want to move the conclusion of the process to the beginning. The U.S. was not prepared to do that.

Akhromeyev said the two sides had to grab the bull by the horns. The Soviet Union had stopped testing for more than a year. If the U.S. were prepared to do likewise, it would be a great step forward.

Nitze stated the U.S. was not prepared to stop testing now, but only to start going down that road.

Akhromeyev said the Soviet Union was not asking the U.S. to stop testing now. It, too, sees a step-by-step approach. But it very clearly sees a complete ban as the objective. The working group should find language that would let each side come away with some necessary characterization of its position.

Nitze said our leaders understood the nature of the problem. Why shouldn’t the experts follow their lead? The U.S. is prepared to go for ending nuclear testing but only in the context of eliminating offensive weapons. That is a perfectly logical approach and we stand by it.

Akhromeyev repeated that the two sides could move to a complete ban on nuclear testing, starting off with the 1974 and 1976 treaties. The Soviet Union had tried to set the example by quitting nuclear testing for 18 months. It had agreed to start negotiations, but on what? On an end to testing.

Nitze reiterated that the U.S. was agreeing to this subject matter and to a step-by-step approach.

Akhromeyev said the working group had to report back to leaders, and asked about the anti-satellite (ASAT) issue. He proposed that the two sides agree to exert additional efforts to ban ASAT systems.

Nitze said no.

Akhromeyev said all right. The two sides would have to report back to leaders that there was a difference of view. Summarizing the night’s discussions, he said the two sides have agreement on significant reductions of strategic offensive arms and on specific ceilings, but they have completely different views on a prohibition of space-based arms, which makes it completely impossible to reduce strategic offensive arms. Unfortunately, he added, there was no agreement on other subjects.

Karpov noted that on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, the two sides had agreed to begin negotiations in late October or early November. These negotiations will be held. The two sides have a common view.

Akhromeyev said the delegations could say they had been working for 10 hours and 15 minutes, but had not produced any great results.

Nitze said he thought the other working group at Hofdi House had developed some language on NRRCs. He wanted to point out that, regarding nuclear testing, the U.S. was not in disagreement on the ultimate purpose and desirability of a complete ban on testing, nor did there appear to be disagreement over the first subject matter of negotiations. The disagreement is over characterization—the title—of the negotiations.

Akhromeyev said there should not be any illusions about deep differences of views.

Perle asked whether the Soviets felt they would rather not have agreement on nuclear testing because the U.S. could not characterize the talks as the Soviets wished?

Akhromeyev said any negotiation must have an agreed agenda and objective. Otherwise, it would just be discussions. The Soviets say that it is necessary to ban nuclear testing. The U.S. says continue nuclear testing. So the sides have deep differences.

Perle commented that a ban on nuclear testing was inherent in the negotiations the U.S. was suggesting.

Akhromeyev said all right, let’s call them Negotiations on a Complete Ban on Testing.

Perle answered that the negotiations would cover other subjects, not just a CTB. Do we or do we not agree to open negotiations?, he asked.

Karpov said that the experts delegations headed by Ambassador Petrosyants on the Soviet side, and Mr. Barker on the U.S. side, contain two objectives—seeking ways toward the complete elimination of nuclear testing, and seeking solutions to verification. The U.S. side now wants to separate them and just negotiate on verification. The Soviets cannot understand this step backwards.

Perle rejoined that the Barker-Petrosyants talks are expert level talks.

Akhromeyev said he could not understand why the U.S. agreed to the ultimate aim but not to negotiate on it. But, he suggested, it was time for the working group to conclude.

Nitze said he admired Marshal Akhromeyev’s stamina.

Akhromeyev said he could say the same thing about Nitze. He wanted to say that despite tough and complicated negotiations, the two sides had tried to sort out things, to understand each other. Unfortunately, the positions are too far apart, and the sides will have to think where they would arrive at if they stayed this far apart. He noted this was the first time he had taken part in such negotiations, and wanted to conclude by saying that we have to move our positions closer together.

The meeting concluded.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Binder—Bkgnd For Vienna Mtg. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Hofdi House.
2. Records of Shevardnadze’s September 19–20 meetings with Shultz in Washington can be found in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 283–285.
3. No minutes were found.
4. During this break, the American delegation met with Shultz in his hotel room. A transcription of Charles Hill’s notes of that conversation is printed below as Document 160.